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SUMMARY 
 
The thesis examines the place of allegory in the literature and intellectual culture of sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century England, especially in its complex and contested relationship to the 
notion of the period’s (early) modernity. What is modernity’s quarrel with allegory? Why 
does it run so deep in Western thought, and why has it remained with us to the present day? 
What specific forms does this quarrel assume in the literary culture of the period now 
commonly designated as “early modern”? Why has allegory, under its many names, remained 
a point of differentiation and dispute between various sets of ancients and moderns even into 
our – some would say “postmodern” – times? Even as scholarship on allegory grows 
increasingly comprehensive and sophisticated, commentary on these issues has remained 
sporadic and inconclusive, and the thesis seeks to provide a more focused and comprehensive 
examination of the subject than has thus far been available. 
 In terms of its format, the thesis pursues with these concerns through three chapters – 
on “Allegory and Poetics”, “Allegory and Drama”, and “Allegory and Epic” – preceded by an 
Introduction on “Allegory and Modernity”, and followed by an Afterword on “(Neo)allegory 
and (Anti)modernity”. The Introduction and Afterword discuss the broader questions raised 
by the allegory-modernity problem, and thus constitute a polemical frame for the three “case 
studies” on poetics, drama, and epic, which engage particular sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century texts and traditions. These range from such canonical staples as Sidney’s Defence of 
Poesy, Shakespeare’s Hamlet, or Milton’s Paradise Lost to numerous other, less well known, 
but no less important works. 
 In reconsidering the place of allegory in this corpus, the thesis is primarily intended as 
a contribution to English literary and intellectual history. On a broader level, it is also 
intended as a contribution to the more comprehensive project of “allegory studies”: the 
emergent nexus of interdisciplinary scholarship tackling those comprehensive and 
fundamental issues raised by the phenomenon of allegory which transcend particular 
discipline-, period-, or author-focused contexts. The thesis thus hopes to demonstrate the 
signal importance of the allegory-modernity problem in any advanced understanding of the 
Western allegorical tradition, at the same time as it sheds new light on what is in many ways 
the most important and most contested period – apart from our own, perhaps – in the history 
of this tradition. 
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CONVENTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
The citation format adopted in this thesis combines essential references in the footnotes with 
full entries in the Bibliography. Specifically, the references in the footnotes abbreviate titles, 
initialize first names, and omit translators and collaborators (except where required for 
identifying the work in the Bibliography), printers and publishers, and number of volumes for 
multi-volume works. 
 The following abbreviations are employed: 
 
CQ  The Classical Quarterly 
CW  The Works of John Milton. Gen. ed. Frank Allen Patterson. 18 vols with index. 
       New York: Columbia UP, 1931-1938. [Columbia Works] 
EETS  Early English Text Society  
ELN  English Language Notes 
ELR  English Literary Renaissance 
FR  The Fortnightly Review 
GM  The Gentleman’s Magazine 
HLQ  Huntington Library Quarterly 
JEGP  Journal of English and Germanic Philology 
JHI  Journal of the History of Ideas 
JMEMS The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 
MLN  Modern Language Notes 
MLR  Modern Language Review 
MP   Modern Philology 
MQ  Milton Quarterly 
MS  Milton Studies 
N&Q  Notes and Queries 
ODBN  Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
OED  Oxford English Dictionary 
OW  The Complete Works of John Milton. Gen. ed. Thomas Corns and Gordon  
       Campbell. 11 vols. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008–. [Oxford Works] 
PQ   Philological Quarterly 
REED  Records of Early English Drama 
RES  The Review of English Studies 
SP  Studies in Philology 
SQ  Shakespeare Quarterly 
SS  Shakespeare Survey 
UTQ  University of Toronto Quarterly 
YP  Complete Prose Works of John Milton. Gen. ed. Don M. Wolfe. 8 vols. New 
       Haven: Yale UP, 1953-82. [Yale Prose] 
INTRODUCTION 
ALLEGORY AND MODERNITY 
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I do not know with any certainty which of the two eminent parties to this 
dispute is right; I know that allegorical art seemed enchanting at one time (the 
labyrinthine Roman de la Rose, which lives on in two hundred manuscripts, 
consists of twenty-four thousand lines) and is now intolerable. And not only 
intolerable; we also feel it to be stupid and frivolous. Neither Dante, who 
represented the history of his passion in the Vita nuova, nor Boethius, the 
Roman, writing his De consolatione in the tower of Pavia under the shadow of 
the executioner’s sword, would have understood this feeling. How can this 
discord be explained without recourse to the petitio principii that tastes 
change?       – J. L. Borges, 1949
1
 
 
 
I 
 
The ensuing pages seek to revisit the question posed by Borges, the question to which there is 
still, more than sixty years later, no definite or even widely accepted answer. What is 
modernity’s quarrel with allegory? Why does it run so deep in Western thought, and why has 
it remained with us to the present day? Already for Plato, before the word allegory was even 
invented, it was “the ancients” who “used poetical forms which concealed from the majority 
of men their real meaning”, while “In more modern times, [...] men [...] plainly demonstrate 
their meaning so that even shoemakers may hear and assimilate their wisdom”.
2
 Yet long after 
Plato himself became an ancient, similar claims continued to be made, and allegory, under its 
many names, has remained a point of differentiation and dispute between various sets of 
ancients and moderns even into our – some would say postmodern – times. Why is this so? 
Obviously, tastes change, but why do they change? 
 More specifically, what particular configurations does the allegory-modernity nexus 
assume in the literature and intellectual culture of the period traditionally designated as 
                                                          
1
 J. L. Borges, “From Allegories to Novels” [1949], in Selected Non-Fictions, ed. E. Weinberger (New York, 
2000), 338. 
2
 Theaetetus, 180c-d, in Complete Works, ed. J. M. Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997); unless otherwise noted, all 
quotations from Plato are from this edition. 
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“Renaissance”, and more recently, “early modern”? Minor idiosyncrasies notwithstanding, 
Borges’ notion of the decline of allegory – of an epochal turn in Western aesthetics “from 
allegories to novels”, imagined as roughly coextensive with the passage from the so-called 
Middle Ages to the Renaissance or early modern period, and itself symptomatic of the 
period’s more fundamental, metaphysical breakthrough “from species to individual, from 
realism to nominalism”
3
 – is exemplary of the most influential and widely disseminated of 
such configurations. According to this view, the emergence and development of which is 
further discussed below, allegory rises to prominence in the decadent twilight of classical 
antiquity, thrives during the Middle Ages, and is cast away as the European mind reclaims its 
classical heritage, emerging, at long last, into that modernity which we still, irreversibly, 
inhabit.  
 To ask Borges’ question today is, however, to ask it in the light of an extensive and 
ever-increasing store of evidence of the inadequacy of this traditional view, and the essential 
continuity of the allegorical tradition from classical antiquity to at least the eighteenth 
century. In 1949, this evidence was still largely restricted to specialist studies unlikely to find 
their way into the hands of a general reader, even one as omnivorous as Borges, and the 
decline-of-allegory narrative reigned supreme. Yet to dispense with this narrative, as 
numerous scholars have now done, in no way absolves us from posing the question of 
allegory’s relationship to modernity; on the contrary, it demands that the question be posed in 
a more nuanced and insightful manner. Indeed, Borges’ question now itself becomes an object 
of metahistorical inquiry, and instead of asking why allegory thrived in the Middle Ages and 
then declined in the Renaissance, we need to ask why so many people were convinced that 
this was how it happened, and why they remained convinced for so long, and in the face of 
such abundant evidence to the contrary. 
 Here emerge the two principal aims of this study. The first and primary aim is to 
contribute to our understanding of the allegorical tradition in the English literature and 
intellectual culture of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. This is notably the case with the 
                                                          
3
 Borges, “Allegories”, 340. 
11 
 
three central chapters, and particularly Chapters 1 and 2, on poetics and drama, domains 
where allegory remains a relatively neglected and even controversial topic, and where many 
of the insights of modern allegory scholarship are yet to be fully acknowledged. Here, indeed, 
it is still necessary to demonstrate the simple fact of the presence and continuity of the 
allegorical tradition, before being able to proceed to more complex levels of analysis. At a 
broader level, however, the thesis is also intended as a contribution to the emerging field of 
allegory studies, and seeks not merely to disprove the decline-of-allegory framework in its 
classic form – indeed it proceeds throughout on the premise that this has, for the most part, 
already been accomplished – but also to understand it. Having outlived its scholarly 
usefulness, this framework has now itself become an episode in the history of the Western 
allegorical tradition, and the present study, in equal parts history and metahistory, hopes to 
shed light on its origins, development, and ongoing influence in literary and intellectual 
history.  
 The question, then, is no longer simply that of whether allegory is premodern, (early) 
modern, or postmodern, or whether this or that period in literary history is pro-, anti-, or neo-
allegorically inclined. It is rather a matter of carefully delineating what is at stake in these and 
other related questions, on what grounds they have been raised and answered, what they really 
mean, and why they continue to matter. That they do continue to matter is clear enough. If 
anything, recent decades have only seen them multiply, so that today we must also ask 
ourselves what it means to look at early modern allegory from a vantage point informed by, 
although not necessarily aligned with, the late twentieth-century “return of allegory”, 
pioneered by Walter Benjamin, continued by such figures as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul 
de Man, and subsequently widely disseminated in contemporary literary studies, art history, 
and other corners of the humanities. This attempt to reverse the previously dominant view of 
allegory as an outlived hermeneutic, literary and artistic practice is another key circumstance 
in which asking Borges’ question today differs drastically from asking it back in 1949, when 
Borges could still count on his readers to agree that “For all of us, allegory is an aesthetic 
12 
 
mistake”.
4
 The fact that such a statement can no longer be made adds a polemical urgency to 
any contemporary inquiry into the subject that would not have been there just a few decades 
ago, and probably puts us at an advantage, whatever our personal aesthetic preferences might 
be, over scholars to whom allegory was either something long dead and buried, or simply 
timeless and universal. 
 To summarize, in examining the role of allegory in the literature and intellectual 
culture of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England – especially in domains where the 
subject has been neglected, and especially with respect to its complex and contested relations 
to the notion of this period’s (early) modernity – the thesis is primarily intended as a 
contribution to English literary and intellectual history. It thus includes a series of detailed 
engagements and close readings of particular literary and non-literary texts of the stated 
period, including such canonical staples as Sidney’s Defence of Poesy, Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
or Milton’s Paradise Lost, but also numerous other works and traditions, less well known, but 
no less important in the present context. On a broader level, the thesis is also intended as a 
contribution to the more comprehensive project of allegory studies, understood as an 
emergent nexus of interdisciplinary scholarship aimed at tackling those comprehensive and 
fundamental issues raised by the phenomenon of allegory that transcend particular discipline-, 
period-, or author-focused contexts. These two interests are seen as complementary and 
indeed interdependent: only in this wider perspective can the specific features of the allegory-
modernity problem in the period under investigation here fully emerge into relief; conversely, 
only a close engagement with sixteenth- and seventeenth-century texts can provide us with 
reliable information on which to base our estimates of this period’s place in the broader 
movements of the Western allegorical tradition.  
 Above all, the thesis hopes to demonstrate the signal importance of the allegory-
modernity problem. Even as contemporary scholarship on allegory grows increasingly 
comprehensive and sophisticated, commentary on this particular issue, one of crucial 
importance to any advanced understanding of the Western allegorical tradition, has largely 
                                                          
4
 Ibid., 337. 
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remained sporadic, sketchy, and inconclusive. The thesis hopes to provide a more extensive 
and comprehensive investigation of this subject than has thus far been available, and one of 
additional interest for taking its point of departure in the most important and most contested 
period – apart from our own, perhaps – in the history of the allegorical tradition. In doing so, 
it hopes to facilitate and encourage further iterations of Borges’ old and perhaps ultimately 
unanswerable question, which remains one of the great riddles of literary and intellectual 
history. 
 
II 
 
As already mentioned, around the middle of the twentieth century the scholarship which 
challenged and ultimately overthrew the classic decline-of-allegory narrative was still 
confined to the specialist, and we cannot expect Borges and most non-specialist thinkers of 
his time to be familiar with the work of such scholars of the Renaissance mythological 
tradition as Don Cameron Allen, the studies emerging from the Warburg circle, or the 
pioneering studies of allegory in classical antiquity.
5
 On the other hand, many of the older 
works touching on the subject, or recent ones of a more general appeal, would have only 
confirmed Borges’ views. Significantly, the authorities he does cite – Schopenhauer, De 
Quincey, de Sanctis, Croce, Chesterton – are not, or are only in a lesser degree, scholars and 
literary historians, and the latest of the references dates from 1904. Thus a well educated non-
specialist could, in 1949, find an array of aesthetic and more broadly philosophical 
discussions of allegory, yet the best scholarship on the subject was probably out of their reach. 
Moreover, such scholarship was itself scarce, and even the specialists remained largely 
confined to their own and directly neighbouring fields. In an admittedly crude summary, it 
                                                          
5
 See D. C. Allen, “Symbolic Color in the Literature of the English Renaissance”, PQ (1936): 81-92, p. 81: 
“The indebtedness of the so-called Renaissance to the Middle Ages increases with every new investigation of 
their relationships; and one is often led to wonder if the term ‘Renaissance’ is not a misnomer and if one would 
not be right, if one referred to this period as ‘the later Middle Ages’”; J. Seznec, The Survival of the Pagan Gods 
[1940] (1953; repr. Princeton, 1995), 3: “As the Middle Ages and the Renaissance come to be better known, the 
traditional antithesis between them grows less marked.” On early studies of allegory in antiquity, see n. 11 
below.  
14 
 
could be said that philosophers realized the importance of a comprehensive investigation of 
the subject, but that their attempts at such an investigation lack a reliable scholarly basis, 
whereas the scholars had such a basis, yet lacked this broader purview. 
 All of that was to change, however, within just a few years of Borges’ essay, and by 
1966, Rosemond Tuve would be able to note that the “number of words spent defining and 
delimiting allegory in this decade could never have been foretold two generations ago”.
6
 The 
crucial development, however, was not merely quantitative, but qualitative. Traditionally, 
allegory had been, and remains, of interest primarily in art history, aesthetics, and literary 
studies, and also, in its interpretive aspect, in various domains of intellectual history, as well 
as theology and patristics. Within English literary studies, scholarship on the subject has 
concentrated in the medieval period (and, as the exception proving the rule, Spenser studies, 
due largely to the importance of The Faerie Queene as England’s most accomplished 
achievement in the genre of the Renaissance epic). Since the middle of twentieth century, 
however, and especially since Angus Fletcher’s seminal study, allegory has been increasingly 
recognized as a subject in its own right, informed by, but not limited to, the said disciplines 
and period- or author-specific contexts.
7
 So conceived, allegory studies have been gaining 
momentum, especially over the past two decades, which have, along with a steady stream of 
specialized studies, seen such publications as an Encyclopedia of Allegorical Literature, a 
Dictionary of Allegorical Meanings, a pioneering collaborative history of allegorical 
interpretation in the West, and most recently, comprehensive volumes in the New Critical 
Idiom and Cambridge Companions series.
8
 A growing number of scholars have been 
                                                          
6
 Allegorical Imagery (Princeton, 1966), 3. 
7
 See A. Fletcher, Allegory (1964; repr. Princeton, 2012). 
8
 See D. A. Leeming and K. M. Drowne, Encyclopedia of Allegorical Literature (Santa Barbara, 1996); H. D. 
Brumble, Classical Myths and Legends in the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Westport, 1998); Allegory and 
Interpretation, ed. J. Whitman (Leiden, 2000); J. Tambling, Allegory (London, 2010); The Cambridge 
Companion to Allegory, ed. R. Copeland and P. T. Struck (Cambridge, 2010). An invaluable survey of modern 
scholarship on allegory up to the 1990s, and especially allegorical interpretation, is found in Whitman’s Allegory 
and Interpretation, 3-70, 259-314. In addition to those already mentioned, general book-length studies, 
collection, and special issues – i.e., those focusing on more than one historical period, author, or work – which 
are omitted from or post-date Whitman’s survey include E. Douglass Leyburn, Satiric Allegory (New Haven, 
1956); L. Broussard, American Drama (Norman, 1962); J. MacQueen, Allegory (London, 1970); C. Gay, The 
Transformations of Allegory (London, 1974); Allegory and Representation, ed. S. J. Greenblatt (Baltimore, 
1981); Allegory, Myth, and Symbol, ed. M. W. Bloomfield (Cambridge, Mass., 1981); M. Warner, Monuments 
and Maidens (1985; repr. London, 1996); P. de Man, Allegories of Reading (New Haven, 1979); C. Van Dyke, 
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approaching allegory without disciplinary or chronological restrictions, and even the phrase 
“allegory studies” has already made a few appearances in the recent work on the subject, most 
notably Gordon Teskey’s Allegory and Violence, where we find an admirably lucid statement 
of the imperative of “open[ing] up the field of allegory studies by asking questions about what 
lies beneath the phenomenon under analysis”, and what “broader human problems motivate 
allegorical expression”.
9
 By all accounts, then, research on allegory is outgrowing traditional 
disciplinary models in favour of an interdisciplinary formation in its own right, and the 
present study draws on, and seeks to contribute to, this work. 
 The allegory-modernity problem is an exemplary instance of the need for such a 
widened perspective. Allegory is everything traditional scholarship says it is: a rhetorical 
figure, a mode of literary and artistic representation, and of religious as well as secular 
hermeneutics. It is, however, much more than that. The cluster of interrelated phenomena for 
which the term allegory has emerged as the most convenient short-hand is a protean cultural 
force which has left a deep imprint on the Western tradition, and whose full significance and 
impact are yet to be fully unravelled. How such a perspective illuminates the study of 
particular texts and periods will emerge repeatedly in the course of this study, but its single 
greatest significance lies in the sheer monolithic continuity of the allegorical tradition that it 
has brought to light. It is impossible to comprehend the broader relevance and dynamics of 
the allegory-modernity nexus, and the critical place of the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
in any attempt to come to terms with it, without taking into account the two millennia of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The Fiction of Truth (Ithaca, 1985); J. Whitman, Allegory (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); Enlightening Allegory, ed. 
K. L. Cope (New York, 1993); D. L. Madsen, Rereading Allegory (New York, 1994); D. L. Madsen, Allegory in 
America (Basingstoke, 1995); G. Teskey, Allegory and Violence (Ithaca, 1996); T. M. Kelley, Reinventing 
Allegory (Cambridge, 1997); S. N. Greenfield, The Ends of Allegory (Newark, 1998); S. Brittan, Poetry, Symbol, 
and Allegory (Charlottesville, 2003); Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition, ed. G. R. Boys-Stones 
(Oxford, 2003);  J. K. Brown, The Persistence of Allegory (Philadelphia, 2007); J. H. Anderson, Reading the 
Allegorical Intertext (New York, 2008); J. E. Petrolle, Religion without Belief (Albany, 2008); Thinking Allegory 
Otherwise, ed. B. Machosky (Stanford, 2010); “Cognitive Allegory”, Metaphor and Symbol 26 (2011), ed. R. A. 
Harris and S. Tolmie; G. Johnson, The Vitality of Allegory (Columbus, 2012); Allegorical Quests, ed. M. 
Nievergelt (Woodbridge, 2012); K. Kerr-Koch, Romancing Fascism (New York, 2013); B. Machosky, 
Structures of Appearing (New York, 2013). 
9
 Teskey, Allegory, xii. In addition to works referenced here and elsewhere in the thesis, my views are also 
greatly indebted to the experience of organizing and participating in the conference Allegory Studies?, which 
sought to explore and promote such an approach to allegory scholarship. The conference took place at the 
University of Warwick on 7 November 2013, bringing together delegates from a number of British universities, 
as well as Israel, the United States, and Switzerland, and from a wide array of disciplines and specializations (art 
history, classics, psychology, philosophy, literary theory, and various periods in literary studies). 
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essentially unbroken, although not uncontested, allegorical tradition in the West. Specifically, 
it is impossible to comprehend the radical nature of the anti-allegorical aesthetic that Borges 
could still take for granted as a common cultural possession of the mid-twentieth-century man 
of letters, or how radical in turn, and for that very fact, is the rehabilitation of allegory that has 
taken place since. 
 Coextensive with Western civilization itself, the allegorical tradition begins already 
with some of the earliest known interpreters of Homeric epic and other mythological poetry of 
archaic Greece, shadowy sixth-century figures like Pherecydes of Syros or Theagenes of 
Rhegium.
10
 Europe’s oldest surviving manuscript of intellectual relevance records an 
allegorical exposition of a mythological poem by an unidentified interpreter from the fifth 
                                                          
10
 One of the most important developments in modern allegory studies has been the revolution in the 
scholarship on the subject in the classical period, including the appearance of translations of many of the key 
primary sources. Early work includes a dissertation by A. Bates Hersman, Studies in Greek Allegorical 
Interpretation (Chicago, 1906); a series of articles by J. Tate – “The Beginnings of Greek Allegory”, The 
Classical Review 41 (1927): 214-15; “Cornutus and the Poets”, CQ 23 (1929): 41-5; “Plato and Allegorical 
Interpretation”, CQ 23 (1929): 142-54, 24 (1930): 1-10; “On the History of Allegorism”, CQ 28 (1934): 105-14; 
and in the 1950s, book-length studies by F. Buffière, Les mythes d’Homère et la pensée grecque (Paris, 1956), 
and J. Pépin, Mythe et allégorie (Paris, 1958). Until very recently, however, this work had failed to make a larger 
impact, and classical studies were dominated by their own variant of the decline-of-allegory narrative, seen most 
graphically in the complete absence of the allegorists from such major histories and anthologies of ancient 
literary criticism as The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, ed. G. Kennedy (Cambridge, 1989), Classical 
Literary Criticism, ed. P. Murray (1965; repr. London, 2004), or Ancient Literary Criticism, ed. D. A. Russell 
and M. Winterbottom (Oxford, 1972). The tradition is also neglected in general histories of literary criticism (see 
below, ch. 2, n. 29). This bias has now been criticized by A. Ford, The Origins of Criticism (Princeton, 2002), 
81-5, and more cogently, P. T. Struck, The Birth of the Symbol (Princeton, 2004), 1-20, who explicitly challenges 
the “view expressed among some scholars that allegorism is rare in the extant evidence, outside the main 
currents of ancient reading, and generally concentrated in the later periods. For reasons that are not at all clear to 
me, for example, Tate, who did the most important work on the allegorists early in the last century, assures us 
that allegory was ‘never, it be noted, popular among the Greeks’” (17). The reason, surely, is precisely the same 
as in the case of the decline-of-allegory narrative applied to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Indeed, these 
are really two sides of the same narrative, both bent on quarantining allegory to the interim of the Middle Ages, 
so that an allegory-free antiquity can be reborn in an allegory-free Renaissance. The view of ancient allegory as 
rare, late, or unpopular is, however, untenable: “At least half a dozen major allegorical tracts survive [...], 
roughly equivalent to the number of major tracts that survive from the rhetorical tradition of reading, and 
allegorical commentary is as well represented in the scholia as other kinds. [...] Considering time distribution, a 
large group of allegorical works survives from the early and late Roman periods – but this is not much different 
from the distribution of tracts of rhetorical criticism. [...] we have indication enough that allegoresis forms a 
more or less continuous strand of literary thinking through the classical, Hellenistic, and early- and late-Roman 
periods” (ibid., 17-18). Struck also comments perceptively on the broader significance of integrating the ancient 
allegorists into the broader purview of the history of literary criticism: “Without reckoning the ancient 
developments of allegory within the context of literary criticism more generally, it becomes impossible to 
discern the history that runs from ancient to modern symbol theories” (13). Even in recent publications, however, 
we are still more likely to read that “allegorism properly speaking [...] was a product of the early Roman Empire 
and became a clearly defined activity only in the context of the culture wars between the polytheist tradition and 
the monotheists [...] – that is, from the 1st century CE to the 6th”; R. Lamberton, “Allegory”, in The Classical 
Tradition, ed. A. Grafton, G. W. Most, and S. Settis (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 34-5. 
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century BC.
11
 This predates by some centuries the first recorded instance of the word allegory 
itself, but what early Greek commentators variously refer to as “riddles” (ainigmata), 
“speaking in riddles” (ainittesthai), “under-meanings” (huponoiai), or “symbols” (sumbola) is 
more or less synonymous with what would by Plutarch’s time be most commonly known as 
allegoria.
12
 Personified abstractions in Greek literature and art also appear at a very early 
date.
13
 Eventually allegorical art and hermeneutics pass into the Christian tradition, where, 
beginning with Prudentius’ Psychomachia in the late fourth century AD, the mode of literary 
composition based entirely or predominantly on personified abstractions also emerges. The 
tradition thrives, in both its compositional and hermeneutic aspects, throughout the span of 
European history usually divided into the “Middle Ages” and the “Renaissance” or “early 
modern” period. 
 When exactly the tradition loosed its grip on Western culture remains a matter of 
debate, as do the very criteria to be employed in this debate. As might be expected, in 
resisting the old decline-of-allegory narrative some scholars have pushed the opposite, 
persistence-of-allegory thesis to an equally unacceptable extreme, positing its survival even 
beyond the point – the later eighteenth century or so – where anti-allegorical aesthetics 
appears in explicit and increasingly influential form.
14
 Where the older view of the allegory-
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 This is the so-called Derveni Papyrus, uncovered during archaeological excavations in northern Greece in 
1962, and the subject of ongoing study and debate. The authoritative edition is The Derveni Papyrus, ed. T. 
Kouremenos, G. M. Parássoglou, and K. Tsantsanoglou (Florence, 2006); see also Studies on the Derveni 
Papyrus, ed. A. Laks and G. W. Most (Oxford, 1997); G. Betegh, The Derveni Papyrus (Cambridge, 2004). 
12
 The term breaks down etymologically into allos, “other”, and agoreuein, “to speak in the agora”, the 
public assembly as well as the open market of the Greek city state, with “the resulting composite connot[ing] 
both that which was said in secret, and that which was unworthy of the crowd” (Whitman, Allegory, 263). 
“These two connotations”, Whitman elaborates, “of the word ‘allegory’ – guarded language and elite language – 
became explicit parts of allegorical theory and practice. The sense of secretive, guarded language had special 
importance for political allegory, in which the allegorist spoke, as it were, other than in the official assembly. 
The sense of elite, superior language had particular point in religious and philosophic contexts, in which the 
allegorist spoke other than in the common market place.” A substantial part of the current enthusiasm for the 
term allegory would seem to derive from the fact that its etymological meaning is often given simply as “other-
speaking”, which resonates suggestively with the various uses in contemporary philosophy and literary theory of 
the notion of the “other”, but ignores these additional connotations of agoreuein. 
13
 See H. A. Shapiro, Personifications in Greek Art (Kilchberg, 1993). The earliest literary instances are 
found in the Iliad, although Shapiro acknowledges the “very curious” absence of personifications from the 
Odyssey, and the fact that most of those in the Iliad appear in passages that have been suspected as later 
interpolations (23-4). The earliest instances in art are said to date to the sixth century. 
14
 A notable case in point is Brown’s Persistence of Allegory, a study with a commendably comprehensive 
agenda, and not without numerous valuable insights, yet whose central thesis is maintained only at the expense 
of severe concessions as to what counts as “persistence”, and what one means by “allegory”. Thus Brown writes 
that “personification allegory persisted in painting into the eighteenth century, and even as an archaism in public 
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modernity dynamic was heavily distorted, this other extreme is even more problematic, for 
here this dynamic is ignored altogether. It would also be possible to rewrite the history of the 
Western allegorical tradition as a gigantomachy, an age-long struggle between competing pro- 
and anti-allegorical tendencies present in any given historical period: Plato vs. Aristotle, 
Alexandria vs. Antioch, Typical Medieval Exegete vs. Nicholas of Lyra, Catholicism vs. 
Protestantism, and so forth. Yet while it is important to acknowledge that the allegorical 
tradition was is no period entirely uncontested, it is equally important to acknowledge that in 
the case of all these contestations until the eighteenth century and the Romantics, the 
allegorical tradition invariably retained the dominant position. The fate of Aristotle’s Poetics 
is instructive: the one surviving ancient treatise on poetry to omit any recourse to allegory – 
which, given the prevalence of allegorical poetics in Aristotle’s day, is more than a simple 
omission, and must be interpreted as a conscious rejection of this poetics – is also the one 
which ended up being all but lost to the world for almost two thousand years, and even when 
“rediscovered” at the end of the fifteenth century, remained subject to radical 
misinterpretation for a long time to come, and was widely conflated with doctrines, including 
allegory, with which it is now perceived to be utterly incompatible.
15
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
art of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The persistence of comparable representation in drama is the thesis 
of this study” (1). But this is more fitly described as the decline or afterlife of allegory than its persistence as a 
vital artistic and hermeneutic doctrine: “in the natural inertia of things, rhetorics of representation, like other 
cultural practices, persist – often in the popular arena – long after they cease to be current and have lost their 
original meaning” (2). Such a catch-all approach is further facilitated by a dubious definition of the terms 
allegory and mimesis: “Treating allegory and mimesis as a dyad is intended to neutralize their instability: where 
their precise meaning is unclear they can still be understood in terms of their mutual difference. Mimesis is 
‘realistic,’ it ‘imitates’ what is natural and materially real. Allegory, by contrast, represents something other than 
what it appears to claim (from the Greek ‘allos’ = other). In mimetic representation one knows what one is 
looking at, assuming one can recognize the outlines, so to speak, but in allegory either the name or the 
ontological level must always be changed. By allegory I understand, basically, a mode of representation which 
renders the supernatural visible, by mimesis a mode which imitates the natural, what is already visible” (5). 
15
 Two places in the Poetics are of particular importance in this respect. The first is ch. 25, responding to the 
established, by Aristotle’s time, genre of Homeric “problems” or “questions”, and thus precisely the section in 
which we would expect to find an appeal to allegory. Instead, we find the unprecedented claim that “there is not 
the same kind of correctness in poetry as in politics, or indeed any other art” – a claim which wholly obviates the 
need for, indeed denies the validity of, the allegorical approach; Aristotle, Poetics, 60b14-15, in The Complete 
Works, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton, 1989); unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Aristotle are from this 
edition. If ch. 25 is a condensed summary of the argument pursued at length in the lost Homeric Problems – as 
argued, among others, by S. Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics (1986; repr. Chicago, 1998), 265-6 et passim – then 
this work must have contained a more explicit confrontation with the allegorists. The other element is Aristotle’s 
censure of the “riddle” or “enigma” (ainigma) at 58a24-30: this occurs in the discussion of figurative language 
rather than hermeneutics, but given the prevalence of ainigma and its cognates in the “allegorical” tradition at 
this period – on which see Ford, Origins, 74, and Struck, Birth, 3, n. 1 – another quiet dismissal of that tradition 
may reasonably be inferred. On the conflation of the “rediscovered” Poetics with doctrines now recognized as 
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 It would thus be the gravest of errors to underestimate the radical – indeed, for all we 
know today, possibly unique – nature of the period between c. 1750 and 1950. Anti-
allegorical sentiment will be found in any age, but this is the only period in Western history in 
which this sentiment is dominant, and where allegory is not merely dethroned, but is demoted 
to the lowest possible status, or even banished entirely from the domain of serious art and 
imaginative literature. Linguistic and terminological barriers aside, a time-traveller from the 
sixteenth century would have an easier time coming to an understanding on this subject with 
Theagenes of Rhegium than with Hegel. Conversely, it is no surprise to find a major precursor 
of modern aesthetics like Francis Bacon so profoundly isolated in his own age as to wonder 
whether what he is thinking “would occur to anyone again in the future”.
16
 Therefore, in 
speculating on the history of allegory in its broadest dimensions, both traps are to be avoided: 
the old trap of having allegory sharply decline at the close of the so-called Middle Ages, and 
the new trap of naively extending its persistence even beyond 1750 or thereabout. The recent 
rehabilitation of the term is itself a confirmation of this claim, for had allegory simply 
persisted throughout 1750-1950 there would be nothing to rehabilitate. 
 The peculiarity of our moment in time, then, as opposed to Borges’ in 1949, is that to 
us aesthetic modernity can begin to seem as something which has ended – and indeed this is 
what many claim had happened, and what the advent of the notions of postmodernity and 
postmodernism attempts to canonize – whereas to Borges it probably seemed not only as still 
lasting, but as something that could never end. The implications of this “forgetting of 
modernism” – either ominous or auspicious, depending on where one stands – are yet to be 
unravelled, and their importance in the study of the allegorical tradition cannot be 
overemphasized. Nor can the imperative of a comprehensive, interdisciplinary approach. 
Students of modern literature cannot fully understand their subject – cannot understand the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
un-Aristotelian, see M. T. Herrick, The Fusion of Horatian and Aristotelian Literary Criticism (Urbana, 1946); 
B. Weinberg, “From Aristotle to Pseudo-Aristotle”, Comparative Literature 5 (1953): 97-104; and more 
elaborately Weinberg’s History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago, 1961). The problem 
with Weinberg’s and most other work on this subject is that allegory is either ignored or treated inconsistently, as 
a side-interest, so that an investigation specifically into this issue remains a desideratum; see n. 32 below and ch. 
1, p. 107. 
16
 The New Organon, ed. L. Jardine and M. Silverthorne (Cambridge, 2000), 3-4. See further on Bacon 
below, ch. 1, pp. 110-31. 
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immense significance of their subject – without familiarizing themselves with the dominance 
of allegorical poetics from antiquity to c. 1750. In turn, students of the earlier periods need to 
look ahead and face up to the extraordinary fact that what had been a key doctrine of Western 
aesthetics for over two millennia was in less than two centuries proclaimed to be the very 
debasement and antithesis of art. 
 Only then will we be able, if nothing else, to at least summon the appropriate level of 
wonder at, say, that freezing night in December 1913, when a nineteen-year-old philology 
student rose from his table in a fashionable Saint Petersburg cabaret, emptied his glass, 
walked over to the podium, and intoned: 
The creation of words is man’s most ancient form of poetic creation. Today, 
words are dead, and language resembles a cemetery, whereas the word that had 
just come into being was imaginal and full of life. Every word is in its basis a 
trope. [...] And often, when one succeeds in reaching the image that had 
formed the basis of the word but that has been lost, obliterated, one is amazed 
at its beauty, a beauty that once was but is no more. 
Or if not those very words, then certainly something to that effect, for the piece, entitled “The 
Place of Futurism in the History of Language”, formed the basis for Viktor Shklovsky’s 1914 
manifesto entitled The Resurrection of the Word, of which the above are the opening 
sentences.
17
 Nothing less was the new poet’s aim, and it could not have been a more urgent 
one, for the death of the word entailed the death of the world, and only in the resurrected word 
could life be saved from the all-devouring plague of “automatization”. But this required a 
very different kind of poetry, a poetry which was not about something, but which was that 
thing – and which thus, at least in theory, finds itself at the farthest imaginable remove from 
any allegorical poetics, ancient or modern.
18
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 V. Shklovsky, The Resurrection of the Word, in Russian Formalism, ed. S. Bann and J. E. Bowlt 
(Edinburgh, 1973), 41. On the Stray Dog performance see K. Clark, Petersburg (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 32. 
18
 For an insightful discussion of this “Orphic” poetics, see G. Bruns, Modern Poetry and the Idea of 
Language (1974; repr. Urbana-Champaign, 2001). 
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 Of course the novelty should not be exaggerated, and in fact the phenomenon only 
gains in interest if it is traced back to the Romantics.
19
 As somebody must have already 
noticed, Shklovsky seems to be almost paraphrasing Emerson’s 1844 essay “The Poet”:  
The poets made all the words, and therefore language is the archives of history, and, if 
we must say, a sort of tomb for the muses. For though the origin of most of our words 
is forgotten, each word was at first a stroke of genius, and obtained currency because 
for the moment it symbolized the world to the first speaker and to the hearer. The 
etymologist finds the deadest word to have been once a brilliant picture. Language is 
fossil poetry. [...] language is made up of images or tropes, which now, in their 
secondary use, have long ceased to remind us of their poetic origin.
20
 
Fully established with the early Romantics and omnipresent by Emerson’s day, the sentiment 
reached its most complete and radical realization in the modernist avant-garde of the early 
twentieth century. In some cases, lines of influence can be traced. Remarkably, however, most 
of the resurrectors of the word seem to have sprung up independently of each other. Half a 
century after Shklovsky’s youthful pamphlet, with which he was almost certainly not familiar, 
Borges employs the exact same expression, in almost exactly the same sense, when a book is 
said to be a “set of dead symbols” until “the right reader comes along, and the words – or 
rather the poetry behind the words, for the words themselves are mere symbols – spring to 
life, and we have a resurrection of the word.”
21
 “WORDS DIE”, urged Aleksei Kruchenykh in 
another 1910s manifesto, yet “THE WORLD IS ETERNALLY YOUNG. The artist has seen 
the world in a new way and, like Adam, proceeds to give things his own names.”
22
 “Scattered 
in scattered capitals”, Borges would write in 1969, “Solitary and many/ We played at being 
Adam/ Who first gave names to things”.
23
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 Although Shklovsky’s more immediate debts may be to Russian philologists and critics such as Potebnia 
and Veselovsky: see S. Cassedy, Flight from Eden (Berkeley, 1990), 57-63. 
20
 Emerson’s Literary Criticism, ed. E. W. Carlson (Lincoln, 1995), 34. Also compare Emerson’s description 
of language as “fossil poetry” to Shklovsky’s claim that “Not only words and epithets fossilize, whole situations 
can fossilize too” (Resurrection, 43). 
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 J. L. Borges, This Craft of Verse, ed. C.-A. Mihăilescu (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), 4. 
22
 A. Kruchenykh, “Declaration of the Word as Such” [1913], in Words in Revolution, ed. A. Lawton and H. 
Eagle (Washington, 2004), 67-68. 
23
 J. L. Borges, “Invocation to Joyce”, in Selected Poems, ed. A. Coleman (New York, 2000), 287. Examples 
could be multiplied indefinitely; for a perhaps less expected one, here is Heidegger in the 1935 lectures 
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 This, in the crudest outlines, is the background against which Borges is able to say that 
“For all of us, allegory is an aesthetic mistake”. It cannot be otherwise, not once the notion of 
aesthetic autonomy is driven to its final consequences, not once “absolute artistic 
representation” is defined as that in which “the universal is wholly the particular, and the 
particular is at the same time wholly the universal, and does not simply mean it”, and where 
“Meaning [...] is simultaneously being itself, passed over into the object itself and one with 
it”.
24
 This is why at the summit of modernist poetics we find a total negation of the 
hermeneutic impulse – as when Eliot writes that “Qua work of art, a work of art cannot be 
interpreted; there is nothing to interpret” – coupled with those seemingly paradoxical 
demands, which the too well known “Ars Poetica” of the otherwise largely forgotten 
Archibald MacLeish so perfectly exemplifies, for poems to be “wordless” (like music), 
“palpable and mute” (like sculptures), “motionless in time” (like paintings), and ultimately, to 
“not mean/ But be”.
25
 
 
III 
 
It might seem as if all this has little to do with our histories of Renaissance literature, and the 
decline-of-allegory narrative which these have traditionally reproduced. In fact, however, the 
connection could not be closer, as this narrative is nothing other than a projection of modern 
anti-allegorism onto the historical plane. The Borges who played at being Adam is the same 
Borges who writes, towards the end of his essay on allegory, that 
The passage from allegory to novel, from species to individual, from realism to 
nominalism, required several centuries, but I shall have the temerity to suggest an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
published as Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven, 2000): “we seek to win back the naming force of 
language and words; for words and language are not just shells into which things are packed for spoken and 
written intercourse. In the word, in language, things first come to be and are. For this reason, too, the misuse of 
language in mere idle talk, in slogans and phrases, destroys our genuine relation to things”; the poet “always 
speaks as if beings were addressed and expressed for the first time. In the poetry of the poet and in the thinking 
of the thinker, there is always so much world-space to spare that each and every thing – a tree, a mountain, a 
house, the call of a bird – completely loses its indifference and familiarity” (15-28). 
24
 F. W. J. Schelling, The Philosophy of Art [1859], ed. D. W. Stott (Minneapolis, 1989), 49. 
25
 T. S. Eliot, “Hamlet and His Problems” [1919], in The Sacred Wood (London, 1920), 88; A. MacLeish, 
Poems (Boston, 1933), 122-3. 
23 
 
ideal date: the day in 1382 when Geoffrey Chaucer, who may not have believed 
himself to be a nominalist, set out to translate into English a line by Boccaccio – “E 
con gli occulti ferri i Tradimenti” (And Betrayal with hidden weapons) – and repeated 
it as “The smyler with the knyf under the cloke.” The original is in the seventh book of 
the Teseide; the English version, in “The Knightes Tale.”
26
 
This is slightly unorthodox in that the proposed date is earlier than most similar accounts 
would have it, and that Chaucer is of course “medieval”, even when imitating his invariably 
“Renaissance” Italian contemporary. But then 1382 is late enough, and Chaucer’s visits to 
Italy and familiarity with Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio is exceptional and precociously 
proto-“Renaissance” in the English context – indeed, Chaucer’s place in literary history would 
be very different were it not for the incidental circumstance that his language, unlike that of 
his Italian contemporaries, became obsolete less than a century after his death.
27
 Be that as it 
may, the central premises of this historiographical topos or myth, as it is perhaps best 
described, are fully present: whenever modern literature begins, that is where allegory ends, 
and 1382 is not too distant from the dates more commonly given for the end of the so-called 
Middle Ages. 
 More typical statements are easily found, for instance by Borges’ disciple Umberto 
Eco, assuring us that allegory “is perhaps [the] most typical aspect” of the “medieval aesthetic 
sensibility”, “the one which characterises the period above all others and which we tend to 
look upon as uniquely medieval”.
28
 Many further examples will crop up in the following 
pages, many more could be submitted, and at any rate, what is controversial is neither the 
existence of the myth, nor the fact that it represents the most important and lastingly 
influential approach to the allegory-modernity problem, nor that it is invalidated by the best 
recent scholarship on the subject. What is at stake is its origin and rationale: how, when, and 
above all, why did this myth come into being? The so-called Middle Ages were certainly an 
age of allegory, but when did it become customary to think of this period as the age of 
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 Cf. B. Boyd, “Whatever Happened to Chaucer’s Renaissance?”, Fifteenth Century Studies 1 (1978): 15-21. 
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 U. Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages [1959] (New Haven, 1986), 52. 
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allegory? Taking, then, the above premises as granted – that there is a myth of the Middle 
Ages as the age of allegory, that it is a powerful myth, and that it is, in fact, a myth – in this 
section I wish to briefly delineate its origins, development, and effect on (primarily English) 
literary historiography. 
To begin to with the question of when, there are several stages of development to be 
discerned. There is, first of all, the matter of the very notion of the “Middle Ages”, and more 
specifically, of when this notion first makes itself felt in literary-historical contexts.
29
 In 
England we may safely take this to occur by the early seventeenth century, when we find both 
the notion and the term itself present in William Camden’s 1605 Remains... Concerning 
Britaine, which contains the first historical account of English authors earlier than Chaucer.
30
 
At least from this point onward, the “Middle Ages” are a working concept in English literary 
history, regardless of how they are called, whether they are viewed positively or negatively, 
when they are believed to begin and end, and what exactly their defining features are 
presumed to be, all of which remains debatable for a long time to come. 
At the same time, there is a rising sense of allegory as an outdated literary mode, 
belonging to a past literary epoch. Crucially, however, this past epoch is not identified with 
the Middle Ages. Things are well underway by 1695, when, for example, Richard Blackmore 
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 There would seem to be a consensus that the concept of the middle age(s) – although not the term itself – 
originates with Petrarch in the fourteenth, continues to develop in various formulations over the fifteenth and the 
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was intimately dependent on the discovery of the Middle Ages”, adding that “the Renaissance did not achieve a 
separate identity until the medieval period had been given historical substance” (Myth, 59). This is perfectly true, 
but the fact that Bullen found it “unexpected” as late as 1994 is illustrative of the need for a unified history of 
what are, both logically and empirically, interrelated, mutually defining concepts. 
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 Between antiquity and “this our learned age”, writes Camden, is interposed a “middle age, which was so 
ouercast with darke clouds, or rather thicke fogges of ignorance, that euery little sparke of liberal learning 
seemed wonderfull”; W. Camden, Remaines of a Greater Worke, Concerning Britaine (London, 1605), a1r-v, 
separately paginated. Camden includes early Celtic and Anglo-Saxon poetry, which he believes to be wholly 
lost, in the ancient rather than the medieval period. For a discussion of the formation of the pre-Chaucerian 
canon, see R. Terry, Poetry and the Making of the English Literary Past (Oxford, 2001), ch. 4. 
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finds the earlier allegorical epics of Ariosto and Spenser to be “so wild, unnatural, and 
extravagant, as greatly displease the reader. This way of writing mightily offends in this Age; 
and ’tis a wonder how it came to please in any”.
31
 Blackmore, as we see, does not identify 
himself against the Middle Ages but against Ariosto and Spenser, and furthermore, the reason 
does not reside in allegory as such, but only a particular, outmoded style of allegorical writing 
– after all, the statement comes from the preface to Blackmore’s own Arthurian allegorical 
epic, in which allegory is explicitly required as an essential property of the genre.
32
 Yet 
Blackmore’s is one of the last voices in this tradition. A year earlier, Addison had already 
expressed his disaffection with the manner of “Old Spencer” with an even stronger sense of 
historical distance: 
 now the Mystick Tale, that pleas’d of Yore, 
Can Charm an understanding Age no more; 
The long-spun Allegories fulsom grow, 
While the dull Moral lies too plain below.
33
 
While this still nominally relates to Spenser and his age, “yet uncultivate and Rude”, it is clear 
that allegory as such is becoming a problem, and two decades later Addison includes it, 
without such mitigating qualifications, among “antiquated ways of Writing, which [...] had 
been laid aside, and forgotten for some Ages”.
34
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 The epic poem is defined as “a feign’d or devis’d Story of an Illustrious Action, related in Verse, in an 
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following Le Bossu’s treatise, the English translation of which appeared in the same year: “The EPOPEA is a 
Discourse invented by Art, to form the Manners by such Instructions as are disguis’d under the Allegories of 
some one important Action, which is related in Verse, after a probable, diverting, and surprising Manner”; R. Le 
Bossu, A. Dacier, and B. Le Bovier de Fontenelle, Monsieur Bossv’s Treatise of the Epick Poem... An Essay 
upon Satyr, by Monsieur D’Acier; and A Treatise upon Pastorals, by Monsieur Fontanelle (London, 1695), B3v. 
Le Bossu also affords a particularly explicit example of the conflation of allegorical poetics with Aristotle’s 
notion of “the universal”: “in the Epopea, according to Aristotle, let the Names be what they will, yet the 
Persons and the Actions are Feign’d, Allegorical, and Vniversal; not Historical and Singular” (B2v). 
33
 “An Account of the Greatest English Poets”, in The Annual Miscellany: for the Year 1694 (London, 1694), 
X7r-Y4r. 
34
 The context of this statement is interesting. It comes from the introduction to Addison’s own sketch for an 
allegorical dispute in imitation of Spenser in The Guardian 152 (4 Sep 1713), on the fashionable topic of “the 
comparative Perfections and Pre-eminence of the two Sexes”: “I have also”, he writes, “by this means revived 
several antiquated ways of Writing, which though very instructive and entertaining, had been laid aside, and 
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 A further development is found in the seminal work of Thomas Warton. Indeed, it is a 
matter of considerable interest that the origins of the first proper history of English literature 
are inextricably bound with Warton’s inquiries specifically into the history of allegorical 
poetry in England. It has been shown that he was working on such a history already in the 
early 1750s, and one of his notebooks even contains what appears to be a prospective title: 
“The Rise & Progress of Allegoric Poetry in England ’till it’s Consummation in Spenser; & 
it’s Decline after him”.
35
 This is consistent with related statements in Warton’s published 
works, according to which the English tradition of allegorical poetry begins in the Middle 
Ages, culminates with Spenser, and only then enters a phase of decline, expiring at some 
indefinite point between the later seventeenth century and Warton’s day, by which time it 
“appears to have been for some time almost totally extinguished in England”.
36
 In Warton’s 
History of English Poetry this view is not merely retained but is enriched by a classical 
background: in the last paragraph of the first volume, Warton comments on the “remarkable” 
circumstance that “allegorical personages” abound in ancient Greek and Roman poetry, citing 
instances in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, Ennius, and Lucretius.
37
 To Warton, then, the 
allegorical tradition extends all the way from Homer to Spenser, and beyond, and it is in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
forgotten for some Ages. I shall in this place only mention those Allegories wherein Virtues, Vices and human 
passions are introduced as real Actors. Though this kind of composition was practiced by the finest Authors 
among the Ancients, our Countryman Spencer is the last Writer of Note who has applied himself to it with 
Success.” It is abundantly clear, however, that the imitation falls far short of the original. Addison claims that he 
was “once thinking to have written a whole Canto in the Spirit of Spencer”, yet finding “not time to accomplish 
this Work”, he is presenting his readers with “the naked Fable, reserving the Embellishments of Verse and 
Poetry to another Opportunity”. But the opportunity would never arise, and not because of a lack of time, but 
because allegory, having lost its ancient seat at the summit of Parnassus, had begun its long retreat to the regions 
of topical polemics, satire, and didactic or children’s literature. Another of Addison’s allegorical vignettes, in 
The Spectator 3 (3 March 1711), is on an even more disposably topical subject: “the Decay of Publick Credit, 
with the Methods of restoring it”, starring Public Credit herself as “a beautiful Virgin seated on a Throne of 
Gold”. 
35
 See D. Fairer, “The Origins of Warton’s History of English Poetry”, RES, n.s., 32 (1981): 37-63, p. 51. 
36
 T. Warton, The History of English Poetry (London, 1774-1806?), 2: 257. Cf. the digression on the history 
of allegorical poetry in Warton’s Observations on the Faerie Queene (London, 1754), Hh2v : “After the 
FAERIE QUEENE, allegory began to decline”, rediscovering “somewhat of its native splendour in the PURPLE 
ISLAND of Fletcher, with whom it almost as soon disappear’d”. The revised version of this section in the 
second edition (London, 1762) states even more explicitly that “allegorical poetry, through many gradations, at 
last received its ultimate consummation in the Fairy Queen” (2: P4v), and notes that the history of allegorical  
poetry “may, probably, be one day considered more at large, in a regular history” (2: O3r). 
37
 Warton returns to the subject of allegory, this time with specific emphasis on allegorical interpretation, in 
the closing passages of the “Digression on the Gesta Romanorum” prefixed to the third volume, published in 
1781. “This was”, he writes, “an age of vision and mystery: and every work was believed to contain a double, or 
secondary, meaning” (3: xciv-xcv) – but the “age” in question again extends to Ariosto and Spenser, and beyond. 
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reference to this whole tradition that he can now write: “As knowledge and learning increase, 
poetry begins to deal less in imagination: and these fantastic beings give way to real manners 
and living characters”.
38
 This is another key component of the myth: the idea that allegory 
does not fall victim to merely random or cyclical turns of literary taste, but that this decline is 
symptomatic of a deeper teleological pattern, of literary progress rather than simply literary 
change, which is itself an aspect of the general progress of human civilization. The “Middle 
Ages”, however, in any sense that would make them sharply distinguishable from a 
“Renaissance”, are still not a significant factor in Warton’s thinking. 
These developments can be further tracked through the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century. The increasing hostility towards allegory receives a more articulate theoretical form 
in the Romantic aesthetics of the symbol, which finds its earliest English representative in 
Coleridge.
39
 In the same way, out of the increasing sense of historical distance there 
eventually emerges a more definite notion of an age of allegory as an identifiable episode in 
literary history, and even the very phrase, “the age of allegory”, begins to appear. Yet even at 
this late date, the age of allegory is not restricted to the Middle Ages as we know them today. 
In fact, in most instances I have been able to find up to the mid-nineteenth century, the phrase 
refers specifically to the Elizabethan period.
40
 In other cases, it is perceived to last well into 
the eighteenth century. In 1785, an author in The Critical Review censures a contemporary 
work of allegorical fiction as old-fashioned: “The age of allegory”, he asserts, “is now past”.
41
 
Note, however, that it is now past, still fresh in memory.
42
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 The scholarship on the subject is extensive; for a study particularly attuned to the contradictions and 
ambivalences of the Romantic statements, see Kelley’s Reinventing Allegory, ch. 5-6. 
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 See L. Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, ed. J. Hoole (London, 1783), 3: 260; Old English Plays, [ed. C. W. 
Dilke] (London, 1814-16), 2: 3; anonymous review of Characters of Shakespear’s Plays, Lectures on the 
English Poets, and Lectures on the English Comic Writers, by W. Hazlitt, The Monthly Review 92 (1820): 53-68, 
p. 63; E. P. Hood, The Good Old Times of Queen Bess (London, 1851), 22. 
41
 [J. Buckland?], review of The Adventures of the Six Princesses of Babylon, by L. Peacock, The Critical 
Review 60 (1785): 221-2. The review is signed “Buckland” – presumably James Buckland, “upwards of 50 years 
an eminent bookseller in Paternoster-row”, who died in 1790 at the age of 79, according to the obituary in The 
Gentleman’s Magazine 60 (1790), 186. James Buckland’s dates would appear to fit those of this and other 
reviews signed “Buckland” in The Critical Review, and the subjects of the reviewed works – mostly religious, 
devotional, and didactic literature – fit those of works published by his press. 
42
 Buckland says further of his “now past” allegorical age that “The luxuriance of Hawkesworth, and the 
energy of Johnson, for some time supported it; but their labours, in this mode of instruction, are, we believe, less 
popular than any other parts of their lucubrations”. Buckland’s review is probably echoed, in addition to 
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 Alternatively, even manifestly allegorical works can still be enjoyable, provided that 
their allegorical dimension is ignored. “The fact”, writes Schopenhauer in one of the loci 
classici of anti-allegorical aesthetics, “that Correggio’s Night, Annibale Carracci’s Genius of 
Fame, Poussin’s Horae are very beautiful pictures must be clearly separated from the fact that 
they are allegories.”
43
 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hazlitt felt comfortable in 
making a virtue out of such under-reading, chastising those contemporaries who complained 
about Spenser’s Faerie Queene because they could not follow the allegory: “If they do not 
meddle with the allegory, the allegory will not meddle with them. Without minding it at all, 
the whole is as plain as a pike-staff”.
44
 “It might as well be pretended”, he goes on to say, 
“that we cannot see Poussin’s pictures for the allegory, as that the allegory prevents us from 
understanding Spenser.” The analogy with painting is not incidental. In painting, as well as in 
music, sculpture, or architecture, allegory involves not only multiple meanings but also 
multiple media. While a painting is a visual phenomenon, allegorical meaning – arguably all 
meaning in so far as it can be distinguished from, say, enjoyment or experience – is at bottom 
a verbal phenomenon. The very etymology of the Greek allegoria or Latin alieniloquium, 
“other-speaking”, would seem to draw attention to this fact. Thus to attribute an allegorical 
meaning to a painting is not only to superimpose a further level of meaning onto the basic, 
“literal” one, but also to superimpose a verbal upon a non-verbal medium. Consequently, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Addison’s “Account”, in another similar statement appearing in 1801: “The age of allegory is past; and readers 
speedily lose their patience, when the dull moral lies too plain below”; review of Richard the First, by J. B. 
Burges, The Monthly Review 37 (1802): 287-91, p. 288. As late as 1866, the pioneering history of English 
painting by the brothers Redgrave explains the failure of the allegorical representation of the Battle of Waterloo 
commissioned in 1815 from the painter James Ward by noting: “The fact was, the age of allegory was past, and 
all the munificence of the donors, combined with Ward’s real talent as a painter could not revive it”; R. and S. 
Redgrave, A Century of Painters of the English School (London, 1866), 2: 150. Allegory plays the same role in 
the Redgraves’ history of painting as it does in contemporary histories of literary criticism and the drama. The 
list of contents for ch. 2 includes the heading “Art run mad with Allegory”, referring to what the authors see as a 
degenerative period following the brief flowering of the arts under Charles I: “Among the causes of its decline – 
in which political events had undoubtedly for a time the chief share – was the tendency of the age to allegory” 
(1: 35). Rubens’ achievements in the mode are “nobly extravagant”, but in the hands of less talented imitators 
“such displays soon descended to vapid inanities”. The Redgraves refer sarcastically to the “great authority” of 
H. Peacham, quoting liberally (1: 35-6) from the prescriptions for the representation of personifications and 
allegorized classical deities in his Compleat Gentleman, first published in 1622, with an obvious delight in 
pointing out those they find the most absurd. “Armed with such traditions, [...] the fashionable painters of the 
end of the seventeenth century covered the walls of our palaces with acres of allegory, appropriately tenanted.” 
Some did better than others, but the manner as such “we may despise”; it is a “degradation of art” (1: 37). 
43
 A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, ed. J. Norman, A. Welchman, and C. Janaway 
(Cambridge, 2010), 264. 
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 W. Hazlitt, Lectures on the English Poets (London, 1818), 74. 
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when the ideological currency of the allegorical meaning runs out, this meaning appears all 
the more arbitrary and detachable from the “work itself”.
45
 
 Thus all the main components of the myth are in place by the mid-eighteenth century 
or so, but the dots are not yet connected. Who, then, connects the dots? Here, as in so much 
else, all roads would seem to lead to Jacob Burckhardt and his 1860 Civilization of the 
Renaissance in Italy, the book in which we meet, apparently for the first time, with a 
categorical claim that “The Middle Ages were essentially the ages of allegory”.
46
 Even if 
there is some precedent for the substance of this claim, nothing would seem to approximate 
the axiomatic force with which it appears, and the central position it occupies, in Burckhardt’s 
work, which thus seems the likeliest source for most subsequent developments.
47
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 “[G]iven a statue of a beautiful woman”, writes Croce in 1902, “the sculptor can attach a label to it saying 
that the statue represents Clemency or Goodness. This allegorical interpretation, which is added, post festum, to 
the completed work, does not change the work of art. What is it, then? It is an expression added extrinsically to 
another expression” – or more precisely, “nothing other than a word: ‘clemency’ or ‘goodness’”; B. Croce, The 
Aesthetic [1902] (Cambridge, 1992), 39. It seems clear that such treatments of allegory in the fine arts exerted a 
certain amount of influence on its treatment in literature, especially once modernist aesthetics began insisting on 
the reformation of the literary art on analogy with the “purer”, i.e. non-verbal arts. A century later, we still read 
that “The problem of preserving interest in The Faerie Queene is one of the live problems of the modern teacher 
of literature”, and that “The most common advice as to the best method of accomplishing this is to ignore the 
allegory, and to emphasize the pictorial and imaginative qualities, and the metrical beauty”; H. W. Peck, 
“Spenser’s Faerie Queene and the Student of To-day”, The Sewanee Review 24 (1916): 340-52, p. 347. This 
statement makes for a good example of the reverse side of the phenomenon already touched on above: if allegory 
converts images, shapes, and music into words, the opposite approach entails the conversion of words into 
images, shapes, and music. 
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 J. Burckhardt, The Civilization of Renaissance in Italy [1860] (1945; repr. London, 1995), 262. The 
original is perhaps even slightly more emphatic: “Das ganze Mittelalter war die Zeit des Allegorisierens in 
vorzugsweisem Sinne gewesen”; “the entire Middle Ages had in the foremost sense been the age of 
allegorizing”; Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien (Leipzig, 1926), 356. 
47
 An identification of allegory with the Middle Ages is strongly implied in a manuscript fragment by 
Michelet, dated 21 June 1841 and first published in H. Hauser, “Quelques fragments inédits de Michelet”, Revue 
du seizème siècle 2 (1914): 19-29, where Michelangelo is said to have “spent his energy in trying to break down 
the life of the Middle Ages in order to escape into the future, to avoid conventional symbolism, to express death 
and the spirit through the forms of life and nature”; the translation (slightly adapted) is from Bullen, Myth, 159. 
Hegel might seem a precursor, but although he notes in the Aesthetics that “allegory” – by which he largely or 
exclusively means personification – “in general belongs less to ancient art than to the romantic art of the Middle 
Ages”, the explanation of this is thoroughly un-Burckhardtian. Far from essentially, allegory is only accidentally 
medieval, for “as allegory it is not properly anything romantic”, and is rather due to the absence of the pagan 
pantheon, through which the universal was expressed in the classical period; G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics (1975; 
repr. Oxford, 1988), 1: 401. “On the one side the Middle Ages had for their content” – as they emphatically do 
not in Burckhardt – “particular individuals, with their subjective aims of love and honour, with their vows, 
pilgrimages, and adventures. The variety of these numerous individuals and events provides imagination with a 
wide scope for inventing and developing accidental and capricious collisions and their resolution. But, on the 
other side, over against the varied secular adventures, there stands the universal element in the relations and 
situations of life. This universal is not individualized into independent gods as it was with the ancients, and 
therefore it appears readily and naturally explicitly sundered in its universality alongside those particular 
personalities and their particular shapes and events” (1: 401-02). 
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 In explaining how Burckhardt came to hold such a view, it is instructive to first take a 
brief look at his guide to Renaissance art, The Cicerone, published five years before the 
Civilization, in 1855. Unlike the Civilization, The Cicerone contains explicit statements of 
Burckhardt’s distaste for allegory, occasionally rising to the level of axioms: “A work of art”, 
we read, “will be impressive in proportion as it contains less allegory and more living distinct 
action”.
48
 Ideally, art “ought never to be founded on” it, for the result is “necessarily false”, 
and a modern aesthetic sensibility cannot fail to note the “insufficiency of all Allegory”. An 
instructive palette of epithets is bestowed upon it: “absurd” is a favourite – with varying 
degrees, from “simple” to “extreme” – but allegory is also “false”, “quaint”, “naïve”, 
“insignificant”, “unpleasing”, “comically pitiful”, and so forth.
49
 And yet, allegory is 
everywhere in Renaissance painting. The solution is to approach an allegorical Renaissance 
painting as the work of two rather than a single author: the painter, who produces the material 
object of aesthetic appreciation which is the sole concern of the modern viewer, and the 
patron peering over his shoulder, typically an ecclesiastic, who commissions the subject, 
including its invisible, hence irrelevant, allegorical meaning.  Thus the “great questions” the 
paintings pose for Burckhardt are “how much was prescribed to the painter? what did he add 
himself? for what parts did he with difficulty gain permission? what suggestions did he 
reject?”
50
 He hastens to add that these “can never be answered”, yet elsewhere seems quite 
certain that, “left to their own powers, [the painters] would have expressed the given 
fundamental ideas in a far more noble and beautiful manner.”
51
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 Ibid., 152. Later on, in the posthumously published manuscript on the genres of Renaissance painting 
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 Cicerone, 42, 152. This was a crucial problem for Burckhardt, and he continued to discuss it in later 
writings. Cf. the statement, more than two decades later, in Painting: “Left to itself, would art ever have created 
allegorical figures? The question is unanswerable for there is no such thing as art ‘left to itself.’ No sooner does 
the capacity of formal creation emerge than it is summoned into the sanctuary, or to some other repository of 
power, there to pass the whole of its youth. There, it receives the impressions that never fade. Even at an early 
stage, however, both religion and power may well need to convey their nature and their demands through the 
abstract concept and its personification” (63). These are the first sentences in the first chapter of the Painting 
manuscript, “On Allegory”, indicative of the central importance of the subject to Burckhardt’s views of 
Renaissance art. 
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And here, finally, is where the dots connect, for while the formal aspect of a 
Renaissance painting is a genuine expression of the Renaissance Zeitgeist, its allegorical 
content is dismissed by Burckhardt as a specifically medieval atavism: 
And whence we may ask arose the impulse towards this allegorising taste which 
 pervades the whole (also the Byzantine) middle ages? It was originally a remnant of 
 antique mythology, which Christianity had deprived of its true signification. The 
 progenitor was Marcianus Capella, and lived in the fifth century.”
52
 
The claim is of course erroneous, but it is hard to believe that Burckhardt was simply 
uninformed; more likely, he is unwilling to grapple with the consequences of the existence of 
an allegorical tradition long predating the advent of Christianity.
53
 Either way, the notion of 
an allegory-free antiquity is essential to his purpose, for it makes it all the more plausible to 
erase allegory from the supposed rebirth of that antiquity, and vice versa. 
 The myth of the Middle Ages as the age of allegory is thus the logical outcome of the 
imperative to reconcile a number of factors in Burckhardt’s theory of the Renaissance: 
specifically, the claim that the Renaissance represents the origin of Western modernity; the 
primacy given to individuality and secularization in the definition of that modernity; the sharp 
contrast made in this respect with the culture of the Middle Ages; the aesthetic distaste for 
allegory as a mode of artistic representation; and finally, the cultural historian’s conviction 
that art, like all other aspects of a culture, is a reflection of the Zeitgeist. Once these claims are 
in place, the presence of allegory in the Renaissance becomes a problem, and the intuitive, 
almost inevitable solution is to relegate it to the Middle Ages. If the Middle Ages were the 
age of the collective, the age in which “Man was conscious of himself [...] only through some 
general category”, then it is only natural for that age to express itself in an art of abstractions, 
just as it is natural for the new age of the individual to express itself in an art of particulars.
54
  
Consequently, any presence of allegory in the Renaissance can now be explained as a 
residuum of the Middle Ages rather than a genuine aspect of the period. 
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The model did not work as well in literary history, however, and if we now return to 
Burckhardt’s Civilization, it seems clear that this explains the extremely limited treatment of 
imaginative literature in that book.
55
 This might seem to imply that literature is deliberately 
omitted, presumably because, like art, it is a subject so extensive as to require separate 
treatment. Yet while Burckhardt went on to write further studies of Renaissance art and 
architecture, he never wrote an account of Renaissance imaginative literature. The problem, 
apparently, was that one could not as conveniently split the Renaissance poet in two, with the 
allegorist dictating to the artist. Thus Burckhardt poses the question of whether Dante was a 
“great poet [...] on account of his symbolism or in spite of it”, and finds it impossible to 
answer.
56
 In painting, the allegorical is easily divided from the non-allegorical – the 
“perishable and feeble” from the “immortal” – but in Dante “all is inseparably woven 
together; he is just as much a scholar and a theologian as a poet”. Consequently, Burckhardt 
treats of those genres of writing, and those aspects of imaginative literature, which support the 
central narrative of the “discovery of the world and the discovery of man” – genres of internal 
and external realism: biography, autobiography, descriptions of nature – while consistently 
understating, and wherever possible avoiding altogether, the allegorical element in the 
period’s literary output. 
It was left to Burckhardt’s successors to take up the ungrateful task of accommodating 
his theory to specifically literary materials, and the key role here, at least in the English 
context, was played by John Addington Symonds and the two literary-historical volumes of 
his Renaissance in Italy. Symonds reiterates the attribution of allegory to the Middle Ages: 
“The spirit of the epoch inclined to Allegory”; “the medieval theory of allegory” is the natural 
expression of “the medieval mind”.
57
 He goes one step further, however, by separating what 
Burckhardt apparently found inseparable, the allegorist and the poet, now internalized as 
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competing elements of a single personality. Typical in this respect is his verdict on Dante, 
who is said to have “stood, as a poet, at a height so far above his age and his own theories, 
that the cold and numbing touch of symbolism rarely mars the interest of his work”.
58
 Finally, 
Symonds expands this into a general principle of literary history: many later works, even into 
the fifteenth century, are similarly “twy-faced”, with “one foot in the middle ages, another 
planted on the firm ground of the modern era”, wavering “between the psychological realism 
of romance and the philosophical idealism of allegory”.
59
 Thus allegory becomes an index of 
a specifically literary modernity, and the progress of literature becomes measurable in degrees 
of its abandonment of “the allegorical heresy”, as Symonds terms it.
60
 
With Symonds, then, the myth emerges in its fully developed literary-historical form, 
and all that remains is its further consolidation and dissemination. This process involves 
dozens of further late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century century publications, and need 
not be fully surveyed here, yet already by 1886 an American author, James Baldwin, is able to 
include a section on “The Age of Allegory”, now delimited to between the twelfth and the 
fifteenth century, into a school textbook of English and American literature.
61
 In Britain, the 
                                                          
58
 Ibid., 1: 81 
59
 Ibid., 1: 229. 
60
 Ibid., 1: 82. Symonds is also the central figure in the naturalization of Burckhardt’s period concept in 
England, and a phrase in a diary entry of 5 April 1866 – “the English Renaissance, the Elizabethan age” – has 
been cited as the earliest instance of the period concept begin grafted onto what seemed its obvious English 
analogue (see Hale, England, 110). Indeed, this whole entry is of interest in exemplifying the degree to which 
Symonds’ view of the Renaissance is a projection of his own modern condition.
 
Not only is the Elizabethan spirit 
analogous to that of the Italian Renaissance, it is also analogous to that of the age immediately preceding 
Symonds’ own: “the two ages [...] are similar: freedom of religious thought, political freedom, a new impulse 
given to all speculation, the movement of the French Revolution answering to that of the Reformation”; H. F. 
Brown, John Addington Symonds (London, 1895), 1: 354-63. The Romantic poets, and even Tennyson and 
Browning in his own day, share a “common Elizabethanism” – remade, of course, in their own Romantic image, 
as non-classical, residually medieval, “Gothic”. But while the Elizabethan spirit may linger in some of its poets, 
the totality of nineteenth-century civilization, the age, could not be farther from it. The Elizabethanist thus finds 
himself stranded in a disenchanted world of industry, commerce, non-interventionist politics. “[T]here is no El 
Dorado now”, sighs the melancholy aesthete, “but California” (1: 358), and along with its fabled golden city, the 
golden age is poignantly and irrevocably gone. It is no surprise to find, at the end of this “diatribe”, Symonds’ 
confession that he wrote it in an attempt to combat an episode of that “clinging lethargy” with which he was 
continually plagued. It worked, and later that day he spent the afternoon “with C. among the gigantic olives, 
deep grass meadows, and clear streams of the Val des Oliviers pleased me. I walked in a dream. Scirocco was 
blowing” (1: 363) – the “Renaissance” as pastoral psychotherapy, intellectual sunbathing. 
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key figure in the myth’s canonization was George Saintsbury, to whose numerous distinctions 
is to be added that of being one of the most loquacious allegory-haters on record, with a 
particular flare for metaphors of emasculation and disease: allegory is “the Delilah of 
criticism”, its Circe, its Calypso, its “congenital or endemic disease”, its witch midwife, who 
“not too profitably assisted at the cradle of [...] literature”, and will return to infest “its death-
bed in her most decrepit and malignant aspect”.
62
 It is in the landmark Periods of European 
Literature series, published under Saintsbury’s editorship between 1895 and 1907, that the 
myth takes firm British roots, especially at the hands of Saintsbury’s junior colleague at 
Edinburgh, G. Gregory Smith, and his volume in the series, on The Transition Period. 
Building on Symonds’ notion of the “twy-faced” fifteenth century, Smith’s book is probably 
the first comprehensive, large-scale deployment of the myth, consistently equating the 
transition from medieval to Renaissance with that from allegorical to non-allegorical 
literature.
63
  
 This, more or less, is how the Middle Ages became the age of allegory – and how, at 
the same time, the Renaissance became the age of not-allegory – a potent historiographical 
myth whose influence still persists, and whose most obvious and most detrimental legacy is 
its reinforcement of the premise of an epochal cultural divide supposed to have occurred 
between these two periods, and of the practices and institutions grounded on this premise. It is 
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no coincidence that scholars concerned specifically with the allegorical tradition have 
repeatedly found themselves driven to question the validity of the accepted periodisational 
concepts and boundaries. Allegory confounds periodisation because periodisation confounds 
allegory.  
“And here I do not use ‘myth’ in any technical sense”, wrote James Franklin in one the 
more spirited attacks on the concept of the Renaissance, “as some avant garde theologians are 
said to do, according to which a myth may be in some way essentially true. By ‘myth’ I mean 
‘lie.’”
64
 Admittedly, the Age of Allegory is, in the final analysis, a lie, long overdue to join 
the Flat Earth, the Chastity Belt, the Angels Dancing on the Head of a Pin, and other denizens 
of that strange limbo of exploded scholarly prejudices about the nature of European 
civilization between the fall of Rome and the fall of Constantinople. Admittedly, none of the 
various rationales proposed for the myth is ultimately convincing.
65
 Yet it is also a myth in a 
sense not unlike – of course, not quite the same either – as that of the theologians, and its 
appeal is the appeal of all myths: it transforms a hostile chaos into a hospitable cosmos, 
conferring on the sprawling wastes of the literary past a historical shape, and endowing it with 
teleological motion. It must have felt good to be Borges, and to be able to date the emergence 
of modern literature, not to a century, or even a decade, but the very year. It must have 
fulfilled, this incessantly repeated sacrifice of allegory at the altar of literary modernity, some 
deeply ingrained intellectual and even emotional need. Thus if any particular product of this 
need may be safely discarded, the need itself must be taken seriously, and subjected to 
elaborate scrutiny, especially in the light of its most recent manifestation, the so-called “return 
of allegory” in the latter half of twentieth century, a turn of events which Borges would have 
found laughably impossible in 1949, and which he, mercifully, did not live to witness. 
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IV 
 
“For all of us, allegory is an aesthetic mistake.” A year before Borges wrote these words, 
however, Curtius’ great book had already been published, containing, among its inexhaustible 
riches, a digression on the curious resurgence of allegory the author had observed in the work 
of Balzac. In “messianically and apocalyptically excited periods”, he writes, “faded symbolic 
figures can be filled with new life, like shades which have drunk blood”.
66
 This was to prove 
prescient, and in fact, even before Curtius, the shade had already been drinking for some 
decades. By April 1925, Walter Benjamin completed his ill-fated Habilitationsschrift on the 
tragic drama – or Trauerspiel, “mourning play” – of the German baroque, which ended with a 
chapter on “Allegory and Trauerspiel”. Here, in an argument informed more decisively by 
contemporary polemical concerns, and Benjamin’s own idiosyncratically appreciative 
experience of the allegorical and emblematic art and literature of the seventeenth century, 
than any attempt to arrive at an objective literary-historical estimate of the subject, he mounts 
a campaign against the Romantic concept of the “symbol”, and for the rehabilitation of its 
scorned counterpart, that would eventually exercise a profound influence on the aesthetics and 
literary criticism of the later twentieth century. 
 “For over a hundred years”, charges the opening sentence, “the philosophy of art has 
been subject to the tyranny of a usurper who came to power in the chaos which followed in 
the wake of romanticism” – namely, the symbol, or rather the “illegitimate”, “distorted”, and 
“destructive” “abuse” of that term, to be carefully distinguished from its “genuine” meaning, 
“which is the one used in the field of theology”, and which “could never have shed that 
sentimental twilight over the philosophy of beauty which has become more and more 
impenetrable since the end of early romanticism”.
67
 The “excessively logical” opposition of 
“symbol” to “allegory” reduced the latter “to the dark background against which the bright 
world of the symbol might stand out”.
68
  By contrast, Benjamin seeks – and this is, in his own 
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words, the “experimentum crucis” of his thesis
69
 – to restore an understanding of allegory 
which is not only less mechanical, and where allegory emerges as “not just a playful 
illustrative technique, but a form of expression” in its own right, but is accorded an immense 
and almost mystical significance, far transcending the sphere of German baroque drama, or 
even art and literature as such: 
Whereas in the symbol destruction is idealized and the transfigured face of nature is 
fleetingly revealed in the light of redemption, in allegory the observer is confronted 
with the facies hippocratica of history as a petrified, primordial landscape. Everything 
about history that, from the very beginning, has been untimely, sorrowful, 
unsuccessful, is expressed in a face – or rather in a death’s head. And although such a 
thing lacks all “symbolic” freedom of expression, all classical proportion, all humanity 
– nevertheless, this is the form in which man’s subjection to nature is most obvious 
and it significantly gives rise not only to the enigmatic question of the nature of human 
existence as such, but also of the biographical historicity of the individual. This is the 
heart of the allegorical way of seeing, of the baroque, secular explanation of history as 
the Passion of the world; its importance resides solely in the stations of its decline. 
The greater the significance, the greater the subjection to death, because death digs 
most deeply the jagged line of demarcation between physical nature and significance. 
But if nature has always been subject to the power of death, it is also true that it has 
always been allegorical.
70
 
If one is no longer puzzled by encountering such a passage in an academic discussion of 
allegory, it is only because Benjamin’s work has been so exceptionally influential over the 
past several decades, and more broadly, because the discourse of the Origin resonates so 
profoundly with that of late twentieth-century literary theory, which restored Benjamin’s 
work from obscurity and elevated him to the status of one of key twentieth-century thinkers. 
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 In 1925, however, passages like these cost Benjamin an academic career – perhaps 
even, some have suggested, his life. The thesis was found to be incomprehensible – “Geist 
kann man nicht habilitieren” was the verdict, as reported by Scholem – and Benjamin was 
advised to withdraw his application to save himself the embarrassment of a formal rejection. 
His later overtures to the Warburg circle also proved futile; an extract from the Origin was 
read by Panofsky, whose response was “cool” and “resentment-laden”.
71
 Although printed in 
1928, the book did not attract much attention, and soon passed into near-oblivion. Europe 
plunged into another World War, and its troubled author took his life during an attempt to flee 
the Nazi occupation of France in September 1940. Reduced to a shade, this strange 
intellectual fruit of the apocalyptically excited Weimar epoch did not, however, die; forgotten 
and emaciated, it waited, precisely according to Curtius’ prediction, for an infusion of fresh 
blood. 
 Although I return to Benjamin, among others, in the Afterword, it is perhaps worth 
emphasizing at this point that the present study is not “Benjaminian” in perspective, nor 
attempts a comprehensive critical engagement with his work on allegory, and the extensive 
work on this work.
72
 What is important to acknowledge, however, is the key role it played in 
what has been widely recognized as the “reemergence”, “reinvention”, “resurgence”, 
“reevaluation”, “revival”, “rehabilitation”, “return”, etc., of allegory in the late twentieth 
century.
73
 In 1955 the Origin was republished in a two-volume edition of Benjamin’s works 
edited by Theodor Adorno, soon followed by other editions. Hans-Georg Gadamer was an 
early reader, and his Truth and Method included a Benjamin-derived critique of the symbol-
allegory opposition, entitled “The Limits of Erlebniskunst and the Rehabilitation of 
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Allegory”.
74
 Paul de Man read both Benjamin and Gadamer, and in his 1969 essay “The 
Rhetoric of Temporality” the critique of the Romantic-modernist aesthetic of the symbol, and 
the corresponding rehabilitation of allegory as a positive term in critical discourse, made its 
first major impact in the Anglophone academia, followed, in the 1970s, by the translations of 
Benjamin and Gadamer, and de Man’s Allegories of Reading.
75
 By the 1980s, talk of a return 
of allegory becomes widespread, and the term retains a currency, especially in art history and 
literary studies, to this day. 
 At the same time, a more critical appraisal of this development has largely failed to 
take place, which is perhaps even more curious and disconcerting than the development itself. 
This, as already noted above, and as one sensitive commentator suggested very early on, 
would seem to be due to the lack of historical perspective: 
Allegory has come to appear to us as “the trope of tropes” – and my concern is then 
with who we are now and what is means to finds ourselves before this appearance. 
 Allegory has come to appear to us as the trope of tropes – and this should be 
astonishing. What we are inclined to forget is that for most of us allegory has been – 
where it has been anything at all – a term of denigration, a way of naming the merely 
rhetorical: the brute fact of constraint to ornament, convention, artifice – opposed 
variously to the depth and integrity, spontaneity and organic holism, of metaphor and 
symbol.
76
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At the same time, it is clear that, even as it reversed the values embedded in the traditional 
decline-of-allegory narrative, and added a further episode to it, this postmodern rehabilitation 
of allegory did not really alter its basic structure.
77
 The sequence allegorical-antiallegorical-
neoallegorical obviously still runs parallel to that of premodern-modern-postmodern, raising 
additional questions that would not have been possible just three decades ago. 
 To ask Borges’ question today thus means to ask it from a perspective where the anti-
allegorical aesthetics he espoused can no longer be taken for granted, and has itself become an 
episode in the allegorical tradition, rather than its end. Where it was once sufficient to ask 
why allegory used to be thought enchanting and then became intolerable, today this question 
inevitably extends into its opposite – how is it that allegory was once thought so intolerable, 
but is now again, at least in some circles, enchanting? Is it merely coincidental that this return 
of allegory is coterminous with the onset of the notions of postmodernity and postmodernism? 
How does this affect our view of the sixteenth and the seventeenth century, the most intensely 
contested period – apart from our own, that is – in the history of the allegorical tradition? 
Perhaps we have not, in spite of all the apocalyptic and messianic excitement of the recent 
decades, “reentered an allegorical age”, but perhaps we do find ourselves suitably positioned 
to reappraise the place of allegory in former ages, and especially the one in which, ostensibly, 
lie the origins of our own (post)modernity.
78
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V 
 
Finally, a few disclaimers. In touching on a number of subjects which are rarely discussed in 
the same context, a study like this one inevitably involves compromises. For one thing, the 
extent of the problems presented by the notion of modernity is of the same, if not greater 
magnitude than of those presented by the notion of allegory. With a good deal of 
simplification, it could perhaps be said that allegory is one thing with many names, while 
modernity is one name attached to a great many things. One parameter here is scale: to a 
paleoanthropologist, “modern” means having the anatomy of homo sapiens – as, for instance, 
in the British Museum’s 2013 exhibition Ice Age Art: Arrival of the Modern Mind, featuring 
art dating from 40,000 to 10,000 years ago – whereas it means something quite different to 
the editor of a fashion magazine. Even within the same time-scale, however, there is the 
question of focus: modernity will manifest itself very differently depending on where one 
goes looking for it, or lack of it – religion, science and technology, politics, economics, or, as 
is mostly the case in the present study, art and imaginative literature. Even among literary 
scholars working in the same period there will be disagreement as to what constitutes (or 
detracts from) that period’s modernity (or lack thereof), and at a certain level of specialization 
proto-, pre-, post-, early, late, classic, high, long, unfinished and other high-resolution 
modernities will also begin to proliferate. 
 Needless to say, this thesis is no exception. If anything, defining modernity in the 
present context is especially problematic due to the fact that allegory has itself often been 
involved, at the fundamental level, in the formation of historiographical concepts and 
frameworks inscribed with those very teleologies of modernity that one sets out to investigate. 
Hence the frequent recourse to formulations like “the allegory-modernity problem”, “the 
allegory-modernity dynamics”, “the allegory-modernity nexus”, and so forth – the point is 
precisely to indicate the interdependence of the two categories, and the need of 
acknowledging this interdependence in any study of the subject that hopes not to repeat the 
errors already inscribed in much of the traditional terminology. Broadly speaking, however, 
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this thesis is mainly concerned with aesthetic modernity, meaning chiefly the belief that art 
and imaginative literature constitute an autonomous domain of human endeavour, proximate 
and related to, but still categorically distinct from such neighbouring domains as philosophy, 
rhetoric, or history. Within this general purview, emphasis varies from chapter to chapter: 
Chapter 1 tackles this notion at the most direct and abstract level, looking at sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century authors’ own explicit theoretical statements on the subject; in Chapter 2, 
the question manifests itself largely as that of the representation in art and imaginative 
literature, here notably the drama, of the modern qualities of individuality and subjectivity; 
and in Chapter 3, the focus is on aspects of what is often problematically referred to as 
“secularization”, and ultimately, on aspects of seventeenth-century ontology and 
epistemology. Of course, the long answer to the question of what is meant by modernity in 
this study is in the chapters themselves, and it is hoped that this summary will be illuminated 
by the close engagements with particular sixteenth- and seventeenth-century texts and 
traditions in the pages that follow. 
 A compromise also has to be made between the general and the particular. Anyone 
who has worked on the subject will know that the temptation to overtheorize is always 
lurking. Time and time again, it has been felt that the phenomenon of allegory holds the key 
to some of the great questions of intellectual history, if not the human condition itself. At the 
same time, there is also the more common temptation to undertheorize, to delay the verdict 
until all the evidence is in, to wait for the facts to speak for themselves. For a while now, the 
present author has found it amusing to imagine this dialectic in terms of a morally neutralized 
psychomachia in which his academic soul is fought over by daemonic figures emblematic of 
these two temptations. One the one side, standing for the temptation to overtheorize, is thus 
Northrop Frye. Frye’s section on allegory in Anatomy of Criticism is of course an essential 
contribution to the subject, and its treatment of allegory as a universal literary mode, 
manifesting itself as a spectrum of possibilities in any historical period – “a kind of sliding 
scale, ranging from the most explicitly allegorical [literature], consistent with being literature 
at all, at one extreme, to the most elusive, anti-explicit and anti-allegorical at the other” – is a 
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major, perhaps even the decisive impetus behind the emergence of modern allegory studies.
79
 
It is also, however, a paradigmatic example – notably in the much quoted statement that “all 
commentary is allegorical interpretation” – of the temptation to overtheorize.
80
 Less well 
known, but even more symptomatic in this respect is the book’s preface – not the famous 
“Polemical Introduction”, but the brief “Prefatory Statements and Acknowledgments” which 
precede it – where Frye explains its genesis as the by-product of an attempt to produce a 
comprehensive “theory of allegory”: “I [...] began a study of Spenser’s Faerie Queene, only 
to discover that in my beginning was my end. The Introduction to Spenser became an 
introduction to the theory of allegory, and that theory obstinately adhered to a much larger 
theoretical structure.”
81
 
 On the other side, standing for the temptation to undertheorize, is the unjustly less 
familiar figure of Don Cameron Allen, on whom this dubious honour is conferred due to a 
passage in his invaluable 1970 study Mysteriously Meant: The Rediscovery of Pagan 
Symbolism and Allegorical Interpretation in the Renaissance, one of more than twenty books, 
in addition to over one hundred articles, published by this major Renaissance scholar, who 
taught for forty years at Johns Hopkins, and who, to quote from an official biographical note, 
“knew not only Latin, Greek, Hebrew and French, but was an expert in the entire range of 
Renaissance learning from astrology to scriptural exegesis”. That this is indeed so becomes 
instantly clear to anyone who opens Mysteriously Meant, a product of a lifetime of devoted 
and highly competent scholarship. Having read, however, more or less everything that one 
can be humanly expected to have read about allegory in the Renaissance, and produced what 
he himself describes as “an annotated bibliography or a thinly masked Grundriss” of the 
subject, here is what Allen had to say about the broader implications of his study: “I have 
presented the facts as I got them – the hard way. I have no theories to offer although I have 
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read many of the moderns who have speculated about myth and symbol. Since I am without 
thought I do not need interpretation. Endurance is all that is required.”
82
 
 These, then, are the two impasses that I have sought to avoid: having no thoughts, and 
having too many thoughts. Without a theory, the accumulation of facts can go on indefinitely, 
endurance permitting. But more importantly, there is simply no such thing as a book without a 
theory, and the more one pretends otherwise, the more is one likely to fall back on the 
seemingly most neutral, but in reality only the most traditional, and hence most dangerous, of 
theories. Withdrawal into empiricist ascesis will not keep the Fryean demon at bay. Yet to 
surrender to the demon unconditionally, especially with such a subject as allegory, is to let 
thought cave in on itself – suddenly allegory is everywhere, and everything is somehow 
allegorical, and before one knows it, one is writing the new Anatomy of Criticism. It is hoped 
that the thesis strikes a good balance, and that there are enough thoughts in it to illuminate the 
facts, and enough facts to harness the thoughts. 
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ALLEGORY AND POETICS 
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I conjure you all [...] to believe, with Clauserus, the translator of Cornutus, that 
it pleased the heavenly deity, by Hesiod and Homer, under the veil of fables, to 
give us all knowledge, logic, rhetoric, philosophy natural and moral, and quid 
non?; to believe, with me, that there are many mysteries contained in poetry, 
which of purpose were written darkly, lest by profane wits it should be abused 
[...].       – P. Sidney, c.15801 
 
Do you believe upon your conscience, that Homer whil’st he was couching his 
Iliads and Odysses, had any thought upon those Allegories, which Plutarch, 
Heraclides, Ponticus, Fristatius, Cornutus squeesed out of him, and which 
Politian filched againe from them: if you trust it, with neither hand nor foot do 
you come neare to my opinion, which judgeth them to have been as little 
dreamed of by Homer, as the Gospel-sacraments were by Ovid in his 
Metamorphosis, though a certaine gulligut Fryer and true bacon-picker, would 
have undertaken to prove it, if perhaps he had met with as very fools as himself 
(and as the Proverb saies) a lid worthy of such a kettle. 
       – F. Rabelais, c.1532-342 
 
 
A study of what sixteenth- and seventeenth-century authors thought about allegory does well 
to begin with what these authors said they thought about allegory. In addition to providing 
one with a place to start and a reference point against which to gauge other, less tangible, 
evidence on the subject, explicit statements are of intrinsic interest for the light they shed on 
how their authors arranged their intellectual spheres, and where literature in general, and the 
allegorical conception of literature in particular, fitted into these arrangements. As the ensuing 
pages will show, allegory is not one issue among many, and when writers of the period voice 
opinions on the subject, they voice in miniature whole theories of literature, or at least of 
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particular literary genres. Even their silence is meaningful – in fact, silence may well be 
especially meaningful. Although they do so far more often than has usually been 
acknowledged, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century critics do not always explicitly endorse an 
allegorical view of literature. Exceedingly rare, however, are occasions on which they 
explicitly denounce it, and even when they do, it is not always for reasons modern readers 
might expect, and with which they can easily sympathize. Too often has a critic’s silence on 
this question been taken as evidence of dissent from the allegorical tradition. Given the 
striking scarcity of explicit anti-allegorical statements in the period, it often makes just as 
much sense to interpret this silence as tacit consent to a doctrine so commonplace that a writer 
may not have felt it to require special mention. In any case, explicit references to allegory in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century poetics provide us with our most direct point of entry into 
the subject, and it seems worth our while to give them a hearing. 
 Furthermore, scholarship on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century poetics is itself so 
thoroughly permeated by the allegory-modernity problem that it is in itself of interest to our 
discussion, offering an exceptionally clear example of what is at stake in the matter, and how 
it has affected one particular tradition of modern scholarly inquiry. As even a cursory review 
of this scholarship will show, from the formative study of Joel Elias Spingarn to the present 
day, most major accounts of English Renaissance poetics have, to a greater or lesser degree, 
been Burckhardtian narratives of the (supposed) aesthetic modernity of the Renaissance 
breaking away from, and ultimately triumphing over, the (supposed) aesthetic premodernity 
of the Middle Ages. In Spingarn’s words, “the criteria by which imaginative literature was 
judged during the Middle Ages were not literary criteria”, and when it was not “disregarded 
or contemned”, “it was as the handmaiden of philosophy, and most of all as the vassal of 
theology, that poetry was chiefly valued”.
3
 By contrast, the task of Renaissance poetics is to 
lead poetry out of this lamentable captivity, “to re-establish the aesthetic foundations of 
literature, to reaffirm the eternal lesson of Hellenic culture, and to restore once and for all the 
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element of beauty to its rightful place in human life and in the world of art”.
 4
 In a word, 
Renaissance poetics is modern, and indeed that word is often found on Spingarn’s lips as he 
pursues his pioneering task of recounting how “modern criticism began”.
5
 
 
SPECTRES OF SPINGARN 
 
This view has not gone wholly uncontested, but a careful analysis of the major studies and 
anthologies shows that Spingarn’s paradigm has continued to dominate the scholarship on the 
subject. Consequently, most historians of English Renaissance poetics – although, again, not 
always to the same degree, nor with the same emphasis – have significantly understated and 
misrepresented the role played by the allegorical conception of literature in the attempts of the 
period’s critics to answer the fundamental theoretical questions of what poetry is, to which 
sphere of human endeavour it belongs, what purpose it serves, and so forth. According to this 
traditional view, nothing could be more characteristic of the literary sensibility of the Middle 
Ages, or more incompatible with that of the Renaissance. If the Middle Ages regarded poetry 
as a vassal of philosophy and theology, allegory is the very means by which this vassalage 
was exacted: “while perhaps justifying poetry from the standpoint of ethics and divinity, 
[allegory] gives it no place as an independent art; thus considered, poetry becomes merely a 
popularized form of theology”.
6
 At the same time as it is relegated to the Middle Ages, 
allegory’s presence in Renaissance poetics is suppressed by means of a number of 
characteristic evasive manoeuvres, some combination of which is encountered in most 
subsequent treatments of the subject. These have included temporal and conceptual 
displacement (in order to make it free of allegory, the Renaissance is redefined and/or 
chronologically repositioned), exclusion (texts or parts of texts advocating the allegorical 
approach to literature are omitted from studies and anthologies), understatement (appeals of 
Renaissance critics to the allegorical doctrine are acknowledged, but are presented as an 
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5
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6
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inessential and increasingly irrelevant element in their arguments), and relativisation 
(Renaissance critics do appeal to allegory, but they do not really mean it, or the allegory to 
which they appeal is not the same kind as that of the Middle Ages, or their theoretical 
statements are found to be contradicted by their own literary practice, and so on). 
Whichever of these tactics they employ, most accounts of the rise of Renaissance 
criticism inevitably turn into accounts of the decline of allegory, and just as inevitably, they 
do not proceed very far before running into major conceptual and chronological obstacles. A 
cultural historian like Burckhardt could afford to be highly selective in his treatment of the 
literature and literary criticism of the period and could thus get away with greatly under-
representing the extent to which it is imbued by allegory. A literary historian like Symonds 
already finds “the allegorical heresy” much more widespread and difficult to account for, but 
can still evade it by orthodox interpretations of the literary practice, as opposed to the 
stubbornly heretical theory, of the age.
7
 No such escape route is open to the historian of 
poetics, however, who is focused precisely on what the age preached rather than what it 
actually practiced. Thus immediately after having described it as the quintessential reflection 
of the medieval hostility towards imaginative literature, Spingarn must concede that allegory 
was not only essential to the poetical views of early humanists like Petrarch and Boccaccio, 
but that it “did indeed continue throughout the Renaissance”, that “This theory of poetic art, 
one of the commonplaces of the age, may be described as the great legacy of the Middle Ages 
to Renaissance criticism” – and, with special reference to the English tradition, that it is 
allegory which, “more than anything else, colored critical theory in Elizabethan England”.
8
 
Thus the historian of poetics finds himself torn between two irreconcilable variables, seeking 
to affirm a modernity for Renaissance criticism in terms fundamentally incompatible with the 
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 Even though “The contemporary theory of æsthetics demanded allegory”, the poet knows better than the 
theorist, and “No metaphysical sophistication, no allegory, no scholastic mysticism, can [...] cloud a poet’s 
vision” (Italian Literature, 1: 54). See Introduction, pp. 32-3, on Symonds’ estimate of Dante. Boccaccio is 
similarly said to have “repeated current theories about […] the dignity of allegory”, yet “his own work showed 
how little he had appropriated these ideas” (1: 81-7). Burckhardt’s influence is particularly palpable here. 
Compare Symonds’ estimates of Dante and Boccaccio to those in Burckhardt’s Cicerone (1: 40) and Civilization 
(1: 165): “The poetical value” of Dante’s work “rests entirely on the lofty artistic representation of single 
motives”, whereas its “symbolic meaning [...] is only valuable as literature and history, not as poetry”; Boccaccio 
“boldly set” the example for the use of pagan deities in Renaissance poetry, namely to “replace abstract terms 
[...], and render allegorical figures superfluous”. 
8
 History, 9, 261-2. 
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doctrine of allegory, while at the same time acknowledging that this doctrine was “almost 
universally accepted by Renaissance writers”.
9
 But how can Renaissance poetics stay modern 
while almost universally accepting a doctrine defined as the very essence of poetical 
premodernity? The answer, of course, is that it cannot, at least not without major concessions 
in the customary understanding of the “Renaissance”. 
Consequently, as his study progresses, Spingarn finds himself cornered into 
abandoning the lofty criteria of aesthetic modernity announced in its opening sentences for a 
more modest cause of classicist “rationalism”, and consequently into pushing “Renaissance” 
poetics forward in time to the recovery and dissemination of Aristotle’s Poetics.10 Only with 
the Poetics does it become possible to defend literature – the “justification of imaginative 
literature” being the “first” and “fundamental” concern of Renaissance criticism – on aesthetic 
rather than moral grounds, and thus without recourse to the doctrine of allegory.
11
 But the 
Poetics only lays “the foundation of modern criticism”, which does not reach maturity until it 
replaces the rule of an authority, even if that authority is Aristotle, with the rule of “reason”.
12
 
Here Spingarn’s account of Renaissance literary criticism can finally link up with the larger 
narrative of the Renaissance as codified by Burckhardt and Englished by Symonds, for this 
rationalist classicism can now be presented as a facet of that same “liberation of human 
reason” which resulted in “the growth of the sciences and arts, and in the reaction against 
mediæval sacerdotalism and dogma”.
13
 The final touch comes with the declaration that Italian 
criticism contains “the germs of romantic as well as classical criticism”, and the integration of 
this “romantic” element – which basically amounts to the Neoplatonic defence of the poetic 
                                                          
9
 Ibid., 263. 
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 Hence the subtitle: with Special Reference to the Influence of Italy in the Formation and Development of 
Modern Classicism. 
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 Ibid., 3. See esp. the discussion in the book’s first chapter. Spingarn also employs the other manoeuvres: 
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method”, the Quattrocento humanists are likewise said to have “carried it far beyond its original application” by 
admiring the literal sense of the pagan poetry even as they attended to its allegorical meanings (10). To what 
degree these views depart from those of the preceding period is debatable: for the view that early humanist 
poetics was actually a continuation of a number of trends in medieval poetics, see C. C. Greenfield, Humanist 
and Scholastic Poetics (Lewisburg, 1981); for further discussion of Greenfield’s study, see below, pp. 63-6. 
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13
 Ibid., 148. 
51 
 
imagination, minus its allegorical corollary – into the “classicist” thesis: “according as the 
reason or the imagination predominates in Renaissance literature, there results neo-classicism 
or romanticism, while the most perfect art finds a reconciliation of both elements in the 
imaginative reason”.
14
 It is in this sense, and only in this sense, that Spingarn can at last say 
that “the theory of poetry, as enunciated by the Italians of the sixteenth century, has not 
diminished in value, but has continued to pervade the finer minds of men from that time to 
this”.
15
 
Spingarn’s argument grows increasingly complex as his study progresses, yet the logic 
behind it is so simple that it can be reduced to two syllogisms, with the conclusion of the first 
providing the first premise of the second: one, Renaissance poetics is modern – allegory is not 
modern – therefore, Renaissance poetics is not allegorical; and two, Renaissance poetics is not 
allegorical – non-allegorical poetics becomes possible only with the recovery of Aristotle’s 
Poetics – therefore, Renaissance poetics becomes possible only with the recovery of 
Aristotle’s Poetics. In the end, we do get a “Renaissance” poetics superficially purged of 
allegory, but at what cost? Spingarn must sacrifice not only Petrarch and Boccaccio, but the 
entire Quattrocento as well, the heart of the Italian Renaissance as commonly understood by 
cultural and literary history alike, and even the early decades of the Cinquecento. As he 
himself notes, the earliest Italian editions of the Poetics, Giorgio Valla’s Latin translation of 
1498 and the 1508 Greek text in the Aldine Rhetores Graeci, had “scarcely any immediate 
influence on literary criticism”.
16
 Thus the beginning of Renaissance literary criticism must be 
postponed until Pazzi’s edition of 1536, for only “from this time, the influence of the 
Aristotelian canons becomes manifest in critical literature”. But again, this is only the 
foundation, for there remains the further step of replacing the authority of Aristotle with the 
authority of reason. Spingarn cites the appeal in the 1587 Discorso of Jason Denores to 
“reason and Aristotle’s Poetics, which is indeed founded on naught save reason”, and then 
adds: “This is as far as Italian criticism ever went. It was the function of neo-classicism in 
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France, as will be seen, to show that such a phrase as ‘reason and Aristotle’ is a contradiction 
in itself, that the Aristotelian canons and reason are ultimately reducible to the same thing”.
17
 
The process has to be completed by Boileau, whose strictures against the use of Christian 
themes are taken to be the culmination of that “combined effect of humanism, essentially 
pagan, and rationalism, essentially sceptical”, that produced the “irreligious character of neo-
classic art”.
18
 The year is 1674. The unspoken burden of Spingarn’s thesis – elimination of 
allegory by any means necessary – has argued its stated subject, a history of Renaissance 
literary criticism, out of existence. 
Now, while the Italian chapter required this brutal and messy amputation, and while 
the French was saved only by a most ironically un-Aristotelian intervention of a deus ex 
machina,19 in the English the analogous result could be achieved almost effortlessly, for 
unlike the Italian or the French, the English dynastic periodisation, with its long-established 
view of the reign of Elizabeth I as “the greatest period of the greatest literature of the world”, 
was uniquely suited to the task.
20
 A foreign and still fairly novel concept in Anglophone 
literary studies of Spingarn’s day, the Renaissance was naturally assimilated to its apparent 
native analogue, the Elizabethan Age.
21
 Furthermore, previous work on sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century English criticism had already traced the outlines of the “Elizabethan” 
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 The narrative stumbles in the French chapter, when it proves impossible to find any Aristotelian influence 
on French criticism before the final third of the sixteenth century, and full-blown classicist doctrine before the 
beginning of the seventeenth – “Excepting, of course, Scaliger”, an Italian, and even then “it was not until the 
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canon, reaching no further back than Gascoigne, while at the same time pushing forward at 
least up to Milton.
22
 
Thus Spingarn had ample precedent in equating, in the opening sentence of his 
English chapter, “Renaissance” with “Elizabethan” criticism, for delimiting its development 
from Gascoigne to Milton, and for treating Sidney as the turning point in the story.
23
 Sidney is 
England’s first Aristotelian, hence its first true anti-allegorist. In his analysis of the Defence of 
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 As early as 1787, an edition of Sidney’s Defence, together with extracts from Jonson’s Discoveries, was 
published by Warton; see Sir Philip Sydney’s Defence of Poetry. And, Observations on Poetry and Eloquence, 
from the Discoveries of Ben Jonson, ed. T. Warton (London, 1787), iii: “The Public has paid, of late, so much 
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Ancient Critical Essays (London, 1811-15) extended from Gascoigne’s Certayne Notes (1575) to Bolton’s 
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See Literary Pamphlets, ed. E. Rhys (London, 1897), and Critical Essays and Literary Fragments, ed. J. C. 
Collins (London, 1903), the latter culled from Arber’s English Garner, first published in 1877-90. F. E. 
Schelling, Poetic and Verse Criticism of the Reign of Elizabeth (Philadelphia, 1891), states explicitly that his 
limitation to 1580-1603 is due to the fact that his interest is primarily in the theory of versification (4). English 
Literary Criticism, ed. C. E. Vaughan (London, 1896), also shows that the conception of Elizabethan criticism as 
the first stage in the broader movement of English classicism was in place by that point: “In the strict sense, 
criticism did not begin till the age of Elizabeth [...]. From the Elizabethans to Milton, from Milton to Johnson, 
English criticism was dominated by constant reference to classical models” (x-xi). See also L. Johnson Wylie, 
Studies in the Evolution of English Criticism (Boston, 1894), who finds English classicism emerging in the 
works the Elizabethans, and already formed, in parvo, in Jonson’s Discoveries (6-15). 
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though most of the Elizabethan treatises were printed by Haslewood, and several received separate editions later 
in the century – for references, see H. F. Plett’s Bibliography (Leiden, 1995) – Sidney’s Defence is a special 
case. It never went out of print. After the initial editions of 1595, it was included in the 1598 volume of Sidney’s 
works, and was available in that form throughout the seventeenth century, while the eighteenth could consult it 
in Henley’s edition, as well as in the separate edition of the bare text printed in Glasgow in 1752, followed by 
Warton’s in 1787. Several more were published by the date of Spingarn’s History, including those by Thurlow 
(London, 1810), Arber (London, 1868), Flügel (Halle, 1889), Morley (1889; repr. London, 1909), Cook (Boston, 
1890), and Shuckburgh (Cambridge, 1891). Where they contain pertinent editorial commentary, these are 
unanimous in completely ignoring the allegorical element in the treatise, and presenting it as a work precociously 
modern it its outlook: Arber points out “Sidney’s use of the word Poet and its modern acceptation” (8); Flügel 
praises the work’s freedom from classicist precepts, emphasizes Sidney’s praise of folk poetry, and rates him 
superior to his contemporaries for not giving in to moralizing – in short, “Für England kann Sidney als der 
früheste und bedeutendste Ästhetiker (im Schiller’schen Sinne) gelten” (xlix); Morley commends the “clear, 
direct, and manly” treatise as “the first important piece of literary criticism in our literature” (9); to Cook it 
presents “a link between the soundest theory of ancient times and the romantic production of the modern era” 
(v); to Shuckburgh, much of it is “as applicable now as when Sidney penned” it (xxxi). 
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Poesy, Spingarn predictably fails to cite any of the treatise’s several references to allegory.24 
The only comment which acknowledges these passages occurs slightly later, in his summary 
of the decline of allegory in English criticism: the allegorical element is “minimized” in 
Sidney’s treatise, its “death-knell” is sounded in Bacon’s Advancement of Learning, which is 
in turn said to be “foreshadowing the development of classicism, for from the time of Ben 
Jonson the allegorical mode of interpreting poetry ceased to have any effect on literary 
criticism”.
25
 
Three years later, Saintsbury cemented Spingarn’s conception of Renaissance 
criticism in the second volume of his History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe – in 
spite of his better judgment, it may be added, for Saintsbury was no Burckhardtian. To him 
medieval achievements in literary practice take “equal rank as a whole with those of classical 
and those of modern times”,
26
 while it is the epoch of classicism, seen as one unbroken 
development stretching from the early sixteenth to the late eighteenth century, which takes on 
the role of the “middle age”, the degenerative interlude between two healthy and productive 
literary epochs. The corollary to this, however, is the claim that medieval literary theory is 
next to nonexistent, indeed that the Middle Ages’ success in the practice of literature is 
directly consequent on their lack of interest in theorizing it, and conversely, that the post-1500 
explosion of classicist theory strangled the literary production of that epoch. It thus goes 
without saying that Saintsbury does not locate the origins of modern poetics in the 
Renaissance, as indicated by the tripartite division of his study into volumes on “Classical and 
Medieval Criticism”, “From the Renaissance to the End of Eighteenth-Century Orthodoxy”, 
and, only then, “Modern Criticism”.
27
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 All of this runs directly against Spingarn’s treatment of the subject, and in fact Saintsbury chastises him 
explicitly, for unfoundedly disparaging medieval literature (ibid., 2: 7-8), and implicitly, addressing “our newest 
Neo-Classics” (2: 35), for his positive evaluation of classicism and the equation of critical modernity with 
classicist “reason”. Predictably, Spingarn in turn found Saintsbury’s sympathies to be “aggressively romantic”, 
in an article significantly entitled “The Origins of Modern Criticism”, MP 1 (1904): 477-96. Besides stating the 
central issue in no uncertain terms, the article also clearly demonstrates that the disagreements between the two 
pioneers of Anglophone metacriticism were a matter of perspective and emphasis rather than of truly 
incompatible conceptions of aesthetic modernity. After all, we have seen that Spingarn’s case for “modern 
classicism” and its “imaginative reason” was due only in a smaller part to genuine personal conviction, and 
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Yet for all his Romantic sympathies, Saintsbury’s section on Renaissance criticism is a 
faithful replica of Spingarn’s book, including, in the final analysis, the treatment of 
Renaissance allegory, although one would never expect it on the basis of its treatment in the 
first volume of the study.
28
 Although it contains numerous expressions of the modernist anti-
allegorical sentiment, his view of allegory in ancient and medieval criticism is more complex 
than that of simple derision. He fully acknowledges its presence in ancient Greek poetics, and 
his account of its transmission through later antiquity and the Middle Ages is something more 
than a sketch. “Many ingenious and industrious hands”, he says, “have traced its origin from 
Homer to Claudian, and from Claudian to the Romance of the Rose”, but he does not say how 
poorly the story was known outside of the specialist spheres of classical and patristic studies, 
and that he is the first to tell it for the benefit of the general Anglophone literary public.
29
 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
largely to the necessity of a compromise between the same high ideals of modern aesthetics espoused by his 
adversary and the sobering reality of the actual critical production of the Cinquecento. While defending his thesis 
within its narrow confines, Spingarn is perfectly comfortable with relinquishing it on the larger scale explored by 
Saintsbury: “Imitation, theory, law; wit, reason, taste – each in its turn became a guiding principle of criticism, 
until with the romantic movement all were superseded by the concept of the creative imagination” (“Origins”, 
20). Thus the two can quibble over the exact nature and proportions of these successive minor modernities, while 
taking for granted the fact of their collective supersession by the aesthetic revelation of Romanticism. 
28
 Saintsbury’s two chapters on Italian criticism, as opposed to single ones for the French and the English, are 
equivalent to Spingarn’s division of the subject. The Italian Renaissance equals the Cinquecento. The brief 
treatment of Erasmus shows him “writing in the ‘false dawn’” – “the fifteenth century, even with a generous 
eking from the earliest sixteenth, had been a time of literary torpor and literary decadence” (History of Criticism, 
2: 5, 10). The title of the French chapter, “The Criticism of the Pléiade”, indicates that Saintsbury learned 
Spingarn’s lesson the easy way, even though he takes him to task for his estimate of Du Bellay’s Defence (2: 
112). The English chapter is entitled “Elizabethan Criticism”: after a quick mention of Hawes, “that curious 
swan-singer of English medieval poetry” (2: 146), Saintsbury jumps to Wilson, Cheke, and Ascham, of whom he 
has more to say as linguistic reformers, classicists, rhetoricians, and patriots than as critics – except in the case of 
Ascham, where he takes note of his general hostility to poetry and his specific hatred of romance, illustrative of 
that “great heresy” of judging literary works according to non-literary criteria (2: 154-7). It is again with 
Gascoigne that Renaissance criticism really begins; the “observations of Ascham, Wilson, and the others” were 
“incidental merely” (2: 162, n. 3). The rest of the chapter follows the beaten path, ending with Jonson. 
29
 By comparison, Spingarn thought that mythological allegoresis was “first employed by the Sophists and 
more thoroughly by the later Stoics”, and that moral allegoresis in particular was a Christian invention, first 
applied to pagan mythology by Fulgentius (History, 7). As late as 1981, it was possible for an otherwise 
informed scholar to write that “Pagan allegorism probably began before Plato, but to our knowledge it was first 
codified by Plato and such Platonists as Maximus of Tyre and Proclus” (Greenfield, Poetics, 28). Clark’s 
account shows that more solid information was not out of reach: see D. L. Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the 
Renaissance (New York, 1922), 116, citing E. Hatch, Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian 
Church, ed. A. M. Fairbairn (London, 1890). Another available source was F. W. Farrar, History of 
Interpretation (London, 1886). Still, to this day, Saintsbury’s remains the only general history of literary 
criticism in English that discusses the ancient Greek allegorists, a subject virtually absent from the treatments of 
the period in such comparable surveys and anthologies as C. S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (New 
York, 1924); J. W. H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity (1934; repr. London, 1952); V. Hall, Jr., A Short 
History of Literary Criticism (London, 1963); H. Blamires, A History of Literary Criticism (Basingstoke, 1991); 
The Norton Anthology of Literary Criticism, ed. V. B. Leitch (New York, 2001); M. A. R. Habib, A History of 
Literary Criticism (Malden, 2005). 
56 
 
spite of the obvious aversion to allegory, and to allegorical interpretation in particular, on the 
part of the critic, it clearly exerts a certain fascination on the scholar. Even though it was 
hardly his business to do so, Quintilian is scolded for failing to do justice to “this great 
subject” – so great that “no critic has even yet exhausted, nor are a hundred critics likely to 
exhaust, the subtle and innumerable ramifications of its literary influence and 
manifestations”.
30
 
Furthermore, discussing the critical outlook of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
Saintsbury explicitly states that “The sacra fames of the whole two hundred years for 
Allegory [...] was not in the least checked by the Renaissance, though the sauce of what it 
glutted itself on was somewhat altered”.
31
 There is thus little to prepare us for the second 
volume and its section on the Renaissance, where allegory’s appearances suddenly become 
much sparser, and sparser still in the remainder of that volume, to disappear altogether with 
the onset of “Modern Criticism” in the third. This is due to a number of reasons, but chiefly to 
Saintsbury’s governing conception of criticism as primarily concerned with the form rather 
than the content of literature, and the resulting conviction that allegory, especially in its 
interpretive aspect, “has only to do with literary criticism in the sense that it is, and always has 
been, a very great degrader thereof, inclining it to be busy with matter instead of form”.
32
 
Thus even though Saintsbury’s overall thesis categorically denies modernity to Renaissance 
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satisfied with the mere literal and grammatical sense, which belongs not to literature but to science. He cannot 
help seeking some hidden meaning, something further, something behind, if it be only rhythmical beauty, only 
the suggestion of pleasure to the ear and eye and heart” (1: 11). 
31
 Ibid., 1: 448. 
32
 Ibid., 1: 11. By the same logic the Middle Ages are said to be devoid of literary criticism, even while the 
use of allegory as a mode of literary composition is noted as “perhaps the most characteristic” (1: 478) feature of 
medieval literary practice. Ironically, it is Saintsbury’s enthusiasm for the Middle Ages that saves the modernity 
of his Renaissance. Bent on producing a revisionist, anti-classicist account of European literary history, 
Saintsbury portrays medieval literature as an outburst of natural literary genius unbridled by critical constraints, 
but this can only be if allegory is not allowed into the fold of what counts as criticism, for in that case the Middle 
Ages would by no means be innocent of it. The collateral of this, however, is that the same principle must be 
maintained in the treatment of Renaissance criticism. 
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criticism, whoever consults his book for information on this particular subject will find there 
nothing that would contradict Spingarn’s account.
33
 
 It was not long before such a notion as “modern classicism”, oxymoronic as most 
would have found it already in 1899, became wholly obsolete, and G. Gregory Smith sets the 
tone for most subsequent treatments when he takes note of “the modern dislike of the classical 
elements in the essays”.
34
 Even so, subsequent studies retain Spingarn’s scheme and along 
with it the malleable premise of modernity with which it is so thoroughly imbued. Thus 
Smith’s own Elizabethan Critical Essays are nothing but Spingarn anthologized, and the 
collection’s Introduction a classic example of a carefully orchestrated deployment of the 
evasive manoeuvres outlined above.
35
 Spingarn himself completes the project in his Critical 
Essays of the Seventeenth Century, bridging the “dead water” between the freshly charted 
Elizabethan springs and the widening streams of the Restoration period.
36
 Although Spingarn 
keeps up the appearances of dynastic periodisation up to the Civil War – as opposed to 
Restoration times, where we suddenly find ourselves in “the age of Dryden”
37
 – it is clear that 
the anthology’s real rationale is still the same as in his 1899 History. Where that book told the 
story of how modern criticism began, this one tells us how modern criticism matured; if 
Sidney and his contemporaries were England’s first modern critics, Dryden is its “first great 
modern critic”.
38
 
In summary, by the first decade of the twentieth century Spingarn, Saintsbury, and 
Smith had between themselves refined and consolidated, if not exactly created, the canonical 
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 In fact, as far as the treatment of allegory is concerned, Saintsbury surpasses his immediate predecessor, 
glossing over its presence even in those cases where Spingarn had acknowledged it. See Spingarn, History, on 
Petrarch (8), Mantuan (9-10), Daniello (30), Fracastoro (34), Ronsard (193), Wilson (261), Lodge (267), and 
Sidney (276); cf. Saintsbury, History of Criticism, 1: 456, 2: 42-6, 66, 119-26, 148-51, 170-6. 
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 See Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. G. G. Smith (1904; repr. Oxford, 1950), 1: xii. Significantly, the 
subtitle of Spingarn’s study was dropped in its second edition (1908; repr. New York, 1908). 
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 Essays, ed. Smith, 1: xxiv-xxv. While acknowledging that the Elizabethan critics’ “argument of the moral 
value of Poetry is to a great extent based on the medieval doctrine of Allegory”, he hastens to add that “it is clear 
that with the progress of the general defence of Poetry this view becomes less important”, and furthermore, the 
emphasis is different from that of the preceding age; though he still appeals to the “medieval” quadriga, 
Harington “rather emphasizes the attitude of the weaker capacities who take but the pleasantness of the story and 
the sweetness of the verse”. 
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 See Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, ed. J. E. Spingarn (Oxford, 1908); Saintsbury, History of 
Criticism, 2: 365. 
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 Essays, ed. Spingarn, 1: xxi. 
38
 Ibid., 1: cvi, emphasis mine. 
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conception of English Renaissance literary criticism in the period which is the concern of the 
present study. Chronologically, it equals “Elizabethan” criticism; conceptually, it comprises 
the earliest stage in the development of English classicism; teleologically, it represents the 
origins of English literary modernity.
39
 The progress of this emergent modernity remains 
measureable in degrees of its supposed, and supposedly growing, antipathy towards allegory: 
“The allegorical substratum of Sidney’s theory was a mediaeval survival repugnant to the 
seventeenth century: for the allegorist the plot or fable was merely the veil of an inner truth, 
the coating of a bitter but wholesome pill; for the neo-classicist it was all in all.”
40
 The 
exceptions merely prove the rule: Spingarn prints Henry Reynolds’ Mythomystes, but is 
careful to identify “this perverse work” as a deviation from the straight path trod by Sidney, 
Jonson, and Dryden.
41
 
Sweeting’s Early Tudor Criticism, a quest for “proof of a ‘Renascence’ outlook, 
existing not yet in the age but in individuals”,
42
 presents an important development in 
extending the field of inquiry back to the late fifteenth century, as well as in drawing attention 
to the educational context. However, the influence of the canonical approach is evident in her 
demarcation of the territory of her study as “Early Tudor”, and her statement of the book’s 
aim as one of identifying “the lines of preparation and advance which activate the Elizabethan 
material widely known through such collections as Smith’s Elizabethan Critical Essays”, as 
                                                          
39
 For further consolidation, see The Theory of Poetry in England, ed. R. P. Cowl (London, 1914), and 
English Critical Essays, ed. E. D. Jones (1922; repr. London, 1959). Jones no longer needs any justification, so 
none is issued is in his brief Preface, for covering “English critical thought from the Renaissance to the Revival 
of Romanticism” (v). Cf. also the equation of “Renaissance” with classicist criticism in C. S. Baldwin’s 
Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice, ed. D. L. Clark (New York, 1939): “The distinctive literary changes, 
indeed, were hardly attained before the sixteenth century. Though humanism as a theory was established in the 
fifteenth, the literary product of that century was generally feeble, as of a Middle Age gone to seed” (14). 
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 Essays, ed. Spingarn, 1:xviii. Cf. esp. G. A. Thompson, Elizabethan Criticism of Poetry (Menasha, 1914), 
the first topically rather than chronologically arranged study of the subject, which includes a section on “Poetry 
as Fiction – Allegory, Imitation” (92-112). The section is of interest for tackling the subject of allegory in a more 
systematic manner than previous studies – and most subsequent ones as well – but it reproduces the classic 
narrative: allegorical poetics, a medievalist atavism present in a number of Elizabethan authors, is “one of the 
chief stumbling blocks in the way of an acceptance of fiction in poetry”; it is overcome, however, by Sidney’s 
poetics of “ideal imitation”, “labor[ing] earnestly to set forth the high nature and significance of pure fiction and 
to establish it as the basis and test of poetry”; Sidney’s appeals to allegory are registered but minimized – he was 
“evidently not strongly of the allegorical turn of mind and doubtless was repelled by the fantastic absurdities of 
over-elaborate interpretations”; under Sidney’s influence, even Spenser “seems to have been on the verge of 
giving that free scope to his creative imagination that would relinquish allegory for ideal imitation or pure 
fiction”, etc. 
41
 Ibid., 1:xxi. 
42
 E. J. Sweeting, Early Tudor Criticism (Oxford, 1940), 138. 
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well as in her approach to allegory.
43
 It is from Spingarn and Smith that she has learned that 
“One mode of examining the literary taste of the age is the study of its modifications of 
allegory, the ‘dominant form’ of the Middle Ages”.
44
 These “modifications”, however, can 
move in only one direction, and Sweeting’s approach to allegory amounts to projecting onto 
“Early Tudor” materials the same narrative of gradual deallegorisation already established for 
the Elizabethan period.
45
 
As Spingarn’s conception of “Renaissance” criticism was naturalized to the English 
corpus by a translation into “Elizabethan” terms, so it outlived the heyday of dynastic 
periodisation by back-translation into “Renaissance”. Indeed, the two terms become largely 
interchangeable, as witnessed by the use of the phrase “Elizabethan Renaissance”,
46
 or the 
more common and still frequent use of the two terms in conjunction. Another variation is 
Pater’s “Renascence”, which we have just seen used by Sweeting, and which is also employed 
in the 1947 volume in Atkins’ series of studies, the third Anglophone attempt, after 
Saintsbury’s and Baldwin’s, to cover the whole span from antiquity to modern times. Atkins’ 
innovation is in joining Sweeting’s “Early Tudor” prelude to the “Elizabethan” mainstream, 
making him the first to tell the story ab ovo, from the laying of the proverbial Erasmian egg 
and its hatching by Colet to the scattered critical remarks of Milton, “the last voice of the 
Renascence in England”.
47
 One consequence of this broadening of perspective is an increased 
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 Ibid., ix. 
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 Ibid., 1. The citation is from C. S. Lewis’s Allegory of Love (1936; repr. London, 1972), ch. 6. 
45
 Ironically, the earliest early Tudor to be cited in her discussion is Hawes, lamenting how the poets of his 
day have stopped writing in the allegorical manner of his “mayster Lydgate”, and how they “spend theyr tyme in 
vaynfull vanyte/ Makynge balades of feruent amyte/ As gestes and tryfles / without fruytfulnes”; see S. Hawes, 
The Pastime of Pleasure, ed. W. E. Mead (London, 1928), ll. 48, 1390-2. To Hawes, then, the idea that he was 
modifying an existing allegorical tradition, not to mention liberating himself from allegory altogether, would 
have seemed most strange – what he saw himself as doing was resurrecting, in all its unadulterated 
“parfytenesse” (l. 47), a venerable tradition neglected by his literal-minded contemporaries. Sweeting further 
explains how the “Renascence” rescued poetry from its allegorical thraldom in the Middle Ages (Criticism, 121-
2), and also employs the familiar tactics of understatement and relativisation (3-5). The account of Skelton is 
typical, beginning with the poet’s explicit acceptance of the theory of allegory in its traditional form, and then 
explaining that this theory had little influence on his actual poetic practice, which sees him gradually “discarding 
[...] the type as he passes from the abstract to concrete and from indirect to direct statement”, and finally 
producing works “free of allegory”, and thus “more directly personal and human”. Of the morality play we are 
similarly told that “through its deployment of Allegory it is linked to a medieval dominant form”, but that it now 
“becomes in a special degree the mouthpiece of the early Tudor period”, and “has to be considered primarily as 
the product and expression of its own age” (126). 
46
 For example by A. L. Rowse, The Elizabethan Renaissance (London, 1971-2). 
47
 J. W. H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The Renascence (London, 1947), 336. 
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attention to allegory. Yet even though Atkins amply acknowledges its presence in 
“Renascence” poetics, he is at the same time faithfully following in Spingarn’s footsteps: thus 
he can claim that the allegorical view of literature is “the most prevalent” one in the period, 
only to add in the very same paragraph that “To modern readers this allegorical theory is 
obviously of historical interest only”, as it fails “to account for those qualities that have 
characterized great poetry throughout the ages”, and confines it “to the coteries of the 
initiated”.
48
 Although Atkins attempts to cover the whole of the century, we are pulled into 
the “Elizabethan” orbit already around the seventieth of the book’s 363 pages; although he 
begins with Erasmus, Sidney’s Defence still finds us only in “the dawn of the great 
efflorescence”; although allegory is omnipresent, the day is saved by the more “illuminating” 
of the Elizabethans – Sidney, Puttenham, and Bacon.
49
 The continued influence of the pattern 
is particularly clear in later anthologies covering the same ground as the formative collections 
of Smith and Spingarn, which are invariably anthologies of “Renaissance” criticism, even 
though their effective time-span remains the “Elizabethan” one.
50
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 Ibid., 138, 150. But only on the condition of ignoring these authors’ appeals to allegory: Sidney’s in the 
Defence – which gave “the ‘poet-haters’ a crushing yet dignified reply, and this without recourse to the 
convenient but unsatisfying allegorical doctrine” (125) – Puttenham’s in The Arte of English Poesy, and Bacon’s 
more complex view in De sapientia veterum and De augmentis scientiarum, as further discussed below. Nor is 
Atkins beyond such relativising conjectures as that made about the prominence of allegory in Harington’s 
“Apologie”: he recognizes it as Harington’s “main line of defence”, but suspects that the “stress thus laid on the 
didactic function of poetry may have been partly due to a courtier’s desire to placate an offended Queen” (194-
5); cf. n. 131 below. 
50
 See English Literary Criticism: The Renaissance, ed. O. B. Hardison, Jr. (London, 1967); English 
Renaissance Literary Criticism, ed. B. Vickers (Oxford, 1999); Sir Philip Sidney’s “The Defence of Poesy” and 
Selected Renaissance Literary Criticism, ed. G. Alexander (London, 2004). Hardison’s anthology opens with a 
tip of the hat to Caxton and his services in the advancement of the English tongue, only to make a seven-decade 
leap to Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique; Vickers similarly makes it to Wilson in only two stops, Elyot’s Governor 
and Surrey’s epitaph on Wyatt; with less space at his disposal, Alexander cuts straight to Gascoigne. Predictably, 
this is paralleled by the tendency to extend this Renaissance of the late sixteenth century well into the 
seventeenth, and to suppress the allegorical element in the resulting corpus. Thus neither of the anthologies 
includes Lodge’s “Reply to Gosson”, nor Reynolds’ Mythomystes, to mention only two very important works, 
even though these are included in the collections of Smith and Spingarn, respectively. Vickers’ antipathy 
towards allegory (implicit here, but see his Appropriating Shakespeare [New Haven, 1993], ch. 7), combined 
with his sympathy for rhetoric (In Defence of Rhetoric [Oxford, 1988]) and his conviction that the culture of 
Renaissance England was “a truly homogenous culture, in which theory and practice interlocked” (Criticism, 
vii), makes for a particularly indicative case. The only mention of allegory in Vickers’ introduction is in the 
statement, following directly on a nod back to Spingarn, that “In the Middle Ages, [...] only those works of 
literature were valued that had an explicitly moral and educational function, or could be given one 
retrospectively by allegorical interpretation” (Criticism, 47). In this same passage, Vickers notes that “Two 
outstanding early humanists confronted medieval enmity with well-argued defences, Giovanni Boccaccio in De 
genealogia deorum [...], and Coluccio Salutati in De laboribus Herculis” – as if these well-argued humanist 
defences were anything other than veritable monuments of mythological allegoresis. Appeals to allegory in 
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At this point, as our account of the fortunes of the allegory-modernity nexus in the 
study of English criticism moves into the latter half of the twentieth century, it is time to 
devote some attention to Weinberg’s History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance 
and the enormous influence that book has had, even though wholly restricted to Italian 
materials, on all subsequent treatments of the subject. Moreover, Weinberg’s example is 
particularly interesting because his study was a deliberate “experiment in writing intellectual 
history” according to the doctrines of the so-called Chicago Aristotelianism, especially R. S. 
Crane’s ideas about “history [...] without a thesis”.
51
 In theory, then, it is here that we should 
expect an approach to the history of poetical thought that will not be trying to fit the materials 
to any preconceived historical concepts and patterns, and we are indeed assured that the 
approach is determined exclusively “by the nature of the materials” themselves.
52
 In practice, 
however, it is easy to see that Weinberg’s approach is governed by two very definite, 
interrelated, and rigorously executed theses. The first is overtly stated in the Preface, where 
Weinberg explains that his method of discerning “the main intellectual traditions of the 
century as they related to literary criticism” will be “to distinguish and identify them as 
developments and continuations of three great critical positions of the classical past: those of 
Plato, Aristotle, and Horace”.
53
 Today it should be striking to see the ancient allegorists so 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
works anthologized by Vickers, but omitted from his extracts, include the section “Of enlargynge examples by 
copye” in Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique; Puttenham’s Art of English Poesy, 1.12, where Puttenham not only 
endorses an allegorical understanding of mythological poetry, but mentions that he has written a whole work 
devoted to the subject of pagan religion, his lost “books of Hierotechnē”, which would have in all probability 
been heavily allegorical in approach; two fairly short passages from Harington’s “Briefe Apologie”, one in 
which Harington exemplifies his allegorical theory of poetry by a fourfold exposition of the myth of Perseus, the 
other where he defends poetry, so defined, against the objections of Plato and Aristotle. See T. Wilson, The Arte 
of Rhetorique ([London], 1553), Cc3v-Dd1v; G. Puttenham, The Art of English Poesy, ed. F. Whigham and W. 
A. Rebhorn (Ithaca, 2007), 119; L. Ariosto, Orlando Fvrioso in English Heroical Verse, trans. J. Harington 
(London, 1591), ¶4r-v.  
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 B. Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago, 1961), vii-viii. On 
Weinberg’s debt to Crane, see R. Wellek, “My Answer to Bernard Weinberg’s Review of My History of Modern 
Criticism”, JHI 30 (1969): 281-2. For the cited phrase see R. S. Crane, The Idea of the Humanities (Chicago, 
1967), 2: 174. Weinberg’s allegiance to the Chicago school is made explicit in the book’s dedication to Crane, R. 
McKeon, and E. Olson. 
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 Weinberg, History, ix. 
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 Ibid., viii. Furthermore, these positions cannot be followed in the manner of traditional intellectual history, 
where either authors or ideas form the basic unit of organization, but must be traced individual text by individual 
text, respecting the specific configuration of ideas presented by each particular endeavour. (Cf. Crane’s 
arguments in Idea, 2: 157-75, an article originally published in 1953; the parallels with the New Critical 
approach to literary analysis are clear – indeed, the Chicago-Aristotelian approach to analyzing critical texts may 
be fitly described as the New Metacriticism.) Thus it is further claimed that “any individual text, taken in its 
entirety, should be classifiable under one or another of the major traditions; or at least its major tendencies may 
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arbitrarily omitted from the list, but Weinberg is only following his sources, however 
unwilling he may be to acknowledge them.
54
 If and when encountered in the texts, allegory is 
thus not to be treated as a vital critical position in its own right, but as an auxiliary concern at 
best, if not simply as a “failure” or an “inconsistency”.
55
 
The second of Weinberg’s theses is the Burckhardtian one, mapping a teleology of 
modernity onto the premise of a fundamental break between the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance. Unlike the first, it is never openly stated, for it is precisely such histories with 
theses that a Chicago Aristotelian seeks to avoid, yet it is betrayed by occasional slips 
scattered among the hundreds of pages of Weinberg’s indefatigable analyses – slips which, 
predictably, have to do with allegory.
56
 Ultimately, the conviction that history can be written 
without a thesis leads the historian only into unconsciously adopting the most conventional, 
and therefore the most problematic, of theses. Once set into action, Weinberg’s experiment 
thus unerringly reproduces Spingarn’s old scheme. A history of Renaissance criticism might 
be what the title promises, yet when the question of periodisation is tackled directly, 
Weinberg can speak of the Renaissance only without the capital “R”, or in quotation marks, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
be expected to bear some resemblance to one of the major tendencies of the century – unless it is a completely 
eclectic work” (Weinberg, History, viii). The obvious objection here is that eclecticism and syncretism are the 
norm rather than the exception in Renaissance criticism. Thus it turns out that nearly one third of the total 
number of critics discussed in the book (55 out of 183 by my count) cannot be firmly identified as either 
Horatians (ch. 3-6), or Platonists (ch. 7-8), or Aristotelians (ch. 9-13), but have to be discussed under at least two 
of these headings. Even more significant is the fact that these 55 fence-sitters are all among the 62 critics who 
can – according to Weinberg’s own standards, indicated by devoting titled subsections to such critics, “to call 
attention to the most important documents” (x) – be qualified as major. Thus the more important a critic is, the 
less it is possible to classify him according to the stated scheme. 
54
 See esp. Saintsbury, History of Criticism, 2: 213: “The main texts and patterns of the critics of the Italian 
Renaissance were three – the Ars Poetica of Horace, the Poetics of Aristotle, and the various Platonic places 
dealing with poetry.” Cf. Spingarn, History, 18-23. 
55
 Weinberg, History, viii. See below, n. 58, on the omission of allegory from Weinberg’s accounts of a 
number of important texts. Also indicative is his treatment of Horace’s Ars poetica, in that it wholly ignores its 
allegorical interpretations of the myths of Orpheus and Amphion, through which Horace’s epistle joined the 
numerous ancient authorities advocating the doctrine. 
56
 Thus we read that the defence of poetry by the Horatian critics partly “consists in the allegorical 
interpretation of poetry, where again both a renewed Platonism and a continued medievalism enter into the sum 
of ‘Horatian’ ideas”, and that the “old medieval justification by allegory still serves as an auxiliary to the 
discussion of the utilitarian ends of poetry” (Weinberg, History, 109, 198). The familiar identification of allegory 
with the Middle Ages – a “thesis” by any, and especially by Chicago-Aristotelian standards – is matched by 
Weinberg’s equally revealing comment on the prominence of allegorical poetics in the 1564 commentary on 
Horace by Francesco Filippi Pedemonte, said to demonstrate that this critic’s “whole conception of the ends of 
poetry is unaffected by his study and his citation of Aristotle” (115). The implication is that a true Aristotelian 
cannot be an allegorist, and, mutatis mutandis, that a truly Renaissance critic must be an Aristotelian. This is the 
reason, precisely as it was with Spingarn, for pushing the emergence of “Renaissance” criticism to the 
Cinquecento, and specifically to the 1536 edition of the Poetics by A. Pazzi (367). 
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as disintegrated into phases.
57
 The only escape route is the one paved by Spingarn: again the 
Renaissance is pushed forward to the assimilation of the rediscovered Poetics, again allegory 
is relegated to the thereby extended Middle Ages, again its presence in the texts from the 
hither side of the great divide is suppressed and relativized.
58
 
 Weinberg’s influence has been immense, and there is no better example of it than the 
case of Greenfield’s Humanist and Scholastic Poetics, 1250-1500, surveying fifteen Italian 
critics stretching from Dante in the thirteenth to Bartolomeo Fontius in the earliest decades of 
the sixteenth century, primarily in the context of Kristeller’s revisionary account of humanism 
and scholasticism as two simultaneous and competing movements lasting throughout and 
beyond the Renaissance.
59
 The influence of such scholars as Kristeller, Curtius, and Seznec 
makes Greenfield’s the first major study of Renaissance criticism to operate on the premise of 
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 Ibid., ix: “I have given to the term ‘Renaissance’ a highly restricted meaning: I have limited it to the 
sixteenth century, except for those few cases in which I have found it necessary to trace a movement back into 
the Quattrocento. Here again, the decision was determined by the nature of the materials. The Cinquecento was 
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Commenting on L. Pariguolo’s 1586 Questione della poesia, Weinberg notes that this critic’s appeal to allegory 
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 See P. O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, rev. ed. (New York, 1961), ch. 5. Kristeller contributed a 
Foreword to Greenfield’s book. 
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continuity rather than rupture between medieval and postmedieval tradition, which has 
numerous important repercussions, particularly in the role assigned to allegory. Thus 
Greenfield explicitly criticizes “the nineteenth-century prejudice that allegory was a medieval 
invention rejected by humanists, who turned to a nonallegorical antiquity”, as well as the view 
of “Late Crocean aestheticians like Spingarn”, who “have read the humanist emphasis on 
‘form’ as an emphasis on beauty and pleasure for its own sake”, a view which “does not find 
support in humanist poetics”.
60
 On the contrary, not only is scriptural allegoresis essential to 
both scholastic and humanist modes of thought, but non-scriptural allegoresis is a specifically 
humanist cause and indeed the “central issue” in the humanist-scholastic debate.
61
 
Accordingly, the traditional configuration of the allegory-modernity nexus is turned on 
its head. It is scholasticism, grounded in the new translations of Aristotle, that presents a 
novelty in the intellectual landscape of thirteenth-century Italy, while it is humanism that 
“retained the general scheme of medieval culture against the contemporary attempt of the 
scholastic culture to supersede it”, and it is scholasticism, in accordance with Aquinas’ dictum 
that “In no science invented by humans [...] can be found anything but the literal sense”, that 
denounces the allegorical approach to secular literature, while it is humanism that champions 
it.
62
 All this, needless to say, strikes right at the root of the Spingarnian orthodoxy – or rather, 
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Mussato was a Humanist and thus a forerunner of the Renaissance; this is demonstrated by the fact that he 
opposed the enemies of poetry. But all the critics fail to go into Fra Giovanino’s theses and hence into the central 
issue of the controversy. The monk makes his attack not on poetry but on the idea that poetry is an ars divina and 
even a theology. [...] But [Mussato’s] theory of poetry and his controversy with Fra Giovanino have little to do 
with the Humanism of the trecento. As a poet and as a theorist of poetry, Mussato follows the paths which the 
Latin poetry of the North had long since opened. In the controversy, he represents tradition – or, if anyone 
prefers, reaction. The Dominican, on the other hand, represents the thinking which at that time was modern: 
Aquinas’s theory of knowledge and of art. Behind this opposition, to be sure, there lies the eternal quarrel 
between the philosopher and the poet. Thomism made the quarrel flare up anew” (Literature, 216-21). For a 
critique of Greenfield’s emphasis on Aquinas, see Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. A. J. Minnis and 
A. B. Scott (Oxford, 1988), 10-11. However, Minnis and Scott only object that Aquinas is atypical, and that 
other scholastics were less averse to secular allegoresis, not to the claim for the centrality of allegory to humanist 
poetics. Greenfield herself acknowledges that the line between “humanist” and “scholastic” could become 
blurred, or at least that card-carrying humanists and scholastics could still enjoy “friendly and even close 
relationships”, and that their “competition was not a personal but a cultural one” (Poetics, 147). Interesting, for 
example, is the case of Dominici vs. Salutati, with the scholastic Dominici dedicating his Lucula noctis to none 
other than the arch-humanist Salutati, just like S. Gosson would dedicate his Schoole of Abuse to Sidney. 
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it almost does, for there is another major influence on Greenfield’s thesis which pulls in the 
opposite direction, that of Weinberg and the unquestioned authority of his two imposing, 
densely packed tomes.
63
 Ultimately, Weinberg’s influence determines the book’s overall 
conceptual and historical framework. Not even Kristeller can withstand it. Greenfield 
repeatedly cites Kristeller’s Renaissance Thought, where the Renaissance is defined as “that 
period of Western European history which extends approximately from 1300 to 1600, without 
any preconceptions as to the characteristics or merits of that period, or of those periods 
preceding and following it”.
64
 The obvious objections to the latter portion of this statement 
can be passed over here; what is important is that Kristeller, like most other scholars, sees the 
Renaissance as lasting from the fourteenth through the sixteenth century, with the 
“approximately” added to account for the few decades of overflow into the thirteenth century 
in the case of Italy, and into the seventeenth in the transalpine countries. Accordingly, in his 
Foreword to Greenfield’s book Kristeller defines the period covered in it as that of “the later 
Middle Ages and the early Renaissance”.
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 Just two pages later, however, in the opening 
sentence of Greenfield’s own Preface, we meet with a crucially different description: “While 
the history of literary criticism in the Renaissance has been written several times”, she begins, 
“practically no work has been devoted to humanist poetics, that is, to the development of a 
theory of poetry from Petrarch to Pontano”.
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 Just how deep this influence runs is most clearly seen in Greenfield’s Preface: her whole methodology is 
simply taken over from Weinberg’s Preface to his History, to the point where what she evidently thinks of as her 
own sentences are sometimes almost verbatim reproductions of Weinberg’s. Thus Greenfield notes that she has 
“not followed any author through his career or any concept through the century” (Poetics, 12). Given that her 
study encompasses two and a half centuries, one is puzzled by this reference to “the century”, until it triggers the 
memory of a passage from Weinberg’s History: “I have not sought to follow any author through his career or any 
term and concept through the century” (viii). Other examples include: “What I have said about each text does not 
represent the totality of its contents” (Greenfield, Poetics, 12); “what I have said about any individual text is not 
intended to represent the totality of its contents” (Weinberg, History, viii); “I present them [i.e. the translations 
included in the study] with the usual modesty of the translator” (Greenfield, Poetics, 13); “I present these 
translations with the usual reservations of the translator” (Weinberg, History, x). 
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 Kristeller, Thought, 3-4. 
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 Greenfield, Poetics, 9. 
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 Ibid., 11. This is no slip: the division between “Humanist and Scholastic” and “Renaissance” is both 
conceptual and chronological, and is maintained methodically throughout the book. “Humanist and scholastic 
poetics, and thus Humanism and Scholasticism, were not replaced the one by the other. They were revived about 
the same time and grew side by side until the Renaissance.” The acceptance, via Weinberg, of Spingarn’s 
equation of the Renaissance with the recovery of Aristotle’s Poetics is particularly clear in statements such as the 
one that “Out of this medieval Neoplatonic tradition there emerges a group of doctrines that reappears in the 
poetics of all the major humanists up to the Renaissance, when the influence of the Poetics definitely overtakes 
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 It should be clear by this point that much more than terminology is at stake. Defining 
the subject as “Renaissance” or even “early Renaissance” would bring Greenfield into direct 
conflict with Weinberg, and through him, with the whole canonical conception of the subject 
outlined in the preceding pages. It would raise some very awkward questions, for example 
that of the fate of allegory in the post-1500 period: how did an issue that had been of “central” 
importance for two and a half centuries become virtually irrelevant almost overnight? More 
broadly, it would make one think twice about Weinberg’s dismissal of the Quattrocento as 
having “provided only a minor impetus in the domain of literary criticism”, and consequently 
of his whole conception of “Renaissance” criticism.
67
 Does it make more sense to find 
Renaissance criticism practiced in the period, and by the figures, to which that term 
customarily applies, or to make it begin almost at the point at which the Italian Renaissance, 
as commonly understood, ends? Eventually, such questions would reverberate in the 
scholarship on the English tradition. Does it make sense to begin the story of English 
Renaissance criticism in the final quarter of the sixteenth century, more than a hundred years 
after the early stirrings of English humanism, and many decades after Erasmus and Colet? By 
dropping the curtain at 1500, and excising the word “Renaissance” from her vocabulary, 
Greenfield elegantly avoids such questions, but also forfeits the chance to make a more 
substantial revision of the canonical account of the subject. 
While the achievements of either Weinberg’s History or Greenfield’s Poetics are not 
to be disputed, the latter should serve as a warning against uncritically accepting the distinctly 
Spingarnian underpinnings of the former. A more recent example of such uncritical reception 
is afforded by Glyn P. Norton’s Introduction to the Renaissance volume in The Cambridge 
History of Literary Criticism, in which Norton fails to mention any of his numerous 
predecessors until he reaches the final paragraph, where, in “One final coda”, he showers 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Neoplatonic influence” (Poetics, 24; cf. 269). Except when referring to the scholarship of others, notably 
Kristeller, the term “Renaissance” is almost never employed in relation to any of the authors discussed in the 
book, including such major fifteenth-century figures as Ficino or Poliziano. 
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 Weinberg, History, ix. 
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praise on Weinberg.
68
 However, while Weinberg’s influence on Norton is certainly clear, 
several contributions to the volume espouse positions wholly incompatible with Weinberg’s, 
especially with respect to the troublesome subject of allegory.
69
 This tension is emblematic of 
the state of scholarship on English Renaissance criticism, where in spite of all the work, 
beginning with the so-called “Revolt of the Medievalists” in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, which has sought to revise the classic Burckhardtian conception of the Renaissance, 
in spite of the now easily accessible fruits of what has been termed the “‘golden age’ for the 
study of medieval literary theory and criticism”, and finally, the enormous advances in the 
research on the allegorical tradition already discussed in the Introduction, Spingarn’s narrative 
survives almost unscathed.
70
 
                                                          
68
 History, ed. Norton, 21: “The luminosity of his scholarship has not dimmed over the years and, as this 
volume attests, continues to invigorate critical dialogue and bring us back to fundamental theoretical issues about 
great writing.” 
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 For example, already in the second chapter, M. Jeanneret’s on “Renaissance Exegesis”, we are told that 
“Allegorical reading was particularly active in Italy, where (there being no gap between the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance) it continued well into the sixteenth century” (ibid., 37). By contrast, in his own editorial synthesis 
Norton can still accommodate allegory only under the standard Spingarnian terms: the sole mention of it occurs 
in a comment on how the chaste marriage of Philology and Protestantism put an end to the depraved ménage à 
quatre of medieval exegesis (4). Erasmus is noted as “chief” (4) among those instrumental in achieving this end, 
yet in Jeanneret’s chapter (40), as well as in M. O’Rourke Boyle’s on “Evangelism and Erasmus” (48-9), we are 
duly reminded that Erasmus was in fact a fervent advocate of scriptural allegoresis. Allegory goes unmentioned 
even in relation to the Florentine Neoplatonists (16), yet several contributors (37, 67, 91-2, 153, 162, 204) go on 
to explain that Renaissance Neoplatonism was in fact very much invested in allegory, including M. J. B. Allen, 
in whose chapter on “Renaissance Neoplatonism” it is particularly emphasized and indeed described as the “key 
to the validity of poetry in the Platonic republic” (439). In spite of this, Norton uses “Renaissance” and “early 
modern” interchangeably, and notes that Renaissance criticism breathes an “air of modernity” (2, 8). The blurb 
promotes the volume as being “the first to explore as part of an unbroken continuum the critical legacy both of 
the humanist rediscovery of ancient learning and of its neoclassical reformulation”, a claim inexplicable in the 
light of the efforts of the Edwardians – particularly the second volume of Saintsbury’s History – and at the same 
time testimony to their lasting influence. 
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 See Ferguson, Renaissance, ch. 11; Cambridge History of Literary Criticism: The Middle Ages, ed. A. 
Minnis and I. Johnson (Cambridge, 2005), 3. Spingarn’s influence extends even to studies which have diverged 
from the dominant pattern in other respects. Such is the case, for example, with V. Hall, Jr., Renaissance 
Literary Criticism (New York, 1945), a genuinely ground-breaking attempt at a socially contextualized 
examination of the subject – and one omitted, as it happens, in R. Matz’s Defending Literature in Early Modern 
England (Cambridge, 2000). Hall’s analyses are purest New Historicism, minus the Foucauldian jargon and neo-
Burckhardtian presentism: not only does Renaissance criticism reflect the ideological agenda of the Renaissance 
elite, it also vitally participates in its production and dissemination. Moreover, Hall makes no attempt to conceal 
his disgust with this elite: the ruthless absolutism of the rulers, the pedantic snobbery of the humanists, and 
ultimately – and intimately related to these – the esoteric authoritarianism of the critics. Not that it was ever 
unknown that the Renaissance had a dark side, so memorably portrayed in those inimitable vignettes in 
Burckhardt’s Civilization, the stuff of contemporary horror fiction: zombie-like bands of murderous peasants 
roaming the apocalyptic landscape in the aftermath of the invasion of Charles VIII, Ferdinand I chuckling as he 
shows off his museum of mummies, Cesare Borgia prefiguring the monstrosities of Ellis’s American Psycho. Yet 
although such things make “one’s hair stand on end”, Burckhardt still concludes that “Good and evil lie 
strangely mixed together in the Italian States of the fifteenth century”, and that “to form an adequate moral 
judgment” of such figures, and of the age which they are taken to epitomize, “is no easy task” (Civilization, 11, 
24). The title of the famous chapter is “The State as a Work of Art”, one section of which is titled “War as a 
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Given the critical bent of this conclusion and the foregoing analyses, it is perhaps 
worth emphasizing at this point what should be obvious enough, namely that the corpus of 
works we have been discussing does not represent the whole of the scholarship on 
Renaissance criticism, which contains numerous worthy contributions by several generations 
of scholars, of which many will receive mention in the remainder of this chapter. The focus 
here has been almost exclusively on anthologies and book-length studies, especially those 
which may be taken as representative of the established opinion on the subject – and of course 
even in these there is much that is valuable in spite of the interpretive biases that I have tried 
to bring to light. Their authors went to work under the influence of the established historical 
conception of the Renaissance, expecting to find a corresponding state of affairs in their own 
field of inquiry. When they could not find it in the Renaissance as commonly understood – 
late thirteenth through sixteenth century in Italy, with variable amounts of transalpine delay – 
they were forced to resort to measures which distorted the notion almost beyond recognition.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Work of Art”. For Hall, however, writing in the shadow of a war the likes of which Burckhardt, for all his 
premonitions, could not begin to imagine, the task is easy enough: “Hitler, we know, asserted that he is ruling 
under the constitution; so did the Medici” (Criticism, 4). At least one reviewer – F. M. Krouse in MLN 61 
(1946): 135-6 – recognized the direct confrontation with Burckhardt: “Mr. Hall’s sharp departure from 
Burckhardt’s view of the Renaissance state as a work of art is also of interest: to Mr. Hall the work of art is a 
state.” But if this chiasmus anticipates L. Montrose’s celebrated dictum about the historicity of texts and the 
textuality of history, of the idea that we are dealing with a modern or even a protomodern poetics – an idea still 
essential to much of the work that unfolded under the banners of the New Historicism and Cultural Materialism 
– there is not a trace. How could a twentieth-century reader possibly relate to poetical doctrines in which “the 
aristocratic, hierarchical society is accepted as the norm”, and which make one wonder “whether a more liberal 
democratic idea was even possible in that age” (Hall, Criticism, 2)? Yet if there is no trace of Burckhardtian 
presentism, there is no trace of allegory either, even though nothing so aptly exemplifies the sentiment of odi 
profanum vulgus which Hall analyzes across the three national traditions. For example, the very phrase – 
Horace’s, of course, from Odes, 3.1.1 – appears as the motto on the title page of Olney’s edition of Sidney’s 
Apologie for Poetrie (London, 1595), or in the epistle to Chapman’s Ouids Banquet of Sence (London, 1595), 
published in the same year, encouraging an allegorical reading of the poem: “The prophane multitude I hate, & 
onelie consecrate my strange Poems to these searching spirits, who[m] learning hath made noble, and nobilitie 
sacred” (A2r). See also Clark’s Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance, where we find a radicalized version of 
Saintsbury’s position, reproducing Spingarn’s formative account even as it emphatically denies the modernity on 
which this account was premised. Clark’s narrative amounts almost wholly to that of the “gradual abandonment” 
in Renaissance poetics of “the popular mediaeval preoccupation with allegory, in favour of the classical view 
which considered example as the best vehicle for moral improvement”, a trajectory fully accomplished in Italian, 
but making “slow headway” in English criticism” (132, 139). “In particular the vogue of allegory did not yield to 
the idea of moral example transferred from rhetoric to poetic” (139), and Clark traces its persistence in Wilson, 
Gascoigne, Lodge, Harington, Webbe, and Reynolds, but not in Puttenham and Bacon – the latter is said to 
“have given the coup de grace to allegory in England” (156); cf. Spingarn’s “death-knell” (History, 276) – and 
only partly in Sidney (148). All of this is entirely conventional. Unconventional, however, is Clark’s final 
paragraph, revealing his view of the present significance of his subject: his study, as he has says, has been one of 
“critical perversions”, and the “failure” of Renaissance poetics “should serve as a warning” against any further 
“confusion between rhetoric and poetic” (161). Thus even authors who denounce Renaissance criticism as an 
ideological and/or aesthetic perversion find themselves reproducing the canonical pattern, even though built on 
premises diametrically opposite to their own. 
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This is, emphatically, not to say that all these scholars were simply in the wrong. In 
fact, the consistency of their failures to produce a viable history of Renaissance poetics is 
actually a rather conclusive success, proving that they did not blindly impose their premises 
on materials that so strongly resisted them, and that they knew better than to bow to the logic 
of broad cultural history when this logic threatened to obscure specifically literary-historical 
developments. In other words, it is not because of a lack of able pens that a coherent account 
of Renaissance poetics has not yet been written, but because of a conceptual impasse at the 
very heart of the subject these pens have proposed to treat. A viable history of Renaissance 
poetics has not yet been written because it cannot be written, and the reason why it cannot be 
written is that the concept of the Renaissance, as originally formulated in reference to the 
spheres of classical learning and the fine arts, and subsequently expanded into a whole-scale 
cultural epoch said to represent the emergence of Western modernity, the dawning of the 
world as we still know it, did not take into account a substantial portion of the literary and 
literary-critical materials produced in the period the concept is supposed to cover. Therefore 
these materials will always remain a foreign body in any literary history of the period which 
rises to Wellek’s old challenge of being both literary and a history, and will keep returning to 
haunt anyone who, unconvinced by the present analysis, decides to take another swing at the 
same impossible task. 
 Allegory, as we have seen, is the chief among these revenants. Historians perform 
rushed funerals of this arch-nemesis of modern aesthetics, but from its uneasy grave allegory 
keeps pulling the strings. Suppressed as an increasingly irrelevant medieval atavism, it 
revenges itself by making this suppression the true burden – spoken or unspoken, conscious or 
unconscious – of the canonical accounts of the subject. It is allegory that drove Spingarn to 
equate Renaissance with classicist criticism and delay it to at least the middle of the sixteenth 
century. It is allegory that has made Spingarn’s successors retain his framework even after its 
original rationale lost the last of its intellectual and aesthetic currency. It is allegory that has 
led these Burckhardtians to begin their Renaissances precisely at the point where 
Burckhardt’s ends, thus making them arrive to the exact same conclusion as their revolted 
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medievalist opponents. Even in their attempts to deny allegory’s presence in the period, 
researchers who refused to run away from the evidence still found themselves witnessing that 
same phenomenon of the “Renaissance” retreating into the future, and the “Middle Ages” 
advancing into the space it leaves behind, that scholars like Allen or Seznec, coming from the 
diametrically opposite position, were observing in the 1930s and 1940s. What is the use, then, 
of forcing a certain concept onto materials which resist this concept to such a degree that we 
can proceed only by emptying it of the very content for which it had originally recommended 
itself to us? 
As long as the study of Renaissance poetics clings to variations on the Burckhardtian 
conception of the period, and the premise of modernity inscribed in that conception, things 
will not make sense, and scholars will continue to find themselves postponing their 
Renaissances by decades and centuries, enveloping them in scare quotes, dissecting them into 
phases, refining them out of existence. However, as soon as their narratives are approached in 
the raw, suspending their teleological baggage, many things begin to make sense. We see how 
the rediscovery of Aristotle’s Poetics gave a fresh impulse to the critical production of the 
sixteenth century; how the first reaction to this difficult text, long-lost in its original form and 
espousing views alien to the sixteenth-century literary mind, was to harmonize it with the 
more conventional teachings of the age; how this harmonization eventually matured into the 
full-scale doctrine of literary classicism; how this development, stretching throughout the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and the eighteenth century, represents a coherent, intelligible unit in the 
development of Western poetics. Indeed, this is what our major histories of “Renaissance” 
criticism mostly are: histories of the emergence and early stages of literary classicism. It is not 
the business of the present study to say what kind of histories of classicism they are, and with 
what degree of success they treat this complex, long-lived, international literary phenomenon. 
My concern is not with what they are, but with what they are not, and what they are not is 
viable histories of poetical thought in the period they set out to cover. The following question 
now poses itself: if the suppression of allegory is a major or even the main reason for this 
failure, can it be remedied by undoing this suppression and rewriting the history of sixteenth- 
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and seventeenth-century English poetics in a way which assigns an integral role to the 
allegorical element in the poetical doctrine of the period? It is to the weighing and the 
tentative answering of this question that the remainder of this chapter is devoted. 
 
HOMO LITERATUS 
 
To begin an account of English “Renaissance” criticism in the 1570s is to begin in medias res 
– no wonder, then, that it makes for a good story, but not very good history. It is true that until 
the 1570s issues belonging to the sphere of poetics were raised sporadically, in the most 
heterogeneous array of works. To a considerable degree this remains the case even after the 
1570s, but from that point on poetics suddenly becomes bibliographically visible in the form 
of vernacular prose treatises specifically devoted to the subject. Thus the impression one gets 
from the bibliographic record, which is then reproduced in the histories and the anthologies, is 
that of a long silence broken by a sudden outpouring of new voices, recovering the long-
forgotten mysteries of the poetic art in their reinvigorated and flourishing mother tongue. This 
sudden and unprecedented abundance of specialized critical materials in the vernacular is 
certainly a phenomenon worthy of the ample attention it has received, and clearly marks the 
beginning of more institutionalized and self-conscious stage in English criticism. Yet however 
conveniently it may seem to fit the standard account of the Renaissance as the light at end of 
the long and dark medieval tunnel, this impression is to a large degree illusory, at least as far 
as it concerns the fundamental questions of poetic theory. 
 In fact, a claim could be made that it is precisely this unprecedented richness which 
has, in this crucial respect, impoverished our understanding of sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century English poetics. However commendable in themselves, the efforts of editors and 
anthologists to encompass and sample the totality of the period’s variegated critical activity 
have tended to obscure the situation with the narrower question of theoretical fundamentals. 
The quantitative increase in overall critical activity has been taken to indicate a qualitative 
change in fundamental theoretical outlook, even though it is clear that the latter need not 
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necessarily follow from the former. And yet, the claim for the emergence of poetic modernity 
in this period has been based precisely on the presumption of qualitative rather than merely 
quantitative change – specifically, the presumption of the decline of the “didactic” view of 
poetry, and of the decline of allegory as its most tangible manifestation. Therefore, in order to 
produce a more viable account of the fortunes of English poetical thought in the period, the 
familiar accounts of the consolidation of a national literary tradition, the rise of the 
vernacular, the development of prosody, the introduction of continental influences, the 
emergence of the critic, and any number of other subjects, however important in their own 
right, need to be carefully disentangled from the inquiry into the fate of the theoretical 
fundamentals – if only so they can be re-entangled in more coherent and insightful ways. 
 For the purposes of the present study, this is perhaps most urgently the case with the 
polemical context in which the period’s criticism operates. The prominence of the allegorical 
conception of literature in late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English poetics is to a 
considerable degree due to this polemical context and the desire to defend literature, 
especially in its most contentious aspects – its representations of the supernatural, the erotic, 
the immoral, the socially inferior – from a more literal-minded view which seeks simply to 
remove these aspects from the ambit of respectable imaginative literature. This, of course, is 
the sort of context allegory had always thrived in. However, while they do acknowledge the 
polemical aspect of the period’s poetics, most accounts continue to misrepresent it on a 
number of important counts, hanging on to the traditional view which pits “Puritan” attackers 
of poetry against its “humanist” defenders, or to a number of other, equally unsatisfactory, 
alternatives. It is thus still worth briefly pointing out the inadequacies of such views, even 
though most of these have been long acknowledged, at least in principle, in the more 
perceptive scholarship on the subject. 
The identification of the poet-hater as “Puritan” basically results from a conflation of 
the quarrel over poetry with the partially related but distinct matter of the quarrel over the 
popular stage. This is in fact another consequence of the agenda set by the Edwardian 
pioneers and its post-1575 focus, in which the publication of Stephen Gosson’s 1579 Schoole 
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of Abuse, along with the ensuing replies of Lodge and Sidney, inevitably emerges as the 
earliest and the most tangibly polemical event of the period.
71
 Since Gosson’s primary target 
was not poetry but the popular stage, he was easily lumped with, and even taken to be 
representative of, the cause of the antitheatrical controversialists; conversely, the enemies of 
the stage are also proclaimed enemies of poetry. From this further distortions follow, 
including the notion that the attack was indiscriminately levelled at all imaginative literature, 
or even fiction or imagination itself;
72
 that the arguments of the attackers, while instrumental 
in eliciting the responses of the critics, do not in themselves constitute documents in criticism 
and poetic theory, and therefore do not merit representation in accounts of the period’s critical 
and poetical thought;
73
 that only the defenders’ views were characteristic of the period 
whereas those of the attackers were either a medieval residuum, or are in fact equally 
characteristic of any age.
74
 Thus the spotlight tends to fall on the reasoned, learned, and 
                                                          
71
 See S. Gosson, The Schoole of Abuse (London, 1579). Cf. E. N. S. Thompson, The Controversy between 
the Puritans and the Stage (New York, 1903): the view of the enemies of poetry as Puritans “seems to have 
gained foothold through exaggeration of the importance of Gosson’s ‘pleasant invective’ in his School of Abuse, 
and in general through the confused application to non-dramatic poetry of attacks on the drama” (6). 
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 On this count the earlier scholarship actually offers more nuanced views than some of the later work. Thus 
Spingarn notes that Gosson “specifically insists that his intention was not to banish poetry, or to forbid harmless 
recreations to mankind, but merely to chastise the abuse of all these” (History, 266). Smith similarly writes that 
the two parties were “in amiable agreement on the viciousness of the Vice”, even as they argued “for and against 
the claims of poetry from different premises” (Essays, 1: xx). More recently, however, the simplistic notion of an 
indiscriminate, religiously motivated attack occurs, for example in Vickers (Criticism, 47) or Alexander 
(Criticism, lv), and even in such revisionist accounts as those of R. Fraser, The War against Poetry (Princeton, 
1970), and P. C. Herman, Squitter-wits and Muse-haters (Detroit, 1996). While undeniably important in drawing 
attention to the social context of the debate, Fraser’s account of the period’s anti-poetic sentiment is marred by 
its utter lack of discrimination: between poetry and theatre – “The campaign to close the theatres and the war 
against poetry are one” (16); between various types of imaginative literature – “To reprehend all poems and 
poets is, from the point of view of the root-and-branch reformer, the only tenable position”; even between 
various types of discourse – the reformers’ is supposedly an “abhorrence of words as words” (11). In spite of his 
sensitive analysis of the “Protestant antipoetic sentiment” in the work of such figures as Sidney, Spenser and 
Milton, Herman similarly continues to view their opponents as religiously motivated enemies of “all poetry” and 
even “fictiveness” as such (24-7). 
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 “It is noteworthy that the greater forces which stimulated this literary defence were themselves unliterary. 
They are not represented in these volumes, except in the answers of their adversaries. [...] There is no criticism in 
these things: merely the old war against the Devil and his work” (Essays, ed. Smith, 1: xiv-xviii). The argument 
remains commonplace in much of the later literature, and continues to govern the one-sided approach adopted in 
the anthologies; Hardison’s is still the only to include a single text by one of the “attackers” – an extract from 
Gosson’s Schoole. On this ground, Alexander omits even Lodge’s reply to Gosson: “The works have little to say 
about literature, and are not represented in this collection” (Criticism, ed. Alexander, lv). 
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 “These objections to literature are not characteristically medieval. They have sprung up in every period of 
the world’s history, and especially in all ages in which ascetic and theological conceptions of life are dominant” 
(Spingarn, History, 6). The appeal of this argument is clear: to claim the desirable elements in the period’s 
critical output for the Renaissance, while transferring undesirable ones onto another (trans-)historical category. 
Spingarn’s view is strongly reiterated in Thompson’s Controversy, which opens with a description of Puritanism 
as “a phase of English thought not indigenous alone to the British Isle, nor even restricted to one historic period”, 
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eloquent treatises of the defenders, while their opponents are reduced to a backdrop of 
fanatical vituperation, and a debate misconceived to begin with is done further injustice by 
being presented in a radically one-sided manner. 
What is, however, particularly detrimental about the “Puritan”-“humanist” dichotomy, 
as well as its later incarnations, is its tendency to obscure the existence of a conflict on the 
question of poetry deeply rooted within humanism itself.
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 In a more comprehensive view, it 
soon becomes clear that Gosson’s Schoole is more correctly seen as a novel development in a 
much older tradition of a distinctly humanist hostility to certain aspects of imaginative 
literature. Far from being representative, the Schoole, with its reliance on Prophane Writers, 
Naturall reason, and common experience, its fashionable euphuistic style, and most 
importantly, its actual appraisal of poetry, coherent in its balanced estimation of its wiles and 
benefits, is in fact that single least representative document in the entire antitheatrical 
controversy. It is, however, perfectly representative of a strand of poetic theory firmly and 
sometimes radically literalist in its approach to poetic fiction, while also unmistakably 
humanist in its fundamental principles and formative background.
76
 Furthermore, this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and goes on to define it as any “effort to rid life, or some phase of it, of the evils that have enwrapped it [...], 
whatever variations it may assume at different times and at different places” (1). In turn, Thompson’s work, 
especially the first chapter, reads like the blueprint for Barish’s influential survey of “antitheatrical prejudice” 
from Plato to the mid-twentieth century: while acknowledging his subject to “evolve with time”, Barish also sees 
it as “an aberration [...] to which virtually our whole species seems in some measure prone”, “a kind of 
ontological malaise” of “nearly universal dimension”; see J. Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice (Berkeley, 
1981), 2-3.  
75
 This also applies to its later, less simplistic incarnations. Kinney, for example, follows Ringler in explicitly 
dismissing the accepted view of Gosson as a Puritan, presenting him instead as “almost a classic case study of 
the growth of an English humanist”, but ends up unable to fully grant him the title: in spite of his intellectual 
formation, Gosson turns out not to be “a true humanist”, indeed to be an “anti-humanist (though Gosson seems 
not to have noticed)”, and ultimately a representative of what “was not yet what would be known in the 
seventeenth century as ‘Puritanism’”. See W. Ringler, Stephen Gosson (Princeton, 1942), 8-10; S. Gosson, 
Markets of Bawdrie, ed. A. F. Kinney (Salzburg, 1974), 1-2, 28, 55, 67. Herman frames the conflict as one 
“between humanist poetics and Protestant antipoetics” (Squitter-Wits, 64), an opposition even less satisfactory 
than the one between “humanist” and “Puritan” for what should be obvious reasons. It is telling that at one place 
he misquotes Smith as writing about the attacks on poetry of “a vigorous Protestantism” (6), where the original 
actually reads “a vigorous Puritanism” (Essays, ed. Smith, 1: xiv). 
76
 This is why the Schoole provoked an immediate reply from those who were content to ignore all earlier 
and later missives from the antitheatrical camp, or in fact joined its ranks, just as most antitheatrical 
controversialists either ignored the question of poetry, or actually took a favourable view of it. The reception of 
Gosson’s work is incomprehensible if this is overlooked. Herman, for example, describes the Schoole as 
“Clearly [...] not an impressive document” and insists on its hostility towards “all poetry”, dismissing Gosson’s 
explicit statements to the contrary as “rhetorical” rather than “substantive”, but then has to wonder “why Sidney 
and the other defenders of poetry had such trouble responding to its charges” (Squitter-Wits, 27, 219, n. 41). 
There were a number of comprehensive defences of poetry between 1573 and 1642, none of which undertakes to 
defend the popular stage, at least not without proposing its radical reform, as for example Lodge’s “Reply to 
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tendency in humanist poetics must also be distinguished from the hostility towards low- and 
middle-brow literature such as romances, popular stories, ballads, songs, and so forth. While 
some of the best known examples come from humanist figures, such as Ascham’s attack on 
Arthurian romance and translations of contemporary Italian authors in The Schoolemaster, the 
issue itself is not specific to humanism, and such protests against “wicked” and “wanton” 
books are voiced by social commentators and polemicists of all stripes.
77
 These are not 
concerned with imaginative literature as such but rather with “pulp fiction”, and can perhaps 
be seen as roughly analogous to contemporary debates on Internet pornography and video-
game violence.
78
 They are not without critical relevance, in the broad sense – for one thing, 
they give us, albeit in negative form, some indication of popular literary tastes and interests – 
but most often it is impossible to recover their authors’ views on broader questions of poetic 
theory. 
Rather than these broad-ranging controversies over the popular theatre and popular 
literature, it is the internal conflict between two competing types of distinctly humanist 
poetics – a conflict within humanism, rather than between humanism and something else – 
that is of prime importance to historians of the period’s poetic thought. This conflict is 
difficult to discern because it appears to have no major printed vernacular representative 
except Gosson, and because there was a considerable degree of agreement between the two 
factions. Both believed the end of imaginative literature to lie in pleasurable edification; both 
attacked works which they did not, and defended those which they did believe to be 
conducive to this end; both could accommodate the major critical vocabularies of the day and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Gosson” ([London, 1579?]), C4v-5v. By contrast, there was only one comprehensive defence of the popular 
stage, which explicitly refrained from entering the question of poetry: see T. Heywood, An Apology For Actors 
(London, 1612), B3r. Gosson gloated over the fact that the opponents of his Schoole “trauailed to some of mine 
acquaintance of both Universities, with fayre profers, and greater promises of rewardes, yf they would take so 
much paine as to write against mee”, but came back empty-handed; see S. Gosson, The Ephemerides of Phialo 
(London, 1579), M2r. Hostility towards the theatre, and the popular stage in particular, did not automatically 
entail hostility towards poetry. For example, Northbrooke’s Treatise (London, 1577) attacks the public stage on 
the Authoritie of the word of God and auntient writers even while displaying a serene acceptance of the pagan 
poets, who are quoted throughout, occasionally in Northbrooke’s own verse translations. 
77
 R. Ascham, The Scholemaster (London, 1570), I2v-3v. In the same passage, Ascham gives an allegorical 
reading of Homer, specifically of the Circe episode, including the moly given to Ulysses, “Whereby, the Diuine 
Poete Homer ment couertlie (as wise and Godly men do iudge) that loue of honestie, and hatred of ill [is] the 
onely remedie against all inchantementes of sinne” (H4v). 
78
 It is this phenomenon that is really the subject of Fraser’s misleadingly titled War against Poetry, where 
numerous examples are cited. 
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find support in an inexhaustible array of classical, patristic, medieval, and contemporary 
authorities. Where they parted ways was the question of how to treat works of serious and 
respectable imaginative literature containing elements which were, at least on the surface, 
deemed to be ontologically or morally offensive: representations of pagan deities and other 
supernatural beings, romantic and erotic passion, crime, and so forth. This most notably 
applied to the ancient classics, which held an essential place in the educational system and the 
literary culture produced by this system, even as they inevitably relied on the fabulous and 
licentious mythology of the pagans, but any argument about ancient poetry was in principle 
applicable to poetry in general. 
The main features and principal intellectual origins of the two schools of thought may 
be conveniently sketched out from the works of two major humanist figures who both had a 
direct influence on the intellectual life of sixteenth-century England: Erasmus and Vives. 
Erasmus’ profound influence is amply acknowledged: altogether he spent some six years in 
England during his visits between 1499 and 1517, befriended and corresponded with some of 
the leading English intellectuals of the period, lectured at Cambridge, and played a major role 
in the establishment of the humanist curriculum in English schools. An important and under-
appreciated aspect of this influence is Erasmus’s promotion of the allegorical understanding 
of both sacred and secular literature, encountered throughout his works, many of which were 
available in English translations. As a scholar of the biblical text, he was a radical innovator; 
as its interpreter, however, he was a staunch traditionalist, siding with the allegorical tradition 
against the literalism of the reformers.
79
 There is perhaps no better example than Erasmus of 
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 See, for example, the Enchiridion, quoted here in its earliest English translation (London, 1533), B7v: “Of 
the i[n]terp[re]tours of scripture / chose them aboue al other [that] go farthest fro[m] the letter / which chefely 
next after Paule be Origene / Ambrose / Jerom & Augustyne.” Ironically, the translator would seem to be none 
other than W. Tyndale, of whom Foxe relates that he produced a translation of the Enchiridion while in the 
service of Sir J. Walshe, thus in 1522-3; see J. A. Gee, “John Byddell and the First Publication of Erasmus’ 
Enchiridion”, ELH 4 (1937): 43-59; Gee, “Tindale and the 1533 English Enchiridion of Erasmus”, PMLA 49 
(1934): 460-71; J. F. Mozley, “The English Enchiridion of Erasmus”, RES, o. s., 20 (1944): 97-107. Already in 
The obedie[n]ce of a Christen man ([Antwerp], 1528), Tyndale would write that “The greatest cause of [the] 
captivitie a[n]d the decay of the fayth and this blyndnes wherein we now are/ sprang first of allehoryes. For 
Origen and the [sic] of his tyme drew all the scripture vnto allegories”, while “The literall sense is become 
nothi[n]ge at all. For the pope hath take[n] it cleane awaye a[n]d made it his possession” (R1r-v, R4v-5r). In the 
Disputatiuncula Erasmus also insists, against Colet, that “Nothing prevents us from extracting different 
meanings from Holy Writ, which is a miracle of fertility, and from reading a single text in more than a single 
way”; Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto, 1974–), 70: 16. 
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the perils involved in drawing in any categorical opposition between allegory and philology in 
this period, and especially in expanding this opposition into accounts of how the “medieval” 
allegorical tradition gradually gives way to the more enlightened ways of “Renaissance” 
philology.
80
 
Particularly relevant are Erasmus’s recommendations of allegory appearing in 
explicitly educational contexts. In the Enchiridion (1503) he welcomes the study of pagan 
literature as preparatory to the study of Scripture, and draws a parallel between the allegorical 
interpretation of the two.
81
 In On the Method of Study (1511) he gives a model of how a 
grammar school teacher should expound an author to his pupils, the final and highest degree 
of exposition being that of moral examples and allegories.
82
 In A Declamation on the Subject 
of Early Liberal Education for Children (1529), he still holds to this opinion, recommending 
the teaching of allegorical interpretation even at the youngest age.
83
 Perhaps most 
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 In The Conflict of Thalia and Barbarism, an early dialogue which is not included in the Collected Works 
edition of the Colloquies, and has still not appeared in the series, Erasmus actually reverses this scheme. The 
Muses Thalia, Calliope, and Melpomene, representing the new learning of the humanists, are approached by 
their “only and most cruel Adversary”, the monster Barbarism, with the face of a virgin and the body of an ass, 
representing the old learning of the scholastics; see The Colloquies of Erasmus, ed. E. Johnson (London, 1878), 
2: 347. A quarrel begins and before long Barbarism turns on the poets: they are “the chief Thing [the Muses] 
have to boast of”, but the monster cannot think of anything “so empty of Goodness as your Poems; for what are 
they but gilded Lies, full of old Womens Tales?” (2: 352). Thalia laughs at this impudence, explaining that the 
poets “think it unfit to cast Roses before Swine in Mire and Dirt; and therefore they wrap up and hide the Truth 
in ambiguous Words and enigmatical expressions; that tho’ all may read them, yet all may not understand them” 
(2: 352-3). The whole conflict turns out to be exclusively about poetry and how it is to be properly written and 
understood, with the Muses advocating the allegorical and Barbarism the literal approach, as truth is not to be 
mingled with lies. Greenfield, it will be remembered, reaches the exact same conclusion in her analysis of 
“humanist” and “scholastic” poetics in late fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Italy. 
81
 Erasmus, Enchiridion, B5v-6r: “But as the scripture is not moche fruitful yf thou stande & sticke styll in 
the letter. In lyke maner the poetry of Homere and Uirgyl shall not [pro]fyte a lytell / yf thou remembre that it 
must be vnderstande in the sence allegory / whiche thyng no man wyll denye that hath assayed or tasted of the 
lernyng of olde antiquitees neuer so lytell”. He then goes on to contrast such allegorical poets with “the poetes 
which wryte vnclenly”, counselling the reader “not ones to touche them / or at the leestway not to loke farre in 
them: except thou can the better abhorre vices whan they be described to the / & in co[m]paracions of fylthy 
thynges the more feruently loue thyngs honest” (B6r). 
82
 “Finally he should turn to philosophy and skilfully bring out the moral implication of the poets’ stories, or 
employ them as patterns” (Works, 24: 683). The two illustrations – “the story of Pylades and Orestes to show the 
excellence of friendship; that of Tantalus the curse of avarice” – seem to tend towards the example more than 
allegory proper, but the latter is undoubtedly included. Erasmus goes on to recommend the heavily allegorical 
Homeric commentary of Eustathius as a resource to help the teacher in this respect, and then himself shows at 
length how to turn a problematic text such as Virgil’s second eclogue into “a symbolic picture of [...] an ill-
formed friendship”. The teacher can also make the training in “topics” more interesting by having his pupils 
discuss, among other things, the simpler sort of allegorical “fables” – “for example: Hercules won immortality 
for himself by vanquishing monsters; or the Muses take special delight in springs and groves and shun the smoky 
cities” (24: 676). 
83
 A translation appeared as an appendix to R. Sherry, A treatise of Schemes & Tropes (London, [1550]), N6r: 
“What is more delectable then the fabels of poetes, which wyth their swete entisynge plesures so delight 
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importantly, allegory, both as a compositional and hermeneutical method, is an integral 
element of the programme of rhetorical proficiency outlined in Erasmus’ exceptionally 
influential De copia (1512). Already in his treatment of allegory as a trope, Erasmus departs 
from classical authorities in viewing the extension of allegory into enigma not as a vice, but as 
a legitimate and even desirable use of the figure: “This is no bad thing if you are speaking or 
writing for an educated audience, and even if you are writing for the general public, for one 
should not write so that everyone can understand everything, but so that people should be 
compelled to investigate and learn some things themselves”.
84
 Later on, the pupils are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
childrens eares that thei profite vs very much whe[n] we be olde also, not only to [the] knowledge of the tong, 
but also to iudgement and copye of elegant speche? What wyll a chyld hear more gladlie then Esops fabels, 
whyche in sporte and playe teach earnest preceptes of philosophy? and the same fruite is also in the fabels of 
other poetes. The chylde heareth that Ulisses felowes were turned into swyne, and other fashions of beastes. The 
tale is laughed at, and yet for al that he lerneth that thing that is the chiefest poynte in al morall philosophye: 
Those whyche be not gouerned by ryght reason, but are caried after the wyll of affeccions, not to be men, but 
beastes.” Sherry explicitly upholds allegory as an essential part of rhetorical learning, specifying that he omits it 
only for convenience and not because he is ignorant of the fact that rhetoric “much helpeth bothe to persuasions 
and copye, the proper handling of tales taken oute of the nature of beastes, dreames, fayned narracions, sumwhat 
lyke vnto the truth, [with] allegories much vsed of diuines” (F8v). His model here is clearly De copia, the first 
part of which treats of the matter comprised in Sherry’s Treatise, while the second part comprises the matter he 
strategically omits here. 
84
 Works, 24: 336. One kind of evidence for the influence of these passages in De copia is the fact that we 
find them directly echoed in the works of English critics. Lodge, for example, is almost certainly paraphrasing 
this precise passage, and in a precisely “copious” way, in castigating his opponent Gosson: “[M]ust men write 
that you maye know theyr meaning? [...] Alas simple Irus, begg at knowledge gate awhile, thou haste not wonne 
the mastery of learning” (“Reply”, A4v). This positive view of enigma is taken over in Susenbrotus’ Epitome 
troporum ac schematum, the chief manual of tropes and figures, besides De copia itself, in Elizabethan England, 
where the book had a stronger and longer vogue than on the continent, especially from the 1570s onwards. L. D. 
Green and J. J. Murphy, Renaissance Rhetoric Short-Title Catalogue (Aldershot, 2006), 422, list twenty-nine 
editions between 1540 and 1635, of which twelve in London, the first in 1562. The prominence of allegory in 
Susenbrotus is worth emphasizing. He takes over the distinction between eight species of “allegory” – enigma, 
paroemia, irony, sarcasm, asteism, mycterism, antiphrasis, and charientism – from Melanchthon’s Institvtiones 
rhetoricae (Wittenberg, 1521), C4r-D2r; trans. in J. X. Brennan, “The Epitome troporum ac schematum of 
Joannes Susenbrotus”, diss. University of Illinois, 1953, 14; cf. P. Mack, A History of Renaissance Rhetoric 
(Oxford, 2011), 216-21. In his appraisal of the enigma, however, Susenbrotus follows Erasmus rather than 
Melanchthon: “Nor ought this device of the enigma be altered from this defect [i.e., obscurity] if you either 
speak or write for learned men; nay, not even for the rabble, so that there may be things which they will be 
forced to investigate and discern. In the works of the prophets and in the Apocalypse there are many enigmas.” 
By contrast, Melanchthon retains the classical view of enigma as a vice – “Inter orationis uicia potius, quam 
ornamenta numeretur” (Institvtiones, D1r) – coupling it with the anti-allegorism of Protestant scriptural 
hermeneutics; while there are allegories and enigmas in scripture, they teach nothing for certain, and no article of 
doctrine is to be derived from them alone. The brief discussion in the Institvtiones is expanded into a seventeen-
page attack on the fourfold method in Melanchthon’s Elementorvm rhetorices libri dvo [1529] (Wittenberg, 
1542), G7r-H7r; German trans. by V. Wels (Berlin, 2001). There is thus a confessional element at work here, 
and further research should look into how treatments of allegory and enigma in post-Reformation rhetorical 
manuals were influenced by the Protestant-Catholic divide on principles of scriptural hermeneutics. The earlier 
emphasis on Susenbrotus has been qualified by Green, specifying that such treatises belonged to an advanced 
level of education – the higher forms of the more ambitious grammar schools and the universities – while “the 
foundation for studies in elocutio” is found in the mass-printed elementary textbooks like Lily’s Grammar. See 
T. W. Baldwin, William Shakspere’s Small Latine & Less Greeke (Urbana, 1944), 2: 138-75; Brennan, 
“Epitome”, ii-iii; L. D. Green, “Renaissance Grammar Books and elocutio”, in “Rhetorica movet”, ed. P. L. 
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instructed to legitimize any deployment of examples drawn from the sphere of poetic fiction 
by prefacing it with the claim that these were invented to transmit allegorical meanings by 
“those wise men of long ago”, and have enjoyed “general consent for so many centuries” – 
arguments dutifully repeated by the majority of the treatises on poetry discussed later in this 
chapter.
85
 Finally, one should provide these allegorical meanings, and in illustrating how this 
is to be done Erasmus gives a brief but complete exposition of the allegorical doctrine, 
recommending Eustathius’ commentaries on Homer for further reading.
86
 The structure of this 
passage on allegory – exposition of the theory, illustration by several examples, the statement 
that further examples are superfluous given the common knowledge of such matters and/or 
the availability of further sources – is reflected in similar passages found in several sixteenth-
century treatises.
87
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Oesterreich and T. O. Sloane (Leiden, 1999), esp. 105-10; Mack, History, 221. Green’s larger claims here – that 
the textbooks “taught elocutio to the masses” on a “sophisticated” level, and this widespread rhetorical 
proficiency is the actual cause of their patronage of the popular stage (74, 115) – seem unsubstantiated by his 
discussion, which deals solely with the so-called “figures of construction”: Latin syntactic constructions 
arranged into classes traditionally dubbed figurae or schemata. Green’s argument hangs on a conflation of these 
syntactic “figures” with rhetorical figures proper; he professes to wonder whether “the two can be separated at 
all” (115), yet has no difficulty in distinguishing, for example, between synecdoche as a “figure of construction” 
and the trope “commonly understood” by that term “in rhetorical elocutio” (101). 
85
 Works, 24:160. For a particularly straightforward appropriation, see the section “Of enlargynge examples 
by copye” in Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique: “The saiyinge of Poets and all their fables are not to be forgotten, for 
by them we may talke at large, and winne me[n] by perswasion, if wee declare before hande, that these tales 
were not fayned of such wise menne without cause, neither yet continued vntyll this tyme, and kepte in memorie 
without good consideration, and thereupon declare the true meanynge of all suche writinge. For vndoubtedlye 
there is no one tale emonge al the Poetes, but vnder the same is comprehended some thinge that perteyneth 
eyther to the amendemente of maners, to the knowledge of trueth, to the setynge forthe of Natures woorcke, or 
elles to the vnderstandinge of some notable thynge done” (Cc4r). There follow examples of such allegorical 
readings of several classical stories, as well as the legends of St Christopher and St George, even though their 
depiction in churches is dismissed as a papist idolatry. “I could talke more largely of examples, & heape a 
nomber here together, aswell of Ethnike Aucthors, as of other here at home: but for feare I should be tediouse, 
these for this tyme shal suffise” (Dd1v). Wilson also includes a translation of Erasmus’s Epistle to perswade a 
young ientleman to Mariage, in which the myth of the Giants is interpreted as signifying “that certaine fierce and 
sauage menne, such as were vnknowen, coulde not abide wedlocke for anye worldes good”, while the myth of 
Orpheus means “nothinge elles, but that a wise and well spoken manne, did call backe harde harted menne, 
suche as liued abroade like Beastes, from open whoredome, and brought them to lyue after the mooste holye 
lawes of Matrimonye” (G2r). 
86
 “Although the principle of the allegory or hidden meaning is not equally obvious in every case, experts in 
antiquity are agreed that under all the inventions of the ancient poets there does lie a hidden meaning, whether 
historical [...]; or theological [...]; or physical [...]; or moral [...]. Quite often there is a mixture of more than one 
type of allegory” (Works, 24: 610-13). By “historical” allegory is meant the sort of mythographical 
rationalization most commonly associated with Palaephatus’ On Unbelievable Tales, although the example used 
by Erasmus is from Diodorus: see Diodorus of Sicily (London, 1933-67), 2: 457-8. 
87
 Besides Wilson, see R. Wills [Willes], De re poetica, ed. A. D. S. Fowler (Oxford, 1958), 121; H. Dethick, 
Oratio in laudem poëseos, in Latin Treatises on Poetry from Renaissance England, ed. J. W. Binns (Signal 
Mountain, 1999), 43; Ariosto, Orlando, trans. Harington, ¶4v. 
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If in Erasmus we can see a precursor for the allegorical tendency in English poetics, 
we can see a precursor for the other, literalist tendency in the view of his younger 
contemporary and correspondent Juan Luis Vives. Like Erasmus, Vives was a scholar of 
international renown; like Erasmus, he was particularly concerned with educational reform; 
like Erasmus, he had direct contact with English literary and intellectual culture during his 
sojourns in England in the 1520s, including a short-lived rhetoric lectureship at Oxford. 
Unlike Erasmus, however, Vives displays a much more negative, and in some cases 
outspokenly hostile, view on the question of allegory in secular literature. In De disciplinis, an 
extensive plan for reform of learning usually regarded as his greatest work, Vives embarks on 
a vehement censure of what he perceives as the abuse of poetry, rehearsing many of the 
arguments that would later be attributed to the poet-haters.
88
 Poets are liars who ascribe a 
variety of immoral deeds not only to ordinary people but heroes and gods, thereby 
encouraging the same vices in their audiences, and Plato was right to banish such poets his 
commonwealth.
89
 Furthermore, “these recitals of lust, savagery, vaingloriousness and deceit” 
are all the more dangerous for being delivered “not […] in a rude uncultivated manner, but 
one that is polished and ornate, so that even without the blandishments of the act itself, the 
very words would charm and entice men of their own accord”.
90
 Nowhere in all this does 
Vives state or even imply that there is to the poets’ fictions any underlying allegorical sense, 
whether beneficial or reprehensible; the emphasis is solely on the powerful psychological and 
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 J. L. Vives, De disciplinis libri XX (Antwerp, 1531). A translation of Vives’ remarks on poetry in the first 
part of the work, De cavsis corrvptarvm artium, is available in R. Stein, “A Study of Juan Luis Vives, De causis 
corruptarum artium (1531)”, diss. University of Oxford, 1952. The second part, De tradendis disciplinis, is 
translated in J. L. Vives, On Education, trans. F. Watson (Cambridge, 1913). 
89
 How inadequate the labels of “attacker” and “defender” are is shown by the fact that in his commentary on 
Augustine’s City of God, first published in 1522, Vives “defends” poetry from Augustine’s strictures by the 
same argument that in the context of the De disciplinis constitutes an “attack”. Augustine takes a simplistic view 
of Plato’s banishment of the poets: “Is not Plato more praise-worthy then you all, who disputing of the true 
perfecton of a citty would haue Poets banished from that society, as enemies to the cities full perfection?”; St. 
Avgvstine, of the Citie of God: with the Learned Comments of Io. Lod. Vives ([London], 1610), H1r. Vives’ 
commentary offers a more complex account, making the key distinction between the argument in Books 2-3 and 
Book 10: “Plato (de rep. lib. 2.) expels al Poets out of a well ordered citty, for the wickedness which they sing of 
the gods: & (in the tenth booke of the same worke) Socrates hauing spoken much against them, concludeth al in 
this, [that] he holds that poetry only fit to be excluded, which giues life to vnmanly affections: & that to be 
allowed, which is manly, & honest: So [that] he condemnes not all poetry, for sometimes he calls Poets, a diuine 
kinde of men, namely when they sing himmes to the Deities [...]: if they exceed not in loosenesse, nor yield to 
rancour nor consent vnto flattery, nor in their songs sowe seeds of corruption, such poets are profitable members 
in Plato’s commonwealth” (H1v). 
90
 Stein, “Study”, 2: 30 . 
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moral effect poetry produces at its face value. Furthermore, Vives’ literalism is not due to the 
vituperative context, and is even more explicit when he takes to praising poetry – for it is not, 
as later critics of both factions would also repeat, the art itself that is corrupt, only the abuses 
to which it has been put. Singled out for praise are thus precisely the formal, rhetorical, and 
imaginative properties of poetry.
91
 Subject matter plays no part in this, including Vives’s 
explicit definition of poetry, and even the commonplace Horatian imperative of teaching and 
delighting is absent.
92
 Essential to poetry are the beauty of poetic language (“harmonious 
agreement”), and the power of the poetic imagination (“delightful allurement”). Ideally, these 
are combined with wholesome subject matter: Vives’ classical models, like Gosson’s, are 
Plato’s Republic, Cicero’s Archias, and Plutarch’s De audiendis poetis. In principle, however, 
subject matter, wholesome or unwholesome, is contingent. 
 At the same time, tackling the question of allegory, Vives can go so far as to deny any 
genuine epistemological value in the method. He discusses the subject in a short early work 
entitled Painted Truth: Truth, a maiden of unsurpassable natural beauty and sometime 
companion of Aristotle, is made to wear hideous make-up by the poets, who “wish neither to 
say nor hear anything without mixing it with lies”.
93
 “[D]isfigured and crying out in protest”, 
Painted Truth – an anti-allegorical personification of allegory – calls the students of the 
University of Paris to return to “pure, unalloyed and simple truth”, and follow Plato’s 
precedent in banishing poetry from their studies.
94
 In De disciplinis Vives is more 
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 Verse is “very charming because of its harmony, which corresponds with the melody of the human soul” 
(Education, 126). Poetic diction is “lofty, sublime, brilliant”, and furthermore, “poems contain subjects of 
extraordinary effectiveness, and they display human passions in a wonderful and vivid manner. This is called 
energia. There breathes in them a certain great and lofty spirit so that the readers are themselves caught into it, 
and seem to rise above their own intellect, and even above their own nature.” 
92
 Stein, “Study”, 2: 26: “Poetry is speech bound by certain fixed laws of rhythm, in which there is not only a 
binding together of feet, but also a rhythm, and a kind of harmonious agreement, delighting the ears and soothing 
the spirits of listeners. This charm was called for, so that, should they wish to impress anything more deeply in 
the breasts of their hearers, and engrave it more firmly upon their memories, they might easily do so by means of 
this delightful allurement; for we are more willing to admit such pleasant things into our mind, and we find it 
easier to recollect them when they are linked together by a rhythmical connection.” 
93
 J. L. Vives, Early Writings, ed. C. Matheeussen et al. (Leiden, 1987-91), 1: 79. Note that the views of 
Vives’ Truth are thus identical to those of Erasmus’ Barbarism. 
94
 “The songs of the poets are the food of demons, said my beloved Jerome, that is, those poets who have 
learned to lie themselves and teach others to do so. Their standard-bearer, as Dio of Prusa said, is that blind and 
insane old man, Homer, whose delight in lying is proved by the fact that he gives a leading role to that favorite 
of his, the wandering Ulysses, the paragon of lies and falsehood” (ibid.). This is the earlier of the two works by 
Vives which bear the same title, first published in 1514. The later dramatic dialogue, published in 1523 and 
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straightforward: some interpreters of the poets “stretch their fables to fit some natural 
interpretation, as do the Stoics, others to fit a moral one, but all the Greek, Roman and 
barbarous histories can be twisted in this way. They give their words interpretations which the 
authors themselves never intended”.
95
 Donatus’ interpretations of Terence, Landino’s of 
Virgil, and the various ancient Greek allegorical readings of Homer are offered as examples. 
The method is epistemologically bankrupt, even though it does have some pragmatic value in 
pedagogy and government.
96
 Poetry is admirable in theory, yet in practice its beauty and 
power are often misused for debased purposes. Allegory, by contrast, is reprehensible in 
theory, but can be allowed a limited practical role within a larger strategy of countering such 
abuse, a strategy comprised of bowdlerisation, “parental guidance” in approaching poetic 
exempla, rationalization, and, at the very end of the list, lowest-grade allegoresis, mentioned 
only with respect to the representations of pagan deities.
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subtitled of Poetic Licence: To What Extent Poets May Be Permitted to Vary from the Truth, has a different 
framework: a treaty is negotiated between Truth, appearing in her unadulterated form, and a sumptuous and 
depraved Falsity, whose emissaries are Homer, Hesiod, Lucian, and Apuleius. Here Vives adopts a less stringent 
attitude, allowing for a number of concessions, but still avoids the allegorical approach: see the account in W. 
Nelson, Fact or Fiction (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 45-9. 
95
 Stein, “Study”, 2: 28. In support of this, Vives cites Seneca and Plato’s Phaedrus, where Socrates voices 
his indifference to rationalist mythography of the Palaephatean variety (230a-b; Works, 510), which Vives 
obviously conflates with allegory here. 
96
 The allegorists are said to have “very wisely translated the sayings of Homer to higher senses”, even 
though Homer never intended them, since in this way they “do less damage, supported as they were by the great 
reverence and trust of the people. How much wiser were they than the men of our time, who prefer crushing the 
things they see that the multitude has great faith in, to reconciling them to their own views!” (Stein, “Study”, 2: 
29). The exact reference of this last remark is unclear, yet what is clear is that Vives’ acceptance of allegory is 
merely pragmatic. The more complex and essentially philological perspective on the problem by allegory opened 
by Vives’ further comments in Book 5, on history, about how the poets corrupted mankind’s earliest historical 
accounts (ibid., 2: 39-40), compare interestingly with, and may have been an influence on, Bacon’s view of 
ancient myth; see further below, n. 213.  
97
 Vives, Education, 128-9: “poets ought not to be excluded from boys’ study, but should be expurgated [...]. 
Obscene passages should be wholly cut out from the text [...]. When however poets depict the bad, let those who 
read know that the poems are only pictures, and impress upon them that they are pictures very often of the worst 
men. When they hear about gods, let them think of them as kings, when of heroes, as noblemen, and when of 
men, as common people.” “Sometimes”, continues Vives – not always, not if the first resort of Palaephatean 
rationalization suffices – the pupils “must take the god as standing for the quality which is attributed to him, for 
instance Jupiter for the majesty of kingship”. Even here, Vives’ impersonal language distances itself from the 
method: the qualities are not genuinely there, but are rather attributed (“attribuitur”; De disciplinis, second 
pagination, g2v), and not by him, but by common opinion. Vives’ view of allegory is reiterated in his 1532 De 
ratione dicendi: “Some stories of the poets contain natural truths, others, moral truths; both ought to be 
preserved. Other stories have nothing of value for life, like the hunt of the wild boar of Calydon or the sailing of 
the Argonauts in search of the Golden Fleece. There are still others which contain many positively harmful 
elements, having arisen from some admitted error. I think here of the stories about the Elysian fields, about the 
kingdom and wicked deeds of the gods, or about wicked delight in obscene matters, like adulteries, abominable 
crimes, wars, and barbarities”; J. F. Cooney, “De ratione dicendi: A Treatise on Rhetoric by Juan Luis Vives”, 
diss. Ohio State University, 1966, 239-40. In The Instructio[n] of a Christen woma[n] (London, [1529?]), E3r-
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 While the direct influence of Vives cannot be compared to that of Erasmus, it is at 
least symptomatic that the views attributed to enemies of poetry in Richard Willes’ 1573 De 
re poetica disputatio, probably the earliest defence of poetry printed in England, are actually 
borrowed, often verbatim, from the above-cited strictures in Vives’ De disciplinis.98 The 
dissemination of such views between Vives and Willes is difficult to document, but they 
cannot have been an isolated case. Another demonstrably influential book was Agrippa’s De 
incertitudine, which rehearsed much the same arguments, albeit from the unremittingly 
negative perspective mandated by its genre.
99
 It also seems reasonable to suppose that the 
literalist view gained at least some level of currency in the educational system. The school 
curricula tell us much about what was taught at a given institution, but little about how it was 
taught. They do not tell us what a particular schoolmaster did when faced with problematic 
material in the poets: did he take Erasmus’ advice and drag up something from the allegorical 
commentaries he kept at his fingers, or did he administer a literalist cocktail similar to that 
devised by Vives? It can hardly be doubted that Erasmus’s model had real-life counterparts 
and that their teachings are to be glimpsed behind the prominence of the allegorical view in 
the defences of poetry composed by their pupils.
100
 But even if the allegorical approach 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
F2v, he opposes “vngratious bokes” (romances, collections like Poggio’s Facetiae, unprofitable ancient poets 
including Homer, exiled by Plato, and Ovid, banished by Augustus) to “good bokes” (the Bible and the fathers, 
and of the ancients, “Plato/ Cicero/ Senec/ & suche other”). 
98
 As first noted by Fowler: see Wills, De re poetica, ed. Fowler, 25-9; cf. Stein, “Study”, 1: 72. 
99
 De incertitudine was first published in 1530 and translated into English in 1569. In the chapter on poetry, 
Agrippa brings the same charges as those found in Vives, coupled with the same emphasis on poetry’s aesthetic 
and imaginative qualities: it is “the principall Authore of lies”, serving “no other end, but to please the eares of 
foolish men, with wanton Rithmes, with measures, and weightinesse of syllables, and with a vaine iarringe of 
wordes, and to deceiue mens minds with the delectation of fables, and with fardels of lies”; Of the Vanitie and 
vncertaintie of Artes and Sciences (London, 1569), D3r-v. There is also the same, albeit implicit, rejection of the 
possibility of allegorical reading: an extended catalogue of mythological “fables” is simply dismissed as “notable 
lies”, delivered, again, “with the venemous eloquence of wordes, and with pestiferous pleasauntnesse of verse”. 
The Latin original was current in the mid-sixteenth century: the Private Libraries of Renaissance England 
database lists eleven copies, all but one in the inventories of Oxford scholars, most dating from the 1570s. Could 
this be any indication of the background against which H. Dethick’s oration in defence of poetry, delivered at 
Oxford sometime between the later 1560s and 1572, is to be viewed? Did the two editions of the English 
translation (1569, 1575) make Agrippa’s censure of poetry additionally provoking? And did Agrippa’s readers 
always understand the satirical nature of his work? Harington apparently does not recognize it, or more likely 
pretends not to recognize it, when he takes from Agrippa his “chiefe obiections” against poetry; see Ariosto, 
Orlando, trans. Harington, ¶3v. Presumably other sixteenth-century readers acknowledged the satire but still 
mined Agrippa’s chapter for arguments against poetry. Sidney for one realizes that “Agrippa will be as merry in 
showing the vanity of science as Erasmus was in the commending of folly”, and that these are merely “smiling 
railers”, who “had another foundation than the superficial part would promise” (Defence, 100). 
100
 Dethick and Willes, who both award an important place to allegory in their treatises, both studied at 
Winchester College under C. Johnson, a schoolmaster who was himself a Latin poet, who emphasized poetry in 
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prevailed in the schools, the situation at the universities would appear to have been less 
uniform. Gosson and Lodge, whose polemic is further discussed below, offer an example of 
how two contemporaries, who both went to Oxford at almost the same time, were shaped by 
their university experience in ways that made them dire opponents in this respect.
101
 
Further investigation along these lines would probably enrich our understanding of 
this crucial stage in the development of the debate. What is clear, however, is that in its 
earliest printed attestations, the academic orations of Willes and Dethick, this debate is not 
concerned with the broad-ranging outcry, “Puritan” or otherwise, over popular literature and 
the popular stage in particular.
102
 It is the summit of Parnassus that is supposedly under siege, 
not its expendable lower ranges. What is also striking is the vagueness with which the 
defenders of poetry refer to their supposed opponents, which cannot be ascribed wholly to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
his curriculum, and who presumably approved of their views for he contributed verses to both their publications; 
see Willes, De re poetica, ed. Fowler, 4-5; Dethick, Oratio, 22-3. Spenser, the author of a lost but in all 
probability thoroughly pro-allegorical English Poete, studied at Merchant Taylors’ under R. Mulcaster, who is 
on record as listing allegory as the defining quality of poetic discourse. See R. Mulcaster, Positions Concerning 
the Training Up of Children, ed. W. Barker (Toronto, 1994), 266: “For when the poetes write sadly and soberly, 
without counterfeating though they write in verse, yet they be no poetes in that kinde of their writing: but where 
they cover a truth with a fabulous veele, and resemble with alteration.” 
101
 It is also striking that the treatises of Willes and Dethick – the earliest comprehensive defences of poetry 
in England, predating Gosson’s Schoole by several years – are both formal Latin orations of the kind that would 
have been required in university exercises, and that Dethick’s treatise in fact is such an oration, delivered in the 
course of his B.A. or M.A. examinations. This is a particularly important piece of information given the fact that 
such orations were delivered on prescribed themes, and that they would have also been answered by other 
students acting as opponents. Did the debate which emerges into public view with Gosson, Lodge and Sidney 
originate in such academic contexts? Was the question of poetry a quaestio in the technical sense, a set topic on 
which the students argued pro and contra, as they did with other similar topics? The Latin treatises were a late 
addition to the corpus. In 1940 appeared the first edition of Dethick’s Oratio, in the version misattributed to 
Rainolds, but with an excellent and still valuable commentary by Ringler: see J. Rainolds [i.e., H. Dethick], 
Oratio in Laudem Artis Poeticae, ed. W. Ringler (Princeton, 1940). There followed in 1958 Fowler’s edition of 
Willes – a note on Willes had appeared in Essays, ed. Smith, 1: 46-7, n. 1 – and then Binns’ editions of Gentili, 
the correctly attributed version of Dethick’s treatise, and Dalechamp: see J. W. Binns, “Alberico Gentili in 
Defense of Poetry and Acting”, Studies in the Renaissance 19 (1972): 224-72; “Henry Dethick in Praise of 
Poetry”, Library 30 (1975): 199-216; Treatises, ed. Binns. Binns also brought to attention the English editions of 
Buchler’s abridgment of Pontanus and Strada’s Prolusiones; see Intellectual Culture in Elizabethan and 
Jacobean England, ed. J. W. Binns (Leeds, 1990), 153-9. On Dethick’s oration, see Treatises, ed. Binns, 4-5, 
where the oration itself is dated to no later than 14 July1572, while it publication – the edition is undated – is 
placed between 1572 and 1576. At the beginning, Dethick explicitly addresses an “audience” of “most excellent 
young men”, who will either “enter upon the same trials” that he is now entering, “or else have already 
undergone” them (ibid., 27-9). The disputations involved in B.A. and M.A. degrees are described in the Register 
of the University of Oxford, ed .C. W. Boase and A. Clark (Oxford, 1885-87), 2.1: 8-88. The lists of topics 
include “Literati potius exoptandi sunt in republica quam armati”, “An critici e republica literaria sint 
expellendi?”, “Criticorum laborum est occupatissima vanitas” (ibid., 2.1: 173, 175, 178). 
102
 As Fowler noted long ago: “we must at least hesitate before turning to the customary scape-goats, the 
Puritans, as early as 1573. After all, the calumniae were not borrowed from any Puritan, but from Vives – a 
Papist and a Humanist. And this is the true reflection of the state of affairs in the earlier Elizabethan period: the 
reasons for attacking poetry were mostly Humanistic or ascetic, not Protestant and Calvinist” (38). 
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principle of nomina sunt odiosa. Thus we know that Willes adapts these charges from Vives, 
but Vives is never named – instead, Willes strikes out at “certain men”, “enemies of the 
Muses”, “these obscure men”, “churlish [...] calumniators of the art of poetry”.
103
 But who are 
these “evidently barbarous” and “completely ignorant” philistines? Even after Gosson’s 
Schoole – with the unrepresentative exception of Lodge – defenders of poetry continue to 
refer to their opponents in this indirect manner, yet it proves impossible to find statements 
denouncing poetry in the wholesale manner that the defenders undertake to refute.
104
 The 
most probable reason for this is that, except as a polemical construct, these indiscriminating 
poet-haters never existed. 
In its polemical content, the defenders’ view is genuine, for what is really at stake for 
them is the allegorical view of literature. This is why Willes and all the defenders of poetry 
following in his train consistently omit any mention of the critiques of allegory found in Vives 
and later in Gosson, or in any other source. They award a prominent place to allegory in their 
treatises, but only as a counter-argument to the charge of lying or “feigning”, and never in 
terms of a debate between an anti- and a pro-allegorical position.
105
 It is the one issue that 
really matters and where genuine disagreement exists, and therefore the one issue they refuse 
to openly debate. Willes’ editor must have suspected the implications of this omission when 
                                                          
103
 De re poetica, ed. Fowler, 45-7. 
104
 Cf. Sidney, Defence, 99-100: “poet-haters”, “fools”, “these other pleasant fault-finders”; Ariosto, 
Orlando, ed. Harington, ¶2v: “the ignorant”, “three sundrie kindes of reproouers”, “our adversaries”, “we liue in 
such a time, in which nothing can escape the enuious tooth, and backbiting tongue of an impure mouth; and 
wherein euerie blind corner hatha a squint eyes Zoilus, that can looke a right ypon no mans doings squint-eye 
Zoilus” of “envious tooth and backbiting tongue”, etc. Lodge is not representative because he is writing to order, 
against a particular author and publication. In the Apologie Gosson notes that “It is told mee that they [i.e. the 
players] haue got one in London to write certaine Honest excuses, for so they tearme it, to their dishonest abuses 
which I reuealed” (M2v). All the evidence suggests that this was Lodge, who was thus expressly hired to write a 
confutation of the Schoole of Abuse rather than a general defence of poetry. 
105
 The single exception, in Dethick’s Oratio, is telling. Willes’ treatise anticipates Sidney’s Defence in being 
cast in the form of a judicial oration: Willes is defending poetry and thus has to refer to the prosecuting party in 
one way or another, so he introduces the construct of the poet-hater, based on the material in Vives. Dethick’s 
oration, however, is laudatory, so that a polemical context is not as prominent, and indeed we hear nothing of the 
existence of any quarrel on poetry until Dethick reaches the point where the allegorical conception of poetic 
meaning is to be introduced. Here the serenity of the panegyric mood is briefly eclipsed as Dethick cannot 
forbear from mentioning that the allegorical view of literature is contested by “some unlearned and inept little 
men” (43). He then returns to this abuse in the final sentence of his oration: “The man who does not see this” – 
i.e., the greatness of poetry, of which allegory is an essential component – “is a fool; the man who does not 
acknowledge this is envious; the man who does not embrace this knowledge ought to be called a madman” (49). 
Just like in the Gosson-Lodge debate discussed below, the denial of the validity of allegorical poetics is 
tantamount to a confession of cultural illiteracy. 
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he urged that “No conclusions can be drawn from Wills’s failure to use Vives’ penetrating 
censure of allegory” in De disciplinis.106 As should be clear, there is, on the contrary, every 
conclusion to be drawn from it, and indeed it is this omission that explains the otherwise 
insubstantial construct of the poet-hater. To Willes and many of his contemporaries allegory 
was the very essence of poetry, and to attack allegory is to attack poetry itself. 
What Gosson’s Schoole of Abuse represented upon its publication in 1579, then, was a 
particularly potent combination of tradition and novelty. His view of poetry was thoroughly 
traditional and thoroughly humanist: there is virtually nothing that Gosson says about poetry 
that could not be derived from Cicero alone. The novelty was to bring this view into the 
public arena, in fashionable vernacular prose, employing only classical sources, and aligning 
it with the censure of the public stage, supported by the civic authorities which also stood 
behind the publication of Gosson’s pamphlet.
107
 The Schoole stuck in the throats of men like 
Lodge and Sidney precisely because it was not “Puritan” – because it flashed the credentials 
of their own humanist culture, and called upon arguments and authorities they were bound to 
find compelling. In fundamentals, Gosson’s argument exactly replicates that of Vives: “The 
right vse of auncient Poetrie was too haue the notable exploytes of worthy Captaines, the 
holesome councels of good fathers, and vertuous liues of predecessors set downe in 
numbers”.
108
 However, poetry is often abused and we are right to follow Plato in banishing 
abusive poets from the commonwealth. The possibility of an allegorical defence of these 
abuses is categorically dismissed, and almost two pages are devoted to exemplifying and 
ridiculing the allegorical readings of Homer by Maximus of Tyre.
109
 Gosson repeats these 
charges with gusto in the Apologie for the Schoole of Abuse later in the same year, where he 
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 De re poetica, ed. Fowler, 35, n. 3. 
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 On the circumstances of its publications see Ringler, Gosson, 26-8, and Gosson, Markets, 17, n. 40. 
108
 The Schoole of Abuse (London, 1579), A7v. Nor is Gosson against all plays: “as some of the Players are 
farre from abuse: so some of their Playes are without rebuke” (C6v). In the Apologie for the Schoole of Abuse, 
Gosson explicitly rejects his opponents’ imputations that “I banishe Poetrie, wherein they dreame; [...] that I 
condemne Musique, wherein they dote; [...] that I forbid recreation to man, wherein you may see, they are starke 
blinde. He that readeth with aduise the booke which I wrote, shal preceiue that I touch but the abuses of all 
these” (Ephemerides, L2v). 
109
 “It is a Pageant worth the sight, to beholde how he labors w[ith] Mountaines to bring foorth Mise [...]. 
You will smile I am sure if you read it, to see how this morall Philosopher toyles too draw the Lyons skin vpon 
Æsops Asse, Hercules shoes on a childes feete, amplyfying that which the more it is stirred, the more it stinkes; 
the lesse it is talked of, the better it is liked” (Schoole, A3r-v). 
87 
 
brings out an abusive catalogue of pagan deities similar to those in Vives and Agrippa – 
Venus is a “notorious strumpet”, Apollo a “buggerer”, etc. – and reiterates his position that 
such representations are inadmissible, whether allegorical or not: 
By writing of vntruthes they [i.e. the poets who write of the gods] are open liers, but if 
they do faine these frantike conceates to resemble somewhat els that they imagine, by 
speaking of one thing and thinking another, they are dissemblers. [...] yet are many of 
their Schollers so enchaunted, that like the superstitious and foolish Ægyptians, they 
had rather lose their lose their lyues, then the Idols of their byrdes, their beastes, their 
Ibes, their Adders, their Dogges, their Cattes, their Serpentes, their Crocodiles.110 
It is Gosson’s attention to poetry, then, and in particular this dismissal of allegory, that made 
his pamphlet impossible to ignore; in attacking allegory, as Lodge’s reply makes clear, 
Gosson is attacking much more than it may at first appear. 
Even though Lodge appears to have been hired to write against Gosson by 
representatives of the theatre, his genuine interest lies not with what the Schoole says about 
the stage, much of which he agrees with anyway, but with what it says about poetry. The bulk 
of his “patchte pamphlet”, as Gosson rightly calls it, is taken over from a commentary on 
Terence by Badius first printed in 1502, but the few opening pages are Lodge’s own, and here 
it is the charges against poetry that concern him, in answering which his first and fundamental 
counter-argument is precisely that of allegory.
111
 “Did you neuer reader reade”, he asks his 
“ouer wittie frend”, “that vnder the persons of beastes many abuses were dissiphered? haue 
you not reason to waye? that whatsoeuer ether Virgil did write of his gnat, or Ouid of his fley: 
was all couertly to declare abuse? but you are (homo literatus) a man of the letter little 
sauoring of learning”.
112
 Lodge’s punning insult precisely encapsulates the debate: for him, as 
for many of his contemporaries, to be a homo literatus, man of letters, is precisely not to be a 
“man of the letter”. He wonders whether Gosson had 
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 Ephemerides, L5r. 
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 See S. Gosson, Plays Confuted in fiue Actions (London, [1582]), B4v; W. Ringler, “The Source of 
Lodge’s Reply to Gosson”, RES 15, o. s., (1939): 164-71.  
112
 “Reply”, A2r. 
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dronke perhaps of Lethe, your gramer learning is out of your head, you forget your 
Accidence, your reme[m]ber not, that vnder the person of Æneas in Virgil the practice 
of a diligent captain is discribed vnder [the] shadow of byrds, beastes and trees, the 
follies of the world were disiphered, you know not, that the creation is signified in the 
Image of Prometheus, the fall of pryde in the person of Narcissus, these are toyes 
because they sauor of wisedome which you want.
113
 
Acquired at the formative schoolboy age, allegory is as much a part of elementary education 
as Latin “Accidence” itself, a common cultural possession of anyone who aspires to the status 
of a homo literatus. Lodge does not debate Gosson’s views, but simply piles further examples 
of allegorical interpretation, juxtaposed with further doubts about Gosson’s cultural literacy. 
Clearly he believes that they speak for themselves, and that denying their validity is 
tantamount to saying that “our studientes [sic] [...] haue made shipwrack of theyr labors, our 
schoolemaisters haue so offended that by your iudgement they shall subire pœnam capitis for 
teaching poetry, the vniuersitie is litle beholding to you, al their practices in teaching are 
friuolous”.
114
 
But Gosson has not forgotten his “gramer learning”, and in fact that is precisely the 
problem. Had Gosson really been a mere philistine his pamphlet would have been easily 
ignored.
115
 Instead, Gosson actually anticipates Lodge’s criticism in a tantalizingly evasive 
passage which almost explicitly extends the metaphor of the “school of abuse” to his own 
King’s School in Canterbury. He himself, as he says, has “matriculated” in this “school, 
where so many abuses florish”, and could tell such “tales out of the Schoole” that he would  
bee Ferruled for my faulte, or hissed at for a blab, yf I layde al the orders open before 
your eyes. You are no sooner entred, but libertie looseth the reynes, and geues you 
head, placing you with Poetrie in the lowest forme: when his skill is showne too make 
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 Ibid., A2r-v. 
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 Ibid., A3r-v. 
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 It is telling that Sidney, in what seems to be a reference to Gosson’s Schoole, says that the objections of 
the more frivolous kind of “poet-haters” – “these other pleasant fault-finders” – “deserve no other answer, but, 
instead of laughing at the jest, to laugh at the jester” (Defence, 99-100), and yet he goes on to answer them 
anyway. Gosson’s Schoole was presented on its title-page as a plesaunt inuectiue; a few sentences further Sidney 
also employs the phrase “nurse of abuse” (101) in recounting the calumnies against poetry. 
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his Scholer as good as euer twangde, hee preferres you too Pyping, from Pyping to 
playing, from play to pleasure, from pleasure to slouth, from slouth too sleepe, from 
sleepe too sinne, from sinne to death, from death to the deuill, if you take your 
learning apace, and passe through euery forme without reuolting.
116
 
The key word being “reuolting”: Gosson is consciously and explicitly revolting against a 
major aspect of his education, and more broadly, a major element in the dominant literary 
culture of his age. He is doing this, however, in a way that would not have been possible 
without the benefits of this education, “beat[ing]” his enemies “from their holdes with their 
owne weapons”.
117
 Consequently, his pamphlet elicits responses where others are ignored, 
driving men like Lodge and Sidney to formulate statements of poetic theory which affirm 
what Gosson denies, namely that allegory is “gramer learning”, an essential requirement of 
basic cultural literacy. In the words of Hawes’ Lady Grammar, some three quarters of a 
century earlier, 
  gramer is the first foundement 
 Of every science to have construccyon: 
 Who knewe gramer without impediment 
 Shoulde perfytely have intellection 
 Of a lytterall cense and moralyzacion 
 To construe every thynge ententiefly, 
 The worde is gramer wel and ordinatly.
118
 
 
COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENTS, 1570-1630 
 
In the background of the Gosson-Lodge polemic, and of the post-1570 explosion of poetic 
theorizing in England in general, there seem to be two distinct, partly complementary and 
partly opposing tendencies: both were humanist, both had a footing in the educational system, 
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 Schoole, A6v-A7r. 
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 Pastime, l. 24. On allegoresis as an essential component of the discipline of grammar up to the twelfth 
century, see M. Irvine, The Making of Literary Culture (Cambridge, 1994), esp. the two chapters on enarratio. 
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both claimed the same authorities, both agreed on the moral end of poetry, both attacked only 
what they perceived as bad and defended what they perceived as good literature. The only 
question in which they genuinely differed was that of the more fabulous or otherwise 
offensive reaches of the poetic imagination, and consequently, on the question of what 
validity is to be awarded to the doctrine of allegory. It is against this background that we can 
now take a fresh look at the place of allegory in the established canon of English 
“Renaissance” poetics, surveying those documents which contain reasonably complete 
statements of poetic theory.
119
 What we find is that works fitting this description produced or 
published in England c.1570-1630, a corpus of some twelve major documents, tend to present 
allegory as a defining feature of all good imaginative literature, or at least of particular literary 
genres. 
 To begin with, such is the case with the earliest comprehensive treatises on poetry to 
survive from sixteenth-century England, the Latin academic orations of Willes and Dethick, 
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 Cf. Weinberg’s category of the “new arts of poetry” (History, 715). It is only such works that lend 
themselves to an analysis of any statistical interest, for it is only in them that the absence of allegorical poetics 
may be plausibly taken to reflect a genuine rejection of the doctrine. For “established canon” read the section on 
“English and Neo-Latin Poetics” in Plett’s Bibliography, 217-37, which is the most complete to date, although 
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comprehensive theories of poetry and are discussed below (the remaining four are Heinsius’ De constitutione 
tragoediae liber, James I’s Treatise, Webbe’s Discourse, and Temple’s analysis of Sidney’s Defence). To these 
nine I have added the treatises of Gentili, Scott, and Dalechamp, and Harington’s “Of reeding poetry”. These are 
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misleading statements about; see A. Nicoll, “Sir Kenelm Digby”, The Johns Hopkins Alumni Magazine 21 
(1933): 330-50, pp. 345-6. Drawing on Nicoll, Tayler further confuses the matter by describing it as a 
“manuscript [...] treatise [...] on the nature of poetry in general”; see Literary Criticism in Seventeenth-Century 
England, ed. E. W. Tayler (New York, 1967), 202. I have been able to locate this text, still virtually unknown to 
scholarship on early modern criticism, as the tenth item (fol. 61r-75v) in Harley MS 4153, a miscellany of 
Digby’s writings professionally transcribed no earlier than 1657. The 4,300-word letter, which probably dates 
from around 1640, is not a comprehensive treatise on poetics, yet it is a sustained discussion on the subject, and 
thus an important addition to the corpus of seventeenth-century English criticism. Following a preliminary 
presentation on the text at the 6th Biennial Conference of the Society for Renaissance Studies, University of 
Southampton, 13-15 July 2014, I am now preparing an edition with an introductory essay and essential 
commentary. Finally, on the “Commendation of true poetry. A Discommendation of all bawdy Rybald and 
paganizde poetes”, supposedly excerpted by its anonymous author in the Epistle to his First Book of the 
Preservation of King Henry the vij. (London, 1599), see pp. 103-04 below. 
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already discussed above. In his 1573 De re poetica disputatio, Willes distinguishes between 
mere “versifiers” and true poets – “those, that is, who invented as if by a loftier spirit things 
which to others remained hidden (for the Muses get their name from µύεσθαι, to have their 
eyes closed, and from µαιώσθαι, to deliver); those Plato calls poets, ‘the Interpreters and 
servitors of the gods’”.
120
 More explicitly, allegory is also Willes’ chief answer to the key 
charge of lying: 
whatever poets feign, at least they do so in a way that they teach what is profitable and 
what is not. For example, trees were stirred by the song of Orpheus: that is, rustics and 
ignorant men are delighted by poetry. So with Actaeon changed into a stag and 
devoured by dogs: that is, a spendthrift wastes his riches most if he supports his 
favourites.
121
 
“It would be tedious”, adds Willes, “to go through each one”, i.e., to allegorize each of the 
fables in this manner, clearly expecting his reader to already know and agree that such 
allegories are to be found in all poetic “feignings”. 
Around the same time, a fuller exposition of the allegorical theory, illustrated with a 
wider selection of examples, but identical in essentials, is given in Dethick’s Oratio in laudem 
poëseos.122 Poetry owes its origins to ancient sages who wished to bequeath their learning to 
posterity in a form that would reach worthy audiences but escape “the impure hands of the 
mob”. It is defined as the expression of wise and noble “thoughts” in a medium characterized 
by “the festive seemliness of meter, [...] bound by the melodious composition of harmonies, 
[and] entwined [...] around in the lurking retreats of darkness, clothed as it were with certain 
coverings of stories”. In illustration, Dethick interprets a number of classical fables as either 
“delineating the difficult and craggy pathway of uprightness”, or else “demonstrating the foul 
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 De re poetica, 59. “Poet”, reads the marginal note set against these lines, emphasizing that the definition 
of poetry is being given. The passage is a patchwork of two separate places in the first book of Scaliger’s 
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92 
 
uncleanness of filth, and the ravenous whirlpools of impiety”. The charge of Plato’s 
banishment of poets is countered by the argument that Plato himself, in “the Alcibiades [...] 
confirms that [the poets] enclose opinions truly golden in the obscure covering of riddles, 
which only the minds of good men can understand”.
123 
 Allegory-based conceptions of poetry are also found in the two treatises occasioned by 
Stephen Gosson’s 1579 Schoole of Abuse.124 As already discussed, Lodge’s reply to Gosson 
offers another complete statement, resorting to allegory as the first and chief counter-
argument to Gosson’s charges. As for Sidney’s Defence of Poetry, little needs to be added to 
Borris’ analysis of the allegorical element in the treatise, a much-needed corrective to 
generations of critical evasion.
125
 Sidney appeals to allegory throughout the work, and it is 
especially prominent in its closing passages, which include, beside enthusiastic references to 
Cornutus and Landino, Sidney’s own plea to his readers to believe, “with me, that there are 
many mysteries contained in poetry, which of purpose were written darkly, lest by profane 
wits it should be abused”.
126
 That these are found in the closing passages of the peroration 
seems significant; the reader goes away with Sidney’s emphatically personal recommendation 
of the doctrine.
127
 Furthermore, Sidney’s famous definition of poetry, so exemplary of the 
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 Ibid., 39. The reference is to the Second Alcibiades, now considered apocryphal, where Socrates quotes a 
verse from Margites and then proceeds to explain its “riddling” sense, on the premise that its author “speaks 
enigmatically, just like a poet. All poetry, by its nature, is enigmatic, and not everyone can take it in” (147b-d). 
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(Leiden, 2001), 433. 
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Abuse up to the 1970s, see Gosson, Markets, 43-51. Kinney’s conclusion there is that Sidney’s treatise presents 
an elaborate answer to Gosson, “as its structure, choice of issues, and subtle parody of language amply testify”, 
but the evidence is not entirely conclusive. Cf. n. 115 above. On balance, it seems plausible that Gosson’s 
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 Borris, Allegory, 110-14. 
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 Sidney, Defence, 121, emphasis mine; for the other references to allegory see pp. 74, 87, 94-5, 103, 107, 
121. 
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 Cf. Harington placing his “Briefe and Summarie Allegorie” of the Orlando “in the latter end” of the work, 
“as it were for a farewell, as men do at a great dinner, in which they haue almost surfeited vpon sundrie sorts of 
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period’s critical tendencies in its synthesis of the essential Platonic, Aristotelian, Horatian, 
and Plutarchian commonplaces, is revealed in its true light only when counterbalanced with 
his other definition, offered later on in the treatise, in response to the charge that poets are 
liars.
128
 Just like Willes, Sidney counters this charge by the claim that poetry is allegorical by 
definition, and before rushing to attribute to Sidney, or any other critic of the period, a 
precociously modern understanding of poetic licence, note should be taken of this corollary 
and the definition of poetry implied in it – the poet may range freely within the zodiac of his 
own wit, but only as long as the ecliptic to which that zodiac is aligned remains firmly 
allegorical.
129
 Sidney does not make this as explicit as some other theorists, yet both the full 
context of his argument and contemporary parallels clearly show this to be the case.
130
 
While ignored by most modern commentators, Sidney’s allegorism was not lost on 
such contemporaries as his secretary William Temple, who produced a dialectical analysis of 
the Defence, or Harington, who had it before him when he composed the “Briefe Apologie of 
Poetrie” prefaced to his 1591 translation of Ariosto.
131
 Indeed, Harington has this precise 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
booke, because commonly, that which men reade last stickes best in their memories, as so I wish this to do, 
being as it were the verie kyrnell and principall part, or as the marrow, and the rest but the bone or vnprofitable 
shell” (Mm2r-v). 
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 Defence, 79-80. 
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 Though the poet “recount things not true, yet because he telleth them not for true, he lieth not [...]. What 
child is there, that coming to a play, and seeing Thebes written in great letters upon an old door, doth believe that 
it is Thebes? If then a man can arrive to that child’s age to know that the poets’ persons and doings are but 
pictures of what should be, and not stories what have been, they will never give the lie to things not affirmatively 
but allegorically and figuratively written” (ibid., 103). 
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 See William Temple’s “Analysis”, ed. J. Webster (Binghamton, 1984), 135-9; cf. Borris, Allegory, 113-
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guilty of lying); thirdly, by pointing out the intentional element in lying (unlike the poet, the liar wants to be 
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fiction of something that either should or should not be, does not lie./ Poetry is this kind of allegorical fiction./ 
Poetry, therefore, does not lie” (“Analysis”, 139). Note that Temple’s treatment of “poetry” and “allegory” as 
synonyms is perfectly deliberate, and that he makes a point of noting that this particular answer to the charge of 
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passage before him when he argues that poets cannot be charged with lying because they are 
“never affirming any for true”.
132
 Then, in the passage immediately following, he proceeds to 
expand Sidney’s briefly stated corollary to this claim – that poetry is “allegorically and 
figuratively written” – into an extended statement of allegorical poetics, postulating three 
levels of meaning (literal, moral, and allegorical) and giving an example of such interpretation 
in the tale of Perseus.
133
 Allegory is also made essential in Harington’s “Of reeding poetry”, 
the theoretical section of his translation with commentary of the sixth book of the Aeneid, 
completed in 1604 for presentation to James I’s son Henry. Unlike Plato, Harington does not 
feel allegoresis to exceed a child’s intellectual capacities, and the fifth of the five rules 
prescribed for the ten-year-old heir apparent enjoins him “to bee inquysytyve to vnderstand all 
the misticall sences of the Poet yow reed”.
134
 
An intriguing but inconclusive case is presented by William Scott’s Model of Poesy, a 
manuscript treatise written around 1599, presenting us with a clash between allegorical and 
literalist tendencies within one and the same work.
135
 Thus at various points Scott seems 
favourably disposed to allegory: it is optional in pastoral, obligatory in epic, and generally 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
manifest enthusiasm for allegory: e.g., T. Rich, Harington & Ariosto (New Haven, 1940), 151-4; Atkins, 
Renascence, 194-5; T. G. A. Nelson, “Sir John Harington and the Renaissance Debate over Allegory”, SP 82 
(1985): 359-79. No argument is spared, including the apocryphal anecdote according to which Harington 
undertook the translation of the whole of Ariosto because his initial translation of one lewd episode offended 
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allegorical apparatus, Harington’s apologists explain, is part of this attempt to placate the offended queen, rather 
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in the Harington family papers from which H. Harington compiled the original edition of the Nugæ Antiquæ, but 
was reportedly told to T. Park, the editor of the 1804 edition, by a certain “Mr. Walker”, who in turn claimed to 
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and sentence well/ And cast away the bran/ To show the kernel, crack the shell/ In peeces now and than”; “What 
can be counted foule or cleane/ But Poets thereon talke/ Yet thousands knows not what they meane/ When they 
in cloud will walke”; T. Churchyard, A Mvsicall Consort (London, 1595), F4v, G3r. 
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Alexander: W. Scott, The Model of Poesy, ed. G. Alexander (Cambridge, 2013). 
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conducive to a poem’s “sweetness”.
136
 At each point, however, this impulse is undercut by the 
opposite tendency, taking Scott into the company of Vives and Gosson. Similitudes, we thus 
read, must be clear, appropriate, and “must not wade into filthy, obscene, and corrupt matters 
[...], lest you bemuddle more than instruct”; most importantly, they must not extend to matters 
of religion.
137
 “But perhaps”, Scott comments, “this scrupulous plainness will have fastened 
on it by some self-liking judge the name of folly” – if so, he is “content to be a fool” rather 
than blaspheme his maker, and proclaims “these gay Babylonish garments anathema”. Only 
two pages after allowing for “some” allegorical wisdom in Ovid, he complains against 
“Ovid’s gross fables” and “unreverend fictions”, and is unable to defend him or Homer from 
Scaliger’s charge of “oftentimes speak[ing] of their gods as of their swine”.
138
 In any case, 
whatever “true” allegories may be unearthed in classical poets, we should prefer the Christian 
Muse of du Bartas, “the first reformer and refiner of our corrupted faculties”.
139
 
Unfortunately, especially for the purposes of the present study, the manuscript of the 
Model contains an eight-page lacuna in the section dealing with the definition of poetry. After 
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 The epic “narration is called a fable or feigning imitation of the actions of men, with conveniency and 
aptness framed to answer the general form of some particular virtues to be followed; which form is called the 
allegory (saith Viperanus), whilst in the pretending a bare report of some singular and particular accidents we (as 
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 Ibid., 41-2: “Lastly, you must not feign things to be that which by religion and divine authority you are 
prohibited to resemble to anything. And this unavoidably lights on them that will needs go to school with the 
heathens to learn of them how to deify creatures and certain qualities; not much unlike this fault is the investing 
God with the titles of ethnic idols. Now we make love, lust, fortune, water, earth (what not?) gods, offering them 
incense of our prayers and thanks; anon we call God Jupiter, Apollo, Neptune, etc. – heathenish idols.” 
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 Ibid., 42. 
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 Ibid., 43. In the manuscript, Scott’s Model is followed by an incomplete translation of Du Bartas’ Divine 
Weeks. On Scott’s and his family’s “Puritan” tendencies in religion, see Model, ed. Alexander, xxix. 
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his opening remarks, Scott proceeds to define poetry according to its genus, difference, and 
use. As to the genus, it is an art, rather than “a divine fury or inspired force”; as to the 
difference, it is “imitation or of feigning and representing in style” (distinguishing it from “all 
faculties that consist not in feigning or imitation – as that of oratory, history, and the sciences 
– or feign not style – as painting, carving, and the like”). Tantalizingly, the remainder of the 
discussion on the difference, and the beginning of the discussion of the use of poetry – 
precisely the place where an appeal to allegory, or an absence thereof, would be significant in 
this survey – is lost in the lacuna, so that we cannot know for sure whether or not Scott saw 
allegory as an essential property of poetry in general. 
Something of this same conflict also appears in another Latin university oration, the 
Artis poeticae et versificatoriae encomium (1624) of Caleb Dalechamp, a Cambridge M.A. in 
theology.
140
 Dalechamp, however, does include an explicit endorsement of the allegorical 
doctrine: 
all men whose ‘hearts are neither simple nor foolish’ admit that not only is their mind 
stirred more by a verse than a prose oration, but also that the feeling of their mind is 
soothed by the highly ingenious hidden meaning of the stories and thus that they are 
fed towards a knowledge of the sciences by a kind of seasoning as it were.
141
 
There is another passage in which Dalechamp adduces the “beneficial effects” of poetry to its 
figurative and allegorical meanings, additionally interesting for a clever spin on the stock 
examples of Origen and Democritus, which are revealing of the context in which he 
undertakes to defend such an allegorical understanding of poetry, namely that of a student of 
Protestant theology addressing a community espousing decidedly anti-allegorical 
hermeneutical principles.
142
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 This appeared as the second of Dalechamp’s Exercitationes dvae (London, 1624). 
141
 Dalechamp, Encomium, 171. Binns’ translation has been modified to acknowledge the citation, which is 
italicized in the original but not indicated in the translation or identified in the notes. It is from the Latin 
translation of two lines from the Odyssey found in Erasmus’ Adages (Works, 5: 376). 
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 See Dalechamp, Encomium, 173. Origen in particular came to embody the allegorical tradition, and 
Origen-bashing, often involving the viciously ironic account of his castration, is almost a commonplace with the 
English writers of the period. For an example from the same year as Dalechamp’s treatise, see P. Simson, The 
Historie of the Chvrch (London, 1624), T6r: “Notwithstanding all these excellent gifts and renowned fame of 
Origen, hee wanted not his owne grosse errours, and foolish facts. In expounding of Scriptures, he became a 
curious searcher out of allegories. Yet this father of allegories Origen, mistook the words of Christ spoken of 
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At the far end of the spectrum from the tactful theology student, we find Henry 
Reynolds and his Mythomystes (c.1632), in which English poetics catches up with the more 
esoteric reaches of Italian humanism.
143
 Reynolds’ treatise sets out to prove the Natvre and 
Valve of Trve Poësie, and depth of the Ancients aboue our Moderne Poëts, consisting wholly 
in the fact that the ancient poets, unlike most modern ones, understood that good poetry 
should contain “high and Mysticall matters”, especially those pertaining to the knowledge of 
natural things, and that these “should by riddles and engimaticall knotts be kept inuiolate from 
the prophane Multitude”.
144
 It is ironic that Mythomystes, when mentioned at all, was singled 
out for special derision by early historians of English “Renaissance” poetics, when it is really 
the most “Renaissance” of all English poetical treatises of the period, if the actual influence of 
Italian humanist critics, and of rediscovered or reanimated ancient texts, is to be the 
measure.
145
 If Reynolds is in any way aberrant, it is not in his notion of allegory as an 
essential requirement of all “true” poetry, but in his extolling of natural at the expense of 
moral allegory, a novel development which deserves more attention than it has received thus 
far. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Eunuches, There bee some chaste, which haue made themselues chaste for the kingdome of heauen: these words, 
I say, spoken in an allegoricoll sense, hee tooke in a simple and vnfigurate meaning, and gelded himselfe, to the 
end hee might liue without all suspition of vncleannesse.” In order to make an allegorical conception of poetry 
palatable to his audience, Dalechamp twists the familiar story to his own end: “Shall we, with Origen (a man 
infamous in other respects because of his craze for allegorizing) interpret in a literal and absolute fashion words 
which ought to be taken figuratively? No; let us rather boldly proclaim of sight and poetry and the other gifts of 
God, what the Apostle declares of the law: ‘But we know that the law is good, if a man use it lawfully.’” If 
figurative readings may be misused, so may literal ones. In this way, Dalechamp manages to pledge his 
orthodoxy in explicitly dismissing the “infamous” allegorist, while at the same time using his example to justify 
the essential role of allegory in his theory of poetry. The dedication of the Exercitationes is addressed to the 
heads of the University of Cambridge. Dalechamp went on to a B.D. in theology and a career in the church; all 
of his other works are of a prominently religious nature and “establish Dalechamp as a theologian of minor 
importance in Cambridge circles who wrote mainly on peripheral theological issues” (Treatises, ed. Binns, 138). 
143
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Henry Reynolds gent[leman]” was entered on the Stationers’ Register on 10 August 1632 for John Waterson, 
“vnder the handes of Master Buckner and Master Aspley warden”; the entry was then “crost out by his 
[Waterson’s] owne Consent and resigned to the Author vt patet supra &c.” (Register, ed. Arber, 4: 248). It was 
eventually printed by H. Seyle, presumably not long after. 
144
 Reynolds, Mythomystes, F3r-v. 
145
 Reynolds mentions Ariosto, Bembo, Guarini, Marino, Sannazaro, Tasso, and quotes or cites Aulus 
Gellius, Maximus of Tyre, Conti’s Mythologies, Poliziano’s Silvae, Farra’s Settenario, and above all Pico della 
Mirandola, to whom he refers to throughout the work, and who is clearly the major influence on his arguments. 
For negative estimates of Mythomystes, see Essays, ed. Spingarn, 1: xxi; Clark, Rhetoric, 96; Atkins, 
Renascence, 287: “perverse”, “ill-directed and wrong-headed”, “a tropical forest of strange fancies”, “wool-
gathering”. 
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The seven authors discussed above belong to a range of social and intellectual 
contexts: Willes and Dethick show us how late sixteenth-century university students might 
have approached the subject; Dalechamp is also a student, but of more decidedly theological 
bent; Lodge is a hired pen, cutting and pasting for an immediate polemical purpose; Sidney 
and Harington are courtiers with a shared intellectual and social background, albeit very 
different ambitions and temperaments; Reynolds is, or would be, an esoteric mystic. In spite 
of these differences, however, their theories of poetry all share the conviction that, in 
principle, all good poetry is allegorical poetry. In principle, it is to be emphasized: even those 
authors who explicitly listed allegory as a requirement of poetry in general would not have 
demanded it from every single work of imaginative literature they encountered. They all 
expected literature to be edifying, and in many cases this could be achieved under the rubric 
of the example. Literature which represented ordinary or at least probable events and 
characters, and had a readily intelligible moral perspective, was not necessarily dredged for 
hidden meanings; the example was deemed sufficiently edifying. However, once pagan 
mythology entered the picture, or supernatural beings and events deriving from other sources, 
or anything else which could not be accommodated under the category of the example, 
allegory was called to aid. 
Exceptions to the pattern – comprehensive treatises which do not define allegory as an 
essential property of all good poetry – prove equally revealing. First of all, not one of these 
four texts contains an explicit rejection of the doctrine, and furthermore, even if they do not 
define it as essential, three of the four welcome it to at least a certain extent. Thus George 
Puttenham’s Art of English Poesy (1589) awards allegory a distinguished place in discussing 
the “fables” of the ancients, some of which would be inexcusable were they not “altogether 
figurative and mystical, covertly applied to some moral or natural sense”.
146
 Allegory is also 
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 Art, 1.12. Tantalizing is Puttenham’s mention of his lost “books of Hierotechnē”, but all that can be safely 
inferred about the work from this passage is that pagan religion was among the subjects treated in it. Puttenham 
briefly expounds his theory of its origin, yet indicates that this is but one element in the larger scope of the lost 
work: “whereof it [i.e., pagan religion] first proceeded and grew [...] appeareth more at large in our books of 
Hierotechnē”. 
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an essential requirement in the pastoral genre.
147
 However, Puttenham does not explicitly list 
it as an essential property of poetry in general. A passage in his chapter on the subject matter 
of poetry seems to come close, but on closer scrutiny proves inconclusive.
148
 Also 
inconclusive is Puttenham’s idiosyncratic treatment of allegory as a trope, which is clearly 
influenced by the allegorical tradition (and the post-classical rhetorical tradition, which had 
itself departed from classical rhetoric in absorbing influence from the allegorical tradition).
 
Puttenham follows the classical rhetoricians when he employs the term to denote a trope, 
defines it as “a long and perpetual metaphor”, and gives examples consistent with this 
definition.
149
 He departs from them, however, when he ascribes to allegory such attributes as 
will not be found, and are indeed incompatible with, its treatment in the classical treatises. 
Thus allegory is defined as “a duplicity of meaning or dissimulation under covert and dark 
intendments”.
150
 Stressing the “covert” and the “dark”, the definition reflects the allegorical 
rather than the rhetorical tradition, as does the source of the English name he bestows upon 
his “courtly figure” – Figure of the False Semblant, borrowed from the eponymous 
personification in the Romance of the Rose – and above all his appraisal of allegory as “the 
chief ringleader and captain of all other figures either in the poetical or oratory science”.
151
 
The reason, then, for Puttenham’s omission of an explicit statement defining allegory 
as essential to all poetic fiction is certainly not any fundamental hostility towards allegory. 
The same goes for Alberico Gentili’s 1593 Commentatio ad Legem III Codicis de 
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 Ibid., 1.18. 
148
 “The subject matter of poesy” is said to consist in the following: “the chief principal is the laud, honor, 
and glory of the immortal gods (I speak now in phrase of the gentiles). Secondly, the worthy gests of noble 
princes, the memorial and registry of all great fortunes, the praise of virtue and reproof of vice, the instruction of 
moral doctrines, the revealing of sciences natural and other profitable arts, the redress of boisterous and sturdy 
courages by persuasion, the consolation and repose of temperate minds, finally the common solace of mankind 
in all his travails and cares of this transitory life” (ibid., 1.11, emphasis mine). The italicized clauses can 
certainly seem to refer to moral and natural allegory, these being the two kinds of “mystical” sense Puttenham 
distinguishes in the passage cited above. In the larger context, however, it seems more likely that the sort of 
“instruction of moral doctrines” Puttenham has in mind here works by example rather than allegory (see 1.13), 
and that “the revealing of sciences natural and other profitable arts” refers to such works of versified philosophy 
and science as he goes on to briefly discuss in 1.21. 
149
 Ibid., 3.7. “Mystical” is the term he reserves for “allegorical” in the sense used in this study; besides the 
passage cited above, see also: “So as to the God of the Christians such divine praise might be verified; to the 
other gods, none but figuratively or in mystical sense” (1.12). 
150
 Ibid., 3.7. This departure from the classical definitions is all the more striking as it follows immediately 
upon the standard definition of metaphor as “an inversion of sense by transport”; one would expect that the 
standard definition of allegory as an extended metaphor, or chain of metaphors, will follow. 
151
 Ibid., 3.18. 
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professoribus et medicis, a commentary, as its unpromising title states, on a statute of Roman 
law regarding teachers and physicians, the first part of which contains a general and 
comprehensive defence of poetry.
152
 The first thing to note here is that that even though 
written and published in England, Gentili’s treatise is atypical in a number of ways. Gentili 
arrived to England at the age of twenty-eight as a formed thinker with a doctorate in civil law 
from the University of Perugia, and his intellectual background is different from the native 
critics discussed above.
153
 Even more importantly, his Commentatio must be seen within the 
specific polemical context of the Oxford dispute about academic drama between John 
Rainolds and William Gager.
154
 There can be little doubt that the primary purpose of the 
Commentatio was to enter the polemic and take arms against Rainolds, and that its subject 
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 This text is the second of the two commentaries in A. Gentili, Ad Tit. C. De maleficis et math. et ceter. 
similibvs commentaries. Item... Commentatio ad L. III. C. De professor. & medic. (Oxford, 1593). 
153
A comparison with Dalechamp is instructive: although of French descent, Dalechamp must have come to 
England at a significantly younger age than Gentili, for he obtained his degrees from English universities and 
was capable of writing what Binns describes as “vigorous and lively prose which displays an idiomatic 
command of the [English] language” (Treatises, 137-8). Binns states that Dalechamp “studied for ten years at the 
Universities of Sedan and Cambridge” (ibid., 137), but the entry in the Cambridge Alumni Database actually 
specifies that he “studied 10 years at Cambridge and then at Sedan” (emphasis mine). By comparison, Gentili 
never published a word of English and he is conversant with Italian critics cited rarely or never by his English 
peers, such as Fracastoro, Patrizi, Riccoboni, and Zabarella; some of his reading in this field may have come by 
way of his brother Scipione, from whose writings Gentili cites in the Commentatio (85, 99). Incidentally, in their 
edition of Sidney’s Defence, Duncan-Jones and Van Dorsten suggest that “The pervading influence of 
continental humanism in the Defence would suggest a personal link between Sidney and some foreign poet-
theorist” (63), tentatively proposing H. Estienne. But what about Alberico and/or Scipione? It is well-established 
that Alberico arrived to England in August 1580, where he was welcomed by influential fellow émigrés like 
Leicester’s physician Gulio Borgarucci and Elizabeth’s Italian tutor Battista Castiglione, by whom he was 
introduced to Tobie Matthew, Leicester, and Sidney, all of whom would act as his benefactors, as acknowledged 
in the dedications of his publications. According to what he relates in the dedication, dated 21 July 1585, of his 
De legationibus libri tres (New York, 1924), 2: iii-vii, Gentili met Sidney soon after his arrival to England, and 
their relationship was one of “acquaintance and intimacy”, involving “not only [...] correspondence but also [...] 
frequent personal interviews”. It is unclear whether Alberico was accompanied by his brother, but it is certain 
that Scipione was in England in 1581, and that he too was then introduced to Sidney, to whom he dedicated two 
volumes of Latin poetry published that year in London. Scipione dedicated further works to Sidney, and during 
his second stay in England composed a poem celebrating the birth of Sidney’s daughter. Thus both Alberico and 
Scipione appear to have been in contact with Sidney during the period to which the composition of the Defence 
may plausibly be dated, on which see Sidney, Defence, 59-63. 
154
 For all the attention it has received ever since it was first examined in Boas’ University Drama in the 
Tudor Age (Oxford, 1914), 229-51, the account of this polemic is still incomplete. Rainolds and Gentili 
exchanged four more letters in addition to those printed in Th’overthrow of Stage-Playes (Middelburg, 1599), 
preserved in the same manuscript (Corpus Christi College Library MS 352) as the other surviving 
correspondence relating to the quarrel. These have been discussed, for example by Binns, but remain 
unpublished; see J. W. Binns, “Women or Transvestites on the Elizabethan Stage?”, The Sixteenth Century 
Journal 5 (1974): 95-120; REED: Oxford, ed. J. R. Elliott, Jr., et al. (Toronto, 2004), 860-1. The last item in the 
manuscript is a copy of the first of Gentili’s Dispvtationes dvæ (Hanover, 1599), which is also related to the 
quarrel, but are seldom discussed, and have never been edited or translated. Gentili’s dedication of the 
Disputationes to T. Matthew is dated October 1597, which means that the Disputationes came first, and that 
Th’overthrow was Rainolds’ response. 
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was a pretext for Gentili to defend his professional territory and argue the case for the 
separation of civil and canon law.
155
 In this context, there were compelling reasons for Gentili 
to avoid allegory in the Commentatio. By 1593, he was Oxford’s Regius Professor of Civil 
Law of six years standing and a renowned authority on the subject. On the other hand, his 
nationality, his conformism, his powerful connections in the court, his role in the Mendoza 
affair, and in particular his views on the prerogatives of civil law – epitomized by the 
celebrated sentence, “Silete theologi in munere alieno”
156 – would not have endeared him to a 
figure like Rainolds, who, among others, opposed Gentili’s appointment to the chair, and to 
whom Gentili’s professed Protestantism may well have seemed little more than a front for 
dangerous, perhaps even “Papist” opinions.
157
 
In taking arms against an opponent as formidable and unsympathetic as Rainolds, he 
was, then, to proceed with caution. Some arguments would be off-limits, and among them any 
attempt to defend literature on the basis of allegory, for that would have almost certainly met 
                                                          
155
 The trajectory of the polemic, which moves from general questions of literature and theatre, to the 
question of transvestism as such, and from there to the territorial dispute on the jurisdiction of canon and civil 
law, would seem to confirm this, as well as to account for its increasing bitterness and longevity. In the initial 
letter to Rainolds, accompanied with a copy of the Commentatio, Gentili barely mentions the immediate subject 
of acting, but elaborates at length on his “duty to defend always the civil law, which I profess, and which I have 
always served as a most just one. If, however, I came into your territory, I not only tried to guard my territory, 
and you knew this was the law when you wished to visit us in our territory. Although I have not been able to 
reflect upon you, who have come into that disputation after my observations, I nevertheless thought that the 
moral and civil polity aspects of the sacred books were either ours, or surely common to us and to the 
theologians. I truly persist in that same opinion even now”; Latin Correspondence by Alberico Gentili and John 
Rainolds, ed. L. Markowicz (Salzburg, 1977), 19. 
156
 “Let the theologians keep silence about a matter which is outside of their province”; trans. in A. Gentili, 
De iure belli libri tres (Oxford, 1933), 1: F6v, 2: 57. For discussions of the sentence, both in its original context 
and its “mythical” afterlife, see The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations, ed. B. Kingsbury and B. 
Straumann (Oxford, 2010), esp. the chapters by Malcolm and Koskenniemi. 
157
 “Xenophobia ran rampant” in 1580s Oxford, writes Feingold, “as it did in England more generally, and 
was directed with particular rancor against Italians – including those whose Protestant credentials appeared 
impeccable”; the “Oxford Calvinists [...] invariably regarded Italian (and Spanish) émigrés as prone to heresy, or 
at least as being inconstant in matters of religion and morals”; M. Feingold, “Giordano Bruno in England, 
Revisited”, HLQ 67 (2004): 329-46, pp. 333-4. In one of his unpublished letters to Rainolds, dated 8 February 
1594, Gentili notes that Rainolds and others had opposed his appointment, and accused him of “Italica levitas” in 
his dealings (ibid.). Further evaluation of Gentili’s position would have to look into the confessional dimensions 
of the very subject of civil, i.e., Roman law: according to J. Ayliffe, The Antient and Present State of the 
University of Oxford (London, 1714), 1: 188, the study of law, both civil and canon, had been almost abandoned 
at Oxford in the sixteenth century for “savouring too much of Popery”. How much of that savour endured into 
the day of Gentili and Rainolds? An intriguing comment is also found in a footnote in T. E. Holland’s Studies in 
International Law (Oxford, 1898), 15-16, n. 4: “It would seem”, he writes, “from notes occurring here and there 
in the Bodleian MSS.” – i.e., the Gentili manuscripts in the Bodleian’s D’Orville collection – “that Alberico, 
about 1593, had to defend himself against the charge of being an ‘Italus Atheus’”, Italian atheist. 1593 is the 
precise year in which Gentili came into conflict with Rainolds; unfortunately, Holland does not provide any sort 
of reference for this comment, and I have not been able to locate it. 
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with condemnation on Rainolds’ part, and would perhaps even been taken as an opportunity 
to cast a passing shadow over the Italian jurist’s religious orthodoxy.
158
 Condemnations of 
“popish allegories” abound in the orthodox Protestant literature of the day, including 
Rainolds’ own writings, and Gentili would not have allowed himself to walk into so obvious a 
trap.
159
 That this was the cause of his avoidance of explicit recourse allegory in the 
Commentatio is made further plausible by evidence suggesting that he was not really averse to 
the doctrine: for example, he cites with approval the Homeric orations of Maximus of Tyre 
and Fulgentius’ Exposition of the Content of Virgil according to Moral Philosophy, both 
paradigmatically allegorical in approach.
160
 If, then, he is an exception to the allegorical rule, 
Gentili is a very specific, and only partial exception; he does not seem to have subscribed to a 
genuinely non-allegorical theory of poetry, but to have tactically avoided what was, in a 
specific polemical context, a potentially harmful argument. 
There remain two works, both fragmentary and hence inconclusive for the purposes of 
the present analysis: excerpts from what may have been a comprehensive poem on the subject 
of poetics in the Epistle to the anonymous First Booke of the Preservation of King Henry the 
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 A detail from their correspondence proves revealing. Gentili could not avoid a figurative interpretation of 
Deut. 22:5, the key biblical text against cross-dressing, and Rainolds predictably accuses him of misconstruing 
the passage by interpreting it, “contrary to all the theologians, not literally but figuratively, not concerning 
clothes but concerning a shameful deed committed by bared clothing” (Correspondence, ed. Markowicz, 33). In 
his reply, Gentili rushes to vaunt his Protestant credentials and pre-emptively dismiss the possible implication of 
such charges, in a manifestly disingenuous attempt to turn them on his opponent. Thus he accuses Rainolds, of 
all people, of preventing him “from treating the sacred books out of a papist spirit”, and acting “tyrannically with 
him who despised the power of the Pope and was banished from the country and the entire papal realm” (ibid., 
39). Implicit in this is Gentili’s awareness – for no such characterization is actually made by Rainolds – that 
there was a savour of popery even in such figurative interpretations as he was offering of Deut. 22:5, to say 
nothing of allegorical interpretations proper. Several years later, in the Disputationes dvæ, Gentili explicitly 
endorses a “mystical” (C7v) interpretation of the Deuteronomy prohibition, citing Philo, On the Special Laws, 
referring to “highly gifted men who think that most of the contents of the law-book are outward symbols of 
hidden truths, expressing in words what has been left unsaid”; see Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1929-62), 7: 587. 
159
 See the record of Rainolds’ discussions with the convicted English Catholic J. Hart: The Svmme of the 
Conference betwene Iohn Rainoldes and Iohn Hart (London, 1584). Rainolds’ hermeneutics is conventionally 
Protestant in reserving allegory for such exceptionally obscure texts as Revelation (R3v), but rejecting it in most 
other contexts; see the section “How the scripture must be expounded”, E5r, L7r-8r. For further discussion of the 
Protestant view of allegory, see ch. 3, esp. pp. 268-89. 
160
 Commentatio, 79, 83. For translations of Maximus (see esp. orations 4 and 26) and Fulgentius, see 
Maximus of Tyre, The Philosophical Orations (Oxford, 1997); Fulgentius the Mythographer (Columbus, 1971). 
Gentili explicitly praises Fulgentius for having “compiled a book of moral precepts from Vergil alone, whom he 
considered a poet in name, in subject a most moral philosopher”, and even defends him from the detractors of his 
method: “Away with you, Trithemius, whoever you are, who dare say that Fulgentius sought for gold in the 
mud.” The reference is not traced by Binns; whatever edition Gentili used, it ultimately derives from the entry on 
Fulgentius in Johannes Trithemius’ Liber de Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis ([Basel, 1494]), E5r: “Expositio 
Virgilianae co[n]tine[n]tiæ secu[n]du[m] philosophos morales: mirabilis industria auru[m] i luto”. 
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vij. (1599), and the section on this subject in Ben Jonson’s Timber, or Discoveries. The entry 
for the former in the Stationers’ Register, dated 12 January 1600, speaks of “A booke called 
The first booke of the preservation of Kinge HENRY the VIJ when he was but E[a]rle of 
RYCHEMOND Grandfather to the queens maiesty Wherevnto is annexed A commendation of 
true poetry. A Discommendation of all bawdy Rybald and paganizde poetes &c”. Although 
this latter title seems to designate a separate work, no such work appears in the single 
surviving copy of the Preservation. Its Epistle, however, does contain nine passages of verse, 
83 lines in total, presented as extracts from a longer poem on the subject of poetry and poetic 
theory, and although this cannot be confirmed, thematic and verbal correspondences could be 
interpreted to indicate that this poem is the Commendation... and Discommendation noted as 
“annexed” to the main work.
161
 This text has not received much attention in this respect, yet 
of the nine passages, two deal with fundamental questions of poetic theory, siding with the 
paradigm represented by Vives, Gosson, and partly Scott.
162
 It is hard to draw firm 
conclusions from such a limited sample, but it seems possible – if the excerpts are not a mere 
conceit, and the author really is drawing from a much longer poem – that we have largely lost 
a very interesting contribution to the canon of comprehensive statements on the subject. 
Finally, there is the relevant section in Jonson’s commonplace book, which merits 
mention here as it appears to be comprehensive in design, yet its unfinished state prevents us 
                                                          
161
 See The First Book of the Preservation, the Epistle, pitting “trew Poetry” against “rybaud and baudy 
Poets”, and “paganis’d Poets” (B1r-2r). 
162
 “[R]ybaud and baudy Poets be but the diuels agents, and are to be detested: but the virtuous and godly 
Poets are to be both reuerenced and regarded”; instead of “amorous madrigals”, poets should “Aime at a trew 
Period, Christ Iesus”; “wee, that professe Christianity, should not vse any paganisme, to detract gods glorie, as 
the paganis’d Poets did, in the time of ignorance. For this I haue written of them, I meane, of Homer, Virgill, 
and others; [...] In truth, all they that professe trew Poetry should seeke to further the aduancement of gods glory 
what they may (which I pray God they may doe, to banish all these fond fantasticall and Veneriall Poets) and 
also to doe their best endeauour in trew Hexameters, to abolish this plain rythme-prose; that wee may imitate 
and follow the best learned, and auncient Poets: as Homer, Virgill, and Lucan in Chronicles” (B1r-2r). Early 
commentary, for example by Collier or Smith, is restricted to the author’s participation in the vogue for 
quantitative verse in English; see Illustrations of Old English Literature, ed. J. P. Collier (London, 1866), 2: ii-iii 
(third pagination); Essays, ed. Smith, 1: xlvii. Spingarn was familiar with the entry in the Stationers’ Register, 
but apparently considered the work lost (History, 267). For a recent attribution to a J. Lane (1564-1605) of 
Bentley, Staffordshire, see J. Considine, “John Lane’s Verball”, in Words in Dictionaries and History, ed. O. 
Timofeeva and T. Säily (Amsterdam, 2011). 
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from drawing any firm conclusions from the fact that includes no mention of allegory.
163
 
Indeed, largely absent from the Discoveries is any advanced discussion of the use of poetry 
and the nature of poetic subject matter – places where allegory may be expected to appear, or 
where its absence could be interpreted as significant. The translator of Horace repeats, of 
course, that the purpose of poetry is to teach and delight, but aside from a few passing 
remarks the nature of that teaching – including the test cases of epic or pastoral poetry
164
 – is 
left unspecified. The definition of poetry is given in a nominally Aristotelian mode, without 
any recourse to allegory; it is “an art of imitation, of feigning; expressing the life of man in fit 
measure, numbers, and harmony”.
165
 But what is the weight of this if we know that Jonson 
can employ the same Horatian and Aristotelian language in his description of the 
quintessentially allegorical genre of the masque?
166 Little can be said of the Discoveries 
within the limits of the present survey; the work is unfinished, and therefore inconclusive.
167
 
The resulting ratio, then, eight to two in favour of the allegorists – with Scott, Jonson, 
and the author of the Preservation omitted as inconclusive – is comparable to that presented 
by Weinberg’s “new arts of poetry”, and is made further significant by the fact, already noted 
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 Except in the classical rhetorical sense, in a passage translated from Quintilian: see The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Ben Jonson, gen. ed. D. Bevington, M. Butler, and I. Donaldson (Cambridge, 2012), 7: 
567. 
164
 Cf. Borris, Allegory, 3. As epic and pastoral gravitated towards the very highest and very lowest objects of 
poetic representation, the impulse to allegory was particularly strong with these genres. To anticipate some 
remarks in the Afterword (pp. 332-3), it is no coincidence that, two centuries later, Wordsworth’s and 
Coleridge’s Lyrical Ballads combine poetic theory dismissing allegory and any other form of didacticism – 
poetry is “that species of composition [whose] immediate object [is] pleasure, not truth”, and that aims “to 
produce excitement in co-existence with an overbalance of pleasure” – with poetic practice that juxtaposes 
supernatural fantasy with the representation of “common life”, and especially “Low and rustic life”, “in a 
selection of language really used by men”; Lyrical Ballads, 3rd ed. (London, 1802), 1: vii. It is further no 
coincidence that, in another century or so, these tendencies fuse in a work like Joyce’s Ulysses, where the 
archetypal work of Western epic fantasy becomes the mythical backdrop for the detailed representation of a day 
in the life of the most ordinary of men, down even to his most undignified bodily functions. 
165
 Jonson, Works, 7: 578. 
166
 See the preface to Love’s Triumph through Callipolis, significantly entitled “To make the spectators 
understanders”: “all representations, especially those of this nature in court, public spectacles, either have been, 
or ought to be the mirrors of man’s life, whose ends, for the excellence of their exhibitors (as being the donatives 
of great princes to their people), ought always to carry a mixture of profit with them no less than delight” 
(Works, 6: 333, emphasis mine). 
167
 An obvious argument, but one which must be bracketed here, along with the rest of Jonson’s critical 
oeuvre, is that the greatest masque writer of the age would have hardly devised a comprehensive poetics that 
would make no room for allegory. Indeed, it is tempting to speculate whether the discrepancy between Jonson’s 
own allegorical practice and the absence of allegory in Heinsius’ De constitutione tragoediae, his chief source 
for the poetics section in the Discoveries, is the reason why the section is left incomplete. Did Jonson find 
himself paralyzed by the opposing demands of these tendencies? Cf. Redwine on the fact that Jonson never 
produced “a systematic and thoroughgoing essay on criticism”, and the “irreconcilable theories” and “accidental 
complexities” in his critical writings; Ben Jonson’s Literary Criticism, ed. J. D. Redwine, Jr. (Lincoln, 1970), xii. 
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above, that the authors come from a wide variety of social and intellectual backgrounds. 
Needless to say, there is, alongside such comprehensive statements, an unabated stream of 
publications which disseminate the allegorical theory of poetry in non-systematic forms, but 
the above survey, restricted to comprehensive statements, gives us a realistic and 
methodologically coherent estimate, derived from a clear set of criteria, of the place occupied 
by this theory in the period’s poetical thought. According to this estimate, most critics 
consider allegory to be an essential attribute of all good poetry, and find it impossible to 
formulate a general theory of poetry without recourse to the doctrine. A minority does not 
consider it essential to all poetry, but does consider it an essential or at least auxiliary attribute 
of certain literary periods or genres. There is no instance of categorical hostility towards it. 
Furthermore, when all this is plotted onto a time-line, we see that the allegorical doctrine 
reigns virtually uncontested until well into the early decades of the seventeenth century. Very 
tentatively, we may perhaps find warrant here to begin to speculate about a transformation in 
attitude beginning to occur at that time, but only about a transformation – emergent, gradual, 
hesitant, uneven – not a precipitous turn, not a straightforward decline, and most certainly not 
an end. 
 
SOME SHADOWE OF SATISFACTION 
 
The state we find at the close of the sixteenth century is thus essentially the same as the one 
found in Plato’s day: one party eschews the possibility of allegory and emphasizes poetry’s 
aesthetic properties, but is consequently driven to censor the offensive elements it is perceived 
to contain; the other is able to keep these elements, but only by submitting them, in the final 
instance, to allegorical interpretation. These tendencies could be followed throughout the 
remainder of the seventeenth century. Thus William Davenant and Thomas Hobbes, writing 
in the interregnum, reject allegory, but at the same time curtail the imaginative scope of 
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modern epic poetry, and poetry in general, to the realm of the credible or the possible.
168
 
Other English theorists of the epic continue in the allegorical tradition, allowing the 
marvellous or otherwise problematic elements on the condition they are underlined by a 
profitable allegorical sense. Indeed, at the very end of the period covered in this study, the 
venerable theory of the allegorical epic actually receives a powerful reinforcement in Le 
Bossu’s 1675 treatise, translated into English in 1695, and echoed in the same year by Richard 
Blackmore, criticizing the earlier allegorical manner of Ariosto and Spenser, but only in 
contrast to the more polished allegorical poetics he sought to exemplify by his own Prince 
Arthur.169 
What is conspicuously missing in all this is a position that would defend poetry for its 
imaginative or aesthetic properties rather than in spite of them; that could give a rationale for 
imaginative literature not in its presumed capacity to transmit content properly belonging to 
another discipline, but in one specific to itself; that could accommodate the entire compass of 
poetic fiction, from its lowest to its highest reaches, without finding it necessary to mitigate 
them through allegoresis. What is missing, in terms of the analogy with Plato’s day, is an 
Aristotle. An Aristotle, it is to be emphasized: as is well known, the so-called rediscovery of 
Aristotle’s Poetics did not in itself meet this end. The work was indeed rediscovered – 
printed, translated, commented upon – and became a pervasive influence on subsequent 
critical thought, yet it was also consistently misinterpreted on a number of key counts, and 
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 In his Discourse upon Gondibert (Paris, 1650), Davenant censures epic poets, both ancient but especially 
modern, for including supernatural and immoral elements in their works (A4v-11v). He makes limited room for 
allegory only in the case of the ancient poets, who were “the sacred Priests” of their times, and whose 
“supernaturall Tales [...] compounded the Religion, of Pleasure and Mysterie” (A8v). He is recognizably 
Protestant, however, in his inversion of traditional view of allegorical poetics: the ancients, he claims, aimed 
their allegories at “the People”, “whilst for the eternity of their Chiefs (more refin’d by education) they surely 
intended no such vain provision” (A8v-9r). But if such faults are “in a great degree excusable” in the ancients, 
with Christian poets, “whose Religion little needs the aids of invention”, they merely “continue and increase the 
Melancholy mistakes of the People”, and thus “admit no pardon”. The “whole business” of poets is to “represent 
the Worlds true image [...] to our view” (A6r-v). Spenser’s talents should have been employed on “matter of a 
more naturall, and therefore of a more usefull kind. His Allegoricall Story (by many held defective in the 
Connexion) resembling (me thinks) a continuance of extraordinary Dreams” (A10r). In his Answer to Davenant’s 
Discourse, Hobbes reiterates these principles: the “strange Fictions and Metamorphoses” of the ancients “were 
not so remote from the Articles of their Faith, as they are now from ours, and therefore were not so unpleasant”; 
a Christian poet, however, may go “Beyond the actuall works of Nature [...]; but beyond the conceived 
possibility of Nature, never” (ibid., F11v). 
169
 See Introduction, pp. 24-5. 
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conflated with sources and doctrines that have since been recognized as fundamentally un-
Aristotelian, including that of allegory. 
Even when nominally Aristotelian sixtheenth-century critics write against allegory, 
under nominally Aristotelian principles, these principles turn out to be those of Weinberg’s 
“pseudo-Aristotle”. Such is the case with Castelvetro, who ignores allegory, but does so only 
on the utterly un-Aristotelian premise that poetry was invented “not for the pleasure of the 
educated” but “exclusively to delight and give recreation [...] to the minds of the rough crowd 
and of the common people”.
170
 What is implicit in Castelvetro is explicit in Fabbrizio 
Beltrami’s 1594 Alcune considerazioni intorno all’allegoria, which not only ignore but 
categorically dismiss allegory as a rationale for poetic fiction on the same ground: poetry is 
intended exclusively for the “completely ignorant”, in addition to which Beltrami also finds 
that allegory violates Aristotelian notions of probability and unity of action.
171
 Even though 
such arguments do not appear in England, they are of interest as further testimony to just how 
central the notion of allegory is to the period’s critical debates. If the allegorical theory of 
poetry makes it the exclusive preserve of an educated elite, pseudo-Aristotelians like 
Castelvetro and Beltrami cannot dismiss it without running into the other extreme, making 
poetry the exclusive preserve of the illiterate mob. 
But these are exceptions, and anti-allegorical statements of any sort are an 
exceptionally rare occurrence in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century poetics. 
Montaigne’s excursus in the Apology for Raymond Sebond, with its condemnation of Homeric 
allegoresis, is perhaps the most notable of these exceptions.172 It is also of interest that we do 
find a few such statements in works of a markedly satirical nature. In Erasmus’ Praise of 
Folly, the height of scholastic obtuseness is to “trot out some foolish popular anecdote, from 
the Mirror of History [...] or the Deeds of the Romans, and proceed to interpret it allegorically, 
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 Quoted in Weinberg, History, 504. 
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 Ibid., 338-9.  
172
 See M. de Montaigne, Essayes (London, 1603), Gg2v-3r: “Is it possible that ever Homer meant all that 
which some make him to have meant. And that he prostrated himself to so many, and so severall shapes, as, 
Divines, Lawyers, Captains, Philosophers & al sorts of people else, which, how diversly and contrary soever it 
be, they treate of sciences, do notwithstanding wholly relie vpon him, & refer them-selves vnto him; as a 
Generall Maister for all offices, works, sciences, & tradesmen & an vniversal counsellor in al enterprises?” 
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tropologically, and anagogically”.
173
 Only decades later, Rabelais can summarily dismiss 
allegorists of all ages, from Heraclitus to Poliziano, and by time of Cervantes’ Don Quixote it 
is a young humanist alone who is the butt of this joke.
174
 Thus allegory can be laughed at, but 
almost exclusively, it would seem, in such ambiguous contexts, from which no confident 
inference can be made of an author’s genuine attitude towards the subject. In much the same 
way, Gosson laughs, in the “plesaunt inuectiue” of his Schoole, at the allegories of Maximus 
of Tyre, and believes his reader also “will smile I am sure if you read it”. But just like 
Erasmus, Cervantes, and Rabelais, he never says why, and this is not only because he believes 
it to be obvious, as he clearly does, but probably also because he himself does not quite know 
why – because he lacks the means to fully conceptualize and express his intuitive displeasure 
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 Works, 27: 134. Cf. [U. von Hutten, C. Rubeanus, et al.], Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum (London, 1609), 
where already in the very first letter we hear of “Magister Andreas Delitzsch, a very subtle scholar [...] who 
lectureth in ordinary upon Ovid in his Metamorphoses, and explaineth all the fables allegorically and literally” 
(1.1/293). Later on, friar Conrad Dollenkopf reports that his studies at Heidelberg are going well, and that he 
“already knows by rote all the fables of Ovid in his Metamorphoses, and these I can expound, quadruply – to wit, 
naturally, literally, historically, and spiritually – and this is more than the secular poets can do”; for “nowadays”, 
he complains, “these Poets do but study their art literally, and do not comprehend” such “allegorizing and 
spiritual expositions” as he goes on to quote from the fourteenth-century Metamorphosis Ovidiana moraliter 
explanata – i.e., the fifteenth chapter of Pierre Bersuire’s Reductorium morale, once attributed to the Dominican 
Thomas Waleys, and still printed at the time of the Epistolæ – and which exemplify, as he explicitly asserts, “the 
way in which we ought to study Poetry” (1.28/343-5). Elsewhere, we learn that magister Gratius himself, the 
addressee of the Epistolæ, has complained that he has but a few pupils, and that “Buschius and Caesarius lure 
the students from” him, “notwithstanding that they lack [his] skill to expound the poets allegorically and to cite 
thereanent the Scriptures. The Devil, I trow, is in those Poets. They are the bane of the universities” (2.46/484). 
If, however, the precedent for this was Erasmus’ above-quoted dismissal of allegorical readings of such medieval 
favourites as the Speculum historiae or the Gesta Romanorum, then the authors of the Epistolæ gravely 
misunderstood his point. With Erasmus, it is not the method itself that is the problem – as discussed above, he 
explicitly and repeatedly recommends its application to classical poets – but its illegitimate application to the 
said “barbarian” texts. Indeed, the fact that the quoted passages from the Epistolæ mock precisely such an 
approach to classical poetry as Erasmus supported throughout his career is not inconsistent with his vocal 
disapproval of the work on other grounds, notably in the 16 August 1517 letter to Caesarius, included, against his 
will, in Gratius’ 1518 Lamentationes obscurorum virorum: “I greatly disapproved of the Epistolae obscurorum 
virorum, right from the beginning” (Works, 5: 66-7), etc. Quite simply, Erasmus had no share in the Protestant 
hostility to allegory, and such irreverent mockery of a doctrine fundamental to his literary views – not to mention 
the much more forceful and damning views of Luther and other Reformers on biblical allegoresis – could have 
only been deeply troubling and distasteful to him. 
174
 See Rabelais, Gargantua, B3r-v, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, and M. de Cervantes, The Second 
Part of the History of... Don Quixote (London, 1620), K8r: among other useless books, Cervantes’ humanist 
scholar – “his Profession was Humanity, his Exercises and Study to make bookes for the Press” – is working on 
one “which I meane to call the Metamorphosis, or Spanish Ouid, of a new and rare inuention: for imitating Ouid 
in it, by way of mocking: I shew who the Giralda of Seul was, the Angell of the Magdalena, who was the Pipe 
of Vecinguerra of Cordona, who the Buls of Guisando, Sierra Morena, the springs of Leganitos and Lauapies in 
Madrid; not forgetting  that of Pioio, that of the gilded pipe, and of the Abbesse, and all this with the Allegories, 
Metaphors, and Translations, that they delight, suspend, and instruct all in a moment”. 
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with the doctrine. The most he can muster comes in the more straightforward mode of the 
Apologie: allegorists, he says here, are “dissemblers”.175 
It is this essentially moral charge that accounts for most, if not all, instances of anti-
allegorical sentiment in the English corpus. As Herman notes, one of the stock definitions of 
allegory – saying one thing while meaning another – “comes perilously close to calling all 
allegories lying”.
176
 Herman’s further statement that this makes allegory “a morally contested 
term in popular discourse” is exaggerated, yet a degree of unease is certainly detectable.
177
 
Also on record are misgivings about the readers’ capacity or willingness to correctly identify 
the intended allegorical meanings, especially those of contemporary topical reference: 
Spenser, for example, writes his “Letter of the Authors” because, “knowing how doubtfully 
all Allegories may be construed”, he wishes to avoid “gealous opinions and 
misconstructions”.
178
 Obviously, however, these are not objections to allegory as such, and in 
fact presume and uphold the validity of allegorical poetics. 
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 “Thus making gods of them that were brute beastes, in the likenes of men, diuine goddesses of common 
harlots; they robbe God of his honour, diminishe his authoritie, weaken his might, & turne his seate to a stewes. 
By writing of vntruthes they are open liers, but if they do faine these frantike conceates to resemble somewhat 
els that they imagine, by speaking of one thing and thinking another, they are dissemblers” (Ephemerides, L5r). 
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 Herman, Squitter-wits, 23-4. 
177
 Thus Puttenham’s famous passage on allegory, where one of the names he gives it is precisely 
Dissimulation, “hints at his doubts about the morality of both poetry and politics” (Art, 23). More precisely, 
Puttenham plays on the negative connotations of the term “dissimulation” in order to insert into an apparently 
innocuous text, an entry on allegory in a survey of rhetorical figures, a playful critique of the court. The irony, 
however, is that in doing so, Puttenham is himself dissimulating, himself displaying a subtle mastery of precisely 
that which he is supposedly criticizing. We find the same irony in Sidney’s allegory sonnet in Astrophil and 
Stella, which begins with the speaker professing to distance himself from those “who with allegory’s curious 
frame/ Of other’s children changelings use to make”; P. Sidney, The Major Works, ed. K. Duncan-Jones, rev. ed. 
(Oxford, 2002), 163. The metaphor of the changeling is equivalent to the straightforward charge of 
dissimulation; the allegorical meaning, as the opening lines of the sonnet intimate, is an illicit and fraudulent 
surrogate for the one genuinely intended by the author. Yet Sidney immediately undermines this by facetiously 
insisting that when he says “Stella”, he means “the same/ Princess of beauty for whose only sake/ The reins of 
love I love, though never slake”. As the names “Astrophil” and “Stella” cannot be more obviously fictional, the 
lines, even while they pretend to discourage it, effectively invite the reader to look for their topical significance, 
which was in all probability perfectly obvious to Sidney’s intended coterie audience. 
178
 The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton with T. Suzuki and S. Fukuda, 2nd ed. (Harlow, 2007), 714. 
Similar statements are found in Jonson’s works, for example in the Epistle to Volpone: “Application is now 
grown a trade with many; and there are that profess to have a key for the deciphering of everything; but let wise 
and noble persons take heed how they be too credulous, or give leave to these invading interpreters to be over-
familiar with their fames, who cunningly and often utter their own virulent malice under other men’s simplest 
meanings” (Works, 3: 29). But precisely as Dutton adds in his note to this passage, “in protesting too much”, 
Jonson and others who utter the same sentiment “may advertise what they purport to disown”, paralleling the 
ambiguous protestations of Puttenham and Sidney. Drummond’s Informations record Jonson’s straightforward 
explanations of the characters in the lost pastoral play The May-lord, Jonson himself figuring as “Alken” (ibid., 
5: 379). 
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We meet, then, with an inarticulate moral objection to allegory as “dissembling”, and 
with a certain degree of unease about the correct decoding of allegorical meaning, but not the 
allegorical process in itself. It is only with Francis Bacon’s discussion of poetry in The 
Advancement of Learning (1605), and its revised and expanded form in De augmentis 
scientiarum (1623) – the one comprehensive statement of poetics purposely omitted from the 
above survey – that we arrive to a considerably more sophisticated critique of the allegorical 
doctrine.
179
 In one sense, the reason is obvious: Bacon’s attitude towards poetry and allegory 
is different from that of his predecessors because his entire framework of human knowledge is 
different. However, in spite of a sizeable literature on Bacon’s poetics there is still little 
agreement on its postulates and its place in the history of poetic thought. The broad outlines 
are well known: poetry, in Bacon’s comprehensive scheme, is one of the three main branches 
of human learning, and is aligned with the faculty of imagination; the other two are history 
and philosophy, aligned with memory and reason.
180
 Poetry is defined as being “nothing else 
than Imitation of History at pleasure [historia conficta ad placitum]”; it is divided into 
“narrative”, “representative”, and “parabolical”; its purpose is “to endow Humane Nature with 
that which History denies; and to give satisfaction to the Mind with, at least, the shadow of 
things, where the substance cannot be had”.  
 These are the familiar broad outlines. A more nuanced estimate of Bacon view’s 
depends, however, on a careful reconsideration of a number of further statements here and 
elsewhere in his works – notably Bacon’s approach to mythography, pursued most 
extensively in his 1609 De sapientia veterum  – to which task the remainder of this chapter is 
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 See F. Bacon, Of the proficience and aduancement of Learning (London, 1605), Ee1v-3v; De Dignitate & 
Augmentis Scientiarum (London, 1623), P2r-S3r (2.13). I will mostly refer to the revised version in De 
augmentis, quoting the contemporary translation by G. Wats – Of the Advancement and Proficience of Learning 
(Oxford, 1640), O1r-R2v (2.13) – pointing out significant differences from the 1605 version, and the 1623 Latin 
original, as they arise. For ease of reference, I will cite the 1605 version as Aduancement (with a u), the 1623 
Latin version as De augmentis, and the 1640 translation as Advancement (with a v). Curiously, Bacon’s writings 
are absent from Plett’s Bibliography, in spite of the fact that the section on poetry in the Aduancement was 
anthologized in Spingarn’s Essays, and is routinely discussed in studies of English poetics.What is not 
sufficiently acknowledged, however, is the significance of the revisions to this section in De augmentis. 
180
 For an overview of Bacon’s framework, see S. Kusukawa, “Bacon’s Classification of Knowledge”, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. M. Peltonen (Cambridge, 1996). 
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largely dedicated.
181
 To begin with, the relevance of Bacon’s inclusion of poetry among the 
three major branches of human learning, and its allocation to the faculty of imagination, 
becomes clear only when compared to prior attempts at the classification of poetry among the 
human faculties and sciences. Out of the terminological quandary presented by these earlier 
classifications, two basic tendencies can be discerned.
182
 Fundamental to both is the premise 
that poetry has no subject or faculty proper to itself, from which premise two seemingly 
opposite but in fact perfectly compatible conclusions can be derived. According to the first, 
the lack of a subject matter proper to poetry means that its definition is to be sought in its 
medium, so poetry is classified along with the other disciplines or faculties of discourse 
comprising the trivium, especially rhetoric.
183
 According to the second, the lack of proper 
subject matter means that poetry encompasses the subject matter of all disciplines, making it 
the supreme science. While superficially at odds, it is easy to see that the two lines of 
argument – that poetry does not have a subject, and that it encompasses all subjects; that it is 
the handmaiden of other disciplines, and that it is their mistress – differ only in emphasis.
184
 
Common to both is the inability to conceive of poetry, or “imaginative literature” and “art” 
more broadly, as an autonomous or at least semi-autonomous field of activity. 
While such elaborate classifications as found in the work of Italian critics do not 
appear in England, the broad outlines are the same. Rhetoric on the side of the verba, 
philosophy, especially moral, on the side of the res, and history, itself similarly suspended 
between the two, are the most important coordinates in locating poetry on the map of human 
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 See F. Bacon, De sapientia veterum liber (London, 1609); I will mostly be quoting from the contemporary 
English translation by A. Gorges, The Wisdome of the Ancients (London, 1619). 
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 For an analysis of the elaborate efforts at such classifications by sixteenth-century Italian critics, see 
Weinberg, History, 1-37. 
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 However divided and named, and sometimes with the addition of history. Cf. Weinberg, History, 2: 
“Since poetry used words as its medium, it belonged with all the logical disciplines – with logic, dialectic, 
rhetoric, and sophistic – and with such arts as grammar and history, all of which also used words. [...] 
Renaissance theorists in a sense never abandoned this classification, although the sciences associated with poetry 
appear in different groupings and combinations. Throughout the sixteenth century we find systems modelled on 
this essentially medieval pattern.” 
184
 The perfect illustration of this is found in a 1551 lecture by the Italian critic B. Varchi, who first declares 
poetry to be a verbal faculty rather than an art, since it has no proper subject, and is thus almost indistinct from 
the other verbal faculties – “dialectic, logic, and poetics are almost the same thing, not being different 
substantially but only in accidents” – and then later in this same lecture claims that poetry contains “in itself 
necessarily all the sciences, all the arts, and all the faculties at once, whence it is more noble, more delightful, 
and more perfect than each one of them in itself” (quoted in Weinberg, History, 8-9). 
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culture. The distinction between form and content, verba and res, is fundamental and 
absolute. A particularly illustrative passage from John Hoskins’ Directions for Speech and 
Style (c.1600) may be quoted at length:  
An emblem, an allegory, a similitude, a fable, and a poet’s tale differ thus: an 
EMBLEM is but the one part of the similitude, the other part (viz., the application) 
expressed indifferently and jointly in one sentence, with words some proper to the one 
part, some to the other; a SIMILITUDE hath two sentences, of several proper terms 
compared; a FABLE is a similitude acted by fiction in beasts; a POET’S TALE, for 
the most part, by gods and men. In the former example, plant a castle compassed with 
rivers and let the words be, Nec obsidione nec cuniculis (neither by siege nor 
undermining): that is an emblem, the proper terms of the one part. Lay it as it is in Sir 
Philip S[idney]: Philoclea’s virtue, the proper terms of the one part; environed, rivers, 
battered, undermined, the terms of the other part; all these terms in one sentence and it 
is an allegory. Let it be this: 
There was a lamb in a castle, and an elephant and a fox besieged it. The 
elephant would have assailed the castle but he would not swim over the river. 
The fox would make a hole in the earth to get under it, but he feared the river 
would have sunk in upon him and drowned him. 
Then it is a fable. Let Spenser tell you such a tale of a Faery Queen, and Ovid of 
Diana, and then it is a poet’s tale. But utter it thus in one sentence:  
Even as a castle compassed about with rivers cannot be battered or 
undermined, 
and this in another: 
Philoclea, defended round about with virtuous resolutions, could neither be 
forced nor surprised by deceit, 
then it is a similitude in his own nature, – which is the ground of all emblems, 
allegories, fables, and fictions.
185
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 J. Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style, ed. H. H. Hudson (Princeton, 1935), 9-10. 
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Hoskins’ passage presents us with the dominant sixteenth-century theory and its 
corresponding educational model in condensed form. At its basis, both conceptually and 
chronologically, are collections of moral maxims, similar to the motto Hoskins derives from 
Sidney’s Arcadia, learned in the lower grammar school forms.186 These are the ultimate 
model of the res, which is understood to remain unchanged regardless of how one 
manipulates the increasingly complex verba by means of which it is expressed. To interpret a 
work of literature is thus to recover the unchanged res from the protean variety of the verba. 
Neither is endemic to poetry: the res belongs properly to philosophy, while the province of 
the verba is shared by all of the arts of the trivium. The specific difference of poetry can thus 
only be located in its configuration of these two components, and the interpretive process this 
entails. Of this process there can be several levels, three of which – verse and figurative 
language, example, and allegory – are usually discernible.
187
 But again, since figurative 
language and example are just as much the property of rhetoric as of poetry – and since verse 
too, at least for those who followed Aristotle on this matter, was insufficient as the specific 
difference of poetic discourse – the distinction, if any, ultimately came down to allegory.188 
 What is Bacon’s relation to this received view? Scholarship on Bacon’s thought has 
often reflected on its transitional character, in which tradition and innovation are often found 
side by side, and his poetics is no exception. Indeed, Bacon himself seems to have understood 
it as such: “searching and pursuing in our Partition the true veines of Learning”, his account 
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 See P. Sidney, The Covntesse of Pembrokes Arcadia (London, 1590), Tt6r: “Philoclea (though humbly 
seated) was so inuironed with sweete riuers of cleere virtue, as could neither be battred, nor vndermined”. 
187
 Cf. also Hoskins’ treatment of literary character, a variation on the commonplace identification of 
Aristotle’s notion of the “universal” with allegory. Hoskins clearly envisages the process of “characterization” as 
essentially allegorical, just as he views fiction as “figured” by definition: “he that will truly set a man down in a 
figured story must first learn truly to set down an humor, a passion, a virtue, a vice, and therein keeping decent 
proportion add but names and knit together the accidents and encounters” (Directions, 41). Thus every character 
in Sidney’s Arcadia is stripped to a type or abstract concept in a manner almost indistinguishable from 
allegoresis: “pleasant idle retiredness in King Basilius, and the dangerous end of it; unfortunate valor in Plangus; 
courteous valor in Amphialus; proud valor in Anaxius”, etc. 
188
 Note the implicit equation, just as in Sidney and elsewhere, of Hoskins’ “fiction” and “poet’s tale” with 
the allegorical mode employed by Spenser, and commonly attributed to Ovid. Cf. also Scott’s Model of Poesy, 
where a deliberate attempt is made to determine the specific difference of poetry, distinguishing it “from all 
faculties that consist not in feigning or imitation – as that of oratory, history, and the sciences – or feign not style 
– as painting, carving, and the like” (11). While this may sound as anticipating Bacon’s position, and the position 
of modern aesthetics more generally, ultimately Scott can only reproduce the traditional view: poetry is “an art 
of imitation, or an instrument of reason, that consists in laying down the rules and way how in style to feign or 
represent things, with delight to teach and to move us to good” (6); the poet “proposeth his sugared meats to 
unjudicious wits for the most part, and is therefore called the vulgar philosopher” (82).  
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of poetry is to proceed without, “in many points, [...] giveing place to custome, and the 
receaved Divisions”.189 Where the received opinion is deemed “true”, it will be retained, and 
where not, a new one will be sought. The first, most obvious, and furthest-reaching break with 
tradition is the categorical separation of poetry from philosophy and its alignment with the 
imagination. The threefold division of the mental faculties into memory, imagination and 
reason is an ancient commonplace, but the correlation of the three faculties with their 
respective arts is apparently a sixteenth-century development, and it has been suggested that 
Bacon here draws on Juan Huarte’s influential Examen de ingenios, first published in 1575. If 
so, Huarte’s influence extended only to the broadest, structural level, for in their substance 
Huarte’s correlations are not merely different from, but irreconcilable with Bacon’s. Notably, 
Huarte also aligns poetry with the “imagination”, yet to him “imagination” and 
“understanding” are antithetical, whereas to Bacon they are distinct and, crucially, 
complementary.
190
 Bacon does not sever poetry from reason in order to denigrate it,
 
nor do the 
specific powers of poetry – which is capable of “proportioning the shewes of things to the 
desires of the mind; and not submitting the mind to things, as Reason and History doe” – 
make it superior to the other two principal sciences, as they do for Sidney and other theorists 
of the period.
191
 Each has its proper place in what Bacon famously describes by his tree 
simile, “because the Partition of Sciences are not like severall lines that meet in one angle; but 
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 “From a good imagination”, says Huarte, “spring all the Arts and Sciences, which consist in figure, 
correspondence, harmonie, and proportion”; J. Huarte, The Examination of mens Wits (London, 1594), H4r. This 
includes rhetoric and the arts – “Poetrie, Eloquence, Musicke, and the skill of preaching”, “Paynting, drawing, 
writing, reading” – but also “the practice of Phisicke, the Mathematicals, Astrologie, [...] the gouerning of a 
Common-wealth, the art of Warfare” (H7v-8v; by “writing” and “reading” are meant the arts of handwriting and 
reading aloud). By “imagination”, as his definition and the ensuing discussion show, Huarte appears to mean 
something like abstract intelligence; thus an uneducated man, possessed of “an ill vnderstanding, and a bad 
memorie, but a good imagination”, is a natural talent at chess (H8v-I1r). However we define Bacon’s 
“imagination”, it is plainly something other than abstract intelligence. Huarte also places a special emphasis on 
poetry, placing it deliberately at the head of the list – but again for very different reasons than Bacon. First of all, 
“poetry” is to Huarte equivalent to “the art of versifying” (H6v), which Bacon straightforwardly dismisses – see 
Bacon, Advancement, O1r: “for Verse, is a kind of Stile and Forme of Elocution, and pertaines not to Matter; for 
a true Narration may be composed in Verse; and a Faigned, in Prose”. More importantly, Huarte says he is 
placing poetry at the head of the “imaginative” disciplines “not by chance nor for want of consideration, but 
thereby to giue notice, how farre off, those who haue a speciall gift in poetry, are from vnderstanding”. The 
English translation of Huarte’s Examen was made from an intermediary Italian translation; all cited passages 
have been checked against an early edition of the Spanish original – Examen de ingenios (Huesca, 1580) – and 
show no important deviations in meaning. The translation had at least nine further editions, the last in 1734. 
191
 Advancement, O2r. 
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rather like branches of trees that meet in one stemme, which stemme for some dimension and 
space is entire and continued, before it break, and part it selfe into armes and boughes”.
192
 
Furthermore, poetry is the only art Bacon classifies under the domain of 
“imagination”, and the reason he gives for doing so makes it clear that by “imagination” he 
means, among other things, more or less what the word means today in similar contexts. 
Poetry, he writes, is “a kind of Learning in words restrained; in matter loose and licenc’d; so 
that it is referred, as we said at first, to the Imagination; which useth to devise, and contrive, 
unequall and unlawfull Matches and divorces of things”.
193
 Bacon assigns poetry to the 
imagination, then – we can drop the quote marks now, at least in this context – for the same 
reason we still speak of imaginative literature when distinguishing between a particular kind 
of writing that we feel to be a form of art rather than merely cultured or “lettered” discourse. 
Nor is Bacon’s imagination a mental aberration, a furor, whether in the negative emphasis, 
coupling poetic phantasia with that of the lunatic and the lover, or the positive emphasis of 
Neoplatonic doctrine. Nor can Bacon’s view be rightly compared, as many critics have done, 
to Sidney’s more famous passage on the golden world of poetry, for as with Huarte, the 
differences are far more important than the similarities. As discussed above, Sidney 
champions poetic licence only on the corollary of seeing all poetry as offering moral or 
philosophical instruction, and therefore, in the final instance, allegorical in nature; the greater 
the licence the poet takes, the more it calls for allegoresis (the stock “argument from 
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 Ibid., O1r. In the earlier version, this is followed by an abbreviated citation from Horace’s Ars poetica: 
“Pictoribus atque poetis &c.” (Aduancement, Ee1v). The passage in Horace runs: “‘Painters and poets have 
always enjoyed recognized rights to venture on what they will.’ Yes, we know; indeed we ask and grant this 
permission turn and turn about. But it doesn’t mean that fierce and gentle can be united, snakes paired with birds 
or lambs with tigers”; Criticism, ed. Russel and Winterbottom, 279. Probably Bacon was attracted to the 
aphorism on the painters and the poets because in itself, without Horace’s addition, it offered a succinct ancient 
confirmation of his own views. Obviously, however, Horace’s comment runs exactly counter Bacon’s insistence 
that poetic licence extends even to precisely such “unequall and unlawfull Matches and divorces” as Horace 
forbids. In fact, Bacon’s statement reads like a deliberate negation of Horace’s strictures. The removal of the 
citation in the De augmentis is thus very likely the result of Bacon’s wish to disassociate himself from Horace’s 
view, with which the anonymous aphorism on poetic licence was inextricably linked. On the nature of Bacon’s 
“imagination” in reference to poetry see also the initial definition at the beginning of Book 2 of the De 
augmentis: “Poesy, in that sense we have expounded it, is likewise of Individuals [i.e. like history, dealing with 
actual particulars, and unlike philosophy, dealing with universals], fancied to the similitude of those things which 
in true History are recorded, yet so as often it exceeds measure; and those things which in Nature would never 
meet, nor come to passe, Poesy composeth and introduceth at pleasure, even as Painting doth: which indeed is 
the work of the Imagination” (Advancement, K3r). 
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absurdity” which, as discussed below, Bacon himself espouses in his idiosyncratic theory of 
mythographical exegesis, but not in his theory of poetry). What Sidney, from the point of 
view of modern aesthetics, gives with one hand, he takes with the other. Exactly like 
Hoskins’, and exactly unlike Bacon’s, Sidney’s poetic licence extends solely to the superficial 
layer of the verba, while the res remains firmly in the domain of philosophy. Whatever 
similarities they may exhibit, this is where the theories irrevocably diverge: Bacon’s poet 
simply cannot, by definition, be a “popular philosopher”.
194
 
This is not to say that Bacon wholly dispenses with the inherited view of poetry as a 
soluble compound of res and verba, or that of poetry as conducive to morals, or indeed of 
poetry as a vehicle for the esoteric transmission of philosophic content, but he profoundly 
transforms these views. With respect to the res-verba distinction, he does so, firstly, by taking 
a genuinely rather than merely pseudo-Aristotelian or rhetorical, view of the two elements, 
and secondly, by assigning them to separate disciplines and mental faculties.
195
 “Poesy”, he 
writes, “is taken in a double sense; as it respects Words; or as it respects Matter” – but, he 
continues: 
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 There are strong indications that Bacon’s revisions of the poetry section in De augmentis are influenced 
by a reading of the Poetics in the 1623 Latin translation by the eminent London physician T. Goulston: 
Aristotelis de poetica liber (London, 1623). The Aristotelian influence in Bacon’s poetics is generally noted, and 
some commentators have made claims for Bacon’s direct knowledge of the Poetics. However, since Bacon never 
cites or refers to Aristotle’s work, or any other authority – as noted above, a citation from Horace appears the 
Aduancement, but is removed in De augmentis – direct knowledge is difficult to demonstrate. Dowlin believed 
that Bacon “must have been familiar” with Riccoboni’s Latin translation, first published in 1579 and included in 
the 1590 Lyons Opera omnia edited by I. Casaubon, but without persuasive evidence; see C. M. Dowlin, “Plot as 
an Essential in Poetry”, RES, o.s., 17 (1941): 166-83, p. 171. The section on poetry in De augmentis appears to 
contain, however, several verbal echoes of Goulston’s Latin translation, which is the first English edition of the 
Poetics in any language or form. Besides these verbal echoes, specified in notes 201 and 203 below, several 
further circumstances corroborate this inference. First of all, the time-frame allows for Bacon’s reading of 
Goulston’s translation, which was entered on the Stationers’ Register on 23 January 1623, nine months before 
De augmentis, entered on 13 October. Thus the first English edition of the Poetics, in an accessible and 
methodical Latin translation, opening with a diagrammatic representation of the treatise’s contents, appeared 
precisely when Bacon was at work, or was about to begin work, on De augmentis (his preceding publication, the 
Historia vitae et mortis, was entered on the Stationers’ Register on 18 December 1622). Secondly, the passages 
in which traces of Goulston’s translation seem to appear are all additions made in De augmentis, absent from the 
early version in the Aduancement, which would be consistent with them resulting from Bacon’s reading of this 
translation. Thirdly, these apparent verbal echoes come from precisely those sections of the Poetics which would 
have been of greatest interest to Bacon – ch. 4, on plot (“Fabula, Qua & Qualis”, C4v), and ch. 15, on epic (“De 
Epopœïa”, I1r) – which, again, the tree diagram of the contents would make easy to identify and locate. Finally, 
Bacon knew Goulston, or at least knew of him, as Goulston sent to Bacon a large-paper presentation copy of his 
previous translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric – Aristotelis de Rhetorica... Libri (London, 1619) – now in the 
British Library, General Reference Collection, C.48.g.7. Goulston’s inscription contains no information on his 
relationship with Bacon; it is reproduced in T. F. Dibdin’s Introduction, 4th ed. (London, 1827), 1: 318-19. 
Although there is no evidence that Goulston did the same with his Poetics, it is at least a possibility. 
117 
 
In the first sense, it is a kind of Character of speech; for Verse, is a kind of Stile and 
Forme of Elocution, and pertaines not to Matter; for a true Narration may be 
composed in Verse; and a Faigned, in Prose. In the latter sense, we have already 
determined it, a Principall member of Learning, and have placed it next to History; 
seeing it is nothing else than Imitation of History at pleasure. Wherefore searching 
and pursuing in our Partition the true veines of Learning; and in many points, not 
giving place to custome, and the received Divisions; we have dismissed Satyres, and 
Elegies, and Epigrammes, and Odes, and the like, and referred them to Philosophy and 
Arts of Speech. Under the name of Poesy, we treat only of History Faigned at 
Pleasure.196 
As with philosophy, the knot which had for centuries tied poetry to rhetoric is severed in one 
bold stroke. The two remain related, as a number of commentators have rightly insisted, but 
while rhetoric remains an aspect of poetry, poetry is no longer an aspect of rhetoric. In terms 
of the traditional configuration, poetry is now promoted to “a Principall member of 
Learning”, aligned to its proper faculty (imagination) and assigned its proper subject (fiction), 
while rhetoric is demoted to a function of those “Faculties of the Mind of Man” that are 
auxiliary to all three “principal” disciplines.
197
 A further consequence of this is the exclusion 
of lyric poetry from the domain of “poesy” and its relegation to rhetoric. This statement, 
added in De augmentis, has been a cause of needless dismay to some modern 
commentators.
198
 Bacon’s exclusion of the lyric is not a value judgement, but simply the 
logical conclusion to be derived from Bacon’s premises at a time when the modern notion of 
lyric poetry, of a lyric “voice” or “speaker” as a fictional persona distinct from the actual 
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 Ibid., Ee1r. Cf. Kusukawa, “Classification”, 54. See also J. L. Harrison, “Bacon’s View of Rhetoric, 
Poetry, and the Imagination”, HLQ 20 (1957), 109-10: it is true that the imagination remains “the principal 
mental agent of both poetry and rhetoric”, but this does not mean that that Bacon “willingly sacrificed neat 
division in order to outline the dual proctorial duties of the Imagination”. Explicitly addressing this issue, Bacon 
writes that he sees “no reason why we should depart from the former Division: For the Imagination commonly 
doth not produce Sciences; for Poesy which hath ever been attributed to the Imagination, is to be estimated 
rather a play of the wit, than a knowledge” (Aduancement, Ee2r). He thinks, that is, in terms of different and 
complementary uses of the imagination. Even so, the fact remains that only poetry is classified under the faculty 
of the imagination, and that it thus finds itself at the very top, and rhetoric at the very bottom of the tree of 
knowledge, a polyvalent mental “faculty” classified as a sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-subdivision of philosophy. 
198
 Cf. Harrison again, insisting that Bacon’s words here do not “mean that satire, elegy, epigram, and ode are 
relegated to rhetoric” (“View”, 121, n. 17) – but what else might they mean? 
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author, is at best only beginning to emerge.
199
 The defining quality of Bacon’s “poesy” is 
fiction, and he simply does not see the lyric kinds – many of which were in his day still 
commonly used for a variety of overtly non-fictional occasional purposes – as fictional 
discourse, but rather as rhetorically embellished statements of the actual thoughts and 
sentiments of actual people. Even today, when a definition of imaginative literature that 
would exclude the lyric is inconceivable, the colloquial use of the term fiction in the English 
language continues to denote narrative fiction. In any case, Bacon is not trying to ban odes 
and epigrams, but merely to assign them to their proper place in his division of knowledge. 
Bacon’s Aristotelianism is tried, however, by the paramount question of poetry’s 
relation to morality and knowledge. Here we do see him stray into pseudo-Aristotelian 
territory, moralizing some of Aristotle’s structural concepts, but again with characteristic 
twists in emphasis which distinguish him from his predecessors. Thus he notes that “a strong 
Argument may be drawn from Poesy, that a more stately greatnesse [Magnitudinem] of 
things; a more Perfect Order [Ordinem]; and a more beautifull [pulchram] variety delights the 
soule of Man, than any way can be found in Nature, since the Fall”.
200
 There would appear to 
be an echo of the Poetics here, specifically the claim, in the chapter on plot, that “Pulchrum in 
Magnitudine & Ordine manet”.
201
 Of course, when Aristotle says that “Beauty is a matter of 
size and order”,
202
 these terms have a purely structural meaning, whereas Bacon turns them 
into affective and moral qualities, redefining structural “magnitude” as affective “greatnesse”, 
and structural “Order” as poetic justice. Again, however, the traditional element in Bacon’s 
poetics undergoes significant reconstruction and transformation: while the reward of virtue 
and the punishment of vice are the near-universal refrain of sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
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 See R. Greene, “The Lyric”, in History, ed. Norton, for a discussion of the “especially problematic” place 
of the lyric in premodern poetics. According to Greene, the notion of the lyric as fictional develops only 
gradually in the course of the sixteenth century, and the theory of the lyric remains “only intermittently separable 
from rhetorical theory [...] until about 1600” (217). 
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 Advancement, O1v. 
201
 Cf. the original version of the passage in the 1605 Aduancement, which has “a more ample Greatnesse, a 
more exact Goodnesse; and a more absolute varietie” (Ee1v, emphasis mine). The replacement of “Goodnesse” 
with “order”, and of the more “absolute” with the more “beautiful” variety, would seem consistent with the 
influence of Aristotle’s passage, the aphoristic clarity of which might have recommended it to Bacon’s attention. 
The above quotation is from Goulston’s version (D1r), but very similar renderings of this place are found in 
other contemporary Latin translations, most closely Vettori’s (Florence, 1560), G6v, “pulchrum enim in 
magnitudine & ordine manet”. 
202
 Poetics, 1450b. 
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criticism, in Bacon’s view poetic justice is only one of three ways in which the fictional 
surpasses the factual.
203
 
 Another example of this is found in the sentence continuing from the passage cited in 
the preceding note. In the Aduancement, Bacon here writes: “So as it appeareth that Poesie 
serueth and conferreth to Magnanimitie, Moralitie, and to delectation.”
204
 In De augmentis, 
the sentence is revised as follows: “Adeo vt Poesis ista, non solum ad Delectationem, sed 
etiàm ad Animi Magnitudinem, & ad Mores conferat.”
205
 Four things are to be noted: first, the 
order of the three items is rearranged so that delectatio is moved from third to first place in 
the sequence; secondly, this rearrangement is reinforced by changes in syntax and emphasis 
(“not only... but also”); thirdly, serve, a verb denoting a definite subordinate relation between 
poetry and the three mentioned categories is dropped, leaving the much less definite conferre; 
fourthly, while delectatio and animi magnitudo correspond exactly to their equivalents in the 
earlier version, mores would probably, considering Bacon’s usage and arguments elsewhere 
in De augmentis, be better rendered here as “manners” than as “morality” or “morals”.206 
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 “Wherefore seeing the Acts and events, which are the subject of true History, are not of that amplitude, as 
to content the mind of Man; Poesy is ready at hand to faine Acts more Heroicall. Because true History reports 
the successes of businesse, not proportionable to the merit of Virtues and Vices; Poesy corrects it, and presents 
events and Fortunes according to desert, and according to the Law of Providence: because true History, through 
the frequent satiety and similitude of Things, workes a distast and misprision in the mind of Man; Poesy cheereth 
and refreshes the soule; chanting things rare, and various, and full of vicissitudes” (Advancement, O1v). The 
cited passage might contain a more definite echo of Goulston’s translation of the Poetics. In Bacon’s Latin 
original, the final part of the above quotation reads: “Cum Historia vera, obuia rerum satietate & similitudine, 
Animæ humanæ fastidio sit; reficit eam Poesis, inexpectata, & varia, & vicissitudinum plena canens” (De 
augmentis, P2v, underlining mine). Cf. Goulston’s translation of the sentence on the requirement of variety in 
the Poetics, ch. 24: “Deinde, vt et is, qui Audit, variae mutetur, et eius, qui Dicit, oratio, Episodijs dilatetur inter 
se Dissimilibus: Cum. n. statim id satiet, quod Simile est; facit, vt Tragœdiæ, præ fastidio, exibilentur e Scena” 
(I2v, underlining mine). I have consulted the major Latin translations preceding Goulston’s – namely, Valla’s 
[1498] (in Aristotle et al., Rhetorica Aristotelis [Venice, 1515]), Pazzi’s (1536; repr. Basel, 1537), Vettori’s, 
Riccoboni’s (Venice, 1579), Heinsius’ [1610] (Leiden, 1611) – and all of these differ significantly from 
Goulston’s in this place. Notably, neither contains any form of the words varius or fastidium, found, alongside 
forms of satietas and similitudo/similis in both Bacon and Goulston. A methodical analysis of the two texts could 
possibly uncover more definite evidence. Bywater’s translation of Aristotle’s passage reads: “This then is a gain 
to the epic, tending to give it grandeur, and also variety of interest and room for episodes of diverse kinds. 
Uniformity of incident by the satiety it soon creates is apt to ruin tragedies on the stage” (Poetics, 1459b). 
204
 Aduancement, Ee2r. 
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 De augmentis, P2v. 
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 The two English translations of De augmentis fail to render Bacon’s revisions, reproducing vocabulary 
from the earlier version, apparently on the premise that Bacon is not rewriting the passage but simply translating 
it into Latin, so that the best translation is a simple reversion to Bacon’s own English. This is particularly clear in 
Wats’ rendering – “So as Poesy serveth and conferreth to Delectation, Magnanimity, and Morality” 
(Advancement, O1v) – which not only renders mores as “Morality”, but also keeps the gratuitous “serveth”, 
showing how easy it was even for a contemporary reader to conflate the subtleties of Bacon’s positions with the 
more standard views of the period. The version in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and 
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What can at first seem as just another variation on the standard Horatian formula of prodesse 
et delectare, or the various Ciceronian triads of probere-conciliare-vocare, conciliare-docere-
movere, conciliare-docere-concitare, and so on, is thus revealed, especially in the revised 
version, as a statement of a very different, far less orthodox position.
207
 To say that poetry 
“serveth and conferreth to Magnanimitie, Moralitie, and to delectation”, is not quite the same 
as saying that is the task of poetry to teach and delight; to revise this into a statement that 
poetry confers (but no longer serves) not only to delectation, but also to magnanimity and 
manners (but no longer morality) – the former primary and obvious, as the revised order and 
syntax would seem to imply, the latter secondary and requiring special emphasis – is to depart 
even further from the conventional formulas.
208
 Most importantly, delectation, magnanimity, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
D. D. Heath (London, 1852-61), 4: 316, is closer to the Latin original, but it too renders mores as “morality”: 
“So that this Poesy conduces not only to delight but also to magnanimity and morality.” Although there is at 
least one instance where Bacon himself translates “Morall matters” as “moribus” (Aduancement, D2v; De 
augmentis, D1v), it is striking that we do not find a single instance of such usage in Bacon’s treatment of moral 
philosophy in Book 7 of De augmentis. Nine relevant instances of mores occur (Advancement, Aaa2r, Aaa4v, 
Bbb2r, Bbb3r-4r, Ccc1r, Ccc2r), neither of which can be meaningfully rendered into English as morals; Wats 
translates them as manners (Advancement, Xx3v, Xx3v, Yy4v, Zz1r, Zz3r), carriage (Zz2r, Zz3r), and 
disposition (Yy2r). Mores also appears in a quote from Cicero, “abeunt studia in mores” (De augmentis, Bbb4r), 
which Bacon himself elsewhere translates using “manners” (Aduancement, D2v). By contrast, in Book 7 of De 
augmentis Bacon consistently refers to the discipline as ethica and moralis philosophia or moralis doctrina, and 
to “Virtutes Morales”, “Axiomata Moralia”, “Rerum Moralium” (De augmentis, Xx4v, Yy2v), etc. Furthermore, 
Bacon explicitly discusses poetry’s relation to moral philosophy in Book 7. Discussing the passions, for 
example, he notes that poets and historians are “the best Doctors of this knowledge”, in whose work “we may 
finde painted and dissected to the life, how affections are to be stirred up and kindled” (Advancement, Yy3r), and 
so on. However, these works, while useful to moral philosophy, are not to be seen as properly partaking of it, as 
is made clear in a longer excursus on the knowledge of “the diverse Characters of mens natures or dispositions”, 
which, Bacon explains, is not concerned with “those common Proclivities to virtues and vices; or Perturbations 
and passions, but those which are more intrinsique and radicall”, and which he claims to be “neglected or 
slightly past over, by writers Moral and Political”, but which is found, among other places, in the works of poets, 
albeit in exaggerated form: “So among the Poets, Heroicall, Satyricall, Tragedians, Comedians, you shall finde 
every where, the Images of wits, althoe commonly with excesse and beyound the bounds of Truth” (Yy1v). 
Crucially, however, Bacon explicitly insists that this poetic depiction of manners is only raw matter for moral 
philosophy to work with: “Neither would we, that those Characters in the Ethiques (as it is with Historians, 
Poets, and in common speech,) should be accepted as perfit politique Images; but rather as the first draughts and 
rude lineaments of those Images, which compounded and commixt, constitute any resemblances whatsoever; 
how many and of what sort they may be; and how they are connext and subordinate with another: that there may 
be made, as it were, an artificiall and accurate dissection of natures and dispositions; and a discovery of the 
secret inclinations of Individuall tempers; and that from a knowledge thereof, precepts of cure may be more 
pertinently prescribed” (Yy2r). 
207
 See Cicero, De oratore (1942; repr. Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 2.115 (“the proof [probemus] of our 
allegations, the winning of our hearers’ favour [conciliemus], and the rousing [vocemus] of their feelings”), 
2.121 (“the winning over [concilientur], the instruction [doceantur] and the stirring [moveantur] of men’s 
minds”), 2.129 (“first the winning over [conciliandorum] of men’s favour, secondly their enlightenment 
[docendorum], thirdly their excitement [concitandorum]”). For other related instances and a discussion of this 
terminology, see L. Calboli Montefusco, “Aristotle and Cicero on the officia oratoris”, in Peripatetic Rhetoric 
after Aristotle, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and D. C. Mirhady (New Brunswick, 1994). 
208
 In the 1605 Aduancement, this whole passage relates to poesy as such, while in De augmentis it appears in 
what is nominally the discussion of “representative” or epic poesy. Hartmann cites the above sentence out of 
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and manners are not the essential and defining ends of poetry; those ends have already been 
established, without recourse to any such categories, as “endow[ing] Humane Nature with that 
which History denies” it, and “giv[ing] satisfaction to the Mind with, at least, the shadow of 
things, where the substance cannot be had”. The shift from morality to mores is especially 
significant here, bringing the section on poetics in fuller accord with Bacon’s map of 
knowledge, as is the removal of the quotation from Horace, consistent with what is plainly an 
attempt to break out of the traditional paradigm. 
 It is much the same with Bacon’s treatment of allegorical poetry, at first sight a 
particularly problematic and contradictory aspect of his poetics. In the Aduancement Bacon 
gives a largely negative estimate of the allegorical tradition, for which he is celebrated in the 
earlier scholarship of Spingarn and others. He concedes that allegorical interpretations of 
ancient myths do “fall out sometimes with great felicitie”, and gives a few brief examples. 
“Neuerthelesse”, he continues, 
in many the like incounters, I doe rather think that the fable was first, and the 
exposition deuised, then that the Morall was first, & thereupon the fable framed. For I 
finde it was an auncient vanitie in Chrisippus, that troubled himselfe with great 
contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoicks vpon fictions of the ancient Poets: But 
yet that all the Fables and fictions of the Poets, were but pleasure and not figure, I 
interpose no opinion. Surely of those Poets which are now extant, euen Homer 
himselfe, (notwithstanding he was made a kinde of Scripture, by the later Schooles of 
the Grecians) yet I should without any difficultie pronounce, that his Fables had no 
such inwardnesse in his owne meaning: But what they might haue, vpon a more 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
context, in an attempt to argue that the version in the De augmentis is “completely restructured”, and that these 
lines now refer only to “representative” poetry and not poetry as such; see A.-M. Hartmann, “Light from 
Darkness”, The Seventeenth Century 26 (2011): 203-20, p. 213. She stresses the formulation “this poetry” 
(“Poesis ista”), interpreting it as referring to “representative” as opposed to other kinds of poetry, but the flow of 
the passage does not support such a reading. “This poetry” must refer to that poetry discussed in the sentences 
immediately preceding, which remain substantially the same as in the Aduancement, and continue to speak 
indiscriminately of “poesy”. A further reason why “this poetry” cannot refer only to “representative” poetry is 
that this would deny the possibility of dramatic and “parabolic” poetry also conducing to magnanimity and 
morality, which is clearly not Bacon’s point, as further discussed below. 
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originall tradition, is not easie to affirme, for he was not the inuentor of many of 
them.
209
 
As research has now well established, the crucial element in Bacon’s interpretations of 
ancient fables is this distinction between the oldest mythological texts actually available to the 
interpreter, the poems of Homer and Hesiod, and the allegorical fables of a much earlier date, 
believed to underlie them in a partly garbled form.
210
 The Greek poets retell ancient myths 
that have been handed down to them, but they do so without understanding their allegorical 
meanings, and hence in multiple and inevitably corrupt versions. The task is thus no longer to 
interpret the extant ancient poems but rather to reconstruct and interpret these more ancient 
myths which underlie them. The comparative method by which the true form of the myths is 
to be uncovered, at least in theory, is rightly described by Hartmann as “akin to philology” – I 
would go further and say it is philology – and can also be seen as a precursor of later 
approaches to comparative mythology.
211
 “[S]eeing they are diuersly related by Writers that 
liued neere about one and the self same time”, the Greek versions of the fables are manifestly 
corrupt, but they still have certain things in common; concluding that this matter common to 
otherwise disparate versions “deriued from precedent memorials”, Bacon believes he has 
found a way – a naively philological way, by modern standards, but philological nevertheless 
– to reconstructing the lost original.
212
 
 This approach has thus far not been traced to any direct source – although Conti would 
seem to come closer than has yet been noted
213
 – yet in broad terms it can be seen to 
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 Bacon, Advancement, Ee3r-v. One obvious source here is Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, 1.15, where 
the allegories of the Stoic Chrysippus are mocked by the Epicurean Velleius for “mak[ing] out that even the 
earliest poets of antiquity, who had no notion of these doctrines, were really Stoics”; Cicero, De Natura Deorum 
(1933; repr. Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 39. 
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 The significance of this appears to have eluded Lemmi, who reports it without comment, but is recognized 
by Carman Garner, and more recently by Borris, Lewis, and Hartmann: see C. W. Lemmi, The Classic Deities in 
Bacon (Baltimore, 1933), 43; B. Carman Garner, “Francis Bacon, Natalis Comes and the Mythological 
Tradition”, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 33 (1970): 264-91, pp. 276-6; Borris, Allegory, 19; 
R. Lewis, “Francis Bacon, Allegory and the Uses of Myth”, RES 61 (2010): 360-89, pp. 378-81; Hartmann, 
“Light”, 210. 
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 In Conti there is also a split, although it involves a shorter span of time and is not between Greeks and 
non-Greeks – even though Greeks are said to have learned allegory from the Egyptians – but rather between two 
generations of Greeks. See Natale Conti’s “Mythologiae”, ed. J. Mulryan and S. Brown (Tempe, 2006), 1-2, 15: 
“In fact not so many years before the times of Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers, the ancients did not 
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constitute a blend of at least four major lines of influence: firstly, the vast tradition of 
mythological and literary allegoresis, omnipresent, as discussed above, in the literary culture 
of Bacon’s day; secondly, the tradition of rationalist mythography exemplified by the works 
of Palaephatus, Heraclitus (“the Paradoxographer”), and others, and later on by numerous 
Christian euhemerists, explaining myths and mythical figures as distorted accounts of real 
figures and events; thirdly, the doctrine of the wisdom of the ancients – prisca theologia or 
sapientia, or sapientia veterum, as Bacon styles it – an profound knowledge attributed to such 
oriental figures as Hermes Trismegistus or Zoroaster, believed to have been contemporary 
with or to have even predated Moses; and fourthly, biblical typology, an approach to biblical 
hermeneutics parallel and, especially in Protestant contexts, rival to biblical allegoresis. From 
allegory Bacon inherits the view of classical myth as a repository of hidden lore; from 
rationalist mythography he adopts the premise that the classical myths, in their present form, 
contain unintentionally garbled content which accounts for their origin, but needs to be 
carefully disentangled from later, purely fabulous accretions; from the esoteric traditions he 
adopts the premise that this garbled content is not, as it was for the rationalists, a trivial 
factual event – the centaurs are really a distorted account of skilled horseback archers, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
openly teach the principles of philosophy: instead they found a secret mythological disguise for disseminating 
these truths. For after the Greeks had brought this hidden philosophical method, which they imported from Egypt 
into their country, they started to use stories to conceal their philosophical directives. [...] At a later time they 
[i.e. the Greeks] confused this great muddle of gods in fictions, since each one invented whatever he pleased 
about the gods. Although a number have tried many times since then, no one has been able as yet to free these 
gods from their fabled disguises; however, many of these gods are still in a state of mythological entanglement, 
and some of them will probably stay in that condition forever. In fact a man who thinks that he will ever bring to 
a most satisfactory conclusion the things that have been said about the gods by the ancients is like a man who 
hopes that he can bring all the ships that sail anywhere into port without losing a single one. The so-called 
ancient wise men did not always have a method in their madness, nor did the poets in these fabrications.” 
Mulryan and Brown compare Bacon’s De sapientia in one of the notes to the passage on pp. 1-2. Cf. also Vives 
in the fifth book of De disciplinis: “Since therefore history is the witness of the ages and the light of truth [Cicero 
in De oratore], its first corruption was the mingling of fictitious with true events, in the first place by the poets, 
who dealt only with what would give pleasure, since they merely aimed at the entertainment and amusement of 
their hearers; and since they did not believe that this could be achieved with the actual truth of things, they not 
only mingled falsehoods with true relations, but also produced new versions of the facts, which they thought 
would be more charming and impressive. They made use for this purpose of figures of speech, metaphors, 
allegories, amphibologies, similitudes of words and things: thus of a man whose name was Taurus, they said 
Taurus was a bull: a ship whose figurehead was a ram, they called, the ram [...]. The first writers were poets, 
they handed down these stories to the most ignorant men in the most elegant speech (for so it seemed to that 
age); they held the attention of the quick-witted and enchanted the slow; gradually the passing on and 
establishment of the error brought about a state of affairs in which the truth was so much obscured and buried 
under so many disguises, that even at that early date it could not be uncovered and brought into the light of day 
by their successors. Phurnutus, and many others, attempted to draw out the kernel of truth from the enveloping 
shell of poetry, but with no great success, and with a remarkable amount of disagreement among themselves” 
(Stein, “Study”, 2: 39-40).  
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gods are really deified heroes and chieftains, and so on – but a profound and comprehensive 
knowledge possessed by ancients of the second age, which he locates between Moses and the 
Greeks;
214
 finally, while typology is least essential to his purpose, he does turn to it, in one of 
the more conspicuous revisions in De augmentis, to affirm the Protestant credentials of his 
hermeneutics.
215
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 As he writes in the opening sentence of The Wisdome of the Ancients, “The Antiquities of the first age 
(except those we find in sacred Writ) were buried in obliuion and silence: silence was succeeded by Poeticall 
fables; and Fables againe were followed by the Records we now enioy. So that the mysteries and secrets of 
Antiquity were distinguished and separated from the Records and Euidences of succeeding times, by the vaile of 
fiction which interposed it selfe and came betweene those things which perished, and those which are extant” 
(a5v). Bacon’s rejection of rationalist mythography in its classic form is also noted by Lewis, “Allegory”, 376-7. 
Interesting in this relation is a passage from Bacon’s 1603 Masculine Birth of Time: “Finally you would wish to 
know what I think may be hidden behind the silence and the reserve of antiquity. My son, I shall answer you in 
my usual way, that is, in accordance with your best interests. I do acknowledge a broken light or two from 
antiquity (I speak of their discoveries, not of their books); and these broken lights I take rather as proofs of 
industry and native wit than of any developed science. But as for the writings which have vanished without a 
trace, I know your modesty well enough to be assured that you will not misunderstand me if I suggest that this 
hunting after guesses is a wearisome business and that it would not be a proper thing for me, who am preparing 
things useful for the future of the human race, to bury myself in the study of ancient literature”; trans. in B. 
Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool, 1964), 68. In spite of the fact that Plato has just been 
dismissed as “deluded”, his philosophy a “sham” (ibid., 64), this seems to be modelled on the passage in the 
Phaedrus where mythography, and specifically rationalist mythography, is similarly dismissed in favour of the 
infinitely more pressing cause of self-knowledge. After giving a brief rationalist account of the story of Boreas 
and Orithuia, Socrates says that “such explanations are amusing enough, but they are a job for a man I cannot 
envy at all. He’d have to be far too ingenious and work too hard – mainly because after that he will have to go on 
and give the rational account of the form of the Hippocentaurs, and then of the Chimera; and a whole flood of 
Gorgons and Pegasuses and other monsters, in large numbers and absurd form, will overwhelm him. Anyone 
who does not believe in them, who wants to explain them away and make them plausible by means of some sort 
of rough ingenuity, will need a great deal of time. But I have no time for such things; and the reason, my friend, 
is this. I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me ridiculous to 
look into other things before I have understood that” (Works, 509-19; 229b-230a). 
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 In the 1605 Aduancement, Bacon defines “ALLVSIVE or PARABOLICALL” poetry as “a NARRATION 
applied onely to expresse some speciall purpose or conceit” (Ee2v) – i.e., allegory, as the qualification “onely” 
clearly denotes, differing from typology precisely in treating the literal or historical meaning of the text as 
“onely” a vehicle for the meaning it supposedly transmits. Accordingly, rewriting this passage eighteen years 
later, Bacon finds it important to redefine “parabolical” poetry as “History with the Type, which brings downe 
the Images of the understanding to the Objects of the Sense” (Advancement, O1v; cf. De augmentis, P2v: 
“Historia cum Typo, quæ Intellectualia deducit ad Sensum”). Here it is also to be noted that while the term 
allegory and its cognates are employed throughout De sapientia – where, again, they refer not to any actual 
literary work surviving from the ancient or the modern world, but the ur-fables Bacon purports to reconstruct – 
they are wholly absent from the poetics section in the 1605 Aduancement, and are employed in only a single, 
decisively negative instance in De augmentis (not counting the three examples of mythographical exegesis, taken 
over from De sapientia). In the Aduancement, Bacon thus speaks affirmatively of “speciall purpose or conceit”, 
“Secrets and Misteries of Religion, Pollicy, or Philosophy, [...] inuolued in Fables or Parables”, and “figure”, 
neutrally of “inwardnesse”, and either neutrally of negatively of the “exposition” and the “Morall” (Ee2v-3v). In 
De augmentis some of these passages are kept and others discarded, and in addition we meet, affirmatively, with 
“Fables, [...] Parables, [...] Ænigmas, and Similitudes”, while “parabolical” poetry is described as that which 
“tendeth to the folding up of those things; the dignity whereof, deserves to be retired, and distinguisht, as with a 
drawn Curtain”; neutrally, with “mysticall sense”; and negatively, with “Allegories” (Advancement, O2r-v; cf. 
De augmentis, P3r-v: “Allegorias”; “Fabularum, & Parabolaru[m], & Ænigmatum, & similitudinum”; “qui facit 
(vt diximus) ad Inuolucrum, earum nempè Rerum, quarum dignitas tanquam velo quodam discreta esse 
mereatur”; “Sensus mysticus”). A positive use of allegory elsewhere in the Aduancement, where Homer’s golden 
chain is said to be an “allegorie of the Poets” (B3v), is removed in De augmentis (“Poetarum Mythologiam”; 
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 While rejecting, then, allegoresis, mythographical rationalism, and varieties of prisca 
sapientia esotericism in their classic forms, Bacon retains selected features of these traditions, 
and combines them – sprinkled with the orthodox terminology of “parable” and “type” – into 
a hybrid approach to classical poetry uniquely tailored to free his poetics from the 
requirement of allegory. At the same time, however, he is able to retain the prestige of these 
venerable traditions for his broader project, and to integrate them, in this refurbished form, 
into the comprehensive conceptual structure of the Great Instauration. And there are also 
important practical benefits: since the presumed ur-fables do not exist in any form other than 
Bacon’s own reconstructions, the process of reconstruction, however independent in theory, 
in practice becomes indistinguishable from the process of interpretation – the mythographer 
gets to write his own myths, which, needless to say, considerably increases their hermeneutic 
pliancy. 
Bacon’s peculiar view of “parabolicall” poetry, certainly unprecedented in English 
poetics, and possibly even in a broader European context, is thus another in a series of 
compromises between tradition and innovation which comprise his poetic theory. While 
clearly pragmatic in practice, it should not be dismissed as such in its theoretical outline, 
which plays an essential role in his poetics, enabling him to maintain a theory of poetry 
substantially free of allegory even while indulging in large-scale mythological allegoresis, 
since the subject of his interpretations are not any extant works of ancient poetry but the 
reconstructed ur-fables. He does not, like the great majority of allegorists before him, find 
allegorical meaning in Homer and Hesiod, or Virgil and Ovid. Indeed he washes his hands of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
B4v). The unusual choice of the term “parabolical” is telling, and appears to be due to the fact that Christ’s 
parables, known universally under that term, were the one form of “allegorical” discourse to which no 
denominational objections could be made. Further of interest here is that Bacon removes the other designation, 
“allusive”, from De augmentis, where we hear exclusively of “Poesis Parabolica”, probably because the words 
allusio and allusion had, among others, a special hermeneutic sense denoting a type of biblical interpretation 
often indistinguishable from allegoresis; see OED, allusion, 2, “A symbolic reference or likening; a metaphor, a 
parable, an allegory”, and H. Hamlin’s discussion in The Bible in Shakespeare (Oxford, 2013), 85-95. These 
terminological adjustments are also consistent with the Protestant anti-allegorism further discussed in ch. 3. 
While not strictly necessary to Bacon’s mythography, in its ability to ward off the central objection to biblical 
allegoresis – that it distorts the meanings of the biblical text according to the preconceived agendas of the 
interpreter – while at the same time offering an alternative means for its ideological maintenance, typology can 
be seen as functionally analogous to Bacon’s approach to ancient myth. Just like typology enabled Protestant 
interpreters to derive secondary meanings from the Bible without, in theory, departing from its literal sense, so 
Bacon’s mythography enables him to derives secondary meanings from ancient myths without, in theory, 
violating the imaginative integrity of the works which unwittingly preserve them. 
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this whole tradition, and remains sceptical even about the authenticity of his own 
interpretations.
216
 
Furthermore, Bacon’s theory of “parabolical” poetry also forestalls, or at least 
extenuates, the obvious objection that in unearthing natural, political and moral philosophy in 
ancient myth he contradicts his own categorical distinction between philosophy/reason and 
poetry/imagination. The esoteric use of “parabolical” poesy is indeed explicitly defined as that 
in which “the secrets and mysteries of Religion, Policy, and Philosophy are vailed, and 
invested with Fables, and Parables”, and he speaks similarly of “Philosophy according to 
ancient Parables”.217 Has Bacon forgotten that he has separated poetry from philosophy? 
Theoretically, the allegorical content of the esoteric kind of “parabolical” poetry must fall 
under the domains of theology and philosophy rather than poetry. If Bacon was able to claim 
that rhetoric played a part in poetry, yet properly belonged to philosophy, what prevented him 
from claiming the same about the philosophical content of “parabolical” poetry? Did he 
simply take this for granted? Here again it is to be kept in mind that the fables that he 
professes to interpret – and they are always “fables”, never “poesy” – are emphatically not the 
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 In the Wisdom he criticizes at length the “liberty [...] lately much abused” by those who “wrest many 
poeticall Fables” and “purchase the reuerence of Antiquitie to their owne inuentions and fancies”, who are “able 
to apply things well, yet so as neuer meant by the first Authors”, whose “writings, though voluminous and full of 
paines, [...] haue applyed the sense of these Parables to certaine vulgar and generall things, not so much as 
glancing at their true vertue, genuine proprietie, and full depth” (Wisedome, a6r, A11v-12r). He takes the 
opportunity to extend this censure to the alchemists, who also “appropriate the fancies and delights of Poets in 
the transformations of bodies, to the experiments of their furnace”. In De augmentis, his final statement on the 
subject, mythography is still “contaminate by the levity and indulgence of mens wits about Allegories”, and 
“imbased” by “Schooleboyes”, “Grammarians”, and “unskilfull men, not learned beyond common places” 
(Advancement, O2r-v). In spite of the uncounted host of allegorists from the ancient Greeks down to his own 
contemporaries, whose efforts “give us no satisfaction at all”, mythological allegoresis is placed on the list of 
insufficiently developed fields of knowledge, requiring further investigation (ibid., O2v). As for his own views, 
in the already cited passage from the Advancement he says that “many” of the allegorical interpretations are 
false, but that all are false he “will interpose no opinion”. In the Wisdom he is ready to affirm that “some”, but 
not all, of the fables contain genuine, intentional allegorical meanings, yet his arguments are again markedly 
ambiguous. He feels that in some fables the correspondence between the literal and allegorical meanings is too 
perfect to be unintentional, and he also feels that the patent absurdity of some of the fables in itself points to 
“other ends” – but it could also be that he is simply “ravished with the reverence of Antiquity” (Wisdome, a7r- 
9r). As for any who would still “obstinately contend, that Allegories are alwaies aduentitially, & as it were by 
constraint, neuer naturally and properly included in Fables, we will not be much troublesome, but suffer them to 
enioy that grauity of iudgment which I am sure they affect, although indeed it be but lumpish and almost leaden“ 
(a10r). The Preface ends on a particularly ambiguous and even impish note: “Wherefore all that hath beene said, 
wee will thus conclude: The Wisdome of the Ancients, it was either much or happy; Much if these figures and 
tropes were inuented by studie and premeditation. Happy if they (intending nothing lesse) gaue matter and 
occasion to so many worthy Meditations. As concerning my labours (if there bee any thing in them which may 
do good) I will on neither part count them ill bestowed, my purpose being to illustrate either Antiquity, or things 
themselues” (a11r-v).  
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 Advancement, O2v.  
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surviving ancient poems, much less modern ones, enabling him to say that Homer intended no 
allegorical meanings in his poems, even as he derives such meanings from these very poems. 
Consequently, if we follow this line of thinking to its logical conclusion, there is no 
contradiction, as it is not poetry but the myths behind the poetry – a separate category of 
discourse, belonging to a specific and irretrievable historical context – which harbour 
philosophical content, and should thus be classified under philosophy. 
But then why include them in the discussion of poetry in the first place? It thus 
remains a legitimate question whether, and to what extent, the case of esoteric “parabolic” 
poesy violates the distinction between poetry and philosophy. It is no good preserving the 
absolute coherence of Bacon’s poetics at all costs. On the contrary, a degree of inconsistency 
is precisely what one would expect from such a transitional document, and is to be 
foregrounded rather than suppressed, for the vaguer and more contradictory Bacon’s 
statements get, the more are they symptomatic of the novelty of his poetic thought – and the 
vaguest of all is also the key one, stating his view of the purpose of poetry. “For seeing”, he 
writes, “this sensible world, is in dignity inferior to the soule of Man; Poesy seems to endow 
Humane Nature with that which History denies; and to give satisfaction to the Mind, with, at 
least, the shadow of things, where the substance cannot be had”.
218
 This repeats the better 
known and substantially identical formulation in the 1605 Aduancement, where poesy is said, 
in Bacon’s own English, “to giue some shadowe of satisfaction to the minde of Man in those 
points, wherein the Nature of things doth denie it, the world being in proportion inferiour to 
the soule”.
219
 This is really the central statement of Bacon’s theory of poetry, aligning it to the 
fundamental cause of his whole project, which is the amelioration of man’s earthly existence. 
In the same way in which the spiritual aspect of man’s condition can be improved by the 
correct form of religion, and its intellectual, political, and material aspects by advancements 
in science and technology, so can its emotional and more broadly spiritual aspect be improved 
by fiction. 
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 Advancement, O1v.  
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 Aduancement, Ee1v.  
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Prior to Bacon, the delight occasioned by fiction is justified only as a means to an end 
– the sugar coating of the bitter pill, the tender fruit enveloping the hard kernel, the life-giving 
cure extracted from a deadly poison – not as an end in itself. The insubstantial shadows of 
poetic fiction could not, in themselves, satisfy the mind of Sidney or anyone else who agreed 
that “the end of all earthly learning [is] virtuous action”.
220
 Bacon does not disallow that 
poetry, on the whole, “conduces” this end, among others, but delightful teaching does not 
constitute the essence of poetry and the poetic experience as he sees it. In fact, Bacon employs 
such terms as “teaching” or “instruction” only with reference to the genres of the drama and 
“parabolical” poetry in its exoteric aspect, a category comprising such patently didactic texts 
as the Aesopic fables or the collection of sayings or “symbols” attributed to Pythagoras. Plays 
“should instruct the minds of men unto virtue” – by which, moreover, Bacon has in mind the 
mass-psychological effect of theatrical performance in front of a large audience rather than 
drama as a literary genre – while exoteric “parabolic” poetry is a “way of teaching which 
conduceth to Illustration”.221 These, however, are recognizably the lower poetic genres, 
addressing the grammar school pupil, tackling one of the earliest properly literary texts on the 
curriculum, and the multitude assembled in the playhouse. With respect to “poesy” in general, 
however, clearly modelled on the privileged genre of the epic, it is fiction which is seen as its 
essential property, and there is something good and valuable in the enjoyment of fiction, in 
itself, apart from any didactic function it might serve, and without an imperative to harness it, 
especially in its farthest reaches, through allegoresis. It is alright for a man – a serious, moral, 
and learned man, not merely the much-derided exponent of the proverbial common mob – to 
indulge in the insubstantial shadows of fiction. Bacon insists on this even though he 
recognizes, at least with regard to the popular drama, the danger of misusing the power of 
poetic imagination. No English critic before him, nor for a considerable time after, had 
allowed as much. This is a level of respect for the human condition, and specifically the 
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 Sidney, Defence, 83.  
221
 “[W]ise men and great Philosophers, have accounted it [i.e., the stage], as the Archet, or musicall Bow of 
the Mind. And certainly it is most true, and as it were, a secret of nature, that the minds of men are more patent 
to affections, and impre[ss]ions, Congregate, than solitary” (Advancement, O2r). 
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human faculty of the imagination, that the overwhelming majority of sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century poetical thought is simply unable to acknowledge. 
 In this, however, as in so much else, Bacon is virtually alone in the early seventeenth 
century. Contemporary English critics whose work betrays a reading of his writings on poetry 
and myth are clearly lacking in the appreciation of the deeper and subtler points of his 
arguments.
222
 It should be clear what this portends for the neo-Burckhardtian narratives of 
critical and aesthetic modernity which continue to dominate much of the study of sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century English poetics. It is less clear, however, and much more important, 
what we are to make of the curious and isolated case of Francis Bacon, and the fact that of all 
the period’s statements of poetic theory, the one that comes closest to the ideals of modern 
aesthetics is by a man whose intellectual profile is so radically divergent, not only from that of 
the typical sixteenth and early seventeenth-century literary theorist, but from the period’s 
most characteristic intellectual tendencies in general. What can we learn from the example of 
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 In his Mythomystes, Reynolds takes Bacon to task for doubting the validity of mythological allegoresis, 
yet Reynolds’ own exegesis of the fable of Narcissus shows how little he had adopted of Bacon’s complex and 
innovative position. Reynolds’ is the earliest statement positing an inconsistency in Bacon’s work on poetics and 
myth: “suppose that a man (nor vnlearned one neither) shall haue taken paines in foure or fiue fables of the 
Auncients to vnfould and deliuer vs much doctrine and high meanings in them, which he calls their wisdom; and 
yet this same man in another Treatise of his, shall say of those auncient Fables. – I think they were first made, 
and their expositions deuised afterward: and a little after – Of Homer himself, notwithstanding he was made a 
kind of Scripture by the latter Scooles of the Græcians, yet I should without any difficulty pronounce his fables 
had in his owne meaning no such inwardnesse, &c. What shall we make of such willing contradiction[n]s, when 
a man to vent a few fancies of his owne, shall tell vs first, they are the wisdome of the Auncients; and next, that 
those Auncient fables were but meere fables, and without wisdom or meaning, til their expositours gaue them a 
meaning” (Mythomystes, L3v-4r). Reynolds does state, apparently in response to Bacon, that he is expounding 
what “the Fable was by the first deuizers therof made to meane”, but he makes no attempt at a reconstruction of 
an ur-fable from his immediate source, Ovid’s Metamorphoses (P1v). It is clear what Bacon would have made of 
this source, of Reynolds’ authorities, and of his eclectic method, unearthing in the single fable “Geographick” 
(i.e. rationalist), “Physick”, “Morall”, and “Diuine” senses. Reynolds also plainly attempts to follow Bacon in 
dismissing from his discussion of poetry the mere “vnder-Accidents” of verse and figurative language, but 
instead of finding “the Forme and reall Essence of true Poësy” in fiction and imagination, he repeats, in extreme 
form, the view which finds poetry’s essence in its allegorical mediation of arcane philosophical knowledge (A3r-
4r). To take another example, Hobbes, in 1650, likely follows Bacon in defining poesy as narrative fiction, and 
consequently in not viewing “Sonnets, Epigrammes, Eclogues, and the like pieces” as poetry, but rather as the 
“Essayes, and parts of an entire Poeme” (Answer, F4v). But the similarity goes only so far: Hobbes also believes 
that verse is essential, that poetry must not overstep the bounds of verisimilitude, that “That which giveth a Poem 
the true and naturall Colour, consisteth in two things, which are, To know well; [...] and To know much”, that 
poems “delight all sorts of men, either by instructing the ignorant, or soothing the learned in their knowledge”, 
and so forth (ibid., F12v). Indeed, a quarter of a century later, in the preface to his 1675 translation of the 
Odyssey, even the requirement of verisimilar fiction has dropped, and Hobbes now requires in a poet “Justice 
and Impartiality”, which “belongeth as well to History as to Poetry. For both the Poet and the Historian writeth 
only (or should do) matter of Fact”; Homer’s Odysses (London, 1675), B4r. The statement is particularly 
remarkable for appearing in a preface to the Odyssey of all poems. No wonder Hobbes fails to explain how this 
precept is supposed to apply to the poem he decided to translate, or indeed why he decided to do so: “Why then 
did I write it? Because I had nothing else to do” (ibid., B9v). 
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a man whose adult life spans the very height of the English “Renaissance” – the period we are 
urged to understand as one of immense achievements in virtually all aspects of human 
endeavour – yet who saw himself as lighting a “new torch in the dark days of philosophy”, 
who spoke so poignantly “of the solitude in which this experiment moves, and how hard, how 
unbelievably difficult, it is to get people to believe in it”, and who rushed fragments and 
sketches of his work to print mortified by the uncertain prospect of “when such things would 
occur to anyone again in the future”, so that “if in the human way of things, anything should 
happen to him, there would still be extant an outline and plan of the thing which he had 
conceived in his mind”, and “some indication of his genuine concern for the good of the 
human race”?
223
 
 These are questions that the history of poetics and literary criticism is yet to 
meaningfully tackle, and which, if unravelled to their utmost implications, can only result in a 
thorough rewriting of this history. In the fourth century BC, the first “father of science” 
decreed that correctness in poetry is not the same as correctness in politics, or in any other art, 
but by all accounts he too was an isolated voice, and this aspect of his work soon fell into 
oblivion and misinterpretation. Now, two millennia later, another “father of science” arrives at 
a comparable position – and arrives at it, in part, by browsing through the Poetics, in the 
methodical, schematized translation by Goulston, a physician – yet the outcome is exactly the 
same. At least until Romanticism, glimmerings of poetic and aesthetic modernity, as we 
perhaps still understand it today, remain an anomaly, appearing and disappearing across the 
centuries with such atypical, proto-scientific figures as Aristotle and Bacon. Throughout this 
period, the conflation of poetry with philosophy and rhetoric, including the allegorical 
tradition as its most radical manifestation – or the inverse position, banishing allegory at the 
cost of severely curtailing the scope of permissible poetic subject matter – reigns supreme. 
 Neither this precarious flicker, nor the monolithic continuity against which we detect 
it, can be meaningfully aligned to the established conceptual and periodisational frameworks, 
and certainly the idea of the so-called “Renaissance” as a transformative period in this respect 
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must be abandoned, at least as far the English corpus is concerned. In its most characteristic 
productions, the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century saw no advances in the 
fundamentals of poetic theory – the fundamentals, let us emphasize for the one final time, of 
poetic theory – over the preceding period. Conversely, where such an advance does appear, it 
emerges from an intellectual profile radically at odds with the dominant currents of the age. In 
neighbouring disciplines covering some of the same terrain this is not a controversial claim. 
For example, a philosophy of art primer can routinely quote Bacon in support of the claim that 
“Historically a shift away from representation theories of art to pleasure- and experience-
oriented theories was specifically motivated by a growing sense of the claims of the modern 
mathematical-experimental sciences of nature to have a central title to accuracy of 
representation and instruction, apparently leaving no room for art in fulfilling these 
functions”.
224
 Even here, however, the emphasis is negative: science banishes art from its 
newly conquered provinces. Yet for Bacon, as I have tried to show – and, in principle, for 
anyone adopting a similar position – precisely the opposite is true: rather than banishing it, the 
autonomy of science liberates art, just as the autonomy of art liberates science. The ancient 
quarrel resolved, Poesy and Philosophy peacefully coexist, each in its proper place at the very 
top of Bacon’s tree of knowledge. At least as far as literary history is concerned, however, this 
thesis – that modern science and modern aesthetics emerge jointly, as mutually defining and 
enabling categories, out of the unprecedented intellectual ferment of the seventeenth century, 
and that allegorical poetics, as the most radical manifestation of the old paradigm, inevitably 
falls victim to this process – is yet to be given a proper hearing. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ALLEGORY AND DRAMA 
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Why did the Italians of the Renaissance do nothing above the second rank in 
tragedy? That was the field on which to display human character, intellect, and 
passion, in the thousand forms of their growth, their struggles, and their 
decline. In other words: why did Italy produce no Shakespeare?  
                                          – J. Burckhardt, 1860 
 
At first sight, the trajectory of the English drama in the course of the sixteenth century – from 
religious to secular subjects, and from an allegorical to a non-allegorical mode of 
representation – would seem to offer the ideal illustration of the Burckhardtian model. In fact, 
right at the heart of the Civilization, in one of the book’s key chapters, “The Discovery of 
Man”, one stumbles across the above-quoted passage, in which Burckhardt himself implicitly 
affirms this view.
1
 Nothing in the preceding discussion quite prepares the reader for these 
lines, which are fundamentally incompatible with the book’s central thesis. How is it, indeed, 
that the model premised on the innately pagan Volksgeist of the Italians – for “We must insist 
upon it, as one of the chief propositions of this book, that it was not the revival of antiquity 
alone, but its union with the genius of the Italian people, which achieved the conquest of the 
Western world”
2
 – comes to realization in the prized sphere of the drama, and specifically 
tragedy, at the far end of the continent, in provincial, Protestant England? 
 Ironically, the increasing evidence of the extent of Shakespeare’s debt to “medieval” 
literary and intellectual traditions – on which my analysis of Hamlet in the latter portion of 
this chapter builds, and to which it seeks to contribute – suggests an answer that runs exactly 
counter to Burckhardt’s intuitions. Other things being equal, notably the crucial yet elusive 
factor of individual temperament and talent, it seems very plausible to say that “Whenever 
you have a gap between what Classical writers were doing and what Renaissance writers do, 
it is almost always because of what happened in between”.
3
 And if so, then it is further 
                                                          
1
 Civilization, 204. 
2
 Ibid., 111. 
3
 H. Cooper, Shakespeare and the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 2006), 11. For a bibliography of the work on the 
subject between 1900 and 1980, see J. P. McRoberts, Shakespeare and Medieval Tradition (New York, 1985). 
McRoberts’ bibliography, which claims to be “comprehensive” (x) in its coverage, offers a graphic illustration of 
the marginalization of this topic in Shakespeare studies: a miserable, by Shakespearean standards, 933 
publications are listed for the entire eighty-year period, of which, moreover, many are concerned with the subject 
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plausible to suggest that Shakespeare emerged in England precisely because there was less 
“Renaissance” there than in Italy, and that the absence of his Italian counterpart, far from 
being problematic, is in fact precisely what one would expect to find. However, to a 
nineteenth-century historian who saw Shakespeare as the supreme reflection of Renaissance 
culture, and at the same time saw the origin of this culture in the revival of classical antiquity 
as qualified by the Italian national spirit, this absence was seriously problematic. The “people 
which possessed the power, perhaps to a greater degree than any other, to reflect and 
contemplate its own highest qualities in the mirror of the drama” simply ought to have 
produced a brilliant and lastingly relevant playwright.
4
 Again the unruly domain of literature 
threatens to collapse the whole culture-historical edifice, and again the forestalling of this 
collapse requires – this time quite literally – a deus ex machina. “It is an obvious reply”, 
writes Burckhardt, “that all Europe produced but one Shakespeare, and that such a mind is the 
rarest of Heaven’s gifts”.
5
 Of course nothing could be less obvious under the terms of a 
Volksgeist theory of culture, and in fact, while England is thus deprived of any defining role 
in the creation of Shakespeare, the product of no one nation but all of Europe, the Italian 
failure to produce an equivalent playwright is still blamed on corrupting foreign influence: 
Italy may have been on its way to a Shakespeare when “the Counter-Reformation broke in 
upon it, and, aided by the Spanish rule over Naples and Milan, and indirectly over almost the 
whole peninsula, withered the best flowers of the Italian spirit”. 
 The importance of the passage cannot be overemphasized. It represents the first 
application of this particular period-concept to these particular spheres of culture: prior to 
Burckhardt’s passage, there was simply no such thing as “Renaissance drama”, nor had the 
notion of the Renaissance as a comprehensive period in cultural history yet been applied to 
England, nor had anyone referred to Shakespeare as a Renaissance playwright. However self-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
only partially, or even incidentally. More recently, however, there has been a most welcome and long overdue 
change of tide: besides Cooper’s lecture, see Shakespeare and the Middle Ages, ed. J. Perry and C. Watkins 
(Oxford, 2009); Shakespeare and the Middle Ages, ed. M. W. Driver and S. Ray (Jefferson, 2009); H. Cooper, 
Shakespeare and the Medieval World (London, 2010); “Premodern Shakespeare”, special issue of JMEMS 30 
(2010), ed. S. Beckwith and J. Simpson; “Medieval Shakespeare”, special issue of Shakespeare 8 (2012), ed. C. 
Wald; Medieval Shakespeare, ed. R. Morse, H. Cooper, and P. Holland (Cambridge, 2013). 
4
 Burckhardt, Civilization, 208-9. 
5
 Ibid., 204. 
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evident all this may seem today, it was virtually nonexistent before these lines were written. It 
is therefore important to emphasize just how radically Burckhardt transforms the received 
view of the subject, and furthermore, to point out that the major influence governing this 
transformation actually ran in a direction opposite than expected. By his own admission, 
Burckhardt cannot have derived his view of tragedy as the supreme expression of Renaissance 
individualism from the “second rate” efforts of the Italians. In effect, rather than making 
Shakespeare Renaissance, Burckhardt makes the Renaissance Shakespearean. 
 The manoeuvre is all the more remarkable considering that the Romantic view of 
Shakespeare, which Burckhardt shared with most readers of his age, and which is obviously 
operative in this passage, had up to this point been premised on the very antithesis of 
everything Burckhardt’s Renaissance stands for.
6
 When it did not outright dismiss him, or 
adapt him to suit contemporary tastes, the classicist sensibility of the later seventeenth and 
eighteenth century could extend only a limited amount of appreciation to Shakespeare, as a 
master of a dead rather than a living art. Thus Pope, for whom the Middle Ages were a 
“second deluge” in which “the monks finished what the Goths begun”, famously likened 
Shakespeare to “an ancient majestick piece of Gothick Architecture”: even though it may 
“strike us with greater reverence” than the “neat Modern building” of regular classicist drama, 
it is still the latter that we should adopt as our model.
7
 Subsequently, the Romantic critics 
turned the tables on such judgments: Shakespeare is indeed Gothic, and precisely because he 
is Gothic he is revealed to be precociously modern, whereas classicism has become obsolete. 
Now, however, in the space of three pages of Burckhardt’s book, the tables turn again, into a 
configuration which would have been as unacceptable to Pope as it would have been to 
Coleridge. Shakespeare remains modern, and the substance of this modernity remains the 
same as with the Romantic critics who originally championed it – the unprecedented insight 
                                                          
6
 Brown misses this more fundamental point when he notes that Burckhardt’s question is “indicative of 
nineteenth-century Romantic views of Italian Renaissance drama and Shakespeare himself”, and that 
“Burckhardt and other late Romantic critics looked at Italian drama through Shakespeare-tinted spectacles”; R. 
D. Brown, “The London Stage”, in Courts, Patrons, and Poets, ed.  D. Mateer (London, 2000), 300. Until these 
lines were written, “Renaissance drama”, Italian or otherwise, simply did not exist. It is in this very passage that 
such a thing comes into being, and it comes into being through Burckhardt’s application of the Romantic ideal of 
Shakespearean tragedy onto the Italian materials, which had not been previously considered in such a light. 
7
 The Works of Shakespear, ed. A. Pope (London, 1725), 1: xxiii-xxiv. 
136 
 
into human nature and a godlike capability for creating individualized, inimitably life-like, 
psychologically complex characters – yet their explanation of this modernity is completely 
evacuated and replaced by its exact antithesis. 
 This Renaissance rebranding of Shakespeare, and more importantly, this 
Shakespearean rebranding of the Renaissance, soon came to influence scholarship on the 
English drama. For illustration we can again turn to Symonds, as Burckhardt’s passage is not 
only a direct precedent for Symonds’ rebranding of the Elizabethan Age as the English 
Renaissance, but also, significantly, for his return to an abandoned history of pre-
Shakespearean drama.
8
 Prior work on the history of English drama had already established the 
key coordinates of secularization and deallegorisation, but these did not coincide with the 
medieval-Renaissance divide in either conceptual or chronological terms. Dodsley, Percy, 
Warton, Malone, Collier: one after another, they all tell versions of the same story of how the 
drama found its way from “allegorical” to “real historical personages” – a story paralleled, it 
may be noted, both conceptually and chronologically, by related editorial developments, 
namely regularized speech prefixes and dramatis personae lists, and the advent of “character 
criticism”.
9
 The reason for this transformation, however, is either deemed inexplicable in 
                                                          
8
 See J. A. Symonds, Shakspere’s Predecessors in the English Drama (London, 1884). According to the 
Preface (vii), Symonds began this work in 1862 but abandoned it unfinished in 1865, “discouraged partly by ill-
health, partly by a conviction that the subject was beyond the scope and judgment of a literary beginner”. I 
would suggest, however, that the conceptual backbone provided by Burckhardt’s work, and in particular the 
suggestive “Italian Shakespeare” passage in the Civilization, with which Symonds was almost certainly 
unfamiliar in 1865, was a more decisive factor. 
9
 In 1741, Dodsley published L. Riccoboni’s Historical and Critical Account of the Theatres in Europe 
(London, 1741), which related the development of the secular out of the religious drama in the major European 
literatures. Dodsley augmented this account in the Preface to his Old Plays (London, 1744) by drawing a firm 
distinction between mystery and morality plays, and dividing the development of English drama into four stages: 
the mysteries (“This Period one might call the dead Sleep of the Muses”), the moralities (“a kind of Morning 
Dream”), the rise of the new drama marked by humanist influence (“The Muse might now be said to be just 
awake”), and finally the sudden, unprecedented arrival – “as it were, all at once” – of the “true Drama”, which 
“received Birth and Perfection from the creative Genius of Shakespear, Fletcher and Johnson” (1: xiii-xxi). An 
evolutionary dimension is added to the account in Percy’s Reliques (London, 1765): the moralities did not 
simply succeed the mysteries but developed, “by degrees”, out of the allegorical elements contained in them; in 
turn, the three kinds or aspects of the morality play developed into tragedy, comedy, and tragicomedy, while the 
masque is nothing else than the continuation of the morality play “with some classical improvements” (1: 120-
6); finally, the mystery cycles mutated into the history plays, for which The Mirror for Magistrates “probably 
furnished the subject, and the antient Mysteries suggested the plan”, the two being similar in “representing a 
series of historical events  simply in the order of time in which they happened, without any regard to the three 
great unities” (1:126-7) – a brilliant flash of structuralist intuition, which Shakespeareans would return to explore 
only centuries later. Percy’s account is then taken over in Warton’s History (at times almost verbatim, e.g., 1: 
242), which is in turn quoted at length in The Plays and Poems of William Shakspeare, ed. E. Malone (London, 
1790), 2: 3. See also J. P. Collier, The History of English Dramatic Poetry (London, 1831): the mystery play (or 
137 
 
literary-historical terms, an outburst of unprecedented and ineffable “genius”, or is attributed 
to categories which, as we have already seen, presume no sharp distinction between the 
“medieval” and the “Renaissance”, at least with respect to this particular sphere of culture. 
 For Symonds, however, the distinction does apply and the explanation is only too 
obvious: the Elizabethan drama is the very “embodi[ment]”, “mirror”, and “compendium of 
all that the Renaissance had brought to light”.
10
  Indeed it is even more than that: for the 
English, the drama is not merely the supreme expression of the Renaissance – it literally is the 
Renaissance. Verging on mysticism, Symonds explains how the Elizabethan drama 
meant for England the recovery of Greek and Latin culture, the emancipation of the 
mind from medieval bondage, the emergence of the human spirit in its freedom. It 
meant newly discovered heavens, a larger earth, sail-swept oceans, awakened 
continents beyond Atlantic seas. It meant the pulse of now ascendant and puissant 
heart-blood through a people conscious of their unity and strength, the puberty and 
adolescence of a race which in its manhood was destined to give social freedom to the 
world. 
All this proceeds directly from Burckhardt’s “Italian Shakespeare” passage, and is indeed 
nothing but the repetition of Burckhardt’s argument in inverse form: what was to be lamented 
in the case of Italy, which had everything except the drama, can now be turned to advantage 
in the case of England, which had nothing but the drama, yet such drama as “conveyed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“miracle play”, as Collier prefers) is transformed, “almost imperceptibly”, into the morality play, “by the gradual 
intermixture of allegory with sacred history”, and the morality play in turn gives way “to Tragedy and Comedy, 
by the introduction, from time to time, of characters in actual life, or supposed to be drawn from it” (1: ix-x). 
Importantly, however, while this drama “reached maturity at the hands of Shakespeare”, his achievement should 
not be exaggerated: “It was, in truth, created by no one man, and in no one age; and whatever improvements 
Shakespeare introduced, it will be seen that when he began to write for the theatre, our romantic drama was 
completely formed and firmly established” (ibid., 1: x). As with other aspects of Shakespearean editing, there is 
a sizeable literature on the introduction of the dramatis personae lists – first systematically executed in Rowe’s 
edition, The Works of Mr. William Shakespear, ed. N. Rowe (London, 1709) – and the regularization of speech 
prefixes; for a succinct discussion, see M. de Grazia and P. Stallybrass, “The Materiality of Shakespeare’s Text”, 
SQ 44 (1993): 255-83, pp. 267-9. On the prefixes, see esp. Shakespeare’s Speech-Headings, ed. G. W. Williams 
(Cranbury, 1997). On Shakespearean “character criticism”, see B. Vickers, “The Emergence of Character 
Criticism”, SS 34 (1982): 11-22. 
10 Predecessors, 13. 
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English minds what Italy, great mother of renascent Europe, had with all her arts, with all her 
industries and sciences, made manifest”.
11
 
 With Symonds, then, the familiar account of the transition from allegories to “real 
personage[s], who would have been at home in ordinary English households”, assumes a 
definite periodisational shape.
12
 In a particularly explicit statement, he notes how  
Three centuries of militant and triumphant humanism, of developed art, and of 
advancing science have rendered allegory irksome to the modern mind. We recognise 
its essential imperfection, and are hardly able to do justice to such merits as it 
undoubtedly possessed for people not yet accustomed to distinguish thought from 
figured models of presentation. It is our duty, if we care to understand the last phase of 
medieval culture, to throw ourselves back into the mental condition of men who 
demanded that abstractions should be clothed for them by art in visible shapes – [...] 
men who delighted in the ingenuity and grotesquery of what to us is little better than a 
system of illustrated conundrums; [...] men who naturally thought their deepest 
thoughts out into tangibilities by means of allegorical mythology.
13
 
Modern English drama is born at the moment at which this condition dissolves, the moment – 
Symonds locates it in Nicholas Udall’s Ralph Roister Doister, printed in 1567 – at which 
English playwrights “emerge[d] from medieval grotesquery and allegory into the clear light of 
actual life, into an agreeable atmosphere of urbanity and natural delineation”.
14
 
                                                          
11
 Ibid., 13-14. 
12
 Ibid., 203-4. 
13
 Ibid., 146. 
14
 Ibid., 203. Cf. A. W. Ward’s History (London, 1875), acknowledged by Symonds as the chief 
contemporary authority on the subject (Predecessors, viii). The underlying narrative remains that of a passage 
from “allegorical abstractions” to “real human personages”, but the novelty is that this passage is now partly 
ascribed to the “Renascence”, a concept which Ward inherits primarily from Arnold, although he was also 
familiar with Burckhardt (History, 1: 78-9, n. 2). As used by Ward, however, the term does not denote a 
comprehensive historical epoch, and is most frequently referred to as an intellectual and artistic “movement” 
(xxiv et passim), in tandem with the “movement” of the Reformation, or a “period” in literary but not general 
cultural history (26, cf. 271). Chronologically, its lower limit is “the close of the so-called Middle Ages” (xxiv), 
but its upper limit does not extend to the golden age of Elizabethan drama: “the Renascence movement [...] 
reaches its height in the earlier part of the reign of Elisabeth” (154). For all its positive impulses (66, 68, 91-2), 
the Renascence remained a foreign import cultivated by the social elite centred on the court, and lacking genuine 
popular support it was prone to degenerating into sterile pedantry. Significantly, this includes its continuing 
participation in “the ancient and enduring national predilection” for allegory; Chaucer alone had escaped it, but 
he had no followers, and at the high point of the Renascence we still find the “cold and tame” allegories of 
Sidney and Spenser (56-7, 156). The drama is no exception: not only do the “tedious” morality plays survive 
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ALLEGORY NOW 
 
It is, and remains, a powerful narrative, told by powerful narrators, and it continues to inform 
much of the representative literature on the subject. It transcends superficial disciplinary 
divides, uniting, for example, such an obvious suspect as Harold Bloom – whose sweeping 
thesis of Shakespeare’s “invention of the human” does not omit an appreciative reference to 
Burckhardt’s musings on the Italian Shakespeare
15
 – with an arguably less obvious figure like 
Stephen Greenblatt, whose unwavering allegiance to the Swiss master governs the whole of 
his influential opus, from the first page of Renaissance Self-Fashioning to the syllogism latent 
in the alternative subtitles of The Swerve.16 It is particularly explicit, as far the drama is 
concerned, in his two Shakespearean publications directed at a wider reading public. Thus we 
read, in Greenblatt’s best-selling Will in the World, how Shakespeare triumphs over the 
morality playwrights by realizing that “the spectacle of human destiny was  [...] vastly more 
compelling when it attached itself not to generalized abstractions but to particular named 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
throughout the sixteenth and into the seventeenth century, but the same impulse finds its authentic Renascence 
expression in the work of Lyly – a “deplorable [...] aberration from the true principles of poetic creation”, 
contributing “nothing to the legitimate drama” of the later Elizabethan period (78, 134, 263). A further 
innovation is the distinction between three rather than two stages in the de-allegorization process – from 
allegories to types, and from types to individuals (140, 260) – which loosely correspond to the three periods in 
the drama’s history, namely the Middle Ages, the transitional period of the Renascence, and finally, after about 
1590, the mature drama of the later Elizabethan and Jacobean period. At most, pre-1590 playwrights made the 
transition from allegories to types, but even this was not an exclusively Renascence achievement, and had been 
“asserting itself in individual instances” already in medieval drama (91). On the whole, the Renascence 
“contributed to prepare and fertilise the soil into which was to descend the seed of genius, the gift of Heaven” 
(xxxii), but this contribution was not remotely sufficient for, and was in many respects an impediment to, the 
additional “great step” (140) from types to individuals, which Shakespeare was to make (510-11). However, 
although Ward’s description of Shakespeare as “the gift of Heaven” is a direct translation of Burckhardt’s 
“Geschenk des Himmels” (Kultur, 274) – and although Ward is happy to repeat after him that “a genius such as 
Shakspere’s [...] belongs to no age and to no country exclusively” (271), he does have a historical explanation 
for “the outward conditions” (246) that made its expression possible, and these are both specifically national and 
anti-Renascence. Other things being equal, we owe Shakespeare to the emergence of a stable, financially self-
sustainable, and genuinely popular stage, governed not by aristocratic patronage but by “the verdict of popular 
applause” (247), and this stage, endemic to England, we owe to specifically national developments in what Ward 
refers to as “the great national age of the latter half of Elisabeth’s reign” (481). 
15
 H. Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (New York, 1998), 719. 
16
 See S. Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning (1980; repr. Chicago, 2005), 1, on the “central [...] 
perception – as old in academic writing as Burckhardt and Michelet – that there is in the early modern period a 
change in the intellectual, social, psychological, and aesthetic structures that govern the generation of identities”. 
The UK and US editions of The Swerve are subtitled How the Renaissance Began (London, 2011), and How the 
World Became Modern (New York, 2011). 
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people, people realized with an unprecedented intensity of individuation: not Youth but Prince 
Hal, not Everyman but Othello”.
17
 
Even if we allow for a concession to the wide readership such a book seeks to address, 
it is still striking to see a major contemporary critic, and a historicist no less, refer so 
emphatically to literary characters as people. Might it be more than an inconsequential 
metaphorical flourish – might this slip of the stirring Burckhardtian unconscious be a sign of 
changing times? Until very recently, a rare and seemingly irreversible consensus among the 
various schools of modern literary criticism had mandated that, whatever else they might be, 
literary characters are not people, and that there is no way of knowing, hence no point in 
asking, how many children Lady Macbeth had, or what her own girlhood was like. Back in 
1998, even Bloom, in a book which presented a deliberate affront to this consensus, stops 
short of such a definite statement.
18
 And yet, however inconceivable it may have seemed at 
the time, it now looks as if Bloom will have the last laugh, for more recently cognate 
discourse has proliferated. “Character has made a comeback”, we are informed by the editors 
of a 2009 volume, making a stand for “the development in Shakespeare studies of what might 
best be termed a ‘new character criticism’”.
19
 Perversely conservative in its day, Bloom’s 
introductory chapter on “Shakespeare’s Universalism” begins to seem curiously avant-garde 
in the wake of recent books on Shakespeare’s Humanism, Shakespeare’s Freedom, 
Shakespeare’s Individualism, and, coming full circle, Shakespeare’s Universality – books 
which, disregarding superficial differences in emphasis, restate the same basic argument, on 
the same basic grounds.
20
 
                                                          
17
 S. Greenblatt, Will in the World (2004; repr. New York, 2005), 34. Greenblatt does acknowledge a degree 
of debt, “for the most part [...] indirect and subtle”, owed by Shakespeare to the morality tradition, which 
“helped fashion the foundations, largely hidden well below the surface, of his writing” (33). 
18
 Albeit reluctantly: “No world author rivals Shakespeare in the apparent creation of personality, and I 
employ ‘apparent’ here with some reluctance”; “I never know how to take the assurances (and remonstrances) I 
receive from Shakespeare’s current critics, who tell me that Falstaff, Hamlet, Rosalind, Cleopatra, and Iago are 
roles for actors and actresses but not ‘real people’” (Invention, xviii, 14-15). 
19
 Shakespeare and Character, ed. P. Yachnin and J. Slights (Basingstoke, 2009), 1. See also Shakespeare’s 
Sense of Character, ed. Y. J. Ko and M. W. Shurgot (Farnham, 2012).  
20
 See R. H. Wells, Shakespeare’s Humanism (Cambridge, 2005); S. Greenblatt, Shakespeare’s Freedom 
(Chicago, 2010), P. Holbrook, Shakespeare’s Individualism (Cambridge, 2010); M. Kiernan, Shakespeare’s 
Universality (forthcoming in 2015 in the Shakespeare Now! series, and promising to “reclaim the idea of 
Shakespeare’s timeless universality from reactionary and radical critics alike and reveal its revolutionary 
potential in the modern world”). Bloom’s influence is palpable, for example in the fact that both Greenblatt 
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A closely related phenomenon is the rearticulation of such tendencies under the more 
inclusive banner of “Presentism”, arguably the most significant “post-Theory” development in 
contemporary English studies.
21
 Appropriating this originally derogatory term, the school 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Freedom, 7-17) and Holbrook (Individualism, 28-9) make much of the unrepentant murderer Barnardine in 
Measure for Measure, a minor character whom Bloom promotes to the rank of the play’s “imaginative center 
(and greatest glory)” (Invention, 374-80). Published in the same year, Greenblatt’s and Holbrook’s books are 
also particularly close in their broader arguments for Shakespeare as a champion of modern individualism, as 
well their avoidance of any historical explanation of this unprecedented achievement. Holbrook is fairly explicit 
about this relapse into bardolatory (Individualism, 22-3), but Greenblatt is more cautious: he cites a phrase by 
Adorno on Shakespeare’s “breakthrough into mortal and infinitely rich individuality”, and claims that “This 
breakthrough [...] arose from an unexpected artistic swerve in [Shakespeare’s] work, a startling departure from 
the norms of beauty that governed Renaissance taste” (Freedom, 4). Obviously, however, this merely transfers 
the question to that of what caused the startling departure, which is never raised, let alone answered. In a sense, 
this too is orthodoxly Burckhardtian; for him also Shakespeare was ultimately inexplicable. It is telling, though, 
that Greenblatt’s quotation from Adorno omits a key adjective qualifying the supposed “breakthrough”, namely 
“Shakespeare’s nominalistic breakthrough into mortal and infinitely rich individuality”; T. Adorno, Aesthetic 
Theory [1970], ed. G. Adorno and R. Tiedemann (1st ed.), ed. R. Hullot-Kentor (1997; repr. London, 2002), 213. 
This of course presupposes a very definite and thoroughly Burckhardtian historical framework, as is more 
explicit elsewhere in Adorno’s work, notably the section “Universal and Particular”, opening with the premise 
that “Art has been caught up in the total process of nominalism’s advance ever since the medieval ordo was 
broken up” (ibid., 199). In Shakespeare’s Humanism, Wells draws on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
sources, as well as advances in contemporary natural and social sciences, to argue that there is such a thing as 
universal human nature, that it informs the literature (or at least the “great literature”) of any culture or historical 
period, and that this was also the view of Shakespeare and his contemporaries. The result is an incoherent, 
meandering argument, mounting a critique of the “presentist” impulse in Foucauldian neohistoricism, remaking 
the Renaissance in its own anti-humanist image, and yet itself advocating a no less “presentist” approach, 
ostensibly grounded in a scientifically respectable notion of universal human nature, yet biased in favour of the 
author’s own ideological agendas. Thus Wells labours to distance himself from the more traditional humanist 
universalism – “great literature typically concerns itself with conundrums” rather than the “verities” of the 
human condition (198) – yet his “conundrums” turn out to be the new “eternal verities”. Thus he finds the 
“pluralist view of ethics” espoused by such twentieth-century thinkers as I. Berlin or N. Rabkin (62-4; cf. 
Holbrook, Individualism, 3-15) in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice and its “dramatic world of stylised 
conundrums and irresolvable paradoxes” (59), but then emphasizes that pluralist ethics “isn’t unique to 
Shakespeare. Indeed it might be said to be the basis of much of the world’s greatest literature” (66). The appeal 
to the contemporary natural and social sciences is irrelevant, for these “universal passions and humours”, shared 
by human beings “as members of the same species” (192), are simply too universal to make a difference either 
way. Any understanding of literature beyond this most elementary, species-specific level – including the very 
idea that there is such a thing as “literature” – is demonstrably historically contingent. Finally, although Wells 
nominally dismisses Burckhardt’s ideas as outdated (187), it is clear that they continue to underpin the argument, 
including the obligatory, albeit elliptical, statement of the decline-of-allegory narrative (27). 
21
 For the first usage of the term “presentist” in this positive sense, see H. Grady, Shakespeare’s Universal 
Wolf (Oxford, 1996), 4-5, 213-14, acknowledging the influence of “Terence Hawkes’s pioneering studies in the 
inevitable construction of Shakespearean interpretations in the interpreter’s present”, and describing the 
approach as “American cultural materialism” – “‘presentist’ in orientation, post-structuralist in theoretical 
inclination, open to the political insights of Marxism and feminism, and deeply indebted to the watershed 
contributions to English studies of the late Raymond Williams”. Later contributions include T. Hawkes, 
Shakespeare in the Present (New York, 2002); E. Fernie, “Shakespeare and the Prospect of Presentism”, SS 58 
(2005): 169-84; Spiritual Shakespeares, ed. E. Fernie (Abingdon, 2005); Presentist Shakespeares, ed. H. Grady 
and T. Hawkes (Abingdon, 2007); Presentism, Gender and Sexuality in Shakespeare, ed. E. Gajowski 
(Basingstoke, 2009); J. O’Rourke, Retheorizing Shakespeare through Presentist Readings (New York, 2012); 
Shakespeare and the Urgency of Now, ed. C. DiPietro and H. Grady (Basingstoke, 2013); and most of the titles 
in the Shakespeare Now! series, edited by Fernie and S. Palfrey. So far titles have considered, among other 
subjects, Shakespeare in relation to atheism, ecology, genetics, performance and reading in prison facilities, anti-
empiricist and anti-Cartesian metaphysics, the “poetic history of the ocean”, or critical autobiography – if that is 
the right term for what is described as a “personal form of criticism” where critics “examine and scrutinise their 
deepest, most personal and intimate responses to Shakespeare’s plays and poems, to ask themselves if and how 
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advocates a radical form of the epistemological scepticism already present in New 
Historicism and Cultural Materialism, which was itself a radicalized approach to a question 
acknowledged in literary history and historicist literary criticism at least since the early 
twentieth century – namely, that of the influence of the critic’s “situatedness” in the present in 
any attempt to recover the literary past. In contrast to earlier views, however, which 
attempted, in one way or another, to negotiate and overcome this situatedness, Presentism 
programmatically foregrounds it, and declares it to be absolute.
22
 Any engagement with the 
past is “altogether, always, and already shaped and determined” by the present; “And if it’s 
always and only the present that makes the past speak, it speaks always and only to – and 
about – ourselves”; anything else is “fundamentally impossible”.
23
 From this premise a further 
radical conclusion is derived: because it cannot be evaded, the present “does not – cannot – 
contaminate the past”, so rather than treating it as “an obstacle to be avoided, or a prison to be 
escaped from”, we are to welcome it with open arms, not merely allowing, but actively 
encouraging it to govern our readings. Presentist criticism will therefore “deliberately begin 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Shakespeare has made them the person they are”, an approach recommended especially to “teachers who agonise 
over how to make Shakespeare ‘relevant’”. For an early critique, see R. H. Wells, “Historicism and ‘Presentism’ 
in Early Modern Studies”, Cambridge Quarterly 29 (2000): 37-60. 
22
 The exaggerated claims to novelty in some Presentist as well as New Historicist statements have been 
criticized by Wells, who adduces examples of “old historicists” acknowledging their situatedness as early as 
1936 (“Historicism”; Humanism, 188-92). In fact, there are even earlier examples, such as this closing paragraph 
of E. E. Stoll’s Hamlet: An Historical and Comparative Study (Minneapolis, 1919), where the question in not 
only raised, but is resolved into precisely such a genuinely dialectical perspective that is unattainable in the 
Presentist view: “Even the historical critic cannot utterly escape from the spell and sway of [...] public and 
private interests and predilections. Look to his author’s purpose and the spirit of the author’s century as he will, 
he lives in his own century and breathes the same atmosphere as his fellows. [...] even in being historical he 
follows the bent of the age. But it is the ‘function of criticism’ to look away, to do what one can to escape. And 
that not merely in order to enter into the spirit of the Elizabethans, the Middle Ages, or the Greeks. Really it is 
also in order to enter more fully and aware into the spirit of today. Only as we continually break loose from our 
moorings in the present can we explore the past. Only as we explore the past can we know and appreciate the 
present” (75). (I quote from the copy available at Archive.org, in which a reader who could not bear to leave it at 
that pencilled in his own conclusion: “Yes, but part of Shakespeare’s greatness is his ability to peer through the 
clouds of his own times, and still have an unbefuddled message for each succeeding generation.”) 
23
 Presentist Shakespeares, ed. Grady and Hawkes, 2-5. Sometimes a dialectic principle seems to be invoked, 
but on closer inspection it proves merely a rhetorical diversion. For example, it is asked how, “given that what 
we term history develops out of a never-ending dialogue between past and present, [...] can we decide whose 
historical circumstances will have priority in the process, Shakespeare’s, or our own?” The implied answer 
would seem to be the dialectical one, namely “neither”, yet the priority of the present is repeatedly and 
emphatically asserted: the “centre of gravity will [...] be ‘now’, rather than ‘then’”, etc. Or consider the following 
passage: “If the present is such a universal and inescapable factor, it necessarily dissolves the possibility of any 
engagement with a past not altogether, always, and already shaped and determined by it. By the same token, all 
our experience of the ‘present’ is shaped and determined by the past and so to some degree only realisable in and 
on its terms. The truth is we can’t ever step off that roundabout” (emphasis mine). Beneath the appearance of 
dialectic, as these qualifications plainly indicate, is always a definite bias towards the present. 
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with the material present and allow that to set its interrogative agenda”, thus “bridging the 400 
years of chronological distance that separate us from Shakespeare as a historical object and 
addressing Shakespeare in the urgency of now”.
24
 
Clearly the question arises of what exactly is supposed to be new in such an approach. 
Is the above not a perfectly adequate description of how Shakespeare has been approached by 
many critics since the Romantics, by most theatre directors since the epoch-making work of 
Peter Brook, and by “appropriations” and “reinscriptions” in a variety of other media in still 
more recent times? Indeed, the Presentists themselves acknowledge that what they do 
“Perhaps [...] simply makes overt what covertly happens anyway”, and in fact, if their 
principles are pushed to their logical conclusion, all literary criticism, including the most 
unrepentantly positivist historicism imaginable, is of necessity a latent presentism.
25
 It thus 
makes perfect sense that Presentism increasingly tends to define itself as an open-ended 
“movement”, encompassing “a number of different contemporary critical tendencies”, and 
that the emphasis is shifting from the appropriated “ism” to the even more inclusive label of 
“now”.
26 
But again, none of this is really new: as Grady himself writes, “every era has 
constructed in own Shakespeare, different from that of other eras, based on its own peculiar 
preoccupations. How could it be otherwise for us?”
27
   
What is genuinely novel and significant about Presentism, however, and what justifies 
and indeed requires its treatment here, is the word itself: the introduction into contemporary 
critical discourse of a term which enables us, at long last, to dispense with the venerable 
model of the pendulum, whereby literary studies are supposed to periodically fluctuate 
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 Ibid., 4; Urgency, ed. DiPietro and Grady, 2.  
25
 Presentist Shakespeares, ed. Grady and Hawkes, 4. Cf. H. Grady, “Shakespeare Studies, 2005”, 
Shakespeare 1 (2005): 102-20, pp. 114-15: “there is no historicism that does not imply a latent presentism”. Here 
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 Urgency, 3-4. Besides this volume, and the already mentioned “minigraph” series Shakespeare Now!, see 
also Fernie’s multi-media project “The Faerie Queene” Now: Remaking Religious Poetry for the Modern World, 
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between opposing “formalist” and “historicist” poles, and which had thus supposedly taken us 
from Old Historicism to New Criticism, from New Criticism to New Historicism, and is now 
poised for another swing in the “formalist” direction. Some still cling to the model, but it 
seems fairly clear that the recent proliferation of manifestos – for a New Formalism, 
Historical Formalism, New Humanism, New Aestheticism, New Character Criticism
28
 – 
simply lacks the mobilising potential of the Presentist project. If not before, it should by this 
point be obvious that the pendulum model has obscured the extent to which (lower-case) 
presentist agendas have survived throughout these successive tides of academic fashion. What 
is really at stake, and what has always really been at stake, is not a conflict between 
“formalism” and “historicism”, but precisely between an approach which, to quote another of 
Stoll’s elegant formulations, seeks “to make the poet [...] the contemporary of the reader”, and 
one which seeks “to make the reader for the time being a contemporary of the poet” – in short, 
between presentism and historicism.
29
 
 This is not, however, a matter of simply substituting one term for another. The rise to 
prominence of a self-avowedly presentist school of criticism – “putting one’s cards on the 
table”
30
 – clears the terrain for a fundamental reorientation of debates long plagued by 
conceptual and terminological confusion, helping us recognize presentism as the lowest 
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 E. E. Stoll, “Anachronism in Shakespeare Studies”, MP 7 (1910): 557-75, p. 557. Cf. DiPietro and Grady, 
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common denominator of a wide array of supposedly independent or even conflicting schools 
and approaches. Indeed, upper-case Presentists have themselves begun to insist on the 
inclusiveness of their “movement”: “the old new historicism, cultural materialism, feminism, 
gay and queer criticism, post-colonial criticism and performances are all instances of 
presentist practice” avant la lettre, taking as their “point of origin the cultural present”.31 
Particularly significant here is the inclusion of approaches previously identified as 
“historicist”, an identification which now proves deeply problematic, and to a large degree 
untenable. Presentism has continually emphasized its kinship and continuity not only with 
Cultural Materialism – where this continuity is obvious through the direct involvement of 
prominent figures like Dollimore or Hawkes – but also the New Historicism, foregrounding 
the strong presentist bias in the work of both schools.
32
 Furthermore, this view is shared by 
the Presentists’ adversaries – the more rigorous historicists designated by such labels as the 
New New Historicism, New Materialism, New Boredom – who foreground the same bias for 
the opposite reason, to distance themselves from these schools, now found to be rife with 
“exactly the narcissism that history should counter”, and “too overtly self-interested to be 
compelling as historical accounts, significant more as records our present needs and anxieties 
than as reconstructions of those of Shakespeare’s time”.
33
 Finally, this presentist bias is now 
also acknowledged, affirmatively, by some of the New Historicists themselves.
34
 By an 
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 In Grady’s original appropriation of the term, it is used “to emphasize the very ‘presentist’, theoretical 
aspects of cultural materialism and cultural poetics that are in danger of disappearing as the dust of the recent 
paradigm shift settles and we enter a period of ‘normal science’” (Wolf, 213). Contributing an Afterword to 
Fernie’s Spiritual Shakespeares, Dollimore commends the collection’s stated aim to “reinvigorate and strengthen 
politically progressive materialist criticism” (3). For Fernie himself, “established new historicism is a complex 
practice and so – already – is presentism”; “historicism and presentism are oddly at one” (“Prospect”, 169, 173). 
See also M. Robson, “Presentism”, in The Encyclopedia of Literary and Cultural Theory, gen. ed. M. Ryan 
(Malden, 2011): the “presentist project appears to be a reformation and reinvigoration of cultural materialism 
rather than a ‘new’ critical mode as such” (789). 
33
 D. S. Kastan, Shakespeare after Theory (New York, 1999), 13; by contrast, Kastan advocates an increased 
“attention to the specific material and institutional conditions of [...] discursive exchanges”, and “a sharper focus 
on the material relations of discourse to the world in which it circulates” – “something that Peter Stallybrass and 
I, usually gleefully, have come to think of as ‘The New Boredom’” (13-14). See P. Fumerton, “Introduction: A 
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apparently general consensus, then, the old map of the discipline has outlived its usefulness, 
and even the new divide, between declared Presentists on the one hand and more rigorous 
historicists or materialists on the other, perhaps finds its lowest common denominator in the 
old divide between the “critic” and the “scholar”.
35
 
 It may be also noted at this point that the presentist agenda is compatible with two 
different and often incompatible accounts of modernity: not only the Burckhardtian model 
discussed above, in which modernity emerges at the Renaissance, and is a good thing, but also 
with the antimodernist model – notably, in the present context, that of Michel Foucault – in 
which modernity emerges after the Renaissance, and is a bad thing. Consequently, when the 
Burckhardtian modernist looks to the past, he sees the familiar three-part scheme in which the 
protomodernity of classical antiquity is temporarily lost to the Middle Ages, but is eventually 
restored at the Renaissance, and extends uninterruptedly into the present time. For the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
only describes it as “much concerned with interpreting the past in the light of the present”, but ventures to 
historicize this concern, positing that the “pessimistic sense that protest in Jacobean drama is always nullified, is 
a reading of it in the light of the bleak situation of present-day radicals in a triumphantly right-wing United 
States” (xii). Far from rejecting such imputations, Greenblatt happily concedes the point in the anniversary 
edition of his own Cold War classic, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, confirming that the book’s “vision of an 
immense malevolent force determined to crush all resistance” indeed is one of “many traces of that profoundly 
disorienting time”, namely the late 1970s, and that “Many of the anecdotes with which I attempt to illuminate 
Renaissance texts had a special contemporary resonance” (xvi). Nor is its vision pessimistic: on the contrary, “an 
ineradicable principle of hope” courses throughout the book, surfacing most explicitly in the “somewhat 
perplexed declaration of faith” disclosed in its Epilogue, where, it will be remembered, “Renaissance figures” 
inhabit “our culture”, and where their power and freedom in shaping their lives is not only “the very hallmark of 
the Renaissance” but also “an important element in my own sense of myself”; “The project was not merely 
descriptive: the goal was to enable us to escape what we detest and embrace whatever brings us wonder, hope, 
and pleasure” (xvi-xvii). 
35
 Cf. N. Parvini, “The Scholars and the Critics”, Shakespeare 10 (2014): 212-23. While timely and 
stimulating – especially in her identification of New Historicists and Cultural Materialists as “critics ‘doing 
history’ rather than scholars ‘doing criticism’” (214) – Parvini’s analysis is flawed in other respects by her plea 
for the affirmation of contemporary criticism, perceived as under threat from “a form of historicism that I like to 
call the ‘new’ old antiquarianism” (212). This plea is based on a skewed account of the respective provinces of 
the scholar and the critic, the former’s supposedly being “data, facts and historical details”, the latter’s  
“language, form, genre and literary influence” (214). Leaving aside the problematic category of “form”, which 
needs to be further specified to be useful in such a context – is close reading attention to “form”?; is “pure 
interpretation”, as Parvini describes the work of G. W. Knight, an attention to “form”? – language, genre, and 
influence have certainly been the domain of the “scholar” at least as much as of the “critic”. Consequently, 
Parvini also fails to recognize in “Presentism” a variety of “criticism” in the traditional sense of the word, 
viewing it as “a development of original political impetus of cultural materialism” (217). As any nineteenth- or 
early twentieth-century source will show, however, the work of the “critic” is by definition presentist in 
orientation. Here, for example, is G. B. Harrison’s once-standard handbook Introducing Shakespeare [1939], 3rd 
ed. (London, 1966): “The scholar says in effect, ‘Shakespeare’s plays are now more than three hundred and fifty 
years old; since then the English language, manners, and ideas have changed greatly. To understand him we 
must know Shakespeare’s environment and examine his plays in the conditions of their original composition.’ 
The attitude of the critic, on the other hand, is that great literature is timeless and therefore perpetually modern. 
He is not concerned with antiquity but with certain works of dramatic art and how they concern him’” (78). 
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Foucauldian antimodernist, however, the “essential rupture in the Western world” occurs 
around the middle of the seventeenth century, marking the end of the Renaissance, whereas 
the whole of Western history up to that point is fundamentally of a piece.
36
 This is the 
Enlightenment’s own view of history, with the value judgments inverted: instead of emerging 
from darkness into light, the antimodernist feels himself banished from light into darkness, 
from prelapsarian bliss into a radically anomalous fallen state.
37
 Interestingly, both 
Burckhardt and Foucault report apocalyptic premonitions about a further epoch just beyond 
the horizon, yet these are, again, diametrically opposite: to Burckhardt, the close of the 
nineteenth century feels like a twilight, fading into the night of the terrible simplifiers, 
whereas to Foucault the close of the twentieth is a dawn, soon to give rise to “some event of 
which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility”.
38
 In spite of these 
obvious differences, however, the two views have one thing in common. Crucially, in the 
context of the present discussion, they both look back on the Renaissance as a mirror of their 
own positions and concerns – “poststructuralism rediscovered what the Renaissance already 
knew”; Shakespeare “is always ahead of you, [...] whoever and whenever you are”
39
 – which, 
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translated into critical and pedagogical practice, inevitably gives rise to latent and eventually 
manifest Presentism. 
 I leave further discussion of these developments for the Afterword. The above is 
meant only to indicate the basic outlines of the polemic raised by an inquiry into the place of 
allegory in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century drama, and the high stakes riding on these 
particular configurations of the allegory-modernity nexus, and the critical modes they seek to 
legitimize. Whereas most texts discussed in the preceding chapter of this thesis get read only 
by specialists, and even among them only a happy few, the drama, headed by the illustrious 
figure of Shakespeare, is of course the flagship item on the pre-1700 syllabus, and often 
metonymous with the entire discipline. To take a random example, commenting, in October 
2013, on a 20% decline in English majors at his institution over the past thirty years, an 
English professor at the University of Virginia did not feel apprehensive about the trend, for 
as he put it, “In the end we can’t lose [...]. We have William Shakespeare.”
40
 Indeed, many of 
those who insist on Shakespeare’s modernity – an insistence which is then often extended, at 
least implicitly, to the period more broadly – do not perceive it as merely an intellectual 
position to be adopted, but as a vested professional interest, and there is every reason to 
believe that this interest will be defended with increasing zeal and militancy as the debates on 
the status of the humanities continue into an economically and politically uncertain future. To 
its adherents, the intellectual commitment to presentism may not, in the final instance, be 
clearly distinguishable from the existential commitment to holding on to their jobs, or even 
the ethical commitment to being a decent, progressive, socially responsible human being.
41
 
What is, however, more immediately relevant to the present discussion is that such 
criticism often verges on, and is sometimes indistinguishable from, allegoresis. Like 
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allegoresis, presentist criticism seeks to perform the ideological maintenance of a canonical 
work at a time when its textual stabilization has imposed limits on alternative modes of such 
maintenance; it resorts to the premise of modernity in order to legitimize its readings, and the 
greater the gap this modernity is required to bridge, the more mysterious must be the ways in 
which it is supposed to work; while it thus seeks to escape the constraints of the work’s 
historicity, it also seeks to elude its textuality, either by focusing on detail to the exclusion of 
the wider context, or by focusing on generalized categories abstracted from their verbal and 
textual particularity. This is why any presentism will feel threatened by a rigorous 
“formalism” no less than by a rigorous “historicism”, and why, lest anyone forget it, “mere 
reading, [...] prior to any theory, is able to transform critical discourse in a manner that would 
appear deeply subversive to those who think of the teaching of literature as a substitute for the 
teaching of theology, ethics, psychology, or intellectual history”.
42
 
The final sections of this chapter deal with Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the play most 
commonly and most intensely identified with precisely those aspects of literary modernity to 
which  allegory is, in the traditional view, most inimical. Precisely for this reason, however,  
Hamlet also occasions some of the best examples of how readings operating on this premise 
habitually turn into their very opposite, with the prince’s much-vaunted inwardness and 
individuality evaporating precisely as the reading they legitimize draws to its climax. In 
Hazlitt’s Characters, for instance, Hamlet’s reality is categorically asserted and then 
categorically denied in the space of a single paragraph: “Hamlet is a name: his speeches and 
sayings but the idle coinages of the poet’s brain. What then, are they not real? They are as real 
as our own thoughts. Their reality is in the reader’s mind. It is we who are Hamlet”.43 
Alternatively, the prince is revealed to be an allegory not of his readers but of his creator: a 
typical example is found in Ward, who joins the chorus praising Shakespeare’s “power of 
characterisation” as his “supreme excellence”, and Hamlet as its “most marvellously profound 
instance”, only for Hamlet to ultimately turn out to be a mere “type into which [Shakespeare] 
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poured so many of his deepest and innermost thoughts”, rather than possessing any of his 
own.
44
 
Endless further examples could be cited, eventually reaching Bloom and his strange 
Presentist bedfellows. Needless to say, the Presentists strenuously deny any such fellowship, 
and would insist on the superiority of their epistemologically enlightened approach over the 
traditional universalism revived in The Invention of the Human.45 But if the present “does not 
– cannot – contaminate the past”, then what exactly is the problem with imposing on 
Shakespeare, “as many teachers seem unthinkingly to do, some kind of absurd 
contemporaneity with ourselves, usually justified by windy rhetoric about the Bard’s 
‘universality’”?
46
 Why would such an approach be less valid than any other? What, in terms 
of actual critical practice, is the difference between extreme epistemological naiveté and 
extreme epistemological scepticism – between interpreting the past in the light of the present 
because we fail to comprehend a difference between the two, and because we believe this 
difference to be incomprehensible? 
Bloom’s reading of Hamlet presents us with further striking instances of Hamlet’s 
much-vaunted individuality turning into its very opposite, indeed combining the two modes 
illustrated above from Ward and Hazlitt: the allegory of the reader, as one might call it, and 
the allegory of the author. Thus Hamlet’s individuality and interiority are tirelessly exhorted, 
to the point where he “ceases to represent himself and becomes [...] a universal figure” – and 
yet, at the same time, “personifies Shakespeare’s Negative Capability”.
47
 “At the end, Hamlet 
is no longer a real personage condemned to suffer inside a play, and the wrong play at that. 
The personage and the play dissolve into each other, until we have only the cognitive music of 
‘let be’ and ‘Let it be.’”
48
 But why should this presentism be more absurd than that of Hawkes 
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or Grady? Clearly the problem with the “windy rhetoric of the Bard’s universality” is 
ideological rather than epistemological.
49
 
In conclusion, although written many years ago, Frye’s words have lost little of their 
relevance, and “Many of our best and wisest critics” continue to  
tend to think of literature as primarily instructive, or as, in Arnold’s phrase, a criticism 
of life. They feel that its essential function is to illuminate something about life, or 
reality, or experience, or whatever we call the immediate world outside literature. 
They thus tend, whether they say so or not, to think of literature, taken as a whole, as a 
vast imaginative allegory, the end of which is a deeper understanding of the 
nonliterary center of experience.
50
 
The closer the allegorist gets to this centre, the more the object of his interpretation, in both its 
verbal and historical dimension, gets in the way. And as play, protagonist, and playwright 
collapse into one another, as history fades into the present and the present into history, we 
emerge into the ultimate fantasy of the allegorist: a text emptied of all identity and meaning, 
infinitely malleable and accommodating to hermeneutical manipulation. “Shakespeare’s plays 
have no essential meanings, but function as resources which we use to generate meaning for 
our own purposes. [...] Shakespeare doesn’t mean: we mean by Shakespeare.”51  
 
FROM EVERYMAN TO OTHELLO? 
 
Returning now to the Burckhardtian model of the history of sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century drama, it is easy to see how it might seem that there is abundant evidence to support 
it. English drama of this period indeed does see a decline in the overt representation of 
religious subjects, a diminished use of personified abstractions in favour of characters bearing 
proper names, and the replacement of the nowhere land of the earlier moralities by at least 
                                                          
49
 Thus, for example, Bloom is out, but Kott is in – “a milestone work of a previous generation with specific 
Presentist principles” (Urgency, ed. DiPietro and Grady, 8, n. 7) – clearly not because The Invention of the 
Human is any less presentist than Shakespeare Our Contemporary, but because Kott’s presentism is found to be 
ideologically flattering whereas Bloom’s is not. 
50
  N. Frye, A Natural Perspective (New York, 1965), 2. 
51
 T. Hawkes, Meaning by Shakespeare (1992; repr. New York, 2005), unpaginated abstract. 
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nominally particularized settings. These are all matters of empirical fact and they present 
problems of the highest order in English literary history. There are a number of reasons, 
however, proceeding from an ever-increasing body of research, to reconsider both the facts 
themselves, and especially their traditional interpretations. While the allegorical dimension of 
late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century drama often needs to be unearthed through close 
reading and historical contextualization, it is just as often hiding in plain sight, where its 
recognition is a matter of getting the facts straight, readjusting one’s focus, and rethinking the 
problem at a fundamental level.
52
 Before proceeding, in final sections of this chapter, to 
demonstrate the former in my engagement with Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the play usually 
understood as epitomising the traditional paradigm, the present section will briefly elaborate 
the latter claim, and will seek to demonstrate the benefits of looking at the period’s dramatic 
corpus and its historical development through the lens of the allegorical poetics discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
This requires a careful disentangling of a number of issues typically conflated in most 
previous scholarship. The question of overt religious subject matter in the drama needs to be 
distinguished from the question of dramatic allegory, dramatic allegory itself needs to be 
distinguished from the use of personifications, and the use of personifications needs to be 
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 The scholarship on allegory in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century drama is scarce. As correctly 
and timely noted in J. Campana’s call for papers for the forthcoming special issue of SEL on “Staging Allegory”, 
“In spite of some notable exceptions, theories of allegory tend to dwell on poetry, prose, and other modalities of 
language while theories of early modern theatricality tend to neglect allegory. Those steeped in Walter 
Benjamin’s The Origin of German Tragic Drama tend to be less interested in what theatre brings to 
conversations about allegory and what happens to the symbolic and linguistic properties of allegory when staged. 
Even scholarship on quasi-allegorical works, such as the masque, tends not to foreground or conceptualize 
allegory except incidentally. As such, the body of writing on theatre and allegory in early modernity is relatively 
limited.” While some of the contributions to the study of the allegorical element in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century drama will receive mention here, the converse phenomenon, relative neglect of drama in allegory 
studies, would merit a discussion which exceeds the scope of the present chapter. Certainly one reason for this 
neglect is the lack of classical precedent, which itself arises largely from the drama’s natural gravitation towards 
the verisimilar. As discussed above, it is no coincidence that the explicit requirement of allegory in sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century poetics survives longest in relation to the representation of the very lowest and the very 
highest, pastoral and epic, shepherds and gods. By contrast, the focus of the major classical dramatic genres, 
comedy and tragedy, falls between these two ends of the spectrum, and when they appear, the supernatural and 
the rustic generally do so as intrusions into a predominantly verisimilar and urban world. Consequently, the 
drama’s edifying function could often be conceptualized solely under the aegis of the exemplum, as in the 
opening sentences of the fragment by the late classical grammarian Donatus, which exercised, along with that of 
Evanthius, an immense influence on the premodern theory of drama, especially before, but even after, the 
rediscovery of Aristotle’s Poetics: “Comedy is a [form of] drama containing the various designs of public and 
private individuals’ desires. Through them people learn what is useful in life and what, on the other hand ought 
to be avoided”; Sources of Dramatic Theory, ed. M. J. Sidnell (1991; repr. Cambridge, 1999), 1: 79. 
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distinguished from the notion of the “morality play”.
53
 While it did, eventually, put an end to 
the old mystery cycles, the initial effect of the Reformation was to increase and broaden the 
scope of English non-cycle religious drama, notably through the emergence of Protestant 
variety of such drama in the 1530s, and the responses of Catholic playwrights to this 
challenge.
54
 Alongside these rival non-cycle forms, falling by turns in and out of royal and 
ecclesiastical favour as England careened between the old and the new faith, the mystery 
cycles, often revised to comply with Protestant doctrine, continued to be widely performed 
until about the 1570s, and would not completely expire, at least in western and northern 
provinces, until the end of the century.
55
 If anything, the mid-century decades saw the drama 
become an increasingly important medium for religious and political polemic and 
propaganda, so that one way of tracing its impact is by following the trail of regulative 
documents that it begins leaving in its wake already by the 1530s, documents which show the 
successive mid-century regimes both utilizing dramatic representation of religious and 
political matters, and at the same time attempting to harness its volatile nature through 
regulation on both local and national level.
56
 
                                                          
53
 As further discussed below, I will employ the term “personification play” to refer to plays whose cast 
consists wholly or predominantly of personified abstractions, avoiding the familiar terminology of the “moral”, 
“moral play”, “morality”, and “morality play”, which is problematic in the present context as not all the plays 
that can plausibly be designated by these terms contain such a predominantly personificational cast. Strictly 
speaking, I am concerned with the use of personifications, whether or not it is accompanied by the presence of 
Everyman and Vice figures, a strong didactic focus, or any other feature linked with the notion of the “morality 
play”. On the issues raised by this notion and the associated terminology, see esp. A. C. Dessen, “The Morall as 
an Elizabethan Dramatic Kind”, Comparative Drama 5 (1971): 138-59.  
54
 Drama was already being used for such purposes by advocates of the old regime: see G. Walker’s chapter 
on Godly Queen Hester in Reading Literature Historically (Edinburgh, 2013), discussing this play as part of “a 
concerted strategy adopted by defenders of the institutional church to take advantage of the fall of Cardinal 
Wolsey and to head off the fierce assault on clerical liberties and prerogatives that had been launched in the first 
session of the Reformation Parliament” (38). See E. K. Chambers, The Medieval Stage (1903; repr. London, 
1963), 2: 219-20, for an anti-Lutheran morality performed by St Paul’s boys before the French ambassadors in 
1527, and other pro-Catholic plays performed in Wolsey’s household in 1528. Protestant plays were being 
actively encouraged and perhaps commissioned from Bale and other Protestant playwrights by c.1530: see 
English Professional Theatre, ed. G. Wickham, H. Berry, and W. Ingram (Cambridge, 2000), 20-1. 
55
 The Kendal Corpus Christi play, apparently suppressed only in 1605, is cited as the longest surviving 
recorded mystery cycle in England, and was still remembered and discussed as late as 1638; see REED: 
Cumberland, Westmorland, Gloucestershire, ed. A. Douglas and P. Greenfield (Toronto, 1986), 17-19; C. 
Davidson, Festivals and Plays in Late Medieval Britain (Aldershot, 2007), 69-71. 
56
 These have been examined by numerous scholars since the first comprehensive study by V. C. 
Gildersleeve, Government Regulation of the Elizabethan Drama (New York, 1908). More recently, see J. Clare, 
Elizabethan and Jacobean Dramatic Censorship (Manchester, 1990); R. Dutton, Mastering the Revels 
(Basingstoke, 1991), and Licensing, Censorship and Authorship in Early Modern England (Basingstoke, 2000). 
For the primary documents I rely mainly on Wickham’s edition in Theatre, ed. Wickham, Berry, and Ingram, 15-
149. 
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 These regulative measures most likely account for the dramatic decline in overtly 
religious non-cycle drama in the 1550s, one of the more striking features uncovered in my 
analysis of the surviving corpus. As presented in Figure 1, the share of non-cycle religious 
drama rises sharply in the 1530s (59%) and 1540s (49%), but then sees a marked drop in the 
1550s (20%). This is further supported by the pattern exhibited by the lost religious plays, not 
included in the main analysis, many of which were aggressively topical and partisan in nature;  
over forty such plays are recorded in 1530-50, compared to some thirteen for the whole 
second half of the century.
57
 The interpretation of these figures seems obvious: clearly the 
more rigid and increasingly pre-emptive regulation of plays in the reign of Edward VI, and 
later reinforced and intensified in the reigns of Mary I and Elizabeth I, had considerable 
effect. The second of Edward’s proclamations, of 28 April 1551, seems a turning point here, 
being the first such piece of legislation to make provisions not only for the suppression of 
plays already being performed, but also for their pre-emptive regulation through licensing, 
demonstrating “a dawning consciousness in Court circles that a form of censorship will have 
to be imposed on the subject matter of all stage plays in advance of their performance”.58 It is 
precisely from this moment onwards that we see a marked decline in overtly religious non-
cycle drama, which means that this decline cannot be interpreted as evidence of 
secularization, but is rather, in all probability, due to censorship, and thus testifies to the 
continuing and indeed increasing interest of religious subject matter to mid-century 
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 M. Wiggins, British Drama, 1533-1642: A Catalogue, with. C. Richardson (Oxford, 2012-), lists about 
fifty such lost plays between 1533 and 1603: in addition to the lost plays of John Bale, see those numbered 5, 6, 
7, 9, 26, 34, 36, 40, 41, 58, 76, 82, 90, 92, 98, 100, 141, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 164, 170, 186, 188, 210, 276, 
293, 295, 335, 377, 381, 402, 479, 592, 774, 815, 830, 1093, and 1136. 
58
 Theatre, ed. Wickham, Berry, and Ingram, 35. Some months later, in his 1551 De regno Christi, presented 
to Edward at Christmas that year, M. Bucer also advocated regime-sponsored religious drama on the condition of 
its pre-emptive censoring: “So that Christ’s people [...] may profit from religious comedies and tragedies, men 
will have to be appointed to the task of preventing the performance the performance of any comedy or tragedy 
which they have not seen beforehand and decided should be acted”; quoted in G. Wickham, Early English Stages 
(1959-81; repr. London, 2002), 2.1: 329. 
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1550s 20 39 47 27 20 
1560s 14 38 37 20 17 
1570s 18 32 37 23 14 
1580s 0 10 14 2 12 
1590s 0 3 2 0 2 
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Figure 1. Analysis of three trends in 
sixteenth-century non-cycle drama: overt 
religious subject matter, employment of 
personifications, and the personification 
play, “pure” and “mixed”. All the figures 
are relative and expressed as percentages. 
Due to the highly fragmentary nature of the 
pre-1530 record – with only a single extant 
play, according to the Annals dating, from 
the 1500s – a decade-by-decade for this 
period analysis is impossible, and 1400-
1530 has been treated as a unit. This 
procedure seems validated by the fact that 
the figures for the personifications and 
personification plays for 1400-1530 are 
strikingly consistent with those for the 
1540s: 38%-36% (personifications), 38%-
37% (person. plays), 32%-32% (pure), 6%-
5% (mixed). The figures are based on 
Harbage’s Annals, 3rd ed. (London, 1989) 
for 1400-1533, and Wiggins’ Catalogue 
for 1533-1600. The survey excludes all 
pre-1400 materials, cycle plays, masques, 
pageants, and other types of dramatic or 
semi-dramatic entertainments, lost and 
fragmentary plays (except where a play’s 
overall character can be inferred with 
reasonable certainty), and translations of 
classical (but not  contemporary plays), 
with the exception of Watson’s Antigone, 
with is original allegorical pompae. 
156 
 
playwrights and their audiences.
59
 
Nor is there anything secular or neutral about the way in which the focus of the 
legislative documents gradually shifts from censoring religious drama belonging to a 
particular confessional faction to censoring all overtly religious drama irrespective of its 
allegiance. Thus one of the best known and most important of these documents, Elizabeth’s 
second proclamation of 16 May 1559, forbids all plays “wherein either matters of religion or 
of governance of the estate of the Commonwealth shall be handled, or treated”
60
 – in other 
words, precisely the two domains Elizabeth herself embodies as England’s queen and the 
Supreme Head of its national church. Again, however, the rationale for these measures is the 
abiding interest in the religious drama and its volatile subject matter: these are “no meet 
matters to be written or treated upon but by men of authority, learning and wisdom, nor to be 
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 The myth of the demise of the religious drama in the wake of the Reformation maintains its grip even on 
scholars who vocally discard other aspects of traditional scholarship. We find it, for example, in a somewhat 
modified form, in the Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Tudor Drama, ed. T. Betteridge and G. Walker 
(Oxford, 2012), even though the editors are careful to specify that the religiously motivated anti-theatricalism 
they find at work in the mid-sixteenth century is “not [...] specifically Protestant”, but common to “all zealots, 
protestant and catholic” (5-7). Yet in exemplifying this “emerging split between those godly Christians on either 
side of the confessional divide [...] and the rest of the populace” the familiar divide emerges: the views of the 
non-zealot majority are related to pre-Reformation plays – the Digby Mary Magdalene and the York Crucifixion 
pageant – whereas the zealots are represented primarily by Bale, although Everyman also receives a passing 
mention. The key feature of non-zealot drama is that it fully embraces theatricality in its handling of religious 
subjects, indeed that it is religious devotion in theatrical form: “A play like the Digby Mary Magdalene with its 
mix of the comic and the sacred, Scripture and hagiography, myth, allegory, and folklore, embodied a degree of 
generic and thematic mixing that all godly religious reformers found unacceptable”; “To be part of the 
performance of The Crucifixion was an act of devotion, and the theatrical nature of the event was a key element 
in its devotional meaning” (5-6). Only in the light of such a definition of “religious drama” can one describe 
such plays as Bale’s – which certainly dealt with religious matters, but just as certainly did not aspire to the 
status of actual devotional practice – as “forcibly divorced from religion, with profound consequences for its 
place within popular culture” (5). This is an easily conceded point, but one of very limited significance: clearly it 
does not present a valid reason to deny the title of religious drama in the usual sense of the term – i.e., drama 
about religion, rather than drama as religion – to the plays of Bale and his zealot contemporaries. Presumably 
Betteridge and Walker realize this, and are thus cornered into an even weaker argument – elaborated at more 
length in J. Simpson’s chapter on Bale’s Three Laws in the same collection – namely, that at those points at 
which they turn to religion, Bale’s plays cease being plays. Unlike in the non-zealot drama, which fully 
embraces “theatrical complexity”, here “for a character to be explicitly theatrical (if this means to play with 
language, to mock, joke and perform comic business, and to self-consciously refer to oneself as a figure in a 
play) is to be marked as a vice, a papist, and as inherently lacking in authority”. Thus “when a character is 
speaking with authority” in a play by Bale or some other Tudor zealot, “their words are not ‘performed’; it is as 
though they are speaking not as a character but rather simply reading a written polemical or instructive text”, and 
are in this way “protect[ed] from the taint of theatricality” (6-7). Surely such a selective definition of drama, 
built on one dramatic style to the exclusion of another, cannot hold. Instead of resorting to such tortuous and 
improvised arguments, scholars need to simply acknowledge that the English drama of 1530-50, including that 
of Bale and his Protestant contemporaries, is obviously and indeed vehemently religious. Any attempt to gloss 
over this simple fact will, in the final analysis, only perpetuate the outdated critical traditions that Betteridge and 
Walker elsewhere so timely and cogently criticize.  
60
 Theatre, ed. Wickham, Berry, and Ingram, 51. 
157 
 
handled before any audience but of grave and discreet persons”.
61
 Such an approach is also 
politically prudent. In the context of the precarious regimes of Edward and Mary, and the 
early days of Elizabeth’s reign, it represents a way of silencing the opposition without 
explicitly antagonizing it by a one-sided, overtly partisan piece of legislation. Throughout this 
period, dramatic representations of matters of religion comprised largely of the remaining 
mystery cycles on the one hand, relicts of the old faith repugnant to hard-line Protestants, and 
on the other, the aggressively Protestant non-cycle drama in Bale’s vein, which was equally 
repugnant to Catholics, and which is known to have been a cause of some diplomatic concern 
in the early years of Elizabeth’s reign.
62
 Furthermore, this strategy of silencing both adversary 
factions without pointing fingers at either would become additionally expedient as the Church 
of England consolidated its position of a via media between Papist and Puritan extremism. 
Before this position was established, the regime simply did not have such openly propagandist 
religious drama at hand as would advocate its view in a way that would clearly distinguish it 
from that of the radicals. Once it was established, however, it no longer needed it, even 
though it continued to tolerate, as the ensuing discussion of Hamlet will amply illustrate, 
generous amounts of both anti-Papist and anti-Puritan satire.
63
 The second and final demise of 
overt religious drama after c.1580 is thus not evidence of secularization, but rather of the 
consolidation and growing influence of one particular religious faction, namely the Church of 
England. 
In order to further corroborate this claim, we must now turn from the pattern obtained 
for the non-cycle religious drama to that obtained for the use of personifications and the 
personification play. While there is a high degree of correlation between the use of 
personifications and the personification play, the correlation between these trends and the rise 
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 Ibid.  
62
 See D. Bevington, Tudor Drama and Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), ch. 10, esp. 127-9. 
63
 Such a perspective also sheds further light on the sources and dynamics of the anti-theatrical controversy. 
Is the anti-theatrical campaign wholly explicable in terms of the familiar arguments – idolatry, immorality, 
Sabbath-breaking, health hazard – actually employed by its proponents? Except for the latter, all of these are 
found fully articulated already in the Lollard Treatise on Miraclis Pleyinge, and were certainly available to such 
men as Bale or Bucer, yet this did not prevent them from using or advocating the use of religious drama for their 
cause. Later on, however, a stage regulated by a regime firmly aligned with the Church of England was of no 
use, and indeed of some harm, to the Puritan faction, and while there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the 
protests on the grounds of irreligion and immorality, one imagines that the assault would have been considerably 
lesser had this faction also been able to use the stage for voicing its views. 
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and decline of non-cycle religious drama is only partial. The share of personifications and 
personification-based drama in the total corpus remains relatively constant, around 40%, for 
almost two centuries, and then drops dramatically around 1580.64 To begin with, this 
conclusively disproves the traditional view of the passage from the “allegorical” drama of the 
Middle Ages to the “realist” drama of the Renaissance – unless, of course, one is willing to 
extend the Middle Ages up to around 1580.
65
 Furthermore, we see a close alignment of the 
use of personifications with the personification play, the only notable divergence occurring at 
                                                          
64
 Cf. Norland’s analysis, according to which moralities comprise less than 5% of the surviving fifteenth-
century drama, a figure which then rises to 20% in the first two thirds of the sixteenth century, falling to less than 
10% only in the 1580s, leading him to conclude that “the morality play in England is essentially a sixteenth-
century phenomenon that grows in popularity as the century progresses until it peaks in the early years of 
Elizabeth’s reign”; H. B. Norland, Drama in Early Tudor Britain (Lincoln, 1995), 37-8. There are two major 
methodological problems here. The first is the inclusion of the cycle drama, based on a completely different 
infrastructure than the non-cycle drama, obscures the data really relevant to the morality play. It is true that the 
moralities comprise less than 5% of the surviving fifteenth-century drama; it is also true, however, and much 
more relevant, that they comprise 43% of the surviving non-cycle fifteenth-century drama, a figure which 
remains relatively constant until about 1580. Secondly, Norland fails to take into account the fragmentary nature 
of the pre-1530 record, the implications of which have already been mentioned above (Figure 1). If the 
perspective is adjusted so that the 1400-1530 period – 31 non-cycle plays in my analysis – is taken as a unit on 
par with the decade segments for the remainder of the century, then the inadequacy of Norland’s view of the 
morality play as a sixteenth-century phenomenon becomes additionally visible, as the correspondence between 
the figures for 1400-1530 and 1530-80 is simply too exact to be accidental. An early and overstated argument for 
the persistence of personifications appeared in J. W. McCutchan, “Personified Abstractions as Characters in 
Elizabethan Drama”, diss. University of Virginia, 1949, according to which “personified abstractions continued 
to be familiar and popular stage personages throughout the period 1558-1616” (866). 
65
 Some recent scholarship has been turning away from this view, but is still haunted by it. A good example is 
J. Watkins’ materialist take on the problem in “The Allegorical Theatre”, The Cambridge History of Medieval 
English Literature, ed. D. Wallace (Cambridge, 1999). “The morality playwrights”, we read, “adopted allegory” 
– by which Watkins consistently means personification – “as their basic mode because its subordination of the 
particular to the universal mirrored the hierarchies of an imagined feudal polity that equated social aspiration 
with pride” (767). If so, one would except the superstructure to decline along with the base, and Watkins 
intimates as much when he adds that “The more demographic and economic conditions allowed subordinate 
groups to raise their wages, improve their terms of tenantry, and heighten their overall standard of living, the 
more they could think of themselves as existing apart from a predetermined social structure” (768). The obvious 
problem here is that “allegorical” drama outlives feudalism, forcing Watkins into self-defeating formulations: 
early and mid-sixteenth-century plays “do not reject allegory as a mode of dramatic exposition” even as “they do 
reject the social conservatism that it embodies in the moralities” (775) – the very conservatism, then, that was 
initially used to explain the emergence of the allegorical mode. For all his explicit protests against “progressivist 
literary history that reduces all medieval drama to a crude anticipation of Shakespeare” – and specifically against 
the premise of “the triumphant recovery of the individuated character from medieval abstraction” (774) – 
Watkins is ultimately unable to reconceptualise the history of “allegorical” drama outside of the Burckhardtian 
pattern. When feudalism fails, he moves on to the next broad historical category, the Reformation, only to meet 
with the “allegorical” plays of Bale. The conclusion is again self-consuming: while playwrights like Bale show 
that the Reformation “did not put an immediate end to drama in the medieval, allegorical tradition”, it did create, 
“somewhat paradoxically, the opportunity for an increasingly secularized drama. Above all, the misgivings about 
allegory and allegoresis encouraged playwrights to present their characters more as exemplars than allegorical 
embodiments of virtues and vices. As the universal yielded to the particular, an aesthetic developed that 
associated abstraction not with truth but with dramaturgical naïveté. By the later sixteenth century, allegorical 
plays were more likely to figure in the repertoire of schoolboys and amateurs than in the professional and 
commercial theatre of Marlowe and Shakespeare” (791-2). This is perhaps not as triumphalist as in most earlier 
accounts, but the familiar alignments and trajectories survive largely intact. 
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the point where the “mixed” plays reach their peak in the 1550s and 1560s.
66
 This may seem a 
tautologous observation but is in fact of great importance: what this means is that 
personifications largely appeared in works belonging to a particular dramatic mode, whereas 
their frequency and status in other types of drama was far less prominent, which further 
disproves their supposed prevalence in the so-called Middle Ages. In brief, the figures very 
strongly indicate that the period between 1400 and 1580 is in this regard a unit, and resist any 
attempt to superimpose upon them the Burckhardtian split between “medieval”-“allegorical” 
and “Renaissance”-“realist”. 
The central question, then, is what prompts the precipitous decline of this tradition 
after about 1580, and here again the answer, or at least part of the answer, seems obvious: 
what these figures reflect is the emergence of commercial London theatre in the late 1570s.
67
 
If one is looking for an event that a) made a major impact on the nature of the drama, and b) 
happened in the late 1570s – which is what the figures indicate independently of any such 
thesis – then surely this is the most plausible explanation. But why would the increased 
professionalization and institutionalization of the popular stage entail the banishment of the 
personifications? Here the Burckhardtian thesis meets its final nadir, for according to this 
thesis the personification play should be the expression of a residual, native, and popular 
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 The vogue of the “mixed” personification play – emerging in the 1540s, peaking in the 1550s, and expiring 
only in the 1590s, a decade later than the “pure” variety – does seem to be a specifically mid-sixteenth-century 
phenomenon. Possibly, then, it could be argued that the lesser advances in the popularization and 
commercialization of the theatre in the mid-century decades had already initiated the process of weeding out the 
personifications and replacing them with named human characters. In this respect it is of significance that mixed 
personification plays, or plays very close to meeting the 50-90% criterion, make up for the bulk of the 27-play 
corpus of “popular” Tudor drama up to the late 1570s, as analyzed by Bevington in From “Mankind” to 
Marlowe (Cambridge, Mass., 1962): “plays homogenous in the sense that they could have been presented under 
no auspices except those of a commercial itinerant stage” (48). Prior to the 1530s, the plays on the list are 
composed either wholly of personifications, or wholly avoid them. After the 1530s, approximately 50-90% of 
personifications is found in twelve of the plays, three further plays contain between 19-40%, and only two 
contain 10% or fewer. Thus, although the overall percentage of personifications actually increases in the mid-
century decades, its decline specifically in those plays legitimately designated as “popular” corresponds to the 
development of the partially commercial itinerant popular theatre, on which see J. Milling, “The Development of 
a Professional Theatre, 1540-1660”, in The Cambridge History of British Theatre, ed. J. Milling et al. 
(Cambridge, 2004), and W. R. Streitberger, “Adult Playing Companies to 1583”, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Early Modern Theatre, ed. R. Dutton (Oxford, 2011). 
67
 Three-year period of c.1575-77 saw the opening of the first permanent private theatres (St Paul’s and the 
first Blackfriars), four purpose-fitted inn-playhouses (the Bel Savage, the Bull, the Cross Keys, and the Bell), 
and most importantly in the present context, three large, purpose-built public playhouses (the Theatre, the 
Curtain, and the playhouse at Newington Butts). The account of these developments has been told many times: a 
classic account is A. Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage, 4th ed. (2009; repr. Cambridge, 2012); for the primary 
documents, see Theatre, ed. Wickham, Berry, and Ingram, 287-674. 
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medievalism, which then gives way to the imported modernity of the Renaissance, allowing 
the drama to emerge, at long last, from Everyman to Othello. If this were so, then the 
establishment of commercial theatre, with popular taste beginning to dictate dramatic 
production to a hitherto unprecedented extent, should see the personification play at least 
remain at its former level, if not further increase in popularity. What we see, however, is the 
exact opposite, and the simplest explanation is that this dramatic mode was never genuinely 
popular, and was in fact booed off the stage as soon as the paying playgoer got a say in what 
sort of performance their hard-earned penny would subsidize.
68
 
It was not, then, “the rude poets of those unlettered ages” who had a taste for 
“compleat dramatic pieces consisting intirely of [...] personifications”.
69
 On the contrary, this 
was precisely the taste of the learned, emerging from, and moulded by, exposure to literary 
models going back to Prudentius’ Psychomachia, whereas the rude and the unlettered, in this 
country like in any other, at this as at any other time, preferred to be entertained rather than 
lectured, and preferred stories and plays about persons to those about personifications. If so, 
the radical demise of personifications around 1580 is to be attributed to a fortunate confluence 
of the lowbrow and the highbrow: of the unchanged and perennial popular taste for stories 
about human characters, and the altered taste of the elite, which now increasingly looked to 
classical drama, with its sparse use of personifications, as a model. This, however, is a 
confluence, not causation, for it seems clear that humanism did not and could not bring about 
this change on its own. The literary and intellectual tendencies normally designated by this 
term had been present in England for over a century by 1580, yet we see no decline in the use 
of personifications in this period. If personifications are an essential literary and dramatic 
expression of the medieval mentality and medieval aesthetics, and if humanism is as hostile to 
this mentality and this aesthetic as has been claimed, then why do we find personifications 
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 Again, it would be a mistake to automatically extend any popularity that the “morality” may have had to 
the use of personifications as such. This does not invalidate the claims – e.g., Dessen’s in Shakespeare and the 
Late Moral Plays (Lincoln, 1986), and elsewhere – that the moralities continued to have a share in the new 
popular stage of the late 1570s and early 1580s, or the larger claim, now endorsed by numerous scholars, that 
these moralities exercised an influence on later Elizabethan and Jacobean drama. The ensuing discussion of 
Hamlet points to several instances of such influence, both in specific details and broad dramatic patterns. 
69
 Percy, Reliques, 1: 120. 
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alive and well on English stages as late as the 1570s? Furthermore, we see that even after 
1580 personifications continue to play an important role in masques and other types of 
patronage-based  performances intended for elite audiences (or those which, as is the case of 
some pageants and comparable occasional performances and entertainments, are open to 
public view, yet supported by, and primarily aimed at, their elite sponsors). Finally, as bona-
fide classicists like Sidney or Jonson keenly felt, the bulk of the post-1580 popular drama was 
simply not classicist, and yet it did banish personifications to the point of near-extinction – to 
single out this one feature as the result of humanist classicism, and at the same time view 
others as remnants of native and popular medievalism, is implausible. At most, then, 
immersion in the classical drama gave the playwrights part of the means to dispense with 
personifications, yet both the motive and the opportunity came from the rise of a truly 
commercial London theatre of the late 1570s, and are thus ultimately credited to that popular 
taste that was the cause of such distress to “Thomas Lodge, of Lincolns Inne, Gentleman”, 
and others who found themselves in the same unprecedented position of tying their university-
trained pens to “Pennie-knaues delight”.70 
Discussing these problems, historians of the drama often quote the singularly 
revealing, yet in my view misunderstood, passage by Lodge’s friend Robert Greene, featuring 
a player who complains that his repertory has grown obsolete: 
Nay more (quoth the Player) I can serue to make a pretie speech, for I was a countrey 
Author, passing at a Morrall, for twas I that pende the Morrall of mans witte, the 
Dialogue of Diues, and for seuen yeers space was absolute Interpreter to the puppets. 
But now my Almanacke is out of date: 
The people make no estimation, 
Of Morralls teaching education.71 
To begin with, it is not at all certain whether personifications are an essential component of 
what is here termed “Morrall”. Yet even if they are, all that the player says is that the genre is 
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 Having successfully tried his hand at playwriting, but now courting, with his Scillaes Metamorphosis 
(London, 1589), a more refined audience, Lodge vows “To write no more, of that whence shame dooth grow/ Or 
tie my pen to Pennie-knaues delight” (C4v). 
71
 Greenes Groats-worth of witte (London, 1592), E1r. 
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“now” obsolete (Greenes Groats-worth was published posthumously in 1592), and that it is 
obsolete because it lacks the “estimation” of “the people”. He does not say, although that is 
how commentators seem to have universally understood it, that the people’s estimation has 
recently shifted ground; that the moral is now disliked, whereas formerly it was not. Greene’s 
player is not as explicit about this as we might wish, yet nothing in his words is incompatible 
with the thesis proposed here, namely that the personifications declined not due to any rapid 
change in popular taste, but rather because, with the advent of popular theatre existing on a 
truly commercial and competitive basis – a theatre subsisting on an entry fee paid in advance 
of the performance by each individual playgoer, who could now also choose among a number 
of alternatives, with the playhouses and the companies vying among each other, and 
collectively with other types of entertainment, for his or her custom – the popular taste began 
to dictate dramatic production to a hitherto unprecedented extent.
72
 
 In short, only in a lesser degree can the rapid demise of dramatic personifications in 
the 1580s be regarded as a triumph of humanist over native tradition, whereas in a greater 
degree it should be regarded as exactly the opposite – a triumph of popular over elite taste, 
and of predominantly commercial over predominantly patronage-based theatre. Returning 
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 A case for the genuine, grass-roots popularity of the moralities is of course mounted in Bevington’s still 
indispensible From “Mankind” to Marlowe, according to which the “morality play [...] was the dominant mode 
of popular dramatic expression for about a century”, and a staple genre of “a genuinely national, popular, 
commercial” mid-Tudor drama (4-6). Bevington’s usage of the terms “popular” and “commercial” would, 
however, bear scrutiny. His study aims to recover “a drama that strove through commercial presentation to win 
the favour of a genuinely national audience in England”, and a “popular theatre [...] that played to country as 
well as to town, to lower and middle classes as well as to the gentry, developing thereby a drama for many tastes 
and for a wide range of opinion on ethical, religious, and political questions” (8). Does the nature, and 
specifically the source of income, of the mid-century troupes meet these requirements? Can we describe as 
“commercial” a type of theatre that seems to have often relied primarily on forms of patronage, whether by the 
aristocrat who extended his endorsement to the troupe, or the representative of the civic authorities, who would 
fund their first performance when newly arrived into a town, a custom described in the well-known passage from 
R. Willis’ Mount Tabor (London, 1639), F7v: “In the City of Gloucester the manner is (as I think in other like 
corporations) that when Players of Enterludes come to towne, they first attend the Mayor to enforme him what 
noble-mans servants they are, and so to get licence for their publike playing; and if the Mayor like the Actors, or 
would shew respect to their Lord and Master, he appoints them to play their first play before himself and the 
Aldermen and common Counsell of the City; and that is called the Mayors play, where every one that will comes 
in without money, the Mayor giving the players a reward as hee thinks fit to shew respect unto them.” Note the 
“or” here: the mayor pays the actors even if he does not like the play, in courtesy to their noble patron. At both 
Oxford and Cambridge, there are records of companies being paid by the universities, presumably for this 
reason, yet sent away without being allowed to perform on university grounds. See REED: Oxford, 614, where 
this is said to have been a regular practice, with very few exceptions, after 1584; REED: Cambridge, ed. A. H. 
Nelson (Toronto, 1989), 984. The prohibition did not extend to the plays staged outside of the universities in the 
cities of Oxford and Cambridge (REED: Oxford, 614). Whatever such touring companies additionally made 
from collections, their operation can hardly be considered as fully, perhaps not even as mainly, commercial. 
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now to the question of the relation between the trends for personifications and personification 
drama and that for the non-cycle religious drama, two major points emerge: we see that the 
1580s drop in dramatic personification coincides with the second and final decline of the non-
cycle religious drama (from 18% to 0% in the 1580s), and that it notably fails to coincide with 
its first and more significant decline (from 49% to 20%, in the 1550s). If, as suggested above, 
this first decline is due to increased regulation of religious subject matter from the 1550s 
onward, then this explains why it finds no parallel in the trend for the personifications. It now 
further becomes clear is that second drop in the 1580s, jointly with the personifications, also 
reflects the emergence and rising success of the commercial London stage, and the 
correspondingly increased need for its regulation. That the radical reform of the Master of the 
Revels office, extending its jurisdiction over all theatrical performances in the land – a reform 
initiated by Burghley in 1573 and eventually formalized in the Patent accorded to Tilney in 
December 1581 – exactly parallels these developments is no coincidence.
73
 As thousands 
flocked to the new playhouses, it became ever more important to control what they saw there, 
especially in so far as it pertained to “matters of religion or of governance of the estate of the 
Commonwealth”, while the theatre’s increased visibility and institutionalization made this 
control easier to exercise. At the same time, the growing consolidation of the Church of 
England’s position as a moderately Protestant via media between the extremes of Catholicism 
and Puritanism made the indiscriminate prohibition of all overt religious subject matter in the 
drama an additionally viable strategy for the regime to adopt. 
 To establish all this is of fundamental importance for the present study because it 
allows us to disentangle the demise of personifications and overt religious subject matter, both 
demonstrable empirical facts, from the supposed demise of “allegory”, a different and not as 
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 Tilney’s Patent authorized him “to warn, command and appoint in all places within this our Realm of 
England, as well within franchises and liberties as without, all and every player or players with their play-makers 
either belonging to any nobleman or otherwise bearing the name or names of using the faculty of play-makers or 
players of Comedies, Tragedies, Enterludes, or what other shows soever from time to time and at all times to 
appear before him with all such plays, Tragedies, Comedies or shows as they shall have in readiness, or mean to 
set forth and then to present or recite before our said Servant or his sufficient deputy whom we ordain and 
appoint and authorise by these presents of all such shows, plays, players and playmakers, together with their 
playing places, to order and reform, authorise and put down, as shall be thought meet or unmet unto himself or 
his said deputy in that behalf” (Theatre, ed. Wickham, Berry, and Ingram, 71). 
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easily quantifiable thesis. In part this is a terminological problem: many historians of the 
drama have employed the term “allegory” to refer exclusively or predominantly to 
personification, and instead of the genus, have thus taken upon themselves the dubious and 
incomparably more difficult task of accounting for the entire species.
74
 If, however, we bring 
a more nuanced view of allegory to bear on the evidence – a view which recognizes a variety 
of possible manifestations between the exoteric and esoteric extremes of the allegorical 
spectrum – it will be seen that the gradual transformation and decline of personification-based 
drama went hand in hand with the rise of a different, more esoteric mode of dramatic allegory. 
Characters with proper names do begin appearing alongside and eventually replace 
personified abstractions, yet these characters are themselves used to convey allegorical 
meanings.
75
 Nominally particular settings replace the indeterminate locales of many of the 
moralities, yet these, even when they contain elements of “local colour”, often signal the 
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 Cf. Wiggins’ Catalogue, which includes the section “Allegorical Roles” in every entry where it is 
applicable, but specifies that “allegory” here means “personification”: “roles who are explicitly personified 
abstractions, not quasi-allegorical figures like the characters in Midas or The Broken Heart, whose allegorical 
significance is secondary to their non-allegorical aspect” (1: xxviii). Obviously this distinction between 
“allegorical” and “quasi-allegorical” characters is problematic, as is the notion of the allegorical sense being 
“secondary” to the “non-allegorical aspect” – in many cases, would not the opposite apply? However, the 
conceptual distinction is clearly made, and is methodically implemented in the Catalogue, making it an 
exceptionally useful tool for the present study. While personification can be profitably viewed as a form of 
allegory in those instances where the absence of an explicit identifying tag requires an interpretive effort on the 
reader’s or viewer’s behalf, it can also be viewed, where such a tag is present, as the exact opposite of allegory, 
the narrativization or dramatization the literal end product of the allegorical process. As far as the dramatic 
corpus is concerned, this varies from play to play, indeed from scene to scene, and of course the problem also 
manifests itself very differently in reading as opposed to performance, where the speech prefix typically 
identifies the personification in advance of its self-identification in the text, or any attempt to do so on the 
reader’s behalf. 
75
 A more extensive analysis would also need to take into account the question of obvious character types, 
and the associated use of semantically motivated, “Cratylian” names: weavers named Bottom, ill-willed stewards 
named Malvolio, prostitutes named Doll Tearsheet or Mistress Quickly, and their kind. See W. N. Niva, 
“Significant Character Names in English Drama to 1603”, diss. University of Pennsylvania, 1959. Niva stops at 
1603 not because this brings the practice of significant naming in the drama to an end, but precisely the contrary, 
because “After 1603 the number of plays which contain significant names increases so much that merely to 
record the names that occurred between 1603 and 1616 would be to double the size of this dissertation (2, n. 1). 
Niva also comments interestingly on the unpopularity of the personifications – they were “hardly likely to have 
been lastingly satisfactory to a medieval audience; the unlearned laity, at least, needed something easier to 
pronounce, something commoner and more meaningful to themselves” (5) – and notes an influx of significant 
names with the rise of humanist influence (255). An issue that Niva does not pursue at any length – although he 
does note that in many cases “Avarice merely became Pinchfist” (5) – is worthy of meticulous further 
examination: to what degree was the banishment of the personifications is made up for by this exponential 
increase of significant names occurring roughly at the same time? An excellent bibliographical resource on 
names in Shakespeare is R. Coates’ Names in Shakespeare Online, http://www.informatics.sussex.ac.uk/users/ 
schoi/Shakespeare/about.php; the project is currently (12 January 2015) offline, presumably only temporarily. 
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contemporary world in general, and England in particular.
76
 “What child is there”, Sidney 
protested, 
that, coming to a play, and seeing Thebes written in great letters upon an old door, 
doth believe that it is Thebes? If then a man can arrive to that child’s age to know that 
the poets’ persons and doings are but pictures what should be, and not stories what 
have been, they will never give the lie to things not affirmatively but allegorical and 
figuratively written.
77
 
Thus the question is not why allegorical drama declines in this period, but why one particular 
form of dramatic allegory, relying exclusively or primarily on a cast of personified 
abstractions in an unspecified setting, is replaced by another. 
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 The trend is apparent already in Medwall’s Fulgens and Lucres, dating from the 1490s and widely 
described as the first modern – secular, humanist, romantic, realist, etc. – English play, which takes its main plot 
and named characters from the translation of the 1428 De vera nobilitate by the Italian humanist B. de 
Montemagno; see The declamacyon which laboureth to shewe wherin honoure sholde reste, in [T]he boke of 
Tulle of olde age, by Cicero ([Westminster], 1481]), second pagination, D5r-F8v. In the comic subplot, however, 
which is Medwall’s own invention, the two characters are listed simply as “A” and “B” – not personifications, 
yet emphatically not “particular named people” either. Furthermore, while the other, named characters are 
ostensibly ancient Romans, Medwall departs from his source in having them swear contemporary English oaths 
and keep English maids, and clearly acknowledges the transparent topical allegory of the setting. “Wherefor”, 
says B, “I can think these folke [i.e. the audience] wyll not spare/ After playne trouth this matier to procede/ As 
the story seyth why shulde they care/ I trow here is no man of the kyn or sede/ Of either partie [i.e. of the play’s 
characters], for why they were bore/ In the cytie of Rome as I sayd before”; H. Medwall, Fulgens and Lucres 
(New York, 1920), A4v. As Bevington points out, “This comic protestation, necessary only because the audience 
might think otherwise, preserves dramatic distance even as it establishes the link to contemporary society” 
(Drama, 51). Fast-forwarding to Hamlet, something of the same effect is gained by introducing the episode of 
the prince of Denmark being sent away to England – a skilfully interjected piece of metatheatrical humour which 
has the effect of confirming, rather than discouraging, the mental equation between the Denmark of the play and 
the England of the playgoer. The convention is laid bare with particular explicitness in the only known play co-
written by Lodge and Greene, whose the main plot is based on the biblical story of Nineveh and Jonah, yet 
whose title is A Looking Glasse for London and England (London, 1594). At the end of the play, Jonah is left 
alone on the stage to explicitly apply the story’s moral to contemporary London. Lodge’s other surviving play 
also bears a title indicating a topical relevance to the plot, based on an episode in Appian’s Roman History: The 
Wovnds of Ciuill War. Liuely set forth in the true Tragedies of Marius and Scilla (London, 1594). For a 
discussion of the play in relation to contemporary political affairs, see A. Hadfield, “Thomas Lodge and English 
Republicanism”, Nordic Journal of English Studies 4 (2005): 89-105. This is just one of a series of parallels 
between Lodge and his adversary Gosson, who also found himself in London, deprived of an expected 
patrimony, trying to make a living with his pen; also wrote plays for the public stage and later publicly repented 
it; and also thought of plays, including those of his own making, in similar terms, as seen in his Schoole of 
Abuse, where he praises “The Iew & Ptolome, [...] the one representing the greedinesse of worldly chusers, and 
bloody minds of Usurers: The other very liuely discrybing howe seditious estates, with their owne deuises, false 
friendes, with their owne swoordes, & rebellious co[m]mons in their owne snares are ouerthrowne [...]. The 
Blacke Smiths Daughter, & Caitlins conspiracies [...]: The first containing the treachery of Turkes, the 
honourable bountye of a noble mind, & the shining of virtue in distresse: The last, because it is knowen to be a 
Pig of myne owne Sowe, I will speake less of it; onely giuing you to vnderstand, that the whole marke which I 
shot at in that woorke, was too showe the rewarde of traytors in Caitlin, and the necessary gouernment of learned 
men, in the person of Cicero” (C6v-7r). 
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 Sidney, Defence, 235. 
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Far from sending it into decline, the developments discussed above actually provided 
ideal, textbook conditions for the rise of dramatic allegory, and specifically of dramatic 
allegory dealing precisely with what the proclamations proscribed and the Master of Revels 
censored: religion and politics. To recognize the resulting tendencies in drama and theatre as 
allegorical is in part simply a matter of adjusting one’s terminology, and overcoming any 
lingering prejudice towards a mode of expression distasteful to many modern readers and 
viewers, as well a mode of scholarship often abused by its less responsible practitioners. Thus 
to search for “topical”, “political”, or “satirical” content in Elizabethan and Jacobean plays is 
a common, if somewhat disreputable, practice, yet to designate, where applicable, these same 
meanings as topical, political, or satirical “allegory” would probably raise eyebrows. 
Although it used all these terms, and although it gave a suggestive and well-documented 
description of the atmosphere of incessant “allegorical lock-picking” in the Elizabethan court 
– “a courtly pastime amounting to a disease”, encouraged by the example of a queen who 
possessed a “fascination for allegorical subtlety” and “suspected a never-ending commentary 
in most plays she saw” – Bevington’s classic study was still subtitled A Critical Approach to 
Topical Meaning.78 In another major twentieth-century title, Annabel Patterson criticized a 
predecessor for “strenuously resist[ing] the dreaded term ‘allegory’”, yet herself preferred to 
trace a “hermeneutics of censorship” at work in later sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century 
English literature.
79
 We lose nothing, and gain much, if we simply call this allegory. To 
allegorize is precisely to speak otherwise than in one would in the agora, otherwise than 
publicly, and what might be called the Aesopic theory of allegorical expression claims 
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 In the opening paragraph, Bevington quotes from J. W. Bennett’s article on “Oxford and Endimion”, 
PMLA 57 (1942): 354-69: “Modern attempts to discover and interpret Elizabethan topical allegory have 
produced such absurdities at the hands of overzealous devotees, that a scholar who desires a reputation for sanity 
hardly ventures to touch the subject” (Drama, 359. 
79
 See A. Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation (Madison, 1984), 41, where this “hermeneutics of 
censorships” is defined as “an everywhere apparent and widely understood [...] system of communication in 
which ambiguity becomes a creative and necessary instrument, a social and cultural force of considerable 
consequence. On the one hand, writers complain constantly that their work is subject to unauthorized or unjust 
interpretation; on the other they gradually develop codes of communication, partly to protect themselves from 
hostile and hence dangerous readings of their work, partly in order to be able to say what they had to publicly 
without provoking or confronting the authorities”. The predecessor is D. Connell, Sir Philip Sidney (Oxford, 
1977), writing on Sidney’s Arcadia: “I have used the term analogy on purpose, rather than allegory, because I 
would resist any implication [of] one-to-one correspondence” (109). 
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precisely that this manner of discourse emerges out of such circumstances as are being 
described here.
80
 
 In this sense, there is already much evidence for dramatic allegory out there, and much 
valuable scholarship on it, and the historicist turn of the late twentieth century, in spite of any 
shortcomings that may be legitimately criticized from this distance, has done much to restore 
its academic respectability. Nobody could today claim, as Richard Levin still could in his 
relentless, three-decade crusade of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, that any idea of secondary 
meanings – whether allegorical, ironic, parodic, thematic, or otherwise – and of different 
meanings intended for different parts of the audience, was completely and utterly alien to 
Shakespeare and his audience.
81
 Although the term itself is seldom used, playwrights do refer 
to what are de facto allegorical meanings of their plays, or complain, as we have already seen 
with Jonson, about unintended allegorical meanings perceived by their audience.
82
 Also of 
interest here are instances where we have overtly allegorical or personificational plays 
presented in a language we would normally associate with realism.
83
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 See also Patterson’s Fables of Power (Durham, N. C., 1991). 
81
 In addition to numerous articles, see esp. R. Levin, New Readings vs. Old Plays (Chicago, 1979), and 
Looking for an Argument (Madison, 2003). 
82
 In addition to the various instances discussed in the cited studies, for two less-known examples from mid-
century Latin plays, see J. Foxe, Christus triumphans, in Two Latin Comedies, ed. J. H. Smith (Ithaca, 1973), 
206-7: “Would that the same Christ Triumphant might come to us all, not in the theatre but in the clouds; not in 
allegorical representation [sub aenigmate] but in the conspicuous majesty of the father, visible to all”; J. M. 
Aitken, The Trial of George Buchanan before the Lisbon Inquisition (London, 1939), 25, quoting Buchanan as 
testifying that under the figure of John the Baptist in his Baptistes he represented, “so far as the likeness of the 
material would permit, [...] the death and accusation of Thomas More and set before the eyes an image of 
tyranny of that time”. Aitken accepts Buchanan’s claim as genuine, but even it were not, as some have argued, 
the statement still shows that such a mode of dramatic allegory, coupling a general and more narrowly topical 
meaning, was perfectly feasible at the time. For an example of the term allegory being employed, see Bevington, 
Drama, 9. 
83
 This too we have already found in Jonson’s description of his masques as “representations” and “mirrors of 
a man’s life” (see ch. 1, pp. 104-05). A further example is Thomas Lupton’s All for Money (London, 1578), 
which is comprised largely of personified abstractions, and yet presented on its title page as “Plainly representing 
the manners of men and fashion in the world now-a-days”. Should we not suspect the same when Shakespeare 
has his tenth-century prince of Denmark paraphrase Cicero, as reported by Donatus, in defining “the purpose of 
playing” as that of “hold[ing] as ’twere the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her feature, scorn her own image, 
and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure” (3.2.20-4), or when he describes players as “the 
abstract and brief chronicles of the time” (2.2.520)? Shakespeare’s works are quoted from The Complete Works, 
ed. S. Wells and G. Taylor (1988; repr. Oxford, 1998), with the exception of Hamlet, quoted from the Arden 
edition of H. Jenkins (1982; repr. Walton-on-Thames, 1997), and, for the 1603 quarto, Hamlet: The Texts of 
1603 and 1623, ed. A. Thompson and N. Taylor (London, 2006). Donatus is the only witness for Cicero’s 
definition of comedy as “the imitation of life, the mirror of manners, and the image of truth” (Sources, ed. 
Sidnell, 1: 79). 
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 Finally, there is the playhouse itself. As such, a modern theatre is typically divested of 
any fixed and deliberate symbolic dimension, much less of definite allegorical signification; it 
does not, in itself, prior to any design imposed upon it, represent or mean anything in 
particular, but is rather a neutral and malleable medium for the production of representations 
and meanings of infinite variety. By contrast, many of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
English stages – in themselves, in a number of key structural and symbolic properties 
preceding any additional design and performance – can be plausibly described as inherently 
allegorical. The canopy above the stage is not just the canopy above the stage: it is a pictorial 
and architectural representation of the “heavens”. The cellarage below the stage is not just the 
cellarage but also “hell”, and where technical conditions allowed, both the “heavens” and the 
“hell” were equipped with trapdoors through which actors and machines could emerge onto 
the central stage.
84
 Situated thus between heaven and hell, the stage itself may have been 
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 The evidence that the trapdoor to “hell” was used for the entrance and exit of devils, furies, and other 
infernal beings, and was thus commonly associated with them, is extensive. For some examples of this use and 
association, which is of significance for the ensuing discussion of Hamlet, see [R. Vennar], The Plot of the Play, 
Called Englands Joy ([London, 1602]), advertising a scene in which “three Furies, presenting Dissention, 
Famine, and Bloudshed, [...] are throwne downe into hell”, and another in which Elizabeth is “taken vp into 
Heauen, when  presently appeares, a Throne of blessed soules, and beneath vnder the Stage set forth with strange 
fireworks, diuers blacke and damned Soules, wonderfully described in their seuerall torments”; T. Middleton, 
The blacke booke (London, 1604), a non-dramatic satire which begins with a prologue delivered by Lucifer 
“ascending” from below the stage, beginning: “Now is Hell landed here vpon the Earth/ When Lucifer in limbes 
of burning gold/ Ascends this dustie Theater of the world” (B1r); T. Dekker, Newes From Hell (London, 1606), 
B1v: “Hell being vnder euerie one of their Stages, the Players (if they had owed him a spight) might with a false 
Trappe doore haue slipt him downe, and there kept him, as a laughing stocke to al their yawning Spectators”; T. 
Adams, The Deuills Banket (London, 1614), V4v: “there is Hell vnder the Stage”; C. Marlowe, Doctor Faustus 
(London, 1619), the well-known woodcut on the title-page showing Mephistopheles, in his true form, half-
emerged through the floor of Faustus’ study (Figure 2); T. Gage, The Tyranny of Satan (London, 1642), C3r: 
“Then you shal see sometimes over the Stage the Heavens open, great glory of Angels appearing, and one 
descending in a cloud. Somtimes you shall see from under the stage ascend a smoak of Fire and Brimstone, and a 
Devill leap up in such shape as may suffice to terrifie you.” The convention was not restricted to the purpose-
built public amphitheatres. In the fourth dumb show in Norton and Sackville’s Gorbodvc (London, 1565), 
performed on 18 January 1562 at Whitehall, “there came forth from vnder the Stage, as thoughe out of Hell three 
Furies” (C5r). Furies also emerge “from vnder the stage” in the first dumb shown in T. Hughes et al., The 
Misfortunes of Arthur, in Certaine Devises and Shewes (London, 1587), A1r, performed at Greenwich on 8 
February 1587, as does the ghost of Gorlois: “he descendeth where he first rose” (F1r) – the words relate to the 
ghost’s appearance in the final act of the play, where its abode is also explicitly identified as “Hell” (F4r),  but is 
presumably also the case with its first appearance. These conventions survived the closing of the theatres and are 
also found in a number of Restoration plays: examples include Dryden’s State of Innocence (see ch. 3, n. 170); 
E. Settle, The Empress of Morocco (London, 1673), H1r: “Here a Dance is perform’d, by several infernal 
Spirits, who ascend from under the Stage”; W. Mountfort, The Life and Death of Doctor Faustus (London, 
1697), B1r-2r: “Mephostopholis under the Stage. A good and bad Angels fly down. [...] A Devil rises in Thunder 
and Lightning.” 
169 
 
physically but was by no means symbolically bare: it represents the world, this world, the 
“middle earth”.
85
 
 However, while the symbolic dimensions of the three-tiered stage have been amply 
acknowledged, what has apparently gone unremarked is the extent to which this structure 
corresponds to that of the auditorium it faces, with its pit for the groundlings and the three  
tiers of galleries – and some portions in particular, such as the so-called Lords’ rooms in the 
tiring-house gallery, before these fell out of fashion in the 1600s, or the expensive rooms in 
the galleries adjacent to the stage – for the more affluent, better educated, and, at least in 
theory, more hermeneutically sophisticated part of the audience. Allegorical poetics is 
typically premised on a minimally twofold, typically threefold or fourfold, division of a 
work’s audience: those of the lowest capacities do not go beyond the literal sense; those of 
medium capacities take in the moral exemplum or allegory; those of higher capacities take in 
the more recondite allegorical senses, natural, theological, or topical. Furthermore, this 
intellectual hierarchy translated to the social hierarchy embedded in the very structure of the 
auditorium: what Andrew Gurr has called the “vertical sociology” of the public playhouse, 
“the physical affirmation of social differences which the design of these amphitheatres 
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 To employ that ancient Germanic term and concept, whose English forms can be traced from the very 
beginnings of the language, and which Shakespeare could still use in a manner redolent, right down to its 
formulaic alliterative pairing, of its meaning in the beliefs and poetry of the old, pre-Christian north: “But stay”, 
says Sir Evans, disguised as a satyr, in The Merry Wives of Windsor, “I smell a man of middle earth” (5.5.79). 
The expression is common in Old and Middle English, and was still current in Shakespeare’s day and beyond, 
including the alliterative formula “man of middle earth” and its variations: see, e.g., Beowulf, l. 2995, The 
“Beowulf” Manuscript, ed. R. D. Fulk (Cambridge, Mass., 2010): “mon on middan-gearde”; Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight, ed. J. R. R. Tolkien and E. V. Gordon, 2nd. ed., ed. N. Davis (Oxford, 1967), l. 4.2100: “mon 
vpon myddelerde”; A dyaloge of syr Thomas More (London, 1529), V3r: “me[n] of mydle erth”; R. Brome, The 
Queene and Concubine (first performed c.1635-40), in Five new Playes (London, 1659), C6v: “Woman of 
middle earth”. By the early eighteenth century, in the glossary to his edition of Virgil’s Æneis, trans. G. Douglas, 
[ed. T. Ruddiman] (Edinburgh, 1710), the editor no longer understands the original meaning of the expression, 
but notes that it is “yet in use in the N. of S[cotland] among old people [...]. Thus they say, There’s no man in 
middle erd is able to do it”. The pre-Christian concept of a “middle earth” populated by humans, surrounded by 
other worlds populated by non-humans – of which a glimmer survives in Shakespeare’s scene, with fairies, a 
hobgoblin, and a satyr harassing a mortal – was easily adapted to the Christian cosmology: see, e.g., T. More, 
The supplycacyon of soulys ([London, 1529]), C1v, distinguishing the four worlds as “heuen”, “hell”, 
“purgatory”, and “mydle yerth”; Christmas carolles (London, [1545?]): “This voice both sharp & also [shrill?]/ 
Shalbe herd from heuen to h[ell]/ All mydle erthe it shall fulfyll”; W. Watson, Decacordon ([London], 1602), 
Q7v: “O monster of mankinde fitter for hell, then middle earth.”  
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Figure 2. Faustus summoning Mephistopheles. The title page of the first edition of the B text of Marlowe’s play 
(London, 1616), and four later versions of the woodcut: The Just Judgment of God shew’d upon Dr. John 
Faustus ([London, 1640?]); The Historie of the Damnable Life and Deserved Death of Doctor John Faustus, 
trans. P. R. (London, 1648); The History of Doctor John Faustus, Compiled in Verse (London, 1664); The First 
Part of Dr. Faustus (London, [1696?]). Cf. the note to the stage direction at 1.23.2 in C. Marlowe, Doctor 
Faustus, ed. D. Bevington and E. Rasmussen (Manchester, 1993). 
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embodied”.
86
 I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the tiered auditorium was deliberately 
constructed to reflect this poetics, yet one has to wonder whether such a structure emanated 
instinctively from this deeply elitist and hierarchical tendency dominant in the period’s 
literary and aesthetic thought. Certainly it is perfectly suited to an intellectual culture which 
routinely distinguished between the “vulgar” and the “wiser sort”, and between the mere 
reader or viewer and the “understander” – a culture in which not only the satirists of the 
public stages, but the public stage itself, through the mouth of Shakespeare’s prince of 
Denmark, can dismiss the “groundlings” as capable “for the most part of nothing but 
inexplicable dumb-shows and noise” (3.2.11-12).
87
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 A. Gurr, “Traps and Discoveries at the Globe”, Proceedings of the British Academy 94 (1997): 85-101, p. 
88 et passim. As Gurr notes, the full acknowledgment of this “steeply vertical sociology” might entail a radical 
rethinking of the nature of performance in such venues: “Socially, in the Globe auditorium the important 
customers were behind and above the stage, while the lowest level was around what we think of as the front. [...] 
This raises such questions as whether the modern terminology, frontstage and backstage, is at all appropriate. 
Neither is a Shakespearean term. We know that ‘upstage’ and ‘downstage’ come from proscenium-arch days 
with their raked stages. But where is the ‘front’ of a circle, even one with such a vertical wall and a focal stage? 
The sociology of the Globe’s auditorium suggests that we should question the cinematic terminology of ‘front’ 
and ‘back’, ‘upstage’ and ‘downstage’, and think rather of socially up and down, inside a cylinder” (89). See also 
A. Gurr and M. Ichikawa, Staging in Shakespeare’s Theatres (Oxford, 2000), 8-11, 33-9. 
87
 This famous passage has perhaps not been fully understood: Hamlet is not saying that the groundlings are 
capable only of dumb shows as opposed to real drama. They are not capable even of all dumb shows, but only of 
inexplicable ones, and not, I think, in the common sense of resisting explication, but simply of lacking, unlike 
the elaborately allegorical dumb shows in the earlier elite drama and other types of dramatic and semi-dramatic 
entertainment, any matter for explication to work upon – inexplicable because there is nothing to explicate. On 
the shift, occurring precisely around the time of Shakespeare’ Hamlet, from the allegorical (“explicable”) to the 
non-allegorical (“inexplicable”) type of dumb show, see B. D. Pearn, “Dumb-Show in Elizabethan Drama”, RES, 
o.s., 44 (1935): 385-405; D. Mehl, The Elizabethan Dumb Show (London, 1965), 19-21. The dumb show in 
Hamlet is of course precisely such an “inexplicable” dumb-show: a mimed representation of events without a 
secondary signification. The terminology opposing the better or wiser to the vulgar or younger sort is 
omnipresent in the period’s literature and needs little exemplification here: a well-known and particularly 
interesting instance, in view of the ensuing discussion of Hamlet, is the marginal entry by G. Harvey, which 
mentions this play and The Rape of Lucrece as those of Shakespeare’s works that “haue it in them, to please the 
wiser sort”. For a high resolution image of Harvey’s note, and a sound argument for its earliest possible date as 
1604, see M. J. Hirrel, “When Did Gabriel Harvey Write His Famous Note?”, HLQ 75 (2012): 291-9. For some 
examples of the reader-understander terminology, see Achilles Shield (London, 1598), prefatory note “To the 
vnderstander”: “You are not euery bodie, to you (as to one of my very few friends) I may be bold to vtter my 
mind [...]; for [...] idle capacities [are not] comprehensible of an elaborate Poeme”; A. Stafford, Meditations, and 
Resolutions (London, 1612), prefatory note “To the Vnderstander”: “Vnderstander (for, to euery Reader I write 
not), beholde this Booke with gentle eye”; B. Jonson, The Alchemist (London, 1612), prefatory note “To the 
Reader”, beginning: “If thou beest more, thou are an Vnderstander, and then I trust thee”; J. Taylor, The Nipping 
or Snipping of Abvses (London, 1613), prefatory “salutation to those that know how to read, and not marre the 
sense with hacking or mis-construction”, addressing “Thou true vnderstander”; B. Varchi, The Blazon of 
Iealovsie (London, 1615), prefatory verse “To the Ivdiciovs Vnderstander: To the Ignorant Reader: and to the 
base Carper whatsoeuer”; T. Middleton, The World tost at Tennis (London, 1620), prefatory note “To the well-
wishing, -well reading Vnderstander, well-vnderstanding Reader”. 
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Nothing is more emblematic of this than the position accorded to the VIP sections of 
the galleries: the Lords’ rooms, above the stage, and the first-tier rooms, adjacent to it.
88
 
Wherever comparable seats still exist today, they are normally considered the worst in the 
house, and are usually sold, if at all, at discounted, “restricted view” prices. Who would want 
to watch a play from behind the stage, not to mention who would pay several times the entry-
level fee for this privilege? Yet this was precisely the custom of the most distinguished 
Elizabeth and Jacobean playgoers. Indeed, when the use of the Lords’ rooms switched, at 
some point between 1602 and 1609, to a less distinguished clientele, the new fashion adopted 
by their former occupants placed them on even more prominent display, on the stage itself.
89
 
These features are familiar to historians of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century stage, yet 
their broader connotations, and especially their relevance to an inquiry into the allegorical 
dimensions of the period’s theatre, have not been fully recognized. Once considered in this 
light, however, it soon becomes clear how they complement and reinforce a mode of dramatic 
representation that could turn any locale, from Nineveh to Elsinore, into late sixteenth- and 
early seventeenth-century London, and any story into a vehicle for topical reference to 
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 This use of the tiring-house gallery is well-attested, including the early visual representation in the de Witt 
drawing. Besides the standard authorities, see esp. R. Hosley, “The Gallery over the Stage in the Public 
Playhouse of Shakespeare’s Time”, SQ 8 (1952): 15-31. 
89
 Two well-known passages from Dekker’s works bear testimony to the change in fashion. The Lords’ 
rooms are apparently still popular with the “gallants” in 1602, when Horace (representing Jonson) in Satiro-
mastix (London, 1602) is urged to “forsweare to venter on the stage when your Play is ended, and to exchange 
curtezies, and complements with Gallants in the Lordes roomes” (M1r). By the time of Gvls Horne-booke 
(London, 1609), however, “our Gallant” is instructed to “presently aduance himselfe vp to the Throne of the 
Stage. I meane not into the Lords roome, (which is now but the Stages Suburbs) No, those boxes by the iniquity 
of custome, conspiracy of waiting-women and Gentlemen-Ushers, that there sweat together, and the couetousnes 
of Sharers, are contemptibly thrust into the reare, and much new Satten is there dambd by being smothered to 
death in darknesse. But on the very Rushes where the Commedy is to daunce, yea and vnder the state of 
Cambises himself must our fetherd Estridge like a peece of Ordnance be planted valiantly” (E2v). The latter 
passage has been commented on by numerous scholars, but I have not been able to find an adequate explanation 
for what is meant by “now [...] contemptibly thrust into the reare”. My guess would be that Dekker is referring to 
a reworking of the layout of the second storey of the tiring house, whereby the front was made wholly available 
for acting, while the boxes were moved to the back. This would explain why these were no longer attractive to 
the gallants, and would fit with Chambers’ observation that “most upper chamber scenes, even of the sixteenth 
century, are of later date than the [1596] Swan drawing”, and his conjecture that “some architectural evolution 
[...] may have taken place”; E. K. Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage (1923; repr. Oxford, 1951), 3: 95. The 
theory could be tested by examining whether there is a significant increase and expansion of the “above” scenes 
after about 1605. Interestingly, the earliest reference noted by Chambers to “point to an upper stage of 
substantial dimensions in the public theatres” (3: 120) is from 1608; see [T. Middleton], The Famelie of Love 
(London, 1608), B2v, where characters discuss an adult play in which they “sawe Sampson beare the Towne 
gates on his necke, from the lower to the vpper stage”. The argument against the identification of the Lords’ 
rooms with the tiring-house gallery by G. Egan, “The Situation of the ‘Lords Room’”, RES 48 (1997): 297-309, 
is unpersuasive on various counts. 
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contemporary affairs. Fiction and real life converged: if one could not watch a play without 
simultaneously watching the “gallants” above, beside, or indeed on the very stage – and if, 
moreover, as contemporary descriptions repeatedly indicate, these really maintained a level of 
interaction and rapport with the players even during the performance itself – then the border 
between play and life was far more fluid than in most modern theatre, providing an ideal 
setting for a topical and allegorical drama. Sitting above, beside, or on the stage makes perfect 
sense if the play is nominally about any number of subjects, but really about you: you 
personally, as in the famous piece of self-allegoresis by the aged Elizabeth I – “I am Richard 
II. know ye not that?”
90
 – or more broadly, about your city and your fellow citizens, your 
country, your monarch, your church, and the larger contemporary world you inhabited. 
Besides the lingering Burckhardtian conception of dramatic character, wariness of 
approaching the popular dramatic corpus from the point of view of allegory seems to derive 
largely from a failure or unwillingness to acknowledge this “vertical sociology” and 
hermeneutic apartheid of the popular playhouse.
91
 If, however, we approach the problem from 
the point of view of allegory, it is clear how the stratified audience in the public playhouse – 
socially inclusive only in the most general sense of sharing, for a few hours, the same 
building, yet not even the same entrances and parts of the same building, to say nothing of 
less tangible aspects of the experience – offers textbook conditions for a form of drama that 
indeed did speak to everyone, only not the same thing, and not in the same way. Such a 
theatre, encapsulating and reproducing, in its very architecture and design, the hierarchy of 
the Elizabethan and Jacobean society, was in itself an allegory of this society, and the 
contemporary world at large – itself the Globe, as the most allegorical name to be borne by 
any of the period’s playhouses so suggestively puts it. 
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 For a recent affirmation of the account’s authenticity, see J. Scott-Warren, “Was Elizabeth I Richard II?”, 
RES, n.s., 64 (2013): 208-30. 
91
 This is the root of any criticism in Levin’s mode – see esp. “The Two-Audience Theory of English 
Renaissance Drama”, Shakespeare Studies 18 (1986): 251-75 – but it also appears in inverse form, for example 
in Clare’s argument against Patterson’s notion of a “hermeneutics of censorship”: “Although some members of 
the socially inclusive Elizabethan audience would have been able to decode oblique political analogies, the 
majority, who were not privy to court affairs or to ideological debate, would perhaps have appreciated only 
thinly veiled satire and topical associations. Communicating with an unhomogeneous audience, the playwright 
has to be more audacious than the writer” (Censorship, xi-xii). Here the audience is acknowledged to be 
heterogeneous, yet the unspoken presumption is that the playwright wants to be understood, and fully 
understood, by the whole or at least the majority of this heterogeneous audience. 
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THAT MONSTER, CUSTOM 
 
 “No work in the English canon”, writes Margareta de Grazia, 
has been so closely identified with the beginning of the modern age as Hamlet. The 
basis of this identification is so obvious now that it hardly needs to be stated. By 
speaking his thoughts in soliloquy, by reflecting on his own penchant for thought, by 
giving others cause to worry about what he is thinking, Hamlet draws attention to what 
is putatively going on inside him. In recognition of his psychological depth and 
complexity, Hamlet has been hailed as the inaugural figure of the modern period: “the 
Western hero of consciousness,” “[a]n icon of pure consciousness,” “a distinctly 
modern hero,” providing “the premier Western performance of consciousness.”
92
  
As the epitome of precisely those aspects of modernity with which the present chapter is 
predominantly occupied, Shakespeare’s prince of Denmark, his longest and most iconic role, 
came to prominence already with the earliest exercises in Shakespearean “character criticism” 
in the final decades of the eighteenth century, and has retained its almost unique status into 
our own day. The very word psychology, de Grazia reminds us, enters the English language in 
Coleridge’s attempt to explain Shakespeare’s apparent lack of method by shifting the 
neoclassicist emphasis on plot and action to character and thought.
93
 If judged by 
appropriately psychological standards – Coleridge begs “pardon for the use of this insolens 
verbum: but it is one of which our language stands in great need” – the neoclassical unity of 
plot can and should be replaced by the psychological unity of character, typical of 
Shakespeare’s work in general, and “peculiarly characteristic of Hamlet’s mind” in particular. 
 Because of this special status, the play presents the ideal ground on which to test the 
observations offered above, and to exemplify the effects of an approach which does not sever 
the popular drama from the wider intellectual and aesthetic currents of the period, and 
specifically the allegorical poetics investigated in the preceding chapter. Contrary to most 
readings of Hamlet, the remainder of this chapter will thus argue, firstly, that the play is a 
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 M. de Grazia, “Hamlet” without Hamlet (Cambridge, 2007), 7. 
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 Ibid., 15-16. 
175 
 
religious and political allegory, with a marked satirical aspect, on matters of religious and 
political controversy (or at the very least contains a strong allusive and satirical subtext 
pertaining to these matters);
94
 secondly, that the perspective governing this allusive or 
allegorical subtext is identifiably that of mainstream Church of England Protestantism, and 
that in this perspective most of the play’s notoriously contentious religious and political 
elements seem to fall into place; and thirdly, that this reading corresponds remarkably well to 
some of the circumstantial evidence we have on Hamlet, such as the record of its 
performances at the universities of Cambridge and Oxford, and the nature, otherwise deeply 
problematic, of a number of early references and allusions to this play. While its primary aim 
is to thus shed light on the dynamics of allegorical representation in English drama in the 
early 1600s, it is also hoped that the ensuing discussion will also contribute to a fuller 
understanding of Shakespeare’s famous, yet still imperfectly understood play. 
 In some respects, then, my discussion is obviously anticipated by Greenblatt’s Hamlet 
in Purgatory and the ensuing “turn to religion” in Shakespearean and “early modern” studies; 
in others, it is intended as a critique of much of the work done under this aegis, and especially 
of the Catholic Shakespeare project.
95
 If there has never been a better moment to write about 
                                                          
94
 It is useful to compare B. Hoxby’s definition of allegorical drama – as opposed to the more isolated use of 
an allegorical motif in a dominantly non-allegorical work – as that “whose fiction appears to point toward a 
system of non-fictional ideas”, and in which, crucially, “the existence of such a system is suggested by the 
‘rudiments’ of an interpretation provided in the play itself”; B. Hoxby, “Allegorical Drama”, in Companion, ed. 
Copeland and Struck, 192. As I hope to show, Hamlet meets both these criteria. 
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 See S. Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory (Princeton, 2001); K. Jackson and A. F. Marotti, “The Turn to 
Religion in Early Modern English Studies”, Criticism 46 (2004): 167-90. Subsequent contributions are too 
numerous to be surveyed here, including those devoted, partly or wholly, to the “Catholic Shakespeare” theory. 
For an account of its origins, see D. Chandler, “Catholic Shakespeare”, ELN 44 (2006): 29-41; for a dissenting 
estimate some of the central “evidence” at stake, R. Bearman, “‘Was William Shakespeare William 
Shakeshafte?”, SQ 53 (2002): 83-94 (Honigmann’s reply in “The Shakespeare/Shakeshafte Question”, SQ 54 
[2003]: 83-6, is unpersuasive, to put it mildly: Bearman’s objection to the idea of Shakespeare being left such a 
large annuity at seventeen years of age, and only months after having supposedly joined Hoghton’s household, is 
countered with the argument that “‘gentle Shakespeare’ [...] seems to have had a remarkable talent for inspiring 
friendship and affection”); “John Shakespeare’s ‘Spiritual Testament’”, SS 56 (2003): 184-202; “John 
Shakespeare”, SQ 56 (2005): 411-33. The early critique by M. Davies, “On This Side Bardolatry”, Cahiers 
Élisabéthains 58 (2000): 31-47, remains exemplary in its lucid analysis of the broader implications of the trend: 
the benefit of the Catholic Shakespeare theory is that its proponents get to “have [their] canonical cake and eat it: 
[...] Shakespeare can be said to have a particular religious identity but one which still demands that all theology, 
religion, and religious history are to be read as absent from the plays. As a consequence, the Catholic 
Shakespeare [...] becomes, finally, quite indistinguishable from the canonised, universal, and utterly religion-less 
Shakespeare that has been handed down to us for centuries by Coleridge, Carlyle, Bloom, et al.” (39). To be 
added is that a Catholic Shakespeare is equally attractive to those who do not wish to see Shakespeare as 
universal in this mainstream Bardolatric mode, but do wish to see him conform to their own ideological agendas, 
as an anti-establishmentarian voice of the repressed Elizabethan “other”. The subtitle of H. Hammerschmidt-
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religion in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature, it is also clear that the potential of 
much of this work remains limited by the “presentist” bias which the “turn”, at least as 
presented in the landmark statment by Jackson and Marroti, was originally supposed to 
combat.
96
 It is thus best stated outright that my discussion proceeds on the assumption that the 
perspective governing the religious element in Hamlet, and compatible with most 
circumstantial evidence relating to this play, is that of mainstream Church of England 
Protestantism, and that I consider the competing theories, especially the Catholic Shakespeare 
and its avatars – the “haunted”, “hybrid”, “allusive”, “unreformed” Shakespeares of much 
recent scholarship – to be mistaken, at least as far as they relate to this particular work.
97
 Also 
to be stressed is that I refrain, on methodological principle, from any discussion of 
Shakespeare’s personal religious beliefs: whether or not these coincide with the perspective 
emerging from the texts and contexts of Hamlet, what follows is an attempt to recover the 
latter rather than the former – the intentio operis rather than auctoris, the beliefs not of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Hummel’s Die verborgene Existenz des William Shakespeare (Freiburg, 2001), one of a series of new 
biographies exploiting the Catholic angle, is exemplary of this trend of presenting Shakespeare as a Dichter und 
Rebell im katolischen Untergrund. Finally, the Catholic Shakespeare project remains associated with authors 
with a strong confessional bias, including members of Roman Catholic clergy: among authors of recent book-
length titles, such is the case with P. Milward and D. N. Beauregard. 
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 Jackson and Marotti position their “turn” against the “relentless ‘presentism’ in political readings of early 
modern culture”, whereby “The otherness of early modern religious agents and culture(s) is translated into (for 
us) more acceptable modern forms conformable to our own cultural assumptions” (“Turn to Religion”, 168). In 
this, however, they seem unaware of the degree to which their own arguments – notably the insistence that a 
genuine engagement with early modern religion can proceed only on the guidance of postmodernist theologians 
and philosophers such as Levinas, Derrida, de Vries, Badiou – can be seen as radically “presentist” in 
orientation. Unsurprisingly, the turn proved instantly compatible with “presentist” and “neo-Theory” arguments 
– witness, for example, Fernie’s Spiritual Shakespeares, or J. Reinhard Lupton’s “The Religious Turn (to 
Theory) in Shakespeare Studies”, ELN 44 (2006): 145-9. 
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 See, respectively, Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory: Shakespeare is “haunted by the spirit of his Catholic 
father”, and it is “conceivable that [he] felt a covert loyalty to [Catholic] structures and a dismay that they were 
being gutted”, yet “We do not [...] need to believe that Shakespeare was himself a secret Catholic sympathizer” 
(249-54); J.-C. Mayer, Shakespeare’s Hybrid Faith (Basingstoke, 2006): “religion for Shakespeare was not so 
much a matter of systematic allegiance as one of constant debating and questioning. [...] The problem is and has 
often been that the terms of this questioning among scholars have often been incomplete, one-sided or partisan, 
whereas the cultural and religious universe around Shakespeare was fast-moving, ever-changing and largely 
hybrid” (5); M. Hunt, Shakespeare’s Religious Allusiveness (Aldershot, 2004): “my argument discovers the 
surprising extent of Shakespeare’s amalgamation of Protestant and Catholic motifs and ideas in single images, 
concepts, and characterizations”, a “syncretistic method [...] virtually singular among early modern English 
playwrights” (ix); G. Woods, Shakespeare’s Unreformed Fictions (Oxford, 2009): “With its negative prefix, 
‘unreformed’ points to the way the ‘Catholic’ material under discussion refuses the orthodox narratives of the 
state Church without actively promoting an alternative theological agenda. The content studied in this book has a 
distinctively Catholic resonance, but it does not necessarily convey theologically or politically Catholic 
meaning” (17). 
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play’s real but its implied author.98 That said, it is certainly remarkable that the possibility of 
Shakespeare’s allegiance to the Church of England mainstream has not received a fraction of 
the attention that has gone into investigating the exceedingly unlikely possibility of his 
Catholicism. Indeed, besides a Roman Catholic, Shakespeare has been a Puritan (or 
Puritanically influenced), a Jew, a Buddhist, a sceptic, an agnostic, even an atheist, yet there is 
still no comprehensive argument for him as a regular – conforming (but not unthinking), 
convinced (but not zealous), and polemically and theologically informed (but not expert) – 
member of the official national religion of his day.
99
 Such a Shakespeare, one “whose plays 
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 This methodological caveat, well-acknowledged in some recent work, is of crucial importance. However 
reasonable it may seem, a straightforward relation between Shakespeare’s personal beliefs (if any) and those 
emanating from his work must not be simply assumed. Lodge’s Catholicism, for example, is infinitely better 
attested than Shakespeare’s, yet Lodge and Greene’s Looking Glasse still ends with an anti-Catholic statement 
more explicit than anything in Shakespeare’s work, appealing to Elizabeth as “the pillar of [God’s] Church,/ 
Against the stormes of Romish Antichrist” (I4v). So Lodge may have been a Roman Catholic, yet his play was 
most certainly not, and the possibility of such a discrepancy in Shakespeare’s case should at least be kept in 
mind. It is further necessary to distinguish between the possibility of Shakespeare, or any other author, 
maintaining different religious beliefs at various given points in his life. Honigmann’s work illustrates the issues 
involved: his Shakespeare: The “Lost Years”, rev. ed. (Manchester, 1998) is often presented as a major 
contribution to the Catholic Shakespeare camp, yet Honigmann’s conclusions actually militate against reading 
Shakespeare’s plays in a Catholic light. As he elsewhere summarizes his case, “My Shakespeare was probably 
(but by no means certainly) brought up as a Catholic, probably continued as a Catholic in his lost years, and 
possibly returned to his Catholic faith on his death-bed, after (probably) converting to the Church of England 
when or soon after he started his career in the theatre”; E. A. J. Honigmann, “Catholic Shakespeare?”, 
Connotations 12 (2002-03): 52-60, p. 54. Thus Honigmann’s Shakespeare was probably not a Catholic precisely 
in the period in which he wrote his works, whereas he may have been one in periods which, while of interest to 
the biographer, are of secondary interest to the literary historian. Finally, while the presumption that 
Shakespeare’s oeuvre is uniform in its religious outlook should not necessarily be discarded, neither should it be 
taken for granted. Cherry-picking from the plays, as P. Milward does in his Shakespeare the Papist (Ave Maria, 
2005), “words and sentences and whole speeches pointing away from themselves to a hidden source of 
inspiration” (285), cannot be taken as serious scholarship, nor can the mysticism to which Milward freely 
confesses, noting that the passages he has assembled “prove nothing outside their dramatic contexts”, and indeed 
fail to prove anything “in the strict sense of proof. Yet there is a strange similarity among them, pointing beyond 
their immediate context to something deep in the heart of the dramatist” (19). 
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could [...] be read as reflecting, evincing, and dramatising Elizabethan Protestantism”, would 
be “historically specific and canonically subversive in a way that the Catholic Shakespeare 
simply is not. But for this reason alone, quite unsurprisingly, critics have traditionally found 
the idea of a Protestant Shakespeare largely unthinkable, if not utterly abhorrent – and one 
might suspect that this will remain the case for quite some time”.
100
 Davies’ prediction has 
proven correct: fifteen years after his article, the idea would seem to remain largely 
unthinkable, and the present chapter seeks to contribute, however modestly, to the reversal of 
this disappointing trend. 
 That said, one does not have to agree with the broader arguments offered by many of 
the recent studies on the subject to benefit from the scholarship that underlies them, or to 
acknowledge that even these arguments are a drastic improvement over the secularist 
orthodoxy of a previous day. On the other hand, I am also indebted to John Corbin, Arthur 
McGee, Linda Kay Hoff, and other unsung heroes and heroines of the eccentric, disturbing, 
devil-ridden, and needless to say, largely ignored underground of Hamlet criticism.101 In 
acknowledging this work, I do not wish to gloss over its shortcomings: much of it is 
demonstrably wrong, and some is worse than wrong, indulging in speculation that flaunts 
even the minimal norms of scholarly argumentation. Yet although Hamlet is not the savage 
anti-Catholic farce envisaged by McGee, any more than it is the allegorical labyrinth conjured 
up by the hermeneutic horror vacui of Kay Hoff, there is still much valuable insight in these 
works, and they deserve credit for their attempts to snatch the play from the vicious jaws of 
“That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat” (3.4.164). As a final caveat, I would like to 
stress that my focus here is even narrower than Hamlet itself: the ensuing discussion, dealing 
largely with passages of interest in the broader purview of this study, and the first act in 
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particular, does not attempt a comprehensive interpretation of the play, although it does seek 
to indicate an intellectual and polemical context from which such an interpretation could 
emerge. Even so, many of the arguments will undoubtedly be found controversial, so it seems 
useful to first briefly review the current critical orthodoxy, identifying the issues I seek to 
address – issues which, as I aim to show, are largely caused by the failure to acknowledge the 
play’s dual, allegorical mode of representation. 
 This orthodoxy can in fact be traced very precisely to a few pages in T. A. Spalding’s 
1880 Elizabethan Demonology, the first study to take a look at Shakespeare’s work through 
the lens of the age’s largely forgotten lore on such things as devils, witches, fairies, and most 
importantly, ghosts.
102
 Reading through such materials, Spalding came upon two works – 
John Hooper’s 1550 Declaration of the x holye commaundementes, and the 1597 
Daemonologie of James VI/I – in which he encountered the educated Protestant view of the 
subject, according to which there was no such thing as ghosts. In the words of Shakespeare’s 
future king and patron, those so-called “spirites” that sometimes appear to people “in the 
shaddow of a person newlie dead”, professing to “discouer vnto them, the will of the defunct, 
or what was the way of his slauchter”, are really disguises assumed by the devil, for “neither 
can the spirite of the defunct returne to his friend, or yet an Angell vse such formes”.
103
 
Hooper and James make for a very limited but perfectly representative sample of the 
Protestant position: eliminating the option of purgatory and thereby the theological rationale 
for ghost beliefs that it provided in pre-Reformation times, any genuinely supernatural 
apparition – i.e. not a man-made illusion or a hallucination – could now only be an angel or, 
far more likely, a devil. 
 A number of passages in Shakespeare’s plays now appeared in a wholly different 
light. It made sense, for example, that Brutus, faced with the supposed “ghost” of Julius 
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Caesar, asks, “Art thou some god, some angel, or some devil” (4.2.330). It made sense that 
Macbeth, faced with the supposed “ghost” of Banquo, implores it to “Approach [...] like the 
ruggèd Russian bear,/ The armed rhinoceros, or th’Hyrcan tiger;/ Take any shape but that” 
(3.5.99-101). It made sense that upon seeing Prospero, whom he believes to be long dead, 
Sebastian thinks that “The devil speaks in him!” (5.1.131). But above all, it made sense for 
the prince of Denmark to suspect that  
  The spirit that I have seen 
 May be a devil, and the devil hath power 
 T’assume a pleasing shape, yea, and perhaps, 
 Out of my weakness and my melancholy, 
 As he is very potent with such spirits, 
 Abuses me to damn me. (2.2.594-99) 
None of this had made much sense before. When not explained away – as was often the case 
with this last passage ever since Bradley dismissed it as yet another “unconscious fiction” on 
Hamlet’s part, “an excuse for his delay” – the “ghost” material was simply ignored, or even 
recommended for excision.
104
 Now, however, read against the contemporary demonological 
background, the ghost scenes made perfect sense. 
 Except, of course, they made no sense whatsoever. Was it to be seriously considered 
that the ghost of the late king Hamlet was a devil in disguise, tempting the prince into eternal 
damnation? And if so, what was to become of Shakespeare’s most famous play? As an early 
follower in Spalding’s footsteps put it, “To have represented the ghost of the dead king as the 
devil, or as anything but ‘an honest ghost,’ would have brought the whole play toppling down 
like a pack of cards”.
105
 Thus as soon as it was recovered, it was imperative that the 
demonological perspective be contained, and even as he brought the demonological evidence 
to light, Spalding did an even better job of minimizing its impact on the traditional view of the 
play. In brief, it is not that the demonological perspective is, in itself, wrong – it is, rather, 
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irrelevant. Granted, the “reforming divines distinctly denied the possibility” of ghosts, yet the 
belief “was too deeply rooted in the popular mind to be extirpated, or even greatly affected, 
by a dogmatic declaration. The masses went on believing as they had always believed, and as 
their fathers had believed before them, in spite of the Reformers, and to their no little 
discontent”.
106
 Thus by Shakespeare’s day, there were basically three schools of thought, 
those of official Catholic and Protestant doctrine, and suspended between them the precarious 
position of the “plain man”: “In the midst of this disagreement of doctors it was difficult for a 
plain man to come to a definite conclusion upon the question; and, in consequence, all who 
were not content with quiet dogmatism were in a state of utter uncertainty”.
107
 Finally, and 
crucially, of the three positions it is the plain man’s that is really relevant, as it was “probably 
the position in which most thoughtful men found themselves; and it is accurately reflected in 
[...] Shakspere’s plays”.
108
 
 Here lie the origins of an argument that remains fundamental to most readings of 
Hamlet, and it is of interest to note at this point, in view of my further arguments below, that 
these readings have always relied on a radically “revisionist” view of the English Reformation 
and the religious beliefs of Shakespeare and/or his original audiences.
109
 This is even more 
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explicit, and was on prominent display throughout the twentieth century in one of the major 
classics of Shakespearean criticism, J. Dover Wilson’s What Happens in “Hamlet”, first 
published in 1935 and still in print.
110 
By Wilson’s day, further sources and parallels had been 
identified, the denominational divide had emerged in its full relief, and the ineffable mystery 
of Shakespeare’s own religious beliefs, implicit in Spalding’s silence on the issue, had been 
explicitly maintained.
111
 In essentials, however, Wilson’s treatment of the subject is an exact 
reproduction of Spalding’s, and if we now fast-forward to the most influential contemporary 
study of the play, the same can be said, in the final analysis, for Greenblatt’s Hamlet in 
Purgatory, and for most of the work which has followed in its train.112 
 Like Spalding, Greenblatt accepts the internal coherence, but not the applicability, of 
the demonological argument. The problem with the “heavy hints” that present the apparition 
as purgatorial ghost is that such a ghost is “utterly incompatible with a Senecan call for 
vengeance”, a call which “could come only from the place in the afterlife where Seneca’s 
ghosts reside: Hell”.
113
 Only two pages further, however, the reader is emphatically 
discouraged from participating in any “ingenious attempts to determine whether the apparition 
[…] comes from Purgatory or from Hell”, questions “almost certainly doomed to 
inconclusiveness”.
114
 The play contains “a bewildering array of hints” about its identity, 
including those compatible with the demonological perspective, but it deliberately leaves 
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them unresolved. And not only this play: “None of Shakespeare’s ghosts (or even the illusions 
of ghosts) is a demon, disguised as the wandering soul of the departed; none is a purgatorial 
spirit, begging for suffrages from the living. They do not greatly resemble the ghosts depicted 
in ballads or in public inquiries into popular superstitions, nor do they conspicuously come 
from a classical Hades”.
115
 Nor is Shakespeare’s position that of a stalwart sceptic like 
Reginald Scot. Rather, his attitude towards this “whole, weird, tangled cultural inheritance, 
the mingling of folk beliefs, classical mythology, and Catholic doctrine” is “contradictory, 
slippery, and complex”, one of “skepticism and bafflement, not unmixed with an odd current 
of half-belief”.
116
 In other words, it remains, “as ever”, a mystery – even to Shakespeare 
himself, as well as to the decisive majority of his audience. Greenblatt is careful not to get 
involved in the ungrateful business of carving up the spectrum of sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century religiosity into essentialist, mutually exclusive categories, yet tell-tale details show 
that such categories still underlie the argument.
117
 In sum, the Reformation “did not destroy 
the longings and fears that Catholic doctrine had focused and exploited”, and “throughout the 
reigns of Elizabeth and James [...] the boundary between the living and the dead was not so 
decisively closed”.
118
 
 The problem with such arguments is that they fail to make essential social and cultural 
qualifications. Most of the evidence cited for the survival of ghost beliefs in the period would 
seem to originate relatively far from London and/or relatively low on the social and 
intellectual ladder. At least by the 1590s, such beliefs seem to be increasingly attributed to 
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“the unskilled multitude”, “the common people”, “many ignorant persons among us”, “poore 
simple and ignoraunt person[s]”, “the people rude”, “simple beholders”, and so forth.
119
 Thus 
to say, without further qualification, that ghost beliefs persisted in spite of Reformation 
teaching is misleading. A comparison of two ghost sightings, one from the mid-sixteenth and 
the other from the early seventeenth century, is instructive. The first will be familiar to 
Shakespeareans, as it was the only piece of evidence which Spalding listed in support of his 
“revisionist” thesis, and has been parroted unreflectively ever since. In 1564, James 
Pilkington, the first Protestant bishop of Durham, writes of events that had occurred in the 
nearby village of Blackburn, where several people claimed to have seen the ghost of their 
long-dead neighbour: “These things be so common here”, the bishop complains, “that none in 
the authority will gainsay it, but rather believe and confirm it, that everybody believes it.”
120
 
This undoubtedly tells us something about the beliefs of the inhabitants of a village near 
Durham in 1564. What, if anything, it tells us about the beliefs and convictions of 
Shakespeare or the attested audiences of Hamlet in the early 1600s is unclear, to say the least, 
especially if Pilkington’s report is compared to the haunting, sometime between 1613 and 
1617, of Hidnam House, the estate of Sir Thomas Wise on the Cornwall-Devon border.
121
 
 One night, “a little after midnight”, Wise is awoken by “a fearfull crye and shrieking 
of some of his maids”, who claim that they were “frighted by a walking spirit [...] in the 
likenes of a woman in her smock, holding her hands ouer the children”. Wise initially reacts 
precisely like Horatio upon being first told of the “thing” appearing on the ramparts of 
Elsinore: “To this conceit of their’s he gave little credit for ye præsent, and imputed it to sore 
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distemper or vaine fancy of womanly feare, because, as he seriously protested, he was euer of 
the opinion that there were no such apparitions.” The following night, however, the apparition 
returns to haunt Wise himself, and again his reaction is strikingly similar to Horatio’s.
122
 The 
next day, Wise seeks the advice of “Mr. Archd[eacon]”, who is of the opinion that it was “an 
angelical apparition and not a diabolicall illusion”. About a month later, however, he 
discusses the event with Featley, who disagrees, judging the apparition to be “an evill spirit”. 
Thus the story “opens for us a range of perspectives on the same events: those of the terrified 
servants, of the educated Protestant layman, [...] and of the learned divines he consults about 
the affair”.
123
 What is striking here, however, is that, unlike the maids, Wise and the two 
divines never even entertain the possibility of an actual ghost, and are in this representative of 
the mainstream Protestant discourse at the time when Shakespeare wrote Hamlet: yes, ghosts 
are still believed in, namely by country folk, and/or the poor and uneducated, and/or Papists, 
and/or women, and/or lunatics.
124
 
 To believe that Shakespeare wrote for all of them is ideologically comforting, and of 
course true in the sense that the popular playhouse typified by the Globe – which, however, is 
only one of several venues and performance contexts attested for this play – was open to a 
wide-cross section of contemporary society. Therefore it is probably reasonable to presume a 
degree of variety in the actual, empirical responses to the Elsinore apparition: we can perhaps 
imagine Wise’s maids attending a performance and taking it for a genuine ghost, Wise 
himself unsure what to make of it, the archdeacon believing it to be angel, and Featley the 
devil. In this sense the “ghost” of old Hamlet indeed is potentially ambiguous, but of course 
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this is not the sense which the post-Spalding orthodoxy has in mind, and here, finally, we 
arrive at the crux of this debate. While acknowledging a degree of empirical variability in 
actual interpretations, the orthodoxy claims to have established the one perspective which 
makes the best sense out of the textual and extra-textual evidence at hand, and furthermore, 
that this “implied reader” it has constructed was matched by the majority of the actual 
contemporary responses to the play. This perspective is of intentional ambiguity, “a deliberate 
forcing together of radically incompatible accounts of almost everything that matters in 
Hamlet”.125 The problem is solved by proclaiming it intentionally unsolvable. To quote 
Greenblatt again, 
the problem is that the father’s design is vengeance; vengeance, moreover, demanded 
by a spirit that seems to come from the place that was for Protestants a supreme 
emblem of the corruption of the Catholic Church. What can be made of this? The 
point surely is not to settle issues that Shakespeare has clearly gone out of his way to 
unsettle or render ambiguous.
126
 
Ambiguous – the magic wand of Hamlet criticism, at whose touch even the play’s most 
contentious and uncooperative cruces vanish into thin air. Yet is it not ironic, and perhaps 
alarming, that this supposed ambiguity has become – “surely”, “clearly” – the only 
unambiguous thing about this play? 
 But what if we presume that Shakespeare wrote this play with more than one implied 
reader in mind – a presumption which of course lies at the basis of all allegorical composition, 
and which, as discussed above, was clearly operative in at least some of sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century drama? What if problems which must otherwise seem unsolvable turn out 
to be solvable after all, just not by everyone? The implications of this are of course unpleasant 
to those who would like to see Shakespeare as a playwright of the people, which he of course 
was, in part. Yet he was also the queen’s and the king’s playwright, the playwright of the 
more affluent and better educated patrons of the Lords’ rooms, the hall playhouses, and 
private performances at aristocratic households, and perhaps even, in the case of this 
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particular play, the playwright of the theologically informed audiences of the universities. He 
was all this, and if by acknowledging it we destroy the tragedy, it is not Shakespeare’s tragedy 
that we destroy. Fortunately, however, we destroy nothing. Like any other allegory, the play 
was intended to be read on several levels, and can still be read in the classic tragic mode by 
those who are content with ignoring the comprehensive and subtly executed allegorical 
counterpoint, and who thus willingly take on the role of “mere” viewers and readers, as many 
of the period’s authors would have seen them. For the “understanders”, however, who do 
respond to the signals pointing to a subtext dealing with matters of religious and political 
controversy, there begins to emerge a play that has remained obscure, even under the undying 
spotlight that shines on Shakespeare’s prince of Denmark, for four hundred years: a 
tragicomic synthesis richer and stranger than anything envisioned by the Romantic orthodoxy 
and its various makeovers, a Hamlet that has so far been fully appreciated perhaps only by the 
denizens of Borges’ Tlön, by whom, of course, “A book that does not contain its counter-
book is considered incomplete”.
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HAMLET IN HELL 
 
That the so-called ghost is the “linchpin of Hamlet” is one of the few points of consensus 
among the competing critical factions; what kind of a linchpin it is, however, has been a 
subject of extensive and ongoing debate.
128
 As discussed above, the traditional reading of the 
play depends crucially on the view of the ghost as intentionally ambiguous, and in this section 
I will argue that such a view is untenable, and that the Elsinore apparition, however 
empirically ambiguous it may have been in any given performance context, is meant to be 
understood as a demonic illusion, imbued with strong anti-Catholic satirical aspect. There 
have been five alternatives to the ambiguous ghost: the demonologically uninflected ghost of 
literary tradition, the demonologically uninflected ghost of popular tradition, the hallucinatory 
ghost, the genuine purgatorial ghost, and the devil. The demonological indifference of the 
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 Wilson, What Happens in “Hamlet”, 52. 
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apparition – which is not the same, of course, as intentional demonological ambiguity – was 
the unquestioned assumption of most criticism up to Spalding, but has obviously been the 
least compelling option since. The best argument for a purely literary ghost remains that of 
Battenhouse, according to whom the ghost comes not from the purgatory of Roman Catholic 
doctrine, but “one of several regions popularly confused with it in the Renaissance – the 
purgatory of the Ancients, or their hell, or their vague afterworld, hades”, “an afterworld 
exactly suited to fascinate the imagination and understanding of the humanist intellectual of 
the Renaissance”.
129
 This, however, requires a drastic suppression of the religious element in 
the play, and more generally, a long-outdated notion of an essentially pagan Renaissance.
130
 
The ghost of popular tradition meets with similar objections. Nobody disputes the presence of 
popular beliefs in the representation of the Elsinore apparition, and Catherine Belsey’s recent 
article substantially deepens our appreciation of these, but as Belsey herself makes clear, the 
popular background, however important, is only one of a “range of existing conventions” on 
which Shakespeare drew.
131
 The hallucinatory ghost, first proposed by Heinrich von Struve in 
1873, and more elaborately, and infamously, by Greg in 1917, has long been put to rest.
132
 
 The fourth alternative, a genuine purgatorial ghost, found a handful of advocates in the 
mid-twentieth century, all marked with a strong confessional bias, and is resurrected in an 
extensive recent essay by Kelly.
133
 In its most sophisticated form, the argument is that the 
apparition indeed is the soul of the late king of Denmark, temporarily released from purgatory 
by special dispensation, and that the task it imposes on Hamlet is not the damnable sin of 
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apparition’s mention of the Catholic sacraments – “Unhousel’d, disappointed, unanel’d” (1.5.77) – as “an 
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personal blood revenge but rather the exaction of divine justice for a crime not punishable by 
conventional means. The chief objections to this view remain substantially the same as half a 
century ago: the weakness of the textual evidence – while there are several indisputable 
allusions to purgatory in the play, none of these is indisputably affirmative of the doctrine – 
and the lack of a single genuinely relevant parallel, of whatever kind and from whatever 
period, to the case we supposedly have in Hamlet.134 
 There remains the devil. This interpretation was first proposed by Hermann Ulrici in 
1839, and has met with least acceptance of the four.
135
 The problem here is not with the 
evidence, which is abundant, but in the feeling that this reading ruins the play. Yet going by 
the demonologies, the apparition haunting the ramparts of Elsinore is a blatant, open-and-shut 
case of demonic visitation, and since much of this evidence remains inadequately 
acknowledged in the critical mainstream, it seems worthwhile to provide a brief summary, 
augmented with a few original contributions.
136
 A number of features of the Elsinore 
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apparition find exact parallels in descriptions of the agency of demonic apparitions, by both 
Protestant and Catholic authorities. Namely, it appears at night, in armour, frowning 
angrily;
137
 it appears in the form of a recently deceased relative; it is “offended” (1.1.53) at 
the invocation of Heaven;
138
 it “started” (Q2, F; Q1 “faded”) at the crowing of the cock, “like 
a guilty thing/ Upon a fearful summons” (1.1.153-4);
139
 it desires to speak to Hamlet in 
isolation; it intersperses its speech with allusions to hell; it dwells on the emotionally 
disturbing details of the murder;
140
 it requires blood revenge on Claudius; and finally, while 
requiring blood revenge on Claudius, it urges forbearance with respect to Gertrude.
141
 Some 
of these features would not necessarily mean much on their own, but as cumulative evidence 
they are unimpeachable: from the demonological point of view, the apparition can only be the 
devil. 
 This conclusion is further reinforced by the meticulous weaving of the ghost scenes in 
the first act. Thus it is significant that the apparition is referred to as a “spirit” only two times 
in the opening scene – and even then noncommittally, as further discussed below – in contrast 
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to thirty-four instances of indeterminate appellations, namely “thing” (1.1.24), “dreaded 
sight” (28), “apparition” (31), “image” (84), “portentous figure” (112), “illusion” (130), and 
most frequently, simply it (including two instances of a and he which are to be taken as 
neuter).
142
 The similarity in appearance to the deceased king is repeatedly stressed – “in the 
same figure like the King” (45), “like the King” (61), “so like the King” (113) – but this 
emphasis on similarity in appearance precisely foregrounds the possibility of non-identity in 
substance. “What art thou”, asks Horatio,  
 that usurp’st this time of night, 
Together with that fair and warlike form 
In which the majesty of buried Demark 
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intense distress of his interview with the apparition. Hamlet is also the only character to use the term in the play, 
except for Horatio’s retort, general and humorous in import, that “There needs no ghost, my lord, come from the 
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apparition as a genuine revenant comes from Hamlet and the so-called “ghost” itself – the very two characters 
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Did sometimes march? (1.1.49-50, emphasis mine)  
Later on, in the second encounter, Horatio is the first character in the play to address the 
apparition as a “spirit”, but only in the context of enumerating a number of other options, 
without committing to any of them:  
 If thou hast any sound or use of voice, 
 Speak to me. 
 If there be any good thing to be done 
 That may do thee ease, and grace to me, 
 Speak to me; 
 If thou art privy to thy country’s fate, 
 Which, happily, foreknowing may avoid, 
 O speak; 
 Or if thou hast uphoarded in thy life 
 Extorted treasure in the womb of the earth, 
 For which they say your spirits oft walk in death, 
 Speak of it, stay and speak. (1.1.131-40) 
Surely nobody is meant to believe that Horatio suspects the soul of the late king of Demark to 
be concerned about some buried treasure. He is merely rehearsing the various popular 
opinions about ghosts, which Shakespeare wants to be heard at this point in the play, but is at 
the same time careful to distance his Wittenberg student from these opinions. That “your 
spirits”
143
 walk in death is something “they say”, just like the other residually Papist folk 
beliefs voiced in the ensuing exchange with Marcellus (in which two further instances of 
“spirit” occur): “I have heard”, “Some say”, “they say”, “So have I heard and do in part 
believe it” (1.1.154-70). Even at the very end, when Horatio says that “This spirit, dumb to us, 
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will speak” to Hamlet (1.1.176), it is still “this spirit”, an expression that does not 
unambiguously identify the apparition as a revenant. 
 All of this is in stark contrast to the premature and ominously proleptic assurance 
displayed by Hamlet when notified of the apparition (1.2.189-258). Horatio’s report is at most 
inconclusive, and gives Hamlet no ground for the certainty with which he exclaims, the 
second he is left alone on the stage: “My father’s spirit, in arms!” Not “your spirits”, “this 
spirit”, “I think”, “they say”, “So have I heard and do in part believe it” – “My father’s 
spirit”.
144
 For this also we have been carefully prepared, as Scene 2 takes considerable pains 
to establish the prince as melancholic, and thus especially susceptible to the devil’s wiles – 
another belief which has been amply documented from contemporary sources, and is also 
voiced explicitly by Hamlet himself, in the passage already cited above (2.2.594-99).
145
 A 
pattern now begins of darkly ironic lapses of judgment on Hamlet’s part, which is to 
culminate in his interview with the apparition in Scene 5.
146
 On top of all this, the speech of 
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 “If it assume my noble father’s person”, says Hamlet immediately upon being informed of the apparition, 
“I’ll speak to it though hell itself should gape/ And bid me hold my peace” (1.3.244-6) – but what if it is his 
friends who will bid him hold his peace, and hell itself that will gape in his noble father’s person? Later that 
night (in Q2), waiting for the appearance of what he has already decided is his “father’s spirit”, the prince 
meditates on how an otherwise good man can be brought to ruin by a single defect of his character – but is not he 
the man, his own melancholy precisely such an “o’ergrowth of some complexion” (1.4.27), his own ruin that is 
imminent? When the “questionable shape” appears, the Wittenberg-educated prince reaches for the essential 
dichotomies of Protestant demonology – “spirit of health or goblin damn’d/ […] airs from heaven or blasts from 
hell/ [...] intents wicked or charitable” – but then simply overrides them in yet another conspicuous leap of 
judgment: “I’ll call thee Hamlet,/ King, father, royal Dane” (1.4.40-5). He demands to be allowed to follow the 
apparition, as he does not set his life “at a pin’s fee/ And for my soul, what can it do to that/ Being a thing 
immortal as itself?” (1.4.65-6) – but if the apparition is a demon, it is precisely his soul that is at peril, and 
precisely because it is immortal; note also the inadvertent distinction between a human soul and the “thing” 
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the apparition adds a further incendiary element into the mix: Roman Catholicism. Up to this 
point it had only been vaguely intimated in the folk beliefs voiced by the sentinels, but now it 
takes centre stage, both metaphorically and literally. Having positioned itself on the trapdoor 
through which it is to sink down during its final “Adieu, adieu, adieu” (1.5.91), the apparition 
finally speaks, delivering what can only be described as a masterpiece of irony and 
insinuation, precisely in accordance with the traditional view of the devil as the father of lies 
and master double-talker.
147
 It introduces itself as a soul returned from the afterlife, “thy 
father’s spirit”, and the exact verbal parallel to Hamlet’s “My father’s spirit” back at 1.3.255 
underlines the fact that it is telling the prince exactly what his “prophetic soul” want to hear. It 
then goes on to refer explicitly, or allude in the most suggestive of terms, to an entire 
catalogue of major elements of Roman Catholic doctrine dismissed by Protestantism, and 
often derided in anti-Catholic polemic and satire: purgatory (“Till the foul crimes done in my 
days of nature/ Are burnt and purg’d away”), fasting (“to fast in fires”),
148
 the Harrowing of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
beckoning into darkness. (As first noted by Spalding, Demonology, 53-4, 58, these lines, and those spoken by 
Horatio moments earlier [1.5.69-78], might be modelled on a specific passage in James’ Daemonologie, 
explaining that the devil appears to men in the form of a ghost “to obtaine one of two thinges thereby, if he may: 
The one is the tinsell of their life, by inducing them to such perrilous places at such time as he either followes or 
possesses them, which may procure the same [...]. The other thinge [...] is the tinsell of their soule” [I4r].) 
Hamlet draws his sword on his friends, threatening to “make a ghost of him that lets me” (1.5.85): the primary 
meaning, depending on the now obsolete let, meaning “hinder” (OED, v2), is clear, but do we not have a double 
entendre here, proceeding from the opposite meaning of the let that is still in use (OED, v1)? As suspected long 
ago by Seymour, Remarks, 2: 158: “To let, undoubtedly, signifies ‘to hinder,’ but I cannot help considering this 
expression as the offspring of that preposterous disposition which often prevails in these works, ‘to palter with us 
in a double sense’.” This pattern is especially consistent in the first act, but it continues, in a more dispersed 
form, throughout the play: one further, particularly suggestive instance occurs just seconds before the final 
appearance of the “ghost” in Gertrude’s chamber – “What devil was’t”, charges the dagger-speaking prince, with 
a vicious and by this point predictable irony, “That thus hath cozen’d you at hoodman-blind?” (3.4.76-7). 
147
 On the movements of the “ghost” on the stage in this scene, see the reconstruction in Edwards’ edition 
(Figure 3), seconded by the analysis of Gurr and Ichikawa, Staging, 131. There is evidence that the “ghost” 
continued to descend through the trap in performances into the late nineteenth century (Figure 4). The tradition 
which attributes the devil with ambiguous speech has not been sufficiently stressed in previous criticism. Two 
notable literary instances include Shakespeare’s own Macbeth (“these juggling fiends [...]/ That palter with us in 
a double sense,/ That keep the word of promise to our ear/ And break it to our hope” [5.10.19-22]), and Milton’s 
Paradise Regain’d (the devil’s speech as “dark/ Ambiguous and with double sense deluding” [1.434-5]). For the 
conventions used in citing Milton’s works, see ch. 3, n. 13. 
148
 Q1 has “confined in flaming fire” (1.5.4). There was a definite Papist stigma attached to fasting. A 
convenient summary of the differences appears in the note to Isa. 58:5 in the Douai-Rheims Bible: “Fasting is so 
often & clerly commended in holie Scriptures, that Protestantes (though not greatly affected therto) confesse it to 
be a good thing of it self, but in diuers respects detract much from it: denying it to be an act of religion, but only 
of bodily mortification: neither do al generally allow of prescript times, nor of abstinence from flesh those dayes, 
vvhich they thinke good to fast: and those vvhich do abstaine from flesh, say they do it not for religion, but for 
the ordinance of ciuil policie”; The Holie Bible (Douai, 1609). See also Theobald’s note to this verse: “And we 
are to observe, that it is a common saying of the Romish Priests to their People, If you won’t fast here, you must 
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Hell (“harrow up thy soul”),
149
 the office of matins (“The glow-worm shows the matin to be 
near”),
150
 and most explicitly, the Catholic sacraments of deathbed confession and extreme 
unction (“Unhousel’d, disappointed, unanel’d”).
151
 
 Point by point, however, every single one of these papist features is undercut by 
allusions to hell and the devil. Almost the very first thing the apparition says is “Pity me not” 
(1.5.5), a sentiment completely inconsistent with a purgatorial soul, but completely consistent 
with the devil, who is beyond pity, and to whom all mention of it is unbearable. If “sulph’rous 
and tormenting flames”, and the “prison-house” with its unspeakably horrifying “secrets”, are 
not inconsistent with the temporary suffering of purgatory, they are no less evocative of the 
“eternal blazon” of hell (1.5.21, emphasis mine). Similarly, even if we allow that the mention 
of Lethe, on the precedent of Dante, may point to the intermediate place in the afterlife, the  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
fast in Fire”; The Works of Shakespeare, ed. L. Theobald (London, 1733), 7: 351, n. 18. I have not been able to 
track down this or any similar saying, whether in Theobald’s or in Shakespeare’s time. 
149
 The verb harrow is used elsewhere in the play (1.1.47) in the sense of “to worry mentally” (see OED, 
harrow, v.2, b; harry, v., 1.4), but the rare phrasal form (“harrow up”), in combination with this particular object 
(“harrow up thy soul”), makes for an unmistakable reference to the Harrowing of Hell, a Roman Catholic 
doctrine dependant on the corollary doctrines of the limbo patrum and limbo infantum, or more broadly, the 
doctrine of purgatory. McGee is apparently the only critic to acknowledge this allusion (Elizabethan Hamlet, 
65), but does not seem to have realized its full import. 
150
 The matins are “One of the daily offices appointed in the breviary of the Western Christian Church, 
usually taken as forming (with the following office, lauds) the first of the canonical hours. Also: an analogous 
part of certain other minor devotions modelled on the canonical hours; esp. in matins (and hours) of the Blessed 
Virgin Mary” (OED, matins, 1.b). The term was retained in the first Book of Common Prayer, but is replaced by 
morning prayer in the 1552 and all subsequent versions; see OED, 1.c, noting this use as “App. rare before the 
19th cent.”, and finding no examples between 1549 and 1832. The term is used after 1549 – in the 1568 Bishops’ 
Bible, for example – but is increasingly seen as papist, and certainly by 1600 it is a branded, specifically 
Catholic word; cf. McGee, Elizabethan Hamlet, 66; Kay Hoff, Hamlet’s Choice, 87. The cue was given by 
Luther and Clavin, and is picked up early on by English authors: see M. Luther, A Commentarie... vpon the twoo 
Epistles generall of Sainct Peter and that of Sainct Jvde (London, 1581), R3r: among “our Monkes and Nunnes 
[...] There is neuer a one of theim that can truely saie: God hath commanded me to heare a Masse, to sing 
Mattins, to mumble vp the Seuen houres, or suche like Trumperies: For there is not so muche as one woorde 
thereof spoken in all the Scripture”; J. Calvin, Sermons... vpon... Galathians (London, 1574), Hh1r: “what doth 
the deuoutest person among them [i.e., the papists], but only make much babbling and mumbling? He must here 
Mattins at night, and two or three Masses in a day [...]. And what are all these things? Surely [...] diuelishe 
deuises”; [G. Gnaphaeus], A myrrour or glasse for them that be syke & in payne (Southwark, 1536), A5v: “theyr 
rummelynge, and mummelynge of matyns, euensonge, and such lyke popyshenesse”; R. Lancelot, A 
commentary... vpon... Ephesyans (London, [1540]), H7r-v: “Purgatorye prestes or popishe prestes that can do 
nothing elles but momble or patter ouer a payre or popyshe Mattyns or Masse”; J. Bradford, “To a woman that 
desyred to know hys mynde whether she, refraining from the Masse, might be present at the popyshe Mattyns or 
no” (letter of 4 July 1553), in Certain... letters, ed. M. Coverale (London, 1564), Ee2r-v; W. Perkins, A Treatise 
tending vnto a declaration (London, [1590?]), M8r: “their darkness can not comprehend the light of the 
Scriptures but they read them as me[n] do tales of Robin Hood, as riddles, or as olde priests read their Ladies 
matins, which they vnderstand not”.  
151
 The references to Catholic rites were first recognized as such in C. Gildon’s Glossary, included in the 
additional, seventh volume of Rowe’s edition: The Works of Mr. William Shakespeare. Volume the Seventh, [ed. 
N. Rowe] (London, 1710). 
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Figure 3. Reconstruction of the staging of 1.4.38-1.5.159 in Hamlet, ed. P. Edwards, updated ed. (Cambridge, 
2003), 44; drawing by C. W. Hodges. 
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Figure 4. Drawing by G. Cruickshank, in G. Raymond, The Life and Enterprises of Robert William Elliston 
(London, 1857), facing p. 116, illustrating the anecdote of a prank played on the actor W. Dowton (1764-1851), 
imagined by the illustrator as performing the ghost in Hamlet. See also J. Boaden, Memoirs of the Life of John 
Philip Kemble (London, 1825), 1: 98: Kemble’s “kneeling at the descent of the Ghost was censured as a trick. 
[...] Henderson saw it, and adopted it immediately”; J. F. Kirk, “Shakespeare’s Tragedies on the Stage”, 
Lippincott’s Magazine, n.s., 7 (1884): 501-10, 604-16: in the day of Garrick and Henderson, “as down to a very 
recent period, the business of the ghost was very clumsily managed. We have all seen him descend by a trap-
door, liable either to stick on its passage or to drop with a jerk before the final ‘Adieu’ was uttered. On the last 
occasion on which I saw the play I found that all this had been changed. There was an ingenious and beautiful 
arrangement of blue lights, gauze curtains, and other paraphernalia, by which the mysterious figure was made to 
recede and vanish in a becoming and even marvellous manner” (508). Cf. R. A. Foakes, “‘Armed at point 
exactly’”, SS 58 (2005): 34-57, p. 40. 
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river is far more commonly placed in hell, and the vegetation of its bank seems decidedly 
infernal.
152
 Finally, and most suggestively, the apparition, speaking of Gertrude, unmistakably 
echoes two key scriptural commonplaces of Christian demonology: 
 But virtue, as it never will be moved 
 Though lewdness court it in a shape of heaven, 
 So lust, though to a radiant angel link’d, 
 Will sate itself in a celestial bed (1.5.53-6) 
The first two verses are closely paralleled by the injunction in Galatians 1:8, “But though we, 
or an Angel from heauen preach vnto you otherwise, then that which we haue preached vnto 
you, let him be accursed”, while the third echoes 2 Corinthians 11:14, “Satan himself is 
transformed into an angel of light”.
153
 However, “wax[ing] desperate with his imagination” 
(1.5.87), Hamlet fails to pick up on any of these clues, and commits himself to the damning 
task of revenge. “I find thee apt”, the thing responds: “Fit, prepared, ready”, but also 
“Customarily disposed, given, inclined, prone”, “susceptible to impressions”.
154
 
Fascinatingly, Hamlet’s descent is accompanied by a cluster of echoes of the earlier 
allegorical drama, almost as if to indicate not only a moral but also ontological degradation – 
a transformation such as underwent by the tyrant of Ariosto’s Cinque Canti, who “From the 
suspicious man [he] had been at first, [...] had now become Suspicion itself”.
155
 In our 
 familiarity with Q2’s “vicious mole” speech means we are not likely to think twice of the 
metaphor of “the pales and forts of reason”, but this is of course the central metaphor of a 
number of sixteenth-century English moralities, themselves structured on earlier plays of the 
                                                          
152
 “[D]uller shouldst thou be”, the apparition admonishes, “than the fat weed/ That roots itself in ease on 
Lethe wharf,/ Wouldst thou not stir in this” (1.5.34). Interestingly, while Dante does place Lethe in his 
purgatory, he stresses the paradisiacal vegetation of its banks. By contrast, see M. Drayton, Englands Heroicall 
Epistles (London, 1597), D2r: queen Isabel wishes for a poison, or at least a very strong sleeping potion, made of 
“those blacke weedes on Lethe bankes below”; F. Beaumont and J. Fletcher, The Humorous Lieutenant (first 
performed c.1619), in Comedies and Tragedies (London, 1647), Sss2r: “This dull root pluckt from Lethe flood,/ 
Purges all pure thoughts, and good”.  
153
 Line 1.5.55 in particular carries a sting in its tail, for if, in the logic of Shakespeare’s simile, the “radiant 
angel” is king Hamlet, and if, in the Corinthians passage, the “angel of light” is Satan, this strongly implies the 
conclusion that king Hamlet – i.e., the apparition before us – is Satan. 
154
 See OED, apt, adj., 2.b, 4.c., 5. 
155
 L. Ariosto, Cinque Canti (Berkeley, 1996), 2.17. The story is taken over in G. Gascoigne’s Aduentures of 
Master F. I., in Posies (London, 1575), P7r-Q1r, and more famously in the story of Malbecco in Spenser’s 
Faerie Queene, 3.9-10. 
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same basic motif, appearing in its most elaborate form in the fifteenth-century Castle of 
Perseverance.156 Similarly, when Hamlet exclaims that he will speak to the apparition 
“though hell itself should gape” and bid him hold his peace, there flickers before our eyes the 
traditional image of the jaws of hell devouring an endless procession of sinners, a common 
motif in the period’s art, but also a feature of the allegorical staging of the medieval and 
postmedieval drama. Furthermore, within seconds of Hamlet saying these words, we find 
ourselves in the midst of a scene which is the structural heart of the psychomachia genre, with 
the protagonist torn between the advice of a friend concerned about his “sovereignty of 
reason” (1.5.73) – and thus, perhaps, very fittingly named Horatio – and an apparition which 
is in all probability the devil, beckoning him into darkness. 
 The pattern culminates in the so-called “cellarage scene” which closes the first act 
(1.5.146-98). Here, for some fifty lines which have baffled readers for centuries, and are yet 
to be fully explained, the “medieval” allegorical drama suddenly erupts from the background 
and takes centre stage. Moments ago, having successfully infected Hamlet’s ear with a 
pestilent speech of his father’s death, the apparition had very appropriately sunk into “hell”. 
By the time Horatio and Marcellus catch up with him, the prince has also formally sworn 
himself to revenge, and has begun to speak in “wild and whirling words” (1.5.139) that his 
friends find difficult to understand. Swearing “by Saint Patrick” (142), and assuring them that 
the apparition is “an honest ghost” (144) – expressions alluding to purgatory and thus 
signalizing his descent into papistry – he demands that they be sworn to secrecy.
157
 As they 
are about to take an oath “on [his] sword”, the apparition cries “Swear” from below the stage, 
to which Hamlet responds: “Ah ha, boy, say’st thou so? Art thou there, truepenny?/ Come on, 
                                                          
156
 Another notable fifteenth-century example is the Digby Mary Magdalene. Anne Boleyn famously played 
the part of Perseverance in a pageant based on the same structure, performed at court on Shrove Tuesday, 1522. 
On the allegory of the castle more broadly, see C. Whitehead, Castles of the Mind (Manchester, 2003). For 
examples of the personification of Reason, see H. Medwall, Nature ([London], 1534), and the three “wit and 
science/wisdom” plays; see M. Twycross, “John Redford, Wit and Science”, in Handbook, ed. Betteridge and 
Walker. In Medwall’s Nature, Reason plays the part exactly analogous to that of Horatio, fighting with 
Sensuality for the allegiance of the protagonist Man. The play does not dramatize the siege, yet Reason makes an 
elaborate comparison of “the lyfe of mortall creature/ To the assyge agayn a strong town or castell” (E3r-v). 
157
 On the association of Saint Patrick with the Irish pilgrimage site known as St Patrick’s Purgatory, and 
with purgatory more generally, see Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, 73-111.  
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you hear this fellow in the cellarage./ Consent to swear.” Why would Hamlet address the 
ghost of his father in this bizarre, irreverent manner? Eventually elaborate psychological  
explanations would be provided, yet for a long time critics could not make much sense of any 
of this, and many chose to regard the scene as a crowd-pleasing atavism from the Ur-
Hamlet.158 
John Upton would seem to have been the first to put criticism on the right track by 
explaining that Hamlet’s apparently erratic behaviour in this scene is modelled on the 
conventional stage antics of the Vice, who was “used to make fun with the Devil; and [...] had 
several trite expressions, as, I’ll be with you in a trice: Ah, ha, boy, are you there, &c. And 
this was great entertainment to the audience, to see their old enemy so belabour’d in 
effigy”.
159
 Thus Hamlet cries “Ah ha”, insists repeatedly on his friends swearing on his sword 
(the Vice’s signature prop was his dagger of lath), and addresses the “fellow in the cellarage” 
by abusively humorous appellations commonly used of the devil. As Upton and most 
subsequent commentators fail to note, however, Hamlet’s adoption of such behaviour and 
language in addressing the supposed ghost of his father is additionally appropriate: the Vice is 
the devil’s son.
160
 
“Truepenny” is the first of a series of such appellations, which continue through what 
is the least understood aspect of the scene, the threefold oath-taking, perhaps because it too is 
                                                          
158
 The theory was accepted by no less a scholar than Chambers as late as 1895: “a survival from the older 
play, [...] retained to please the groundlings”; W. Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet, ed. E. K. Chambers 
(Boston, 1895), 140. One particularly insightful commentator was even of the opinion that “This whole scene” – 
Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 1 – “is unnecessary to the design of the play; and might, I believe, with advantage, be 
omitted”; E. H. Seymour, Remarks... upon the Plays of Shakespeare (London, 1805), 2: 138. 
159
 J. Upton, Critical Observations on Shakespeare (London, 1746), 7-11, n. 5. This, along with 
Tschischwitz’s claim that the “repetition of the oath, the shifting of the ground, and the Latin phrase are taken 
from the ceremonies of conjurors” was still the only useful commentary to be found in the New Variorum: 
Hamlet, ed. H. H. Furness (1877; repr. New York, 1963). On “Ah ha” – “Aha”, “A ha”, etc. – as part of the 
conventional “expository formula” of the Vice, see B. Spivack, Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil (New 
York, 1958), 179; cf. McGee, Elizabethan Hamlet, 69-70. Feste’s lines in Twelfth Night shows that Shakespeare 
was perfectly familiar with these conventions: “I am gone, sir,/ And anon, sir,/ I’ll be with you again,/ In a trice,/ 
Like to the old Vice,/ Your need to sustain/ Who with dagger of lath/ In his rage and wrath/ Cries ‘Aha,’ to the 
devil,/ Like a mad lad,/ ‘Pare thy nails, dad,/ Adieu, goodman devil’” (4.2.123-34). See also the final chapter in 
de Grazia’s “Hamlet” without Hamlet. 
160
 An early instance appears in the fifteenth-century Assembly of Gods, ed. J. Chance (Kalamazoo, 1999), 
where Vice appears as Pluto’s “dere son” (l. 605), leading the army of hell against that of Apollo’s captain, 
Virtue. Cf. Spivack, Allegory of Evil, 60-1, n. 4. 
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based on a stage convention from the earlier drama that has not come down to us.
161
 For 
whatever reason, as Horatio and Marcellus take the oath, the apparition again cries “Swear”, 
now apparently directly beneath them, to which Hamlet responds by removing himself and 
the oath-takers to a different place on the stage: “Hic et ubique? Then we’ll shift our ground./ 
Come hither, gentlemen”.
162
 As Greenblatt explains, hic et ubique is another Catholic tell-tale: 
the phrase appears in a Catholic prayer to be recited when entering a churchyard, for which 
one receives a pardon of as many days in purgatory as there are persons buried in that 
                                                          
161
 That this scene, so marginal in modern criticism and performance, must have had considerable effect in 
Shakespeare’s day is evidenced by the borrowing of the seemingly trivial “truepenny” line – conflated with 
Marcellus’ “Hillo, ho, ho” (1.5.117) – in J. Marston’s Malcontent, first performed in or about 1603. Truepenny 
normally means “A trusty person, an honest fellow” (OED), but Shakespeare’s and Marston’s usage is of course 
ironic, and Marston’s “old truepenny”, just like Shakespeare’s “old mole” (see n. 164 below), is evidently an 
expression used of the devil. This is supported also by the context of Marston’s usage, where it is employed by a 
character both Vice-like and Hamlet-like, and refers to the villain of the play: “Malevole. Illo, ho, ho, ho! Art 
there, old truepenny? Where hast thou spent thyself this morning? I see flattery in thine eyes and damnation i’ 
thy soul. Ha, ye huge rascal!/ Mendoza. Thou art very merry./ Malevole. As a scholar futuens gratis. How does 
the devil go with thee now?”; J. Marston, The Malcontent, ed. G. K. Hunter (London, 1975), 3.3.38-41. See also 
Nashe’s anti-Marprelate tract An Almond for a Parrat (London, [1589?]), B4v, where “the good olde true-pennie 
Marprelate [...] sits ruminating vnder an oake, or in the bottome of a haystacke, whose bloud shall be first spilte 
in the reformation of the Church”. Ruminating under an oak, or at the bottom of a haystack, is the devil: see the 
broadside ballad The Devil’s Oak (London, 1685): “And the Devil he was weather-beat/ and forc’d to take a 
tree;/ Because that the Tempest it was so great,/ his way he could not see:/ But under an Oak, instead of a cloak,/ 
he stood to keep himself dry”; S. Harsnett, A Discovery of the Fravdvlent practices of Iohn Darrel (London, 
1599), I1r: here the devil is said to assume the form of a haystack, rather than sit at the bottom of one, but 
probably a direct parallel could be found (this appears in what is presented as a quote from G. More’s True 
discourse, published a year later in Middelburg, but the passage in question [F1r] agrees only partly with 
Harsnett’s quote; possibly Harsnett knew an earlier version in manuscript; More notes that his Discourse was 
“dispatched in December last. The difficultie of printing hath hindred the publishing of it thus longe”). Jenkins 
also compares Greene’s Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay, where the devil is referred to as “a plain, honest man” – 
to which we may also compare Hamlet’s statement, just moments earlier, that “It is an honest ghost, that let me 
tell you” (1.5.144). The line is most sensibly read with a stress on there, “Art thou there, truepenny?”, thus 
meaning, as Prosser notes, “So you are the devil?” (Hamlet and Revenge, 140).  
162
 I side with Wilson (What Happens, 85), Jenkins (long note to 1.5.163, SD), and others who believe a 
threefold oath is being taken – namely, “Never to speak of this that you have seen” (1.5.161), “Never to speak of 
this that you have heard” (168), and “never [...] to note/ That you know aught of” the assumed “antic 
disposition” (180-6) – rather than the “ghost” interrupting the taking of a single oath. The logic behind this, and 
especially the role of the apparition, remains unclear. In Der bestrafte Brudermord, a German adaptation of 
either Shakespeare’s or the earlier Hamlet, surviving in a manuscript probably dating from 1710, the reason is 
explicitly stated: “Oh! I hear now what this means. It seems that the Ghost of my father is displeased at my 
making the matter known” (Hamlet, ed. Furness, 2: 126). This is clearly the germ from which Upton and later 
Wilson draw their interpretations of the scene, but the impression is that the original logic was already obscure to 
the German adapter, and that his Hamlet’s explanation is his own rationalization. Wilson points (ibid., 82) to R. 
Scot, The discouerie of witchcraft (London, 1584), Ii4r-v, where there is an account of an oath between the 
sorcerer and his familiar which is to be sworn “three times”, “in reuerence (peraduenture) of the Trinitie”, “and 
at euerie time kisse the booke, and at euerie time makes marks to the bond”. J. A. Quincy, Jr., “Some Notes on 
Hamlet”, MLN 28 (1916): 39-43, points to the episode of Balaam and Balak (Num. 22-24): when Balaam proves 
unable to utter a curse on the Isrealites, Balak twice asks him to remove to another place and try again; in the 
Chester mystery cycle, the episode was represented by having Balaam visit all four ends of the stage. Neither of 
these suggestions is very helpful, nor is the imitation in Fletcher’s The Woman’s Prize (Comedies, Qqqqq1v). 
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churchyard.
163
 As the second oath is taken, the apparition cries again, again they change 
place, and again Hamlet addresses it as the devil: “Well said, old mole. Canst work i’th’ earth 
so fast?/ A worthy pioneer! Once more remove, good friends.”
164
 Finally, as the third oath is 
being taken, the apparition cries “Swear” for the fourth and last time, and Hamlet breaks off 
the pattern with “Rest, rest, perturbed spirit”. 
 The effect of all this would be have been to a large degree comic, indeed farcical, and 
if we keep this in mind we will not be puzzled by the irreverent nature of the early references 
and allusions to the play, and the fact that they so often portray the prince as a figure of 
ridicule, and hint at the infernal rather than purgatorial origin of the “ghost”.
165
 We should 
                                                          
163
 Hamlet in Purgatory, 16, 234-5: “In the context of the Ghost’s claim that he is being purged, and in the 
context, too, of Hamlet’s invocation of Saint Patrick, the words hic et ubique, addressed to the spirit who seems 
to be moving beneath the earth, seem to be an acknowledgment of the place where his father is imprisoned.” 
While this is true, Greenblatt fails to take into account the simultaneous references to hell and the devil. He notes 
that the custom ridiculed in T. Rogers’ 1607 Catholic Doctrine of the Church of England. For another example, 
see O. Ormerod, The Pictvre of a Papist (London, 1606), Y4r: Ormerod’s Minister lists twenty-five points of 
comparison between the doctrine of Roman Catholics and “Turkes”, the twenty-first being that “The Turkes pray 
for the dead; so do you, and that especially when you go ouer any Church-yard saying: Auete omnes animæ 
fideles, quarum corpora hic et vbiq[ue] requiescat in puluere”, etc. 
164
 For “old mole” and “worthy pioneer” as denoting the devil, see Jenkins’ long note to 1.5.157, and the 
references there. In addition, see The Revelations of St. Birgitta of Sweden, trans. D. Searby, intro. and notes B. 
Morris (Oxford, 2006-), 3: 61: “What does the mole burrowing in the earth symbolize if not the devil who 
burrows about unseen and upsets the soul?”; J. Melton, Astrologaster (London, 1620), L1r, aligning the four 
devils of fire, air, water, and earth, with the salamander, the chameleon, the herring, and the mole; W. Charleton, 
The Darkness of Atheism Dispelled (London, 1652), 2B1v: “that subterraneous Mole, the Devil”. The real 
giveaway, however, is the collocation “Old Mole”: see the OED entry for devil,  I.1.a, addressed “in popular or 
rustic speech by many familiar terms as Old Nick, Old Simmie, Old Clootie, Old Teaser, the Old One, the Old 
lad, etc.” The line is echoed in Ford’s ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore, in reference to the villainous Hippolita: “Work 
you that way, old mole?” (2.2.139); J. Ford, “’Tis Pity She’s a Whore”, ed. M. Lomax (Oxford, 1995). 
165
 On the early allusions, see S. N. Greenfield, “Quoting Hamlet in the Early Seventeenth Century”, MP 105 
(2008): 510-34; de Grazia, “Hamlet” without Hamlet, 8-9, and n. 13: “In the early decades of performance, 
Hamlet’s signature action may have been not paralyzing thought but frenzied motion”, and “his hyperactivity 
would have linked him more with the roustabout clown of medieval folk tradition than with the introspective 
consciousness acclaimed by the modern period.” Parodic references include A. S[coloker?], Daiphantvs 
(London, 1604), A2r: “Faith it [i.e., the author’s  poem] should please all, like prince Hamlet. But in sadnesse, 
then it were to be feared he would runne made: Insooth I will not be moonesicke to please”; G. Chapman, B. 
Jonson, and J. Marston, Eastward Hoe (London, 1605), D3r: a minor character is introduced rushing onto the 
stage (“Enter Hamlet a footeman in haste”), solely for the purpose of occasioning a brief laugh at his expense – 
“Sfoote Hamlet; are you madde?”; F. Beaumont, The Woman Hater (London, 1607), D2r: “Laza. [...] speake I 
am bound [to heare.]/ Count. So art thou to reuenge, when thou shalt heare the fish head is gone, and we know 
not whither” (cf. Hamlet, 1.5.6-7); T. Dekker, The Dead Tearme (London, 1608), G3r,  describing a scam 
perpetrated by two con-men: “Sometimes would he ouertake him, and lay hands vppon him (like a Catch-pole) 
as if he had arrested him, but furious Hamlet woulde eyther breake loose like a Beare from the stake, or else so 
set his pawes on this dog that thus bayted him, that with tugging and tearing one another frocks off, they both 
looked like mad Tom of Bedlam.” For early references implying the demonic nature of the apparition, see 
Beaumont’s Woman Hater, where the Gondarino, pursued by Oriana, addresses her with words echoing Hamlet, 
1.1.2 and 1.1.43: “It comes againe; new apparitions,/ And tempting spirits: Stand and reuele thy selfe,/ Tell why 
thou followest me? I feare thee/ As I feare the place thou camst from: Hell” (D4r); I. M. S., “On Worthy Master 
Shakespeare and his Poems”, in Mr. William Shakespeares Comedies, Histories, and Tragedies (London, 1632), 
*3r, praising Shakespeare’s ability to “blowe ope the iron gates/ Of death and Lethe, where confused lye/ Great 
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probably suppose that most saw that Hamlet is sick, that his head is the devil’s bath, and that 
he is falling to the powers of evil. Yet as already Corbin argued in his early study – 
incidentally one of the better examples of how daring and radical the much-maligned “old 
historicism” was in its day – mental illness, true or feigned, elicited little sympathy from the 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century playgoer.
166
 Hamlet’s psychological disintegration after 
the encounter with the apparition, which most of the audience must have at least suspected to 
be the devil, would not have endeared them to his plight, especially those of them who also 
recognized that it was paralleled by a descent into papistry. “O all you host of heaven! O 
earth! what else?/ And shall I couple hell?” (1.5.92-93). What else is there besides heaven, 
earth and hell? For a Wittenberg-educated prince of Denmark, the answer should be 
“nothing”, yet this prince swears by Saint Patrick, judges the apparition to be “an  honest 
ghost”, and admonishes his fellow student that “There are more things in heaven and earth, 
[...]/ Than are dreamt of in your philosophy” (1.5.175).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
heapes of ruinous mortalitie./ In that deepe duskie dungeon to discerne/ A royall Ghost from Churles”. Of even 
greater interest is the representation of the apparition in the Brudermord, which opens with a Senecan prologue 
unambiguously defining its moral perspective, as well as the origin of the so-called “ghost”. Night appears, 
boasting of her power “To practice evil, to afflict mankind”, and summons the three furies “From Acheron’s 
dark pit”, instructing them to “Kindle a fire of revenge, and let the sparks fly over the whole realm; entangle 
kinsmen in the net of crime, and give joy to hell, so that those who swim in the sea of murder may soon drown” 
(Hamlet, ed. Furness, 2: 122). The “ghost” that soon appears is blatantly, farcically malevolent. Even before its 
appearance, one of the sentinels reports his initial sighting, which has given him “a hell’s sweat”; he is 
admonished by his comrade, for a soldier “must fear neither friend nor foe; no, nor the devil himself”. Presently, 
however, “Ghost of the King approaches the Sentinel, and frightens him, and then exit”; moments later, the 
apparition returns and “from behind gives him a box on the ear, and makes him drop his musket”, causing him to 
cry, “The devil himself is after me.” The sentinel – who had previously invoked Catholic saints: “O holy 
Anthony of Padua, defend me! [...] O Saint Velten [sic]!” – reports to Horatio that the apparition “set upon me so 
that I fancy myself a live man in purgatory”. However, informed of an apparition in the likeness of his late 
father, that “does much harm to the sentinels on this post”, the German Hamlet hopes they are mistaken, “for the 
souls of the pious rest quietly till the time of their resurrection”. 
166
 See Corbin, Elizabethan Hamlet, a study, as stated in its subtitle, of the Sources, and of Shakespere’s 
Environment, to show that the Mad Scenes had a Comic Aspect now Ignored. “It is a fact too often forgotten”, 
writes Corbin, “that bear baiting was a national sport with our forefathers, and that the merriment of their dinner 
tables was supplied by idiots and madmen”, “an attitude towards acts of cruelty and insanity which is incredible 
to any one brought up amid the sensibility of modern life” (33-4). How novel such ideas were at the time comes 
across vividly in the brief and notably restrained “Prefatory Note” contributed by F. Y. Powell: “it seemed to 
me”, he writes, “that [Corbin] had got hold of a truth that has not been clearly, if at all, expressed in our 
Elizabethan studies – to wit, that the 16th century audience’s point of view, and, of necessity, the playwright’s 
treatment of his subject, were very different from ours of to-day in many matters of mark” (vii). For the basic 
idea Corbin is indebted to his Harvard lecturer B. Wendell; see Wendell’s William Shakspere (New York, 1894): 
“Elizabethan England was childishly brutal. [...] In actual lunacy, [...] the England of Elizabeth saw not 
something horrible, but rather conventionally comic – much as drunkenness is still held comic on the stage. In 
physical suffering it often saw mere grotesque contortion: witness the frequency of trashing in old comedy. [...] 
There are few facts in the Elizabethan drama which more strongly emphasize the remoteness from ourselves not 
only of Elizabethan England, but also of Shakspere, the Elizabethan playwright” (155-6). 
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 Finally, while the audience would have sympathized with the prince’s desire for 
revenge, this sympathy would not have extended to his decision to act on this desire.
167
 This is 
premeditated murder, and the terminology of Hamlet’s fall is unmistakable: “thy 
commandment all alone shall live/ Within the book and volume of my brain,/ Unmix’d with 
baser matter. Yes, by heaven!” (1.5.102-4). “[W]ould an Elizabethan audience fail to see”, 
asks McGee, “a blasphemous parody of God giving the Tables of the Law to Moses?”
168
 The 
antically disposed Vice is out of the box; riotous blasphemy is to be expected. Evil is now 
Hamlet’s good, and he will make a heaven – “Yes, by heaven!” – out of hell. The act of 
writing down his wrathful sententia into his freshly erased “tables” is more than reminiscent 
of the act of signing an infernal contract.
169
 Horatio’s “Heavens secure him!” comes too late. 
“I have sworn’t./ [...] So be it.” Hamlet has made his pact with the devil. 
 Obviously, this takes us very far from the ordinary understanding of the play, not to 
mention that it denies utterly any idea of Catholic sympathies at work in it. “Many readers”, 
writes Prosser in the conclusion of her argument for the demonic ghost, “have long been 
objecting, ‘But how is such an interpretation possible when it conflicts with our instinctive 
impression of the Ghost?’ I believe this interpretation is the only one that corresponds to our 
instinctive impressions – or would be, if we were free to react naturally, without misleading 
preconceptions fostered by critical and theatrical tradition.”
170
 Prosser is a sound and sober 
                                                          
167
 See Prosser, Hamlet and Revenge, 3-94. Even F. Bowers, whose Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy (1940; 
repr. Princeton, 1966) popularized the much-abused idea of the Elizabethan’s supposed “ambiguity” towards 
revenge,  inevitably concludes that this ambiguity only goes so far: “the revenger of the drama started with the 
sympathy of the audience if his cause were good and if he acted according to the typically English notions of 
straightforward fair play. It was only [...] when he turned to ‘Machiavellian’ treacherous intrigues that the 
audience began to veer against him. That the majority of stage-revengers [...] met their death, may be attributed 
either to the fact that they turned from sympathetic, wronged heroes to bloody maniacs whose revenge might 
better have been left to God; or else that the strain of the horrible situation in which they found themselves so 
warped their characters that further existence in a normal world became impossible and death was the only 
solution” (40). 
168
 Elizabethan Hamlet, 9. 
169
 Indeed, the entire passage reads like a travesty of 2 Cor. 3:3: “Forasmuche as ye declare that ye are the 
epistle of Christ ministred by vs, and written, not with ynke, but the spirite of the lyuyng God, not in tables of 
stone, but in fleshly tables of the heart.” Hamlet’s actions reverse Paul’s injunction: he goes from metaphorically 
writing in his “table of memory” and “book and volume of [his] brain”, to actually writing, in an actual table – 
from the New to the Old Testament, as befits someone about to make a formal vow to revenge. I quote the 
Bishops’ Bible here – The holie Bible (London, [1568]) – as it corresponds to Hamlet’s “table” and “tables” 
(1.5.98, 107); the Geneva has “tablets”. The Bishops’ and the Geneva are the versions Shakespeare was most 
familiar with: see N. Shaheen, Biblical References in Shakespeare’s Plays (Newark, 1999), 38-48. 
170
 Hamlet and Revenge, 141. 
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historicist, arriving at the above judgment by a meticulous appraisal of the available textual 
and contextual evidence. It is worth pointing out, however, that it is not only the scholars who 
have felt this. Critics have felt it too. Harold C. Goddard, for example, as thoroughbred a 
Shakespearean critic as one can imagine, whose 1951 Meaning of Shakespeare is one of the 
major monuments to the tradition – a solid, two-volume, 700-page slab of pure interpretation, 
untainted by the slavish pedantry of “embalming every scholarly fly that has fallen into the 
scholarly amber by dedicating to him the tombstone of a separate footnote”.
171
 Goddard’s 
contempt pours steadily on these wretches, pestering him with “those strange abstractions, 
‘the Elizabethan audience’ and ‘the Elizabethan playgoer.’ As if the nature of the human 
imagination, which has scarcely altered in a thousand years, must step aside in deference to 
‘the conventions of the Elizabethan stage’!”
172
 The most pitiful of all, as it happens, are those 
who have wasted their time trawling through the ghost-lore of the age. “The whole thing is 
reduced to absurdity when we begin to hear, as we do, of ‘Elizabethan ghosts.’ Shakespeare’s 
lifelong pity for ‘the fools of time’ suggests what he might have thought of this way of 
approaching his works.” If anywhere, then, here is a critic that would have considered the 
present study as simple nonsense. Yet for all this, Goddard’s ghost is deeply malevolent. “I 
once asked”, he writes, towards the end of his Hamlet chapter, 
a young girl (barely over the border of childhood) to whom I had read Hamlet, 
whether she thought the Ghost was Hamlet’s father or the devil. I like to get a fresh 
reaction of innocence to a masterpiece, uncontaminated by traditional critical opinion. 
“I don’t see that it makes any difference,” she said, “I should think it would be just the 
same.” “Just the same?” I inquired, arrested. “Well,” she explained, “I should think 
that whoever told you to kill somebody was the devil.”
173
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 Goddard, Meaning, 1: x. 
172
 Ibid., 1: 8. 
173
 Ibid., 1: 382. 
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CHAIRBONNE AND POISSON 
 
Hamlet, the quintessential modern hero, behaving like the quintessential medieval buffoon, 
the allegorical son of Satan; the supposed ghost of his father dutifully checking every box in 
the demonologist’s questionnaire, and boasting his Papist credentials – even if we agree that 
this is what Shakespeare labours to impress upon the more perceptive members of his 
audience in the first act of the play, what are we to make of it in a larger context? While, 
again, a comprehensive reading is beyond the scope of this chapter, in this section I will 
suggest a polemical perspective in which such a Hamlet and such a ghost make sense, a 
perspective which emerges readily enough once it is recognized that, while certainly present, 
the anti-Catholic element is only one side of the play’s double-edged satirical blade.
174
 
Hamlet is not only anti-Papist but also anti-Puritan, and it is this point of view, aligned with 
the dominant discourse of Church of England orthodoxy, which not only accommodates the 
broadest range of the play’s religious references and allusions, but also uncovers a more 
comprehensive allegorical subtext at work, and indicates for whom this subtext was primarily 
intended, and what contemporary issues it seeks to address. 
 The discourse which differentiated the three competing religious factions in England 
as Protestant, Puritan, and Papist, and which equated the latter two as the twin enemies of the  
former, seems to have been firmly established by the late 1590s.
175
 Thus in 1590 Richard 
Harvey writes that he “hard say a good old Doctor [...] found out Puritanisme in Papistry”, 
                                                          
174
 In presenting his ghost-devil as Catholic, Shakespeare is drawing on a long tradition in English Protestant 
drama. See J. D. Cox, The Devil and the Sacred in English Drama (Cambridge, 2000), 84-6: “In Johan Baptystes 
Preachynge (1538) Bale [...] for the first time openly identified the devil with traditional religion itself – a model 
that countless dramatists, including Shakespeare, would imitate after him. [...] His influence on other playwrights 
is apparent in the persistent pattern of having infidels and vices betray themselves by their pious allusions to the 
old faith and by their vigorous Catholic oaths.” The most famous dramatic example of the devil’s equation with 
Roman Catholicism was, of course, Marlowe’s Faustus. When the devil first appears in his true form, Faustus 
sends him away as “too ugly to attend on” him: “Go and return an old Franciscan friar,/ That holy shape 
becomes a devil best”; C. Marlowe, Dr Faustus, ed. R. Gill, 2nd ed. (1989; repr. London, 2004), 1.3.25-7. See 
Figure 5. 
175
 In calling attention to this discourse, my intention is not to polemicize with the two tendencies in recent 
historiography of the English Reformation that have drawn attention to the limitations of this terminology, 
namely the tendency to lessen the divide between many of so-called “Puritans” and the Church of England, and 
the tendency, already discussed above, to posit a longer afterlife for traditional beliefs and practices than earlier 
scholarship had allowed. My claim is that there was a discourse, propagated by the Church of England 
mainstream, which did differentiate these three categories (Protestant, Puritan, Papist); that there was a particular 
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apparently taken with the novelty of the conceit.
176
 Two years later, Matthew Suttcliffe 
sarcastically remarks that “Onely this thing is herein commendable, that puritans & papists 
are very fitly ioyned together in this case. Both deny the supremacie alike, both depraue the 
gouernme[n]t alike, both rayle against our Communion booke alike: and therefore (that all 
may be alike) both deserue to be vsed alike”.
177
 At the 1593 trial of the dissenters Henry 
Barrow and John Greenwood, Thomas Owen is reported as saying that “bothe they [i.e., the 
puritans] and the papists were pioners for the king of Spaine, the one beginning at the one 
end, and the other at the other end, and so at the last they would mete at the harte of the 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
topos in this discourse, which equated the Puritan and the Papist as the twin opponents of the (Church of 
England) Protestant; and that this discourse did relate to a political, if not necessarily doctrinal or social, reality. 
176
 Plaine Percevall (London, [1590]), C4r. 
177
 An Answere to a Certaine Libel (London, 1592), Z3v. 
Figure 5. Mephistopheles as 
Franciscan friar; The Historie of the 
Damnable Life, and deserued Death 
of Doctor Iohn Faustus (London, 
1608), facing the title page. 
Summoned by Faustus, the devil 
assumes several forms before finally 
appearing “in the manner of a gray 
Fryer” (A3r).  
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midle”.
178
 A manuscript report containing Owen’s statement reached Robert Parsons, who 
reports it in paraphrase and comments on its wittiness.
179
 The topos also appears in two of 
John Harington’s epigrams, “A Paradox. To Cinna the Brownist” and “Of the Papists Feasts, 
and the Brownists Fasts”.
180
 This discourse received a major reinforcement with the 
publication, within days of Elizabeth’s death on 24 March 1603, of the first publicly available 
edition of James I’s Basilikon doron.181 In spite of the addition of a cautiously worded 
preface, the work still denounced, in the plainest of terms, both Puritans and Papists, and 
moreover, it denounced them in the same breath, and specifically with respect to the 
paramount question of royal authority.
182
 Nor was this a purely polemical gesture: James was 
actually appealed to by representatives of all three factions before even having the chance to 
be crowned king of England. As the royal entourage was making its way towards a plague-
ravaged London in April and early May of 1603, he met with various representatives of the 
conformist view, but was also tricked, on 17 April in York, into accepting a petition on the 
                                                          
178
 The Writings of John Greenwood and Henry Barrow, ed. L. H. Carlson (1970; repr. London, 2003), 202. 
179
 Newes from Spayne and Holland ([Antwerp], 1593), E1r: “And wittely spake Sargent Owin of late in my 
opinion, at the Barr against Barrow and Grenewode, that were araygned and executed, that puritans and papists 
were like dangerous pioneers, that began to dig at the two endes, and would inclose at the length the protestant in 
the middle, and meete at the very hart of the realme, vnderminyng the same before it could be remedied.” 
180
 See The Letters and Epigrams of John Harington, ed. N. E. McClure (Philadelphia, 1930): “Pure Cinna 
deemes I hold a Paradox,/ Not to be prov’d, but vnto stones and stox,/ That brownists are vnto the papists neerer/ 
Then Protestants: tis cleer thear’s nothing cleerer” (289-90); cf. n. 183. 
181
 On the circumstances of the publication, and the immediate popularity of the work, see the account in 
Craigie’s edition: Basilicon Doron, ed. J. Craigie (Edinburgh, 1944). The London edition was reportedly “sent to 
press within an hour of the Queen’s death”, and was being read by 30 March, only two days after it was entered 
on the Stationers’ Register. In the first few weeks around 14,000 copies were printed, and according to Francis 
Bacon, the book was in “every man’s hand”; see Basilicon Doron, ed. Craigie, 2: 18, n. 2; Selected Writings, ed. 
N. Rhodes, J. Richards, and J. Marshall (Aldershot, 2003), 199, n. 1. The publication immediately upon 
Elizabeth’s death cannot have been, as Craigie believed, by “happy but undesigned chance” (2: 2), but was rather 
part of a carefully prepared and timed propagandist effort in favour of the new king.  
182
 See James VI/I, [Basilikon doron] (London, 1603): e.g., “I am no Papist” (C4v); “hate no man more than a 
proud Puritan” (E5r); “both the extreamities, as well as [...] the vaine Puritane, so [...] Papall Bishoppes” (E5v); 
“a king is not merè laicus, as both the Papistes and Anabaptistes would haue him, to the which errour also the 
puritanes incline ouer-farre” (I7v). Cf. K. Fincham and P. Lake, “The Ecclesiastical Policy of James I”, Journal 
of British Studies 24 (1985): 169-307: “This new epoch of Protestant virtue and Christian unity was threatened 
by two disaffected and aggressive minorities, the papists and the Puritans. Although the sermons of 1606 were 
directed primarily against the threat of Puritanism, or rather Presbyterianism, the stability of church and state 
was no less threatened by the papists, as the preachers themselves acknowledged in a number of asides. The king 
himself never tired of pointing out the equivalence of these two menaces, a view that may be traced in royal 
correspondence at the start of the reign through to the king’s speeches in his final parliament of 1624” (170). 
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behalf of the English Catholics, and was presented, towards the end of the month, with the 
Millenary Petition.
183
 
 Corresponding to this urgent political reality, and now enjoying explicit royal favour, 
the discourse of the Puritan-Papist caught on, and there is evidence that Shakespeare was 
quite familiar with this discourse and the associated controversies. In late September or early 
October 1603, the heads of the University of Oxford issued their Answere to the Millenary 
Petition, in the epistle to which, addressed to James, they listed seven counts in which they 
detected “a certeine Semblance [...] in two contrary Factions, that haue shewed themselues by 
their Petitions, discontented by the præsent State, & Ecclesiasticall Government: namely in 
the Papists and the Puritants [sic]”.184 “Verily”, the text continues, 
these men are like Samsons Foxes. They have their heades severed indeed; the One 
sort looking to the Papacy, the Other to the Presbiterie. But they are tyed togither by 
the tailes, vvith fire brandes betvveene them. Which if they bee not quenched in time, 
are able to set the whole Land in a Combustion and Vprore.
185
 
Other authors followed, enlarging the conceit into entire pamphlets and treatises, culminating 
in David Owen’s 1610 Herod and Pilate reconciled: or, The Concord of Papist and Pvritan... 
for the Coercion, Deposition, and Killing of Kings, but appearing until the final decades of the 
                                                          
183
 See The True Narration of the Entertainment of his Royall Maiestie (London, 1603), D3v: “This Sunday 
[i.e., 17 April] was a Seminary Priest apprehended: who before (vnder the title of a Gentleman) had deliuered a 
Petition to his Maiestie, in the name of all the English Catholikes”. According to The Answere of... the 
Vniversitie of Oxford... To the humble Petition (Oxford, 1603), ¶4v, note a, the Millenary Petition was presented 
to James in April (and not, as is sometimes claimed, upon his arrival into London on 11 May). Already by 3 
April, James had received an elaborate gift from John Harington, which included a “Gratulatory Elegie of the 
peaceable entry of King Iames”: “Ioy, Protestant; let papists be reclaymed;/ Leave, puritan, your superciliows 
frowne” (Letters and Epigrams, 320). 
184
 Answere, ¶¶2r. The Answere is presented as Agreeable, vndoubtedly, to the ioint and Vniforme opinion, of 
all the Deanes and Chapters, and altogether the learned and obedient Cleargy, in the Church of England. The 
Oxford Answere was preceded by a grace mandating conformity passed at Cambridge on 9 June. James had met 
with the heads of the University of Cambridge at the house of Oliver Cromwell, where the entourage stayed on 
27-29 April (True Narration, F1v). A letter of support from Cambridge, dated 7 October, is included in 
subsequent editions of the Answere, and is said to have been received “Immediately after the Printing” of the 
first edition. Thus the Answere was published in late September or early October, soon after James’ meeting with 
the heads of Oxford at Woodstock between 11 and 15 September, during his first progress, where the king 
“promised them his favour, and presence also, when GOD should abate the infection now raging in his 
Kingdom”; A. Wood, The History and Antiquities of the University of Oxford, ed. J. Gutch (Oxford, 1792-96), 2: 
281. These documents constitute a reaction to further activities by the advocates of the Millenary Petition, who 
had been campaigning for signatures to accompany a revised edition of the Petition. See N. Tyacke, Aspects of 
English Protestantism (Manchester, 2001), 265-7. 
185
 Ibid., ¶¶2v. 
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century.
186
 The most exact parallel, however, with the metaphor found in the Answere, down 
to specific points of verbal correspondence, comes from Lavatch, the clown of Shakespeare’s 
All’s Well That Ends Well: “For young Chairbonne the puritan and old Poisson the papist, 
howsome’er their hearts are severed in religion, their heads are both one: they may jowl horns 
together like any deer i’th’ heard” (1.3.51-5).
187
 
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine this discourse and these controversies 
in further depth. What is important is that they were current at the time when Shakespeare 
wrote Hamlet, and that they offer a context in which a play about “a young man from 
Wittenberg, with a distinctly Protestant temperament, [...] haunted by a distinctly Catholic 
ghost”, is not necessarily ambiguous.
188
 While such a play may have struck some of its less 
                                                          
186
 D. Owen, Herod and Pilate reconciled (Cambridge, 1610); the work had several posthumous editions, in 
slightly altered form, and under alternative titles. See also O. Ormerod’s Pictvre of a Puritane – paralleling his 
already cited Pictvre of a Papist – Wherunto is annexed a short treatise, entituled, Puritano-papismus: or a 
discouerie of Puritan-Papisme (London, 1605) ; [A. Cowley], The Puritan and the Papist ([Oxford], 1643). 
Owen borrows the metaphor of Samson’s foxes: “The Puritan-Church-Policie, and the Iesuiticall societie began 
together: the one in Geneva, 1536. and the other in Rome, 1537. [...]. These (though brethren in sedition and 
headie) are head-seuered, the one staring to the presbyterie, and the other to the Papacie, but they are so fast 
linked behind, and tayle-tied together with firebrands betweene them, that if they be not quenched by the power 
of Maiestie, they cannot chose (when the meanes are fitted to their plot) but set the Church on fire, and the state 
in an vprore” (Herod and Pilate, ¶¶2r). 
187
 All’s Well was first printed in the 1623 folio, and no references to early performances have been found. 
The date is most often conjectured as 1604-05, but estimates have varied from 1601 to 1609. If the Answere is 
the source for this passage, then the play cannot be earlier than October 1603 (cf. n. 191). This fits well with the 
recent argument for a mid-1604 date by T. Reilly, “The 1604 Controversy”, in New Critical Essays, ed. G. 
Waller (New York, 2007), who thinks the play “roughly coeval” with the Parliament debate on the Court of 
Wards and Liveries, which lasted from 30 March to 20 June 1604. The period between October 1603 and April 
1604 would not seem to be out of the question. While the passages pointed out by Reilly clearly relate to this 
subject, the 1604 debate was, as Reilly himself notes, only the “first formal” and the “first large-scale opposition 
to the Court of Wards and Liveries” (209, 211, emphasis mine). According to H. E. Bell, An Introduction to the 
History and Records of the Court of Wards and Liveries (1953; repr. Cambridge, 2011), 135, “complaints 
against the evils resulting from sales of wardships and leases of the minor’s lands” were already “long-standing” 
by “Elizabeth’s time”. 
188
 Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, 240. Other critics have similarly seen the religious conflict at the heart 
of the play’s topical or allegorical dimension as one between Protestantism (rather than Puritanism) and 
Catholicism. Thus McGee interprets the play as anti-Catholic (and pro-Protestant); Milward and Oakes, among 
others, as pro-Catholic (and anti-Protestant); while Kay Hoff anticipates Greenblatt’s position, namely that 
“Hamlet exploits religious issues that are exactly that – exploited. While they do bear witness to a theological 
sophistication of which Shakespeare has not been thought capable, and they evince, therefore, a deep, lively, and 
intelligent interest in religious matters, the theological issues expressed in Hamlet subserve Shakespeare’s 
dramatic purposes” (Hamlet’s Choice, 338). Cf. Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, 254: “We do not [...] need to 
believe that Shakespeare was himself a secret Catholic sympathizer; we need only to recognize how alert he was 
to the materials that were being made available to him. At a deep level there is something magnificently 
opportunistic, appropriative, absorptive, even cannibalistic about Shakespeare’s art”. A minor difference is that 
Kay Hoff allows that Hamlet “may betray a personal aversion to Spanish-style Catholicism” (Hamlet’s Choice, 
338), while Greenblatt and most contemporary critics would be inclined to see a degree of sympathy to the old 
faith. See McGee, Elizabethan Hamlet; Milward, Shakespeare the Papist, 159-73; E. T. Oakes, “Hamlet and the 
Reformation”, Logos 13 (2010): 53-78. 
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informed viewers and readers as curiously confused in religious matters, and while some may 
have missed the clues altogether, it would not have been so to anyone reasonably familiar 
with these very prominent and public debates, and the official position of the Church of 
England mainstream. Young Chairbonne the Puritan and old Poisson the Papist, both working 
on the behalf of their continental masters, were plotting to undermine the English church and 
state, and here was a play featuring a malcontent educated in one of the hotbeds of continental 
Puritanism, urged by a Catholic devil-ghost to commit regicide – both named Hamlet, 
underscoring their alignment and equivalence in the anti-English cause, with the old heresy 
fittingly represented as the father (and devil), and the younger as the son (and Vice). Precisely 
this, plotting to overthrow king and state, was the central charge levelled at the Puritan-Papist 
construct, and the play fully endorses this charge: the end result of the actions of young 
Chairbonne, undertaken at the bidding of old Poisson, is the extinction of the Danish royal 
family, and the fall of Denmark into the hands of a foreign power. 
 Furthermore, while agreeing with this general context, the play would seem to fit 
remarkably well with various circumstances specific to 1603, which is of course the date of its 
first quarto edition. England had a new king, whose three published works – freshly printed in 
London, and being the most obvious means by which the general public could become 
informed of his interests and opinions – were prominently concerned with demonology, the 
divine right of kings, and an ecclesiastical policy favouring a middle ground between the 
Puritan and Papist extremes.
189
 The fact that Shakespeare’s company was in the possession of 
a play whose most conspicuous features are a demonologically suspect apparition and an 
instigation to regicide, and which also, on a subtler level, relates both of these to current 
religious and political controversy and the Puritan-Papist topos, was thus either a stroke of 
spectacularly good luck, or, as seems more likely, the result of a deliberate attempt to respond 
to James’ views and court his favour.
190
 In addition, the play appears to have been written 
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 On 3 April, just four days after the first London edition of the Basilikon doron is reported as already being 
read, editions of the Daemonologie (London, 1603) and The Trve Lawe of Free Monarchies (London, 1603) are 
entered in the Stationers’ Register. 
190
 A Hamlet by Shakespeare was in existence around 1600, and appears on the Stationers’ Register on 26 
July 1602, but the earliest known text – and the earliest publication to credit Shakespeare’s company as his 
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with a university audience, among others, in mind. Although unique among Shakespeare’s 
plays, the claim on the Q1 title page that the play was performed at the universities of 
Cambridge and Oxford is supported by both textual and contextual evidence, and gives us 
another performance context in which the allegorical subtext of the play would have been 
appreciated.
191
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Highnesse seruants – could not have been published before the award of the King’s Men patent on 19 May 1603, 
and late additions or alterations are at least a possibility. Discussions typically pass fairly lightly over the award 
of the royal patent, an event whose importance to Shakespeare and his fellow actors cannot be overemphasized. 
By May they were probably already on the road, and Shakespeare would have had ample time to familiarize 
himself with his new king’s writings, and in the process notice, perhaps, how easily the old play could be made 
to resonate with the views and interests these exhibited. If not earlier in 1603, there is very good reason to 
believe, with Kiernan, that the play was performed before James and a courtly audience at Hampton Court, as 
part of the year’s Christmas festivities – an audience on which play’s various allusions and references to matters 
of theological and political controversy would not have been spent.See A. Kiernan, Shakespeare, the King’s 
Playwright (New Haven, 1995), ch. 2. The titles of the plays performed by the King’s Men are not recorded, but 
Kiernan’s deduction that they included Hamlet seems warranted, especially in the light of the present argument. 
Aspects of Kiernan’s discussion are unconvincing, but he does surmise that the play’s presentation of a 
succession crisis would have been of interest to James, and that he would have been suspicious of the Catholic 
ghost.  
191
 The London theatres had been closed since 19 March due to Elizabeth’s illness, and by the end of the 
month the plague broke out. On 19 May the royal patent is awarded at Greenwich Palace. By this point the 
company was probably already on tour, and after 19 May they are recorded as the King’s Men at Bath, Coventry, 
Ipswich, and Shrewsbury in 1602-03, and at Maldon and Oxford in 1603-04; E. K. Chambers, William 
Shakespeare (1930; repr. Oxford, 1951), 2: 328-9. The date of the Bath performance has been tentatively 
identified as 25 July 1603; see REED: Somerset, ed. J. Stokes and R. J. Alexander (Toronto, 1996), 876. Going 
by the entry of the payment of Oxford alone, the date of the performance could have taken place between 29 
September 1603 and 29 September 1604. However, any such performance is extremely unlikely to have taken 
place between July 1603, when the plague reached Oxford, and February 1604, when it ceased (Wood, History, 
2: 279-80). If, then, Hamlet was performed at Oxford in 1603, as stated on the Q1 title page – As it hath beene 
diuerse times acted by his Highnesse seruants in the Cittie of London: as also in the two Vniuersities of 
Cambridge and Oxford, and else-where – this would have been between 19 May and an indeterminate date in 
July. Records of 1603 performances close to Oxford – at Coventry, and especially the dated performance at Bath 
on 25 July – add further probability to this inference. The editors of the REED volumes for Cambridge and 
Oxford are sceptical about the performance of Hamlet on university grounds in the light of the well-known 
prohibitions against common players (REED: Oxford, 858-9; REED: Cambridge, 984-5). Nelson in particular 
suspects the Q1 claim to be “the printer’s groundless boast”, overlooking, apparently, the fact that the King’s 
Men enjoyed a status like no other company in the land, and that their patent authorized them explicitly to 
perform “within the liberties and freedom of any city, university, town, or borough whatsoever within our said 
realms and dominions” (Theatre, ed. Wickham, Berry, and Ingram, 123, emphasis mine). As the king’s own 
company, with express allowance to perform at the universities, it seem reasonable to suppose that they would 
have been exempt from the prohibitions, and so the claim on the Q1 title page may well be a boast, yet a very 
grounded one, parading the company’s newly acquired special status. This is precisely one of the arguments in 
favour of university performance in the excellent article by M. Srigley, “Hamlet, ‘the law of writ’, and the 
Universities”, Studia Neophilologica 66 (1994): 35-46. The REED editors inexplicably engage with Boas’ early 
conjectures in “Hamlet at Oxford”, FR, n. s., 94 (1913): 245-53, but not with any later scholarship opposing his 
view, beginning with W. J. Lawrence’s “Belated Reply”, FR, n.s., 106 (1919): 219-27. Perhaps understandably, 
given the archival orientation of the project, the editors also omit any consideration of the intra-textual evidence 
for university performance, discussed since E. B. Reed, “The College Element in Hamlet”, MP 6 (1908-09): 453-
68, and more comprehensively, J. M. Nosworthy, Shakespeare’s Occasional Plays (London, 1965), ch. 10. A 
full investigation is impossible here, yet the following discussion proceeds on the assumption that university 
performances of Hamlet did take place, most likely between 19 May and July 1603. 
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 Various bits of potentially relevant information are yet to be systematically examined 
in light of the present argument, and there are, of course, numerous other questions, not the 
least of them whether Hamlet can decode as “Puritan”, and if so, to what extent and with what 
emphasis. Of great interest here is the fact that Hamlet’s “Puritan” features have been noted 
independently of the present thesis. Waddington and others note a number of perceived 
similarities with Luther, most tangibly the physical appearance and the melancholy.
192
 More 
recently, Hassel underscores Hamlet’s black garb, use of tables, sense of calling and appeals 
to “special providence” (5.2.215-16),
193
 diatribes against sex, women, cosmetics, and other 
perceived moral evils, a vocabulary which often intersects with that ascribed to the Puritan 
stereotype, and is “reinforced by a syntax and sound also associated by the satirists with 
Puritan expressions of moral outrage” – but most importantly, “Hamlet’s conscious and 
unconscious hypocrisy”, which “wears many cloaks, and some are woven in the style of 
Puritan representation”.
194
 Hamlet refuses to accept direct responsibility for the murders of 
Polonius, Rosencrantz, and Guildenstern, and indirect responsibility for the death of Ophelia; 
he “resists the authority of a monarch’s request for ‘outward conformity for the sake of 
union,’ and in so doing helps propel the state into both reform and chaos”; perhaps most 
indicatively, he also “admits frustrated ambition as one of his motives for killing Claudius” – 
who “Popp’d in between th’election and my hopes” (5.2.65) – where “we see once more his 
complicated brush against what Hamilton calls ‘the conformist representation of the Puritan 
who, on a pretense of being busy about reform, seeks to realize his own ambitions’”.
195
 
 Again, however, this “unusually rich and sympathetic version of the often caricatured, 
oversimplified Puritan figure” is only one half of the play’s polemical vision.
196
 Any reading 
which fails to acknowledge the opposite, anti-Catholic element at work – “absent from 
Hamlet’s usage”, Hassel finds, are the usual “derogatory references to Rome and the Papacy” 
– is inevitably drawn into the ambiguity argument, and the play remains an “odd and 
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sometimes contradictory field of allusion and analogy”.
197
 For one thing, Hamlet does make 
derogatory references to Catholicism, notably in the elaborate cluster of such references in his 
replies to the bewildered and comically uncomprehending Claudius, when summoned to 
divulge the hidden whereabouts of Polonius’ body (4.3.16-39). “Now, Hamlet”, the king 
demands, “where’s Polonius?” 
 Ham. At supper. 
 King. At supper? Where? 
 Ham. Not where he eats, but where a is eaten. A certain convocation of politic 
worms are e’en at him. Your worm is your only emperor for diet: we fat all creatures 
else to fat us, and we fat ourselves for maggots. Your fat king and your lean beggar is 
but variable service – two dishes, but to one table. That’s the end. 
 King. Alas, alas. 
 Ham. A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king, and eat the fish 
that hath fed of that worm. 
 King. What dost thou mean by this? 
Ham. Nothing but to show you how a king may go a progress through the guts of a 
 beggar. 
The supper where one is eaten is the Lord’s supper, and the scatological idea of Christ being 
chewed, digested, and eventually evacuated is one of the staple tropes in the Protestant satire 
of the Catholic Eucharist.
198
 From this, the prince moves on to a particularly ingenious 
allusion to the Diet of Worms, and given the context of the scene, to Luther’s examination at 
the 1522 Diet, before emissaries of the Catholic Church (“A certain convocation of politic 
worms are e’en at him”), and under the presiding of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V 
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 Here again there would seem to be a conflation of “Papist” and “Puritan” features. Waddington was the 
first to see in this passage a “grotesque literalization” of the Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist (“Lutheran 
Hamlet”, 28-30), whereas Greenblatt sees it as a “grotesquely materialist reimagining” of Roman Catholic of 
transubstantiation, adducing similar examples from Protestant satirists; see C. Gallagher and S. Greenblatt, 
Practising New Historicism (Chicago, 2000), 136-62; Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, 240-4. Both are correct, 
because the point is precisely to highlight another aspect in which the Puritan is perceived as identical to the 
Papist, and vice versa. 
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(“Your worm is your only emperor for diet”).
199
 All of this flies high above the head of 
Claudius – “Alas, alas”, “What dost thou mean by this?” – as it probably flew over the heads 
of most of Shakespeare’s contemporaries, but is precisely the kind of allusion that a more 
learned audience would have registered, and which would have alerted it to be on the lookout 
for an allegorical subtext pervading the play. 
 The king repeats the question: “Where is Polonius?” “In heaven”, answers the 
antically disposed prince, “If your messenger find him not there, seek him i’th’other place 
yourself. But if indeed you find him not within this month, you shall nose him as you go up 
the stairs into the lobby.” This continues the logic of the exchange by adding a further element 
of Catholic doctrine commonly derided in Protestant polemic and satire: if Polonius is neither 
in heaven, nor in “th’other place”, he must be in the “lobby” of purgatory.
200
 Again the king 
understands only the literal meaning, ordering his men to “Go seek him there”, to which 
Hamlet replies, bringing the sequence to an end, “A will stay till you come” – a piece of 
morbid humour, as Polonius’ body is not going anywhere, but also a veiled threat, implying 
that Polonius has more time to spend in purgatory than Claudius has left to live. Whether or 
not Hamlet actually believes this, or is merely keeping up with the logic of the exchange, is 
unclear, yet whether he is fully or only partly convinced, it is clear that the possibility has 
never left his mind, and that he is, in this respect, a lapsed Protestant – and are we not to 
expect this from the proverbially hypocritical Puritan?
201
 
 These references also underscore Hamlet’s connection to Wittenberg. One of 
Shakespeare’s most conspicuous additions to the story as he received it is to cast the 
protagonist and his main confidant as university students, which is not the case in any other 
version of the Hamlet, and has been plausibly interpreted as one of the elements introduced 
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with university performances in mind.
202
 Yet Hamlet and Horatio are not students of just any 
university: they are students of the University of Wittenberg, and Shakespeare makes sure the 
word is heard a sufficient number of times to get this point across (1.2.113-19, 164-8). It is 
therefore legitimate and indeed necessary to inquire what contemporary audiences would have 
made of this. Certainly Wittenberg was a word familiar to any educated person, and the city’s 
image in non-fictional sources seems clear enough: besides the high reputation of its 
university, the city was famous for being the birthplace of Luther, the cradle of the 
Reformation, and a major centre of continental Protestantism.
203
 Official opinion of 
Lutheranism seems to have been broadly irenic, if also critical in detail: there were significant 
divergences – notably in one of the principal shibboleths, the doctrine of the Eucharist – but 
these could be overlooked in the name of a broader Reformed unity.
204
 For a prince of 
Denmark to study at the University of Wittenberg seems realistic in that Denmark was a 
Lutheran nation, and there are records of Danish students at the university in Shakespeare’s 
day.
205
 
 The question to which there is still no wholly satisfactory answer, however, is what 
the mention of Wittenberg meant and connoted in English fiction, and on the English stage, of 
c.1600.206 Here, apparently, a Wittenberg degree does not seem to have been in much esteem. 
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 Apart, of course, from the obvious anachronism that it was founded in 1502, whereas the play’s action 
nominally takes place at the time of the Danelaw. 
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 As already mentioned, an early case for Luther as Shakespeare’s “prototype” for Hamlet was made by 
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Here the university’s most famous alumnus was not Luther but Faustus, who learned many 
things there, but most of all how to summon demons and syllogise himself into damnation. 
Even more interesting, and apparently unnoticed in this respect, is Henry Chettle’s Tragedy of 
Hoffman, where prince Jerome boasts: “True, I am no foole, I haue bin at Wittenberg, where 
wit growes.”
207
 This, however, is irony of the crudest sort, for as a theatre audience would 
already know, and as readers learn presently, Jerome is mentally disabled, and his father’s 
greatest care is that “A witlesse foole must needs be Prussias heire”.208 Wittenberg also 
figures unflatteringly in Austen Saker’s Narbonus – where, however, it is probably little more 
than a front for either or both of the English universities – and more significantly, Nashe’s 
Unfortvnate Traveller, where it is definitely presented as Puritan.209 Furthermore, Wittenberg 
often appears indiscriminately coupled with Geneva and other centres of continental 
Protestantism, and even if some the allusions in Hamlet do have a specifically Lutheran 
background, it could be that its mention more readily connoted a general category, 
“continental Protestantism”, and consequently, to many in the conformist and often 
xenophobic Church of England mainstream, “Puritanism”.
210
 Finally, the Puritan-Papist 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
N&Q 56 (2009): 55-7, that the association with Wittenberg “suggests that Hamlet’s unworldliness, contemptus 
mundi, and lack of interest in Denmark and in his princely responsibility represents the strange fruit of his higher 
education” is not very persuasive. 
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contention beyond sea” (Traueller, D4v-E1r). 
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analogy would seem to be signalled by another element in the play, namely the deliberate 
contrast between Hamlet’s Wittenberg and Laertes’ Paris; the latter was a renowned centre of 
Catholic learning, and condemnation of the “Sorbonists” is a common refrain in English 
writings of the period.
211
 
 Thus at least the main contours of the play seem to corroborate the inference of a 
satirical allegorical subtext representing the submission of Chairbonne to Poisson – Puritan 
son to Papist father, the younger heresy to the older, Vice to devil – for the purpose of 
overthrowing the established regime. One complication, obviously, is the fact that Claudius, 
while lawfully the king, and insistent on his divine prerogative, is also guilty of murder – 
including that of the most heinous kind, fratricide – and incest. Much ink has been spilled on 
where Hamlet stands in this, and what is the answer to the question he himself explicitly 
poses: 
 Does it not, think thee, stand me now upon – 
 He that hath kill’d my king and whor’d my mother, 
 Popp’d in between th’election and my hopes, 
 Thrown out his angle for my proper life 
 And with such coz’nage – is’t not perfect conscience 
 To quit him with this arm? And is’t not to be damn’d 
 To let this canker of our nature come 
 In further evil? (5.2.63-70) 
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 The only direct hint that Laertes’ is in Paris for studies comes in Polonius’ very last instruction to 
Reynaldo: “And let him ply his music” (2.1.72). However, Polonius’ list of vices – Reynaldo is to find out 
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We may sympathise with Hamlet’s plight – and clearly the idea is to make his case for 
revenge as tempting as possible – yet the correct answer is implicit in the very question: no, 
premeditated murder is not “perfect conscience”, least of all – according to established 
Church of England opinion, including James’ views in The Trve Lawe of Free Monarchies – 
the murder of a monarch, however corrupt and tyrannical. In contrast to the Puritans and the 
Papists, who are both presented as arguing that the deposition and even killing of tyrants is 
lawful under the right circumstances, the conforming view allowed only patient tolerance or 
escape.
212
 
 In this perspective, Hamlet’s revenge is patently unwarranted, and two circumstances 
are particularly damning. The first is his confession of his frustrated hopes in becoming the 
king himself. Even if his case was purely altruistic, it would still have not been valid, but this, 
as Hassel notes, is perfectly in tune with the stereotype of the Puritan, who, under the pretence 
of godly reform, seeks to seize power for himself. The second is Hamlet’s appeal to the 
doctrine of the king’s two bodies: “The body is with the King, but the King is not with the 
body. The King is a thing [...]/ Of nothing” (4.2.26-9).
213
 Although its roots lie in the 
medieval period, the consolidation of the doctrine came at the hand of sixteenth-century 
jurists, notably the influential, and staunchly Catholic, Edmund Plowden, who used it to 
provide a legal case for Mary Stuart’s claim to the English throne.
214
 Clearly Shakespeare was 
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familiar with this to at least some degree, and Hamlet’s “The king is a thing [...]/ Of nothing” 
sounds like a parody of the paradoxical descriptions found in Plowden’s work, describing the 
king’s body politic as “a Body that cannot be seen or handled”.
215
 Subsequently, however, in 
an uncanny fulfilment of the darkest forebodings of the Puritan-Papist propaganda, the 
doctrine developed by Plowden in an attempt to restore England to Catholicism would serve 
as the conceptual background to the legal formulations employed to justify the deposition and 
execution of Charles I.
216
 
 
FROM HAMLET TO LAMETH 
 
Thus the play so intimately associated with the Burckhardtian idea of an increasingly secular 
early modernity, and the associated turn from allegory to realism, turns out to be thoroughly 
pervaded both by the religious concerns of the period, and by allegorical devices and figures 
which often hark back to the very dramatic traditions that Shakespeare is supposed to have 
left behind as he made the transition from Everyman to Othello. As if in a prescient mockery 
of this narrative, Shakespeare employs the allegorical structure of the stage for an episode of 
sinister farce, transforming the icon of modern consciousness to the buffoonish figure of the 
Vice, brandishing his dagger of lath and heaping crudely humorous abuse at the “fellow in the 
cellarage”. In the back of Hamlet’s thoughts, in what linguists would refer to as his conceptual 
metaphors – “pales and forts of reason”, “though hell itself should gape” – we catch glimpses 
of the religious and allegorical drama that met its demise with the transformation of the 
London theatrical scene in the late 1570s. A certain Norman horseman shows up at Elsinore, 
praising Laertes’ skill in fencing; the report makes Hamlet “envenom[ed] with envy”, and 
anxious to put this to the test, which Claudius exploits to arrange the fatal duel (4.7.80-161). 
But what is the name of this horseman, whose gossip thus leads to the deaths of Hamlet, 
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Laertes, Claudius, and Gertrude? It is, most fittingly, Lamord, and it is not long before he 
returns to reap the harvest that he has so artfully sown: “this fell sergeant, Death”, says dying 
Hamlet to the pale and trembling Horatio, “is strict in his arrest” (5.2.341-2).
217
 
 There has been much discussion as to whether Shakespeare ever witnessed a 
performance of a mystery cycle, perhaps as a boy at nearby Coventry, whose cycle was 
suppressed in 1579.
218
 Echoes in a number of plays, including Hamlet – for example, in 
Hamlet’s advice against overacting, which “o’erdo[es] Termagant” and “out-Herods Herod” 
(3.2.13-14) – make his familiarity with the mysteries virtually certain, but it seems to me that 
in accounting for these echoes too much emphasis has been placed on the procession-type 
cycles, performed at the Corpus Christi feast in particular towns. There were also mystery 
cycles that were not necessarily tied to any particular occasion or locale, were not staged as 
pageant processions but as theatre-in-the-round, and were adapted for touring. The N-Town 
Play is a case in point, and there seems no particular reason to discount the possibility of  
Shakespeare seeing such a cycle performed anywhere in England, and perhaps also at a date 
when many of the procession cycles had already been suppressed. That he did see a mystery 
cycle seems clear, and of whatever type it was, it may have, like The N-Town Play, contained 
a particular episode which may have made an impression on him. 
 The episode in question deals with Lamech, a minor figure who appears in the Book 
of Genesis, but who rose to considerable prominence in medieval and postmedieval legend, 
art, and drama.
219
 The brief account of Lamech in Genesis 4:18-24 recounts his birth as a 
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 Various details favour the Q2 reading “Lamord” over F’s “Lamound” (the passage is absent from Q1). 
Firstly, it is a horseman, which fits the traditional representation of death, as does the description of “this gallant” 
as “incorps’d and demi-natur’d” with his “brave beast”, and of his equestrian skills as having “witchcraft in’t”. 
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Plays, ed. P. M. King and C. Davidson (Kalamazoo, 2000), 9. 
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 Besides the The N-Town Play, the episode is also found in the Cornish Creation of the World, and other 
plays from France, Germany, and Spain. The longest and most elaborate dramatic treatment of the Lamech story 
appeared as late as 1550, in the pageant-play Adam und Heva by the Swiss Jacob Ruf, and later still, in the early 
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sixth-generation descendant of Cain, his bigamous marriage and its progeny, and ends with a 
cryptic passage sometimes referred to as Lamech’s “Song of the Sword”, in which lie the 
origins of the legend which would eventually be performed in The N-Town Play: 
And Lamech said vnto his wiues Ada and Sella: Heare my voice ye wyues of Lamech, 
hearken vnto my speache: for I haue slayne a man to the wounding of my selfe, & a 
young man to myne owne punishment. 
 If Cain shalbe auenged seuen folde, truely Lamech seuentie tymes & seuen 
tymes. 
The passage, in this standard reading, has puzzled readers since ancient times.
220
 Who are the 
two men? Why has Lamech killed them? What does he mean by the seventy-sevenfold 
vengeance? In order to provide answers to such questions, an apocryphal tradition on Lamech 
emerged, building on the cue provided by Lamech’s final words, referring to God’s decree 
that “whosoeuer slayeth Cain, he shalbe punished seuen folde” (Genesis 4:15). The adult man 
killed by Lamech, the interpreters concluded, was none other than his ancestor Cain. Other 
details of the biblical text were then construed in various ways which fit this central premise, 
ultimately giving rise to an elaborate account which may be summarized as follows: Lamech, 
in his prime the greatest of archers but now grown old and blind, refuses to stop hunting with 
his bow, employing a boy, sometimes identified as his son Tubalcain, to guide him and find 
him marks to shoot at; one day, the boy thinks he sees a beast in the bush and instructs 
Lamech to shoot at it; Lamech’s arrow hits the mark, yet it turns out to be no beast but his 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
seventeenth century, the subject was handled by the Spanish playwrights V. de Guevara and L. de Vega. See B. 
Murdoch, The Medieval Popular Bible (Cambridge, 2003), 70-95. Murdoch’s claim that the medieval drama 
“only rarely allows Lamech onto the stage” (84) seems contradicted by the number, dispersion, date and nature 
of the works he himself references and discusses. It is, of course, on the surviving evidence that the judgment is 
based, and this evidence can be plausibly interpreted to support different conclusions; for example, the extensive 
dispersion of the motif, and the very late date of the works of Ruf and the Spanish playwrights, can be taken as 
evidence precisely of Lamech’s rootedness in theatrical tradition. 
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 I quote from the Bishops’ Bible. Similar readings are to be found in the Tyndale, Great Bible, Douay-
Rheims, and King James versions, as well as in the Vulgate; in all of these, Lamech says to his wives that he has 
killed two men, an adult and a youth. The exception is the Geneva, reading “for I would slay a man in my 
wound, and a yong man in mine hurt”. This is clearly based on Calvin’s commentary on Genesis, where he 
rejects the Lamech legend – although not before first providing a synopsis – and urges a philological solution to 
the crux: “in my opinion their iudgment is true, which turne the Verbe of the preterperfect tense into the time to 
come or future tense, and vnderstande it indefinitely: as if he did boaste, that he was strong and violent enough, 
to kill the moste strong enimie. Therefore I reade the text after this manner, I will kill a man, &c.”; A 
Commentarie of John Caluine, vpon the first booke of Moses called Genesis (London, 1578), K5r-v. 
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outlawed ancestor Cain; realizing what has happened, Lamech beats the boy to death in a fit 
of rage and returns home to his wives, lamenting his fate. The appeal of the story is easy to 
perceive: not only does it account for the references to the two men in Genesis 4:23, but it has 
the added advantage of wrapping up the otherwise incomplete history of Cain. 
 The account first appeared in ancient biblical commentary and pseudepigrapha, 
whence it entered the mainstream of Christian tradition at least as early as Jerome. Jerome’s 
Letter 36, in reply to pope Damasus’ inquiry about several biblical passages including 
Genesis 4:15 (the sevenfold punishment pronounced on whoever kills Cain), does not contain 
an account of the actual shooting, but does take note of the tradition, encountered in a “certain 
Hebrew volume”, that Cain was killed by Lamech.
221
 Several further interpretations are 
surveyed: Cain’s sevenfold punishment had to do either with Cain’s seven sins, or the seven 
torments with which he was supposedly punished by God, or the seven generations between 
Adam and Cain’s killer Lamech. By similar interpretive manoeuvres, the seventy-sevenfold 
punishment on Lamech is said to refer to the seventy-seven souls of Lamech’s kin perished in 
the Flood, or the seventy-seven generations from Adam to Christ, who takes on himself the 
sins of all humanity (represented in the person of Lamech). These, however, are only some of 
the paths winding through what Jerome describes as “a vast forest of disputations” on the 
questions of Cain, Lamech, and their sevenfold and seventy-sevenfold vengeances or 
punishments. Origen, we learn in an off-hand comment, devoted two entire books of his lost 
commentary on Genesis to this subject, which long continued to exercise the imagination of 
Christian commentators. 
 It is with such interpretive underpinnings that the story of Lamech’s shooting of Cain 
was later widely disseminated throughout medieval and post-medieval Europe. In spite of his 
marginal role in the biblical text itself, Lamech came to be known as an exemplum of rage and 
vengeance, repeating, with greatly magnified consequences, the sin of his accursed forefather, 
and thus assuming a place of considerable importance in Christian history, becoming indeed 
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“a crucial pivot in the whole salvific scheme”.
222
 Eventually he makes it to The N-Town Play, 
where his portrayal is notable for the emphasis on his “raving” rage at his loss of sight.
223
 
Lamech implores his boy to find him a mark to shoot at; the boy thinks he sees a beast in the 
bush, causing Lamech to kill Cain; enraged, Lamech kills the boy, calling him a “stynkynge 
lurdeyn”, and ends his part with a wail of despair. The widening cycle of wrath and 
vengeance is finally broken by the Flood. As Lamech departs from the stage, Noah returns to 
mourn its coming, even though it is just punishment “for synne of mannys wylde mood”. 
 Did Shakespeare witness a performance like this one?
224
 Did raving Lamech and his 
ill-fated slaying of Cain come to his mind when he wrote Hamlet? We can never know for 
sure, yet striking resemblances cannot be denied, and have been noted independently of the 
present discussion. Thus in 1957 J. A. Bryant, Jr., found Shakespeare’s play “strangely 
reminiscent of the legend”, specifically in Hamlet’s curious apology to Laertes, disclaiming 
any “purpos’d evil” in the killing of Polonius: “I have shot my arrow o’er the house/ And hurt 
my brother” (5.2.237-39).
225
 Why arrow, when Polonius was killed with a sword? And is the 
unintended murder of Polonius, hiding behind the arras, not reminiscent of Lamech’s 
unintended shooting of Cain, hiding behind the bush? There was no decisive evidence, Bryant 
thought, for conscious allusion on Shakespeare’s part, yet 
the consonance of that legend with Hamlet as regards the spread of sin, the blindness 
that precipitates the catastrophe, and the catastrophe that purges is a further indication 
of the general background against which Shakespeare wrote his play. Like Lamech, 
Hamlet sees the errors of his own blindness as spreading the corruption which will end 
in a bloody catastrophe.
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Bryant overlooked, however, far more specific and important analogies, notably that between 
Lamech’s killing of his fratricidal great-great-great-grandfather Cain, and Hamlet’s killing of 
his fratricidal uncle Claudius, whom the play twice explicitly relates to Cain.
227
 He also 
overlooked the legend’s specific connections to the topics of revenge and murder. God’s 
injunction against the killing of Cain was seen as the archetype of God’s injunction against 
taking justice into one’s own hands. Violating this injunction, the interpreters claimed, 
Lamech does the same thing as Hamlet: he takes justice into his own hands rather than 
leaving it to God.
228
 The fruit of vengeance is more vengeance. Hamlet’s vengeance on 
Claudius not only claims several collateral victims, but also leads to Laertes’ vengeance on 
Hamlet. Ultimately, the toll turns from sevenfold to seventy-sevenfold. In the frenzied words 
of Laertes, about to leap, with sinister symbolism, into his sister’s grave:  
  O, treble woe  
 Fall ten times treble on that cursèd head 
 Whose wicked deed thy most ingenious sense 
 Deprived thee of! (5.1.242-5) 
Cain’s crime leads to Lamech’s, Lamech’s to the Flood. Claudius’ leads to Hamlet’s, 
Hamlet’s to the bloodbath in the hall of Elsinore. 
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 Who, then, is Hamlet, the killer of his fratricidal kinsman, if not Lamech? The biblical 
archetype hovers above him as he thrusts the rapier at the rat behind the arras – “This bad 
begins, and worse remains behind” (3.4.181) – and when he finally fulfils the apparition’s 
bidding, pouring the poisoned wine down the fratricide’s throat, his transformation is 
complete. Out of the brave new world of particular named people, he steps back into the 
shadowy realm of archetypes and allegories. Indeed, the very letters that comprise his name, 
the principal token of his personal identity, begin to flicker and trade places. For to 
Shakespeare and his contemporaries, Lamech was not only Lamech. He also had another 
name, the name under which he raves and murders in The N-Town Play and many other 
medieval and postmedieval English texts, including some contemporary with Shakespeare’s 
play. The name was Lameth. And like Ariosto’s tyrant, who of a jealous man became 
Jealousy itself, we see Hamlet evacuated of his fabled interiority, banished from his prophetic 
modernity, anagrammatized into an ancient biblical exemplum of the unlawfulness of revenge, 
dissolved into Lameth.
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CHAPTER THREE 
ALLEGORY AND EPIC 
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Have I spoken something, have I uttered something, worthy of God? No, I feel 
that all I have done is to wish to speak; if I did say something, it is not what I 
wanted to say. How do I know this? Simply because God is unspeakable. But 
what I have spoken would not have been spoken if it were unspeakable. For 
this reason God should not even be called unspeakable, because even when this 
word is spoken, something is spoken. There is a kind of conflict between 
words here: if what cannot be spoken is unspeakable, then it is not 
unspeakable, because it can actually be said to be unspeakable. It is better to 
evade this verbal conflict silently than to quell it disputatiously. 
       – Augustine of Hippo
1
 
 
Belief in scripture is disbelief in scripture. This is what Augustine wants evaded in silence, for 
quelling it disputatiously would mean to bring to light the paradox at the heart not only of his 
own faith, but any religion of the book. Frozen in their canonical forms and stranded in 
futures undreamt of by those who wrote them, sacred texts cannot be believed in, not in any 
simple sense. Genuine, literal belief in the shape-shifting monsters of classical myth leads just 
as inexorably to atheism as does genuine, literal belief in the anthropomorphic deity of the 
Old Testament. In the long run, what is required is not belief, but increasingly sophisticated 
modes of strategic, selective disbelief, ranging from the via negativa exemplified by 
Augustine’s passage, in which the hermeneutic process grinds to a halt, and the exegete lays 
down his pen to contemplate his inability to contemplate the divine, to the via positiva that 
has wearied the flesh of untold commentators, and of commentators on those commentators. 
The purpose, however, remains the same: unspeaking the speakable, harnessing the volatile 
power of the text into the service of an interpretive community whose authority nominally 
arises from that text, but in reality proceeds precisely from its methodical suppression. 
 Throughout the history of Western hermeneutics one encounters, especially in 
polemical contexts, aporetic moments similar to Augustine’s conundrum, in which the hidden 
kinship of all scriptural religion, its common hermeneutical DNA, suddenly erupts into the 
foreground. Two centuries before Augustine, for example, we find the Assyrian apostate 
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Tatian imploring the Greeks to stop allegorizing their gods, and preserving, in the process, a 
rare testimony of the work of Metrodorus of Lampsacus, a shadowy pre-Socratic figure from 
the fifth century BC, said to be a disciple of Anaxagoras: 
The arguments of Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who turns everything into allegory in his  
work On Homer, are totally absurd; for he says that Hera or Athena or Zeus are not 
what their believers say, who made shrines and temples for them, but that they are 
natural substances and arrangements of elements. No doubt you will go on to say that 
Hector and Achilles and Agamemnon, and indeed all the Greeks and foreigners 
together with Helen and Paris, are entities of the same nature and were put into the 
poem for the sake of the composition, not because any of these human beings ever 
existed.
2
 
But why should a Christian advise the pagans not to allegorize their gods? “Mind now what I 
say, men of Greece: do not allegorize either your stories or your gods, for if you try to do so 
your conception of divinity is subverted not only by us but also by yourselves.” If Tatian 
really believes what he is saying, should he not in fact be inciting the Greeks to allegorize 
their gods, thus precipitating their imminent downfall? But of course he does not. The real 
reason why Tatian does not want the Greeks to allegorize their gods is that he knows, at least 
on an intuitive level, that any text-based divinity, his or theirs, can survive only in the gap 
between the speakable and the unspeakable, and that a faith in scripture is really a faith in the 
inadequacy of scripture. He does not want the pagans to follow the example of Metrodorus 
precisely because this is the only way in which their gods might be rescued from the textual 
death-traps in which they increasingly found themselves imprisoned. 
And vice versa, as illustrated by the anti-Christian treatise of the pagan monotheist 
Celsus, which was written around the same time as Tatian’s oration, but which must have 
stuck in the throats of his adversaries if Origen was commissioned to answer it some three 
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quarters of a century later.
3
 Just as Tatian compiles a catalogue of the various perceived 
absurdities of Greek myth, so Celsus berates the crudely anthropomorphic deity and other 
indiscretions of Judeo-Christian scripture, which “the more reasonable Jews and Christians 
are ashamed of [...] and try somehow to allegorize them”.
4
 Just as Tatian dismisses the pagan 
allegories, so Celsus dismisses those of the Christians, setting himself up for a predictable 
riposte from Origen, who naturally does not miss the opportunity to turn the accusations back 
on the accuser.
5
 In doing so, however, the Christian ventures a dangerous comment: “when 
people read the theogonies of the Greeks”, writes Origen, “they make them sacred by 
allegories”.
6
 They make them sacred. This is the lesson Christianity learned from its pagan 
adversaries: it is not the text, as such, that is sacred, it has to be made sacred by its 
interpretation. And if Hesiod can be made sacred in this way, why not Moses? “Are the 
Greeks alone allowed to find philosophical truths in a hidden form, and the Egyptians too, and 
all barbarians whose pride is in mysteries and in the truth which they contain? And do you 
think that the Jews alone [...] are the most stupid of all men”?
7
 
 Origen’s successors further consolidated and defended Christian hermeneutics, first 
from the pagan exegetes from whom they inherited it, then from Christian heretics, and finally 
from competing tendencies within the pale of Christian orthodoxy itself. For centuries to 
come, the church successfully harnessed the power of the sacred text. It restricted access to 
what was a forbiddingly expensive book in a foreign language readable only by the 
beneficiaries of a church-governed education, and it supervised its interpretation through 
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6 Ibid., 4.42. 
7 Ibid., 4.38. 
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elaborate protocols of hermeneutical maintenance in which allegoresis played a central role. 
But what happens when this process is reversed? What happens when the theological 
apparatus of a former age crumbles, and the text suddenly awakes from its thousand-year 
slumber? And what happens when a poet, singularly equipped and positioned for such an 
undertaking, takes it upon himself to translate a highly advanced scriptural religion back into 
the narrative myth from which it had originally been abstracted?  
 What, in other words, happens in John Milton’s Paradise Lost, the poem which 
attempts nothing less than a comprehensive rewriting of sacred history, and in which the 
concerns central to this study surface in acute and particularly revealing forms? It is hard to 
think of a work which has been so closely related to competing narratives of literary and 
intellectual modernity, and yet whose representational mode has been so radically contested, 
and whose critics labour in such punishing conditions, differing, as Waldock observed long 
ago, “not only in their approach to the poem, in their feeling about it, in their judgment of it: 
they differ also in their understanding of what occurs in it”.
8
 One thing that is certain, 
however, and is now both more widely recognized and more openly disputed than in 
Waldock’s day, is that any answer to this question crucially depends on one’s view of the 
status of allegorical representation, or absence thereof, in the poem. Indeed, the problem of 
what happens in Paradise Lost largely is the problem of whether the poem is to be understood 
as thoroughly allegorical in its representational mode, as thoroughly non- or even anti-
allegorical, or as suspended, consciously or unconsciously, coherently or incoherently, 
between these two opposing poles – positions which all find representatives in the long 
history of the poem’s reception, especially since the rise of scholarly interest in allegory in the 
second half of the twentieth century. If the scholarship produced in the decades which divide 
us from Waldock supersedes earlier discussions of these questions, and gives us a much better 
idea of what is at stake in posing them, it is still far from offering a definite or even a broadly 
accepted answer to the “deceptively simple” yet “obviously fundamental” question that he 
                                                          
8 A. J. A. Waldock, “Paradise Lost” and Its Critics (Cambridge, 1947), unpaginated Preface. 
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attempted to settle – “the question of what, at this important juncture or that, is really 
happening in the poem”. 
 Furthermore, answers to this question have inevitably implied, and are often explicitly 
premised on, specific configurations of the allegory-modernity nexus. In asking whether or 
not, and to what extent, and in what sense precisely, Paradise Lost is an allegorical poem, 
critics have also been asking questions about the dynamics of broader currents in intellectual 
and literary history. Most importantly in the present context, and affording the most tangible 
and suggestive opportunities for analysis, Paradise Lost has often been seen as a turning point 
in the history of the epic poem, and specifically in the tradition of the Renaissance allegorical 
epic, even though critics have been unable to agree on what sort of turning point it is. Is 
Milton to be located at the end of this tradition, and of the Renaissance more generally – a 
notion dating back at least to Voltaire and his view of Milton as “the last in Europe who wrote 
an Epick Poem”, and awkwardly enshrined in our literary histories, where the Renaissance 
reaches uncomfortably deep into the seventeenth century to claim Paradise Lost as its last 
masterpiece?
9
 Or does Paradise Lost represent an epochal break with tradition, aligning it 
with the age to come, as it does in Larson’s early case for Milton’s modernity, or more 
recently, and with marked differences in conception and emphasis, Allen’s, Murrin’s, 
Fallon’s, or Teskey’s.
10
 Still more recently, however, a number of critics – notably, Treip, 
Martin, Borris, Anderson – have reaffirmed the canonical periodisation, presenting Milton as 
the last major exponent of the Renaissance allegorical epic, and arguing for comprehensive 
allegorical readings of his work.
11
 
                                                          
9 See Voltaire, An Essay upon the Civil Wars of France... And Also upon the Epick Poetry of the European 
Nations (London, 1727), 102. Voltaire clarifies that he is excluding “all those whose Attempts have been 
unsuccessful, my Intention here being not to descant on the many who have contended for the Prize, but to speak 
only of the very few who have gain’d it in their respective Countries” – a view premised on Voltaire’s hostility 
towards the excessive use of allegory, and consciously calculated, as will become clearer below, to deny this 
prestigious title to works proceeding from the second wind of neoclassical allegorical epic in the wake of Le 
Bossu’s treatise of 1674. For a good discussion of Milton and periodisation, see J. Lynch, “Betwixt Two Ages 
Cast”, JHI 61 (2000): 397-413. 
10 See M. A. Larson, The Modernity of Milton (Chicago, 1927); D. C. Allen, Mysteriously Meant (Baltimore, 
1970), 289-301 (correcting Allen’s earlier views in “Milton and the Descent to Light”, JEGP 60 [1961]: 614-
30); M. Murrin, The Allegorical Epic (Chicago, 1980), 153-71; S. M. Fallon, Milton among the Philosophers 
(Ithaca, 1991), esp. 137-93; G. Teskey, Delirious Milton (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), esp. 129-47. 
11 See M. A. Treip, Allegorical Poetics and the Epic (Lexington, 1994); C. G. Martin, The Ruins of Allegory 
(Durham, N. C., 1998); Borris, Allegory and Epic; J. H. Anderson, Reading the Allegorical Intertext (New York, 
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 The present study does not pretend to take a disinterested view of these developments. 
I believe that the literalists are largely right, and that the allegorists, although they have done 
much to bring these concerns to the foreground of Milton studies, are largely wrong. 
Intervening directly into this debate, however, and responding adequately to the wide range of 
specific interpretive questions it raises, is beyond the compass of a single chapter, and is at 
any rate ancillary to the primary interests of this study. What can be done here – and what, 
given the current critical impasse, is perhaps even a priority – is to re-examine the grounds on 
which these debates have been waged, and see how they contribute to our understanding of 
the allegory-modernity dynamics in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English literature and 
the history of its reception. All engagements with specific interpretive issues on my own part 
are thus ancillary to this primary aim, and even though I presuppose throughout a non-
allegorical approach to the poem, and provide an outline of such an approach in the first two 
sections of the chapter, I do this primarily in order to give some indication of the scope and 
parameters of the debate. 
 The chapter also hopes to demonstrate the exceptional interest that Milton’s work 
holds within this purview. This is partly due to the peculiar and fragile intellectual formations 
of the mid-seventeenth century that provided the narrow window of opportunity for this work 
to come into being. Yet if it is increasingly recognized just how narrow this window was, it 
should also be recognized that it could easily have come and gone without leaving behind a 
supreme poetic expression had it not met with so singularly apposite a figure as Milton. Into 
the abyss where Augustine and others dared not look, Milton hurled himself with the same 
desperate resolve with which his Satan launches into the uncharted wilderness of chaos, and 
there, old, blind, and reviled, floating among the thousand systems, he was shown the secrets 
of the hoary deep. The great hermeneutical anchors of the world, encrusted with centuries of 
commentaries and glosses, were lifting from their ancient beds. The dark materials of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2008). There is an early dissertation on the subject which I have not been able to see: R. W. Condee, “Milton’s 
Theories concerning Epic Poetry”, diss. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1949. 
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narrative myth, once safely constrained into theological service, longed to return to their 
primal state. “For a brief and exciting period, reality was up for grabs.”
12
 
 
OR FLOCKS, OR HEARDS, OR HUMAN FACE DIVINE 
 
Discussions of the representational mode of Paradise Lost have touched on practically all 
aspects of the poem, yet in relation to the subject of perceived allegory in the work four major 
centres of attention can be discerned. The first and most obvious is comprised by the four 
passages of extended “personification allegory” in Books 2 and 10: Sin and Death (2.648-927, 
10.229-414, 10.585-613), and the pavilion of Chaos (2.959-1009).
13
 Secondly, there are the 
supernatural beings: God, Christ, angels, devils, and the monsters inhabiting hell. Except for 
the last, all of these are present throughout them poem, and their representations, especially 
the war in heaven, have been approached by many critics as “allegorical” in nature. Thirdly, 
there is Milton’s cosmology, notably the descriptions of the four principal cosmological 
realms of heaven, chaos, hell, and cosmos, as well as a number of minor or adjunct domains 
such as the structure leading up to the portal of heaven, the radiant sea or lake said to be 
positioned under it, and so on – again, some or all of this has been taken as partly or wholly 
“allegorical”.
14
 Finally, there are more or less isolated episodes and motifs where allegory has 
                                                          
12 Fallon, Philosophers, 138. 
13 Paradise Lost is cited from B. K. Lewalski’s edition (Oxford, 2007), De doctrina Christiana, Paradise 
Regain’d and the shorter poems from OW, the English prose from YP, and other Latin prose from CW. For 
further details, see Conventions and Abbreviations. 
14 For an extensive review of the scholarship on the cosmology of Paradise Lost, see J. Leonard, Faithful 
Labourers (Oxford, 2013), 705-819. I deliberately omit the mention of the Paradise of Fools, often noted as one 
of the prime instances of “allegory” in the poem, because I agree with Martin, followed by Leonard, that there is 
“a figurative gap between this domain and the real cosmos” of the epic; see C. Gimelli Martin, “Milton’s 
Epistemology, Cosmology, and Paradise of Fools Reconsidered”, MP 99 (2001): 231-65, p. 258; cf. Leonard, 
Labourers, 716. Other instances of perceived cosmological allegory in Paradise Lost are more complex, 
carefully balancing between mimetic action and diegetic, rhetorical overlay, but the Paradise of Fools is emptied 
of mimesis altogether – a satirical elaboration of a joke so simple, that it is probably this simplicity that has 
rendered it invisible to most critics. This “Limbo large and broad” is “since calld/ The Paradise of Fools” (3.495-
6), not because fools go there, but because fools believe in it. We do not need to speculate on what kind of a 
limbo it is, or whether it is literal or allegorical, because Milton did not and never would have placed any limbo, 
anywhere – not as the dualist of his younger days, much less so as the monist mortalist of his maturity. The 
expression denotes precisely something unreal – “A state of illusory happiness or good fortune; enjoyment based 
on false hopes or anticipations” (OED, fool’s paradise, 1) – and is thus, in a Protestant context, very aptly 
applied to purgatory. For some contemporary instances, see [E. Gayton], Wit Revived (London, [1655]), B5v; A 
Humble Representation of the Sad Condition Of many of the Kings Party ([London], 1661), A2v; J. Spencer, A 
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been presumed, often involving references or allusions to episodes in classical myth and epic 
to which allegorical meanings were traditionally attached.  
 The most ambitious allegorical readings of the poem have sought to encompass all 
these and still further elements in the poem. Treip, for example, also finds allegory in certain 
aspects of the portrayal of Adam and Eve, and according to her count between one fifth and 
the “bulk” of Paradise Lost is allegorical in mode, whether it is “direct allegory or semi-
allegory or near-allegory in verbal device, or [...] allegorical figuration in the broadest 
senses”.
15
 Still more comprehensive is the reading of Borris, who, in addition to all of the 
above, also finds in the poem a “general diffuse allegorism” whereby its “analogical cosmos 
and complementary heroic ecclesiology” signify the trans-spatial and trans-temporal 
community of Christ’s mystical church, and even more expansively, God himself, signified by 
the “godly allegorism” of universal correspondences and sympathies embedded in his 
creation, a “cosmic allegoresis” emerging from “the rapport of all its constituents as divinely 
authorized signs expressively participating in divine being and creativity, and collectively 
indicating their source”.
16
 
 The common starting point for thse allegorical readings is the same as with all other 
works submitted to such readings: the feeling that, if taken only in its literal sense, the work 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Discourse Concerning Prodigies (Cambridge, 1663), E1r. Furthermore, it has not yet been noted that Milton’s 
passage is in part a reply to the passage on limbo in S. Pordage’s Mundorum explicatio (London, 1661), P6r-Q1r, 
which seeks to reaffirm the existence of an intermediate state in the afterlife, although he dismisses the Roman 
Catholic purgatory as a Satanic perversion of its true nature: “By Rome’s false Limbo, doth true LIMBO fall.” 
Thus Pordage’s angel tells the poem’s protagonist, named Pilgrim, of this true limbo and of souls “yonder up and 
down [...] wandering” (cf. Milton’s Satan “Walk[ing] up and down alone” [3.441] in the yet unpopulated limbo); 
describes how the journey of unprepared souls to heaven is interrupted when “Parca assunder cut their vital 
thread:/ Their parted souls then to this Region flew” (cf. the souls of Milton’s friars, who “Of Heav’ns ascent [...] 
lift thir Feet, when loe/ A violent cross wind from either Coast/ Blows them transverse ten thousand Leagues 
awry”, and they “Fly” into the limbo “o’re the backside of the World farr off” [3.486-94]); and asks “what shall 
those Pilgrim’s do,/ Who in Heav’ns Way have gone”, but are not yet “fit for Paradise: What then?/ Must they 
be hurled to the Stygian Den?” (cf. Milton’s sarcastic agreement that “Here Pilgrims roam, that stray’d so farr to 
seek/ In Golgotha him dead, who lives in Heav’n” [3.476-7]). A few pages earlier, Pordage also uses the phrase 
“paradise of fools” – “This is the state which Reason’s foolish Schooles/ Do nominate the Paradise of Fools” 
(Explicatio, P1v) – possibly lifting the rhyme from Harington’s epigram “Against Paulus”: “Theise writers that 
still sauour of the schools/ Frame to themselues a Paradice of fooles” (Letters, 170). Raymond’s discussion of 
Pordage in Milton’s Angels (Oxford, 2010), 137-47, does not touch on these matters. On other sources for 
Milton’s satire, see J. Wooten, “From Purgatory to the Paradise of Fools”, ELH 49 (1982): 741-50. 
15 Treip, Poetics, 126-7. 
16 Borris, Allegory, 189-90. The problems with such an approach, conflating theological doctrines or 
worldviews which may be particularly germane to allegorical expression with that expression itself, are briefly 
discussed below, p. 266-7. See also Borris’ “Allegory in Paradise Lost”, MS 26 (1991): 103-33, and “‘Union of 
Mind’”, MS 31 (1995): 45-72. Milton discusses the concept of the mystical church in De doctrina, 1.24. 
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violates the norms of serious imaginative literature, whether in theological, moral, or more 
importantly in the case of Milton’s modern readers, ontological terms.
17
 Furthermore, because 
such passages typically do not appear in isolation from the main action of Milton’s poem, the 
representational mode of the so-called allegorical episodes inevitably spreads to the rest of the 
poem. If we take Sin and Death to be allegorical, then it would appear that Satan, if he is able 
to interact with them, must also be allegorical; but then Satan also interacts with other angels, 
fallen and unfallen, so they must be allegorical as well; but then both Satan and the good 
angels converse with Adam and Eve, and so on, down to the last allegorical blade of 
allegorical grass in the allegorical paradise. In a work as tightly knit as Paradise Lost, a work 
which continuously stages complex interactions between its human and non-human 
characters, and repeatedly juxtaposes ostensibly fantastic with ostensibly verisimilar events, 
episodes cannot be safely quarantined from the whole, and any distinction between 
intermittent and continuous allegory becomes impossible to maintain. 
 What is really at stake is thus the imaginative unity of Milton’s poem. Either, Treip 
writes, the literally implausible elements “belong within some total artistic conception which 
Milton entertained of his poem as a special kind of poetry and epic, or else Paradise Lost is a 
very bad poem and epos indeed”.
18
 For this very same reason, however, other critics – 
Teskey, for example – have insisted on a radically literal reading.
19
 The same episode is 
                                                          
17 See Treip, Poetics, 129, 133-4: allegorical interpretations of Paradise Lost are invited by “passages of pure 
fantasy, meraviglie, supernatural actions not coated with ‘verisimility’ but conspicuously otherwise”; “Seeming 
‘irrelevance’, ‘absurdity’, riddle, grotesqueness, bizarre or unexpected shifts in mode [...] are the signals by 
which allegory has always disclosed its hidden presence. [...] By such devices we can recognise the presence of 
hidden meanings in Paradise Lost”. As further discussed in the Afterword, the positions of many modern critics 
are complicated by the fact that, even as they seek to unearth allegorical meaning in Milton’s poem, they are 
also, inescapably, heirs to the contrary, post-Romantic impulse, which sees allegory as an affront to the 
imagination. Thus between the two passages cited above, Treip writes that Milton subscribed to a poetics 
according to which allegorical poetry must retain “the literal integrity of the main narrative line of the fiction”, 
and “sustain credibility in the sequence of probable causation or links between events, as well as in the 
particulars of the human psychology and actions”. There is an obvious and irreducible contradiction here: if the 
literal sense is sustained, credible and probable, then how can it at the same time be “conspicuously otherwise”, 
and thus invite allegorical readings? 
18 Treip, Poetics, 127-8. 
19 “Sin’s lacerated entrails and Death’s vast, seeking nostril”, writes Teskey, “resist any idealization as 
meaning. But they produce the effect that Milton intended: to force open the rift between the material and ideal 
until the ideal disappears altogether, overwhelmed by the exudations of substance – of blood and guts, of chaotic 
slime and rotting flesh – that rise through the crack. Milton intends to destroy in this manner any possibility of 
his poem’s being interpreted allegorically. He does so by pressing to extremes the violent physicality that had 
been dialectically awakened in his great allegorical forebears, Spenser in particular. In so doing, Milton frees Sin 
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interpreted in two radically incompatible ways, yet for what is, in the final analysis, the same 
reason: radical allegorists and radical literalists both seek to uphold the total imaginative 
integrity of Milton’s poem. Neither position, however, is wholly satisfactory. As discussed at 
length below, evidence of various kinds is overwhelmingly against the comprehensively 
allegorical readings by Treip, Borris and others. On the other hand, Teskey’s view, anticipated 
by Voltaire’s comments of the 1720s, is persuasive in its broad outlines but deficient in 
detail.
20
 Extremely violent and physical personifications are found at least as early as 
Prudentius, and Milton’s Sin is not in this respect greatly, if at all, superior to its partial model 
in Spenser’s Errour, yet no one would argue that this makes it impossible for us to read the 
Psychomachia or The Faerie Queene as allegorical poems.
21
 
 More importantly, however, it also needs to be asked whether an entirely coherent 
reading of the poem is desirable or even possible, a question additionally relevant in the wake 
of the recent call for a “New Milton Criticism” programmatically opposed to this 
imperative.
22
 Are we justified in seeking such complete coherence in Paradise Lost, or are we 
projecting onto the poem modern notions and ideals that are simply alien to it? Empirical 
evidence is inconclusive here: we meet with no record of a representative allegorical reading 
until well into the eighteenth century, but we also meet with no objection to Milton’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and Death to become daemonic beings (of the kind he knew from the pre-classical, archaic worldview of Homer 
and Hesiod) in an entirely material world. Death is not the symbol of death but is death itself, the killer. Sin is 
not the symbol of sin but sin itself, for she is metonymically, rather than metaphorically, connected, by ‘secretest 
conveyance,’ to every sinful act as its cause” (Delirious Milton, 30-1). 
20 See Voltaire, Essay, 114-16: “We must first lay down that such shadowy Beings, as Death, Sin, Chaos, are 
intolerable when they are not allegorical. [...] there are Parts in that Fiction, which bearing no Allegory at all, 
have no Manner of Excuse. There is no Meaning in the Communication between Death and Sin, ’tis distasteful 
without any Purpose; or if any Allegory lies under it, the filthy Abomination of the Thing is certainly more 
obvious than the Allegory”. Cf. S. J. Gallagher, “‘Real or Allegoric’”, ELR 6 (1976): 317-35, p. 323: “The 
insistent physicality of these individuals [i.e., Sin and Death] pressures the reader to regard their generation as a 
literal fact of cosmic history.” 
21 It also seems implausible to read into Milton’s thinking the modern periodisation of ancient Greece, and to 
presume that he would have distinguished between “archaic” and “classical” daemons. For the background of 
Teskey’s argument here, see his Allegory and Violence (Ithaca, 1996), 32-55, and for the background of this, 
Fletcher’s discussion of personification and “daemonic” agency in Allegory, 24-68. However, as Fletcher clearly 
acknowledges (44-5), and as the demonology of Milton’s Paradise Lost explicitly insists, in Christian contexts 
pagan demons were typically explained as good or bad angels. Whatever, then, is to be made of Fletcher’s 
“daemonic” theory of allegorical agency, it is a wholly different and unwarranted move to credit Milton with an 
inverted form of the same theory, a view that his Christian demonology explicitly contradicts. 
22 See The New Milton Criticism, ed. P. C. Herman and E. Sauer (Cambridge, 2012): the collection aims to 
showcase “a Milton criticism resistant to reading Milton into coherence, a criticism that treats his work – 
Paradise Lost especially but not exclusively – as conflicted rather than serene, and that explicitly highlights the 
spirit of critical inquiry in Milton’s writing” (1). 
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personifications until Addison, more than a generation after the poem’s first edition. It could 
be that Milton and his earliest readers did not apply the same standards of ontological 
consistency to his work as we have come to expect since, and which, if conscientiously 
applied to Paradise Lost, unfold inexorably to one of the two extreme positions exemplified 
above by Borris and Teskey. It could also be, however, that the poem’s earliest readers, at 
least those whose responses have come down to us, were in tune with a more sophisticated 
understanding of Milton’s work, which the eighteenth century lost, and which Milton 
criticism would begin to recover, slowly and abortively, only after the discovery of De 
doctrina Christiana.
23
 
 The presents study inclines strongly to the latter view, and even though my primary 
aim is not to intervene directly in these debates, it seems advisable to offer at least a cursory 
account of an approach which is, in my view, the preferred response to the venerable, robust 
and increasingly self-aware allegorical school of Paradise Lost criticism, whose emergence 
and development are discussed in the ensuing sections of this chapter. Such an account should 
indicate the larger context which this discussion hopes to illumine, and put some perspective 
on the claims, occasionally proffered by the allegorists, that their work champions a 
controversial and suppressed approach to Milton’s work.
24
 Far from being controversial, the 
allegorical reading of Paradise Lost has in fact been a core Miltonist orthodoxy at least since 
the days of Samuel Johnson, albeit with significant variations in terminology and emphasis. 
While it is thus true that the term allegory fell out of favour for a substantial portion of this 
period, readings that are allegorical in spirit if not in the letter continued, and were effortlessly 
rechristened once the term returned to fashion in the late twentieth century. What has been 
controversial, however, is precisely the opposite, reading this poem for what it actually says, 
                                                          
23 Milton’s theological treatise came to light in 1823, and was first published in 1825: Joannis Miltoni Angli 
De doctrina Christiana libri duo posthumi, ed. C. R. Sumner (Cambridge, 1825); A Treatise on Christian 
Doctrine (Cambridge, 1825). Doubts about Milton’s authorship, most notably by W. B. Hunter, have now been 
conclusively put to rest; see Hunter’s Visitation Unimplor’d (Pittsburgh, 1998), and the response in G. Campbell 
et al., Milton and the Manuscript of “De Doctrina Christiana” (Oxford, 2007). 
24 See, for example, Martin, Ruins, 11, presenting her work as countering a supposed “repression or 
effacement of the existence of allegory in a work [...] largely governed by that mode”; Borris, Allegory, 183: 
while “controversial in twentieth-century Milton studies”, the allegorical approach “has had diverse proponents, 
in various formulations, and has gained much force since 1990”. 
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and mainstream criticism, as we shall see, has gone to extraordinary lengths to combat this 
heresy. 
 By contrast, the present study presupposes, and hopes to contribute to, an 
understanding of Paradise Lost as a poem which adheres to a high, proto-modern standard of 
ontological consistency, and which, by reconstructing the highly sophisticated mode of 
representation Milton designed for his work, largely vindicates the intuitive literalism of a 
reader like Teskey. It also presupposes a work vitally informed by some of the most important 
and daring contemporary advances in a number of fields, including theology, biblical 
criticism, mythography, or natural philosophy, and in ways which often resonate powerfully 
with informed contemporary readers. Neither are Milton’s ideas dead, nor is Paradise Lost a 
monument. The intellectual ferment of the mid-seventeenth century is not presented here in 
some embalmed, abstract form, but as transmuted by an extraordinarily vivid, uncannily 
prescient, and often simply volatile poetic imagination, the more remote reaches of which are 
yet to be adequately charted. Too much of this is muted in the readings of the allegorists, 
whose Milton is, by comparison, orthodox in his theological, philosophical, political, and 
literary views, and also conservative in his maintenance of these views, so that works and 
statements of later can be illumined by those of earlier periods, and vice versa. Instead, the 
ensuing pages presume a man who changed his mind about things, and who generally tended 
to change his mind from more to less conventional opinions, so that it is of utmost importance 
when and in what context he wrote or said this or that.
25
 
 Of course, every scholar of Milton’s work will be at least nominally informed about a 
number of unorthodox theological and philosophical views Milton adopted by the late 1650s: 
                                                          
25 The past decades in particular have seen a growing appreciation of the heterodox nature of many of 
Milton’s theological and philosophical views, as well as of conflicted and aporetic elements in his poetry: major 
statements include J. P. Rumrich, Milton Unbound (Cambridge, 1997); Milton and Heresy, ed. S. B. Dobranski 
and J. P. Rumrich (Cambridge, 1998); P. C. Herman, Destabilizing Milton (New York, 2005), 19; New Milton 
Criticism, ed. Herman. An important caveat here is that these two projects are not always and necessarily 
compatible: a heretical Milton is not necessarily the “indeterminate” or “uncertain” Milton of Rumrich and 
Herman, nor is a determinate and certain Milton necessarily an orthodox one. An obvious example would be 
Milton’s portrayal of the deity, which is infinitely more conflicted and problematic if read in the light of 
Trinitarian than of anti-Trinitarian doctrine. For an argument that all of Milton’s heresies are logical corollaries 
of his monism, see J. L. Padgett, “The Monistic Continuity of the Miltonic Heresy”, diss. Ball State University, 
1987. On the imperative of approaching Milton’s thought as changing and developing over the course of his 
career, see J. T. Shawcross, The Development of Milton’s Thought (Pittsburgh, 2008). 
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his anti-Trinitarianism, Arminianism, monism, mortalism, traducianism, and so on. Often, 
however, one gets the impression that the significance of these views for our understanding of 
Milton’s poetry – especially outside of direct parallels, notably in Paradise Lost – is still not 
adequately appreciated.
26
 Thus has De doctrina Christiana, the work which often presents us 
with the best evidence of Milton’s mature opinions on a variety of theological and 
philosophical topics, recently been described as “probably the worst place to begin trying to 
like Milton”.
27
 “To like Milton”, it is claimed, “we really need to go right back to the 
beginning”, the juvenilia collected in the 1645 Poems – “young writing”, “full of aspirations”, 
“less awe-inspiringly assured than Paradise Lost, but [...] infinitely more touching”.
28
 In a 
superficial sense this is of course true: De doctrina admittedly contains some of Milton’s 
driest and most abstruse writing, on ideas which can seem hopelessly distant from the 
interests of most contemporary readers. On second look, however, it is precisely these ideas 
that often present us with what is probably the best, and sometimes perhaps the only way in 
which certain aspects of Milton’s work can be made accessible to broader contemporary 
audiences. 
 They can even enhance our appreciation of such passages of obvious human interest as 
the famous excursus on blindness in Paradise Lost, where Milton laments, in propria 
persona: 
  Thus with the Year 
 Seasons return, but not to me returns 
 Day, or the sweet approach of Ev’n or Morn, 
 Or sight of vernal bloom, or Summers Rose, 
 Or flocks, or heards, or human face divine; 
                                                          
26 Or is, indeed, programmatically bracketed, the argument being that whatever views Milton expounded in 
his prose, poetry is a wholly different matter, and should not be scoured for coherent theological doctrine. This 
view is refuted not only by explicitly theological content found within the poem itself, but also the records of 
early readers acutely conscious of this content: among other examples discussed below, see S. Morland’s 
reference to Paradise Lost as a “Treatise” rather than a poem (n. 163), or R. Blackmore’s statement, explicitly 
encompassing Paradise Lost, that “Epick Poetry is indeed the Theology of the Country where the Poet lives, and 
every Work of this kind is a System of the Religion, and a sort of Confession of the Publick Faith there 
establish’d”; see R. Blackmore, An Essay on the Nature and Constitution of Epick Poetry, in Essays upon 
Several Subjects 1st. ed. (London, 1716), 74. 
27 C. Burrow, “Shall I go on?”, London Review of Books, 7 March 2013, 3-8. 
28 Ibid.  
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 But cloud in stead, and ever-during dark 
 Surrounds me (3.40-6) 
In polemics, Milton boasted of how stoically he took his blindness (YP 4: 582-92). In polite 
conversation, he could dispatch royalist triumphalism with a deadpan one-liner that affords us 
a precious glimpse of the “Satyricall” table-talk reported by Dryden.
29
 The two sonnets on 
blindness similarly stage triumphs of “patience” and “conscience”, carefully orchestrated at 
the voltas, over the “murmur” of despair and resentment. How soulless it would be to 
suppose, however, that he did not suffer profoundly, and at least in this place he was willing 
to drop the mask of stoic self-possession and give some genuine expression to this suffering. 
 Surely here is a Milton as touching and likeable as anything in his youthful poems, 
expressing sentiments of universal human interest in plain-English blank verse – and yet, even 
here, the full import of the verses can be appreciated only by those who have served in the 
trenches of De doctrina. Take, for instance, Milton’s much-discussed and now broadly 
accepted monism, the poetic statements of which, notably the “one first matter” speech in 
Paradise Lost (5.469-503), are greatly enriched by the more elaborate discussion in the 
treatise.
30
 Few aspects of Milton’s thought are more entangled in the technicalities of 
                                                          
29 “One visiting Milton. doe you not sometime reflect on your blindness as a judgment for your writing agst 
K. Charles &c. Milton I am blind Salmasius is dead wch is the greater judgment?” The anecdote is recorded in 
one of the notebooks of A. Hill (c.1635-1722), now British Library, Sloane MS 2896, 143r, first transcribed and 
discussed in W. Poole, “Two Early Readers of Milton”, MQ 38 (2004): 76-99, p. 90. Clearly this is the original 
of the later and now demonstrably apocryphal forms of this anecdote, tentatively accepted by, among others, J. 
M. French, The Life Records of John Milton (New Brunswick, 1949-58), 4: 391, and W. R. Parker, Milton: A 
Biography, 2nd ed., rev. G. Campbell (Oxford, 1996), 1092, n. 55. According to Dryden, as reported by Aubrey, 
Milton was “Extreme pleasant in his conversation, & at dinner, supper &c: but Satyricall”; The Early Lives of 
Milton, ed. H. Darbishire (London, 1932), 6. 
30 See De doctrina, 1.7. For an overview of the discussion up to the 1990s, see Fallon, Philosophers, 4-5. 
Fallon defines Milton’s position as “animist materialism”, positing that “All that exists, from angels to earth, is 
composed of one living, corporeal substance” (1, emphasis mine). The position is said to be “unusual”, “subtle 
and ingenious”, and “best understood as an original synthesis of ideas, [...] which countered the threats to free 
will and theism posed by the new science and emerging mechanism” (1, 79, 107). The consensus on Milton’s 
monism has been contested by Sugimura, arguing that Milton’s “intellectual development over the trajectory of 
his career suggest[s] that his conception of matter and spirit is far more confused and complex than the orthodox 
picture of him as a monist materialist admits”; see N. K. Sugimura, “Matter of Glorious Trial” (New Haven, 
2009), xvi. There is much that is useful in Sugimura’s wide-ranging book, but the central thesis proves 
unpersuasive. She argues that Milton’s oeuvre does not align with a coherent philosophical system, but nobody 
ever claimed it did; Fallon certainly labours to show how Milton gradually abandoned his early dualism to 
embrace views attested in his mature work (Philosophers, 79-98). Passages of special importance elicit special 
pleading. Fallon and others are mistaken to think that Raphael speaks of matter when he speaks of “matter” 
(Paradise Lost, 5.472) – this is merely a metaphor for “a strange potentiality cusping on power”, which Raphael 
employs only so that he could disrupt its “overriding monist tenor” (“Matter”, 44). Up to a point, Sugimura is 
right to criticize the tendency “to emphasize [...] the importance of one word: ‘matter’” (ibid., xv); without 
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seventeenth-century theology and philosophy, and yet few can make him appear more in tune 
with our age, which is not only materialist but is often moved to quasi-religious sentiments by 
the insight, by now degenerated into a cliché, that the elements which compose our world and 
our very bodies are quite literally stardust, uniting us, on a fundamental level, with the 
incomprehensibly vast and ancient universe we inhabit.
31
 How remarkable, then, that three 
and a half centuries earlier Milton has Raphael inform Adam that 
  one Almightie is, from whom 
 All things proceed, and up to him return, 
 If not deprav’d from good, created all 
 Such to perfection, one first matter all, 
 Indu’d with various forms, various degrees 
 Of substance, and in things that live, of life (5.469-74) 
True, Adam is not precisely starstuff, or is so in an indirect sense – stars are made of the 
“Ethereal quintessence”, man of the four “cumbrous” elements, infused with the “breath of 
Life” (3.714-19, 7.524-8) – yet all of these, except for the ontologically ambiguous “breath of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
adequate qualifications, this can be misleading. But what is at stake here is, precisely, one word – a 
terminological rather than a conceptual problem, as Fallon clearly acknowledges, for example when he writes 
that Milton’s “‘one first matter’ extends from what we think of as matter to reason, the ‘being’ of the soul” 
(Philosophers, 103, emphasis mine). Against the general drift of Milton’s mature thought to obliterate the 
distinction, Sugimura preys at such verbal lapses as the project inevitably entails, in which Milton’s monism 
encounters resistance from the dualist conceptual apparatus deeply embedded in the language he is using – as, 
yet again, Fallon clearly recognizes (Philosophers, 102). Had Milton written “one first spirit” instead of “one 
first matter all” – which would change absolutely nothing in his philosophy – and had Fallon then written of his 
“materialist spiritualism”, Sugimura could criticize him with equal propriety for overemphasizing the importance 
of the word “spirit”. In my view, the problematic part of Fallon’s thesis is not the “materialism” but the animism, 
the claim that Milton believed that matter is “essentially alive”, and that he endorsed this view “as if he is saying 
that the deadness of the material world is too great a price to pay for the immortality of a separable soul” (107). 
This seems explicitly contradicted by the same key passage in Paradise Lost: “one first matter all,/ Indu’d with 
various forms, various degrees/  Of substance, and in things that live, of life” (5.472-4, emphasis mine). 
31 This sentiment is usually said to have passed into broad circulation with C. Sagan’s extremely popular 
BBC series Cosmos. “Some part of our being”, intones Sagan deep into the camera lens, against the backdrop of 
a majestic, wind-swept coastline of Monterey, California, “knows this is where we came from. We long to 
return. And we can, because the cosmos is also within us. We’re made of starstuff.” The quote is transcribed 
from the first episode in the series, “The Shores of the Cosmic Ocean”, which originally aired on 28 September 
1980. An alternative statement of the same idea, also often quoted, appears in the book based on the series, 
reputedly the best-selling scientific publication in the English language, C. Sagan, Cosmos (1981; repr. London, 
2003), 255-6: “The nitrogen in our DNA, the calcium in our teeth, the iron in our blood, the carbon in our apple 
pies were made in the interiors of collapsing stars. We are made of starstuff.” For an early study of how Sagan’s 
work “creates a mythic understanding of science which serves for television audiences the same needs that 
religious discourse has traditionally satisfied for churchgoers”, see T. M. Lessl, “Science and the Sacred 
Cosmos”, Quarterly Journal of Speech 71 (1985): 175-87. 
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life”, are forms of the same primal matter.
32
 Note, furthermore, that just as with Sagan, there 
is, both before and after the fall, a promise of return: “time may come when men/ With 
Angels may participate”, and “Improv’d by tract of time, [...] wingd ascend/ Ethereal” (5.493-
9). This is not, or is not only, a moral ascent: the “cumbrous” elements may, by a process 
inherent in all incorrupt matter, be eventually sublimed into “Ethereal quintessence”, starstuff 
proper – a prospect that still seemed perfectly feasible to an American critic of the 
prelapsarian 1920s.
33
 
 The most radical aspect of all this is the effacement of an ontological boundary 
between body and soul, and the consequent acceptance of traducianism and mortalism, the 
doctrine that the soul lives and dies together with the body – or more precisely, at least in 
Milton’s view, indistinguishable from the body – until resurrected at the last judgment.
34
 For 
                                                          
32 Traditionally the “breath of life” of Gen. 2:7 was identified with the soul. Milton thus had to come up with 
an alternative explanation, and this drives him to some uncharacteristically vague formulations in De doctrina, 
1.7: the “infused breath of life [...] was not something divine – part of the divine essence, as it were – that was 
imparted to man by God, but only something human, representing a fixed portion of divine virtue [...]. For he 
infused the breath of life even into the other animate creatures too”; the “breath of life was neither part of the 
divine essence, nor was it even the soul, but a certain breeze or divine power wafted out, suitable only for the 
power of life and reason and instilled in an organic body; since man himself when finally made – the whole man 
himself, I say – is in distinct words called ‘a living soul’” (OW 8: 121-2). 
33 See Larson, Modernity, 137: “We need not consider this transformation a mere fancy with Milton: he 
probably took it very seriously. And, in all sober earnest, is it really unreasonable to believe that man, who has, 
as science tells us, developed from a little mass of quivering jelly, may, with a lesser further evolution, be able to 
throw off the dross of his material body and sail upon the depths of azure blue? May not this potentiality be 
realized in a few ages, in an eon or two?” With regard to Larson’s “depths of azure blue”, see Leonard’s 
discussion (Labourers, 734-4) of the residually Ptolemaic, bright blue cosmos imagined by Milton’s nineteenth-
century editor Masson, who describes the universe – the real universe of what he calls “modern science” – as “an 
absolute, boundless, ocean of azure space”, an “enormous sphere of blue”. “The change from a bright to a dark 
universe”, comments Leonard, “is one of the most profound paradigm shifts in the history of ‘cosmic 
imaginings’ – as profound as Copernicus’s displacing of the earth, but unlike ‘the Copernican revolution’, it 
seems to have occasioned no debate and little notice. [...] Modern readers, accustomed to a ‘pitch-black’ 
universe, are unsurprised by the darkness of Milton’s abyss, but Masson can help us see how prophetic Milton’s 
‘cosmic imaginings’ were.” Leonard speculates that Masson’s blue universe was dispelled by scientific 
discoveries of c.1859-71, but Larson’s “depths of azure blue” would seem to indicate an even longer afterlife. 
The phrase appears in several poems from the nineteenth and early twentieth century, where it plainly means 
nothing more than “sky”, but note that the text on which Larson is commenting – the “one first matter” speech, 
specifically the prospect that men will eventually “wingd ascend/ Ethereal, [...] or may at choice/ Here or in 
Heav’nly Paradise dwell” – intimates precisely future “space travel”. 
34 Protestants like Luther and Tyndale maintained the doctrine of psychopannichism, according to which the 
soul sleeps, rather than dies, until awoken at the last judgment, and which thus preserves the soul’s immortality 
while dispensing with the problem of intermediate states. For Milton’s views, see De doctrina, 1.7 and 1.13: 
“man is an animate being [animal], inherently and properly one and individual, not twofold or separable – or, as 
is commonly declared, combined or composed from two mutually and generically different and distinct natures, 
namely soul and body – but [...] the whole of man is soul, and the soul is man; namely, a body or substance 
which is individual, animated, sensitive, and rational”; “the whole person dies; [...] body, spirit, and soul” (OW 
8: 121-2, 175). For a recent discussion of the mortalist heresy in the context of competing conceptions of 
secularisation and modernity, see N. McDowell, “Dead Souls and Modern Minds?”, JMEMS 40 (2010): 559-92. 
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the dualist, withdrawal from the senses brings one closer to the transcendent mystery of God, 
and ultimately, death releases the immortal soul from its prison in the body, to be reunited 
with its divine source. As Fallon notes, the young Milton, the Milton we are supposed to like, 
was an orthodox dualist, and could speak of the body as a “foul prison”, “darksome House of 
mortal Clay”, “fleshly nook”, “mortal dross”, “Earthy grosnes”.
35
 Even for a philosophically 
sophisticated dualist like Milton’s contemporary and intellectual antipode Kenelm Digby, the 
soul can be imagined as indistinguishable from the body only until their separation at death, 
and so the senses can, in the final analysis, only be a distraction.
36
 
 The monist, however, for whom the body is not a prison, and knowledge acquired 
through the senses is not illusory or (qualitatively) deficient, has every reason to regret having 
“wisdome at one entrance quite shut out” (Paradise Lost, 3.50). But it is more than a source 
of knowledge that Milton lost. For one to whom all creation is but dispersion of the “one first 
matter” into “various forms” and “various degrees/ Of substance”, the visible world does not 
merely symbolize or adumbrate the magnificence of its creator, or the glory of the world to 
come – it is, in its very material being, itself divine, and since its beauties thus occasion 
                                                          
35 The quotations are from “In obitum Præsulis Eliensis” (On the Death of the Bishop of Ely) (46), “Nativity 
Ode” (14), “Il Penseroso” (92) and “On Time” (6, 20); cf. Fallon, Philosophers, 80-1. 
36 Thus Digby’s major philosophical work, the 1644 Two Treatises, logically ends with a call to ascetic 
mysticism (Nnn2v). For an even stronger statement of the same view, see the philosophical fragment extant in 
two manuscript versions, an earlier one, dated 19 June 1634, in Morgan MS, B, 59v-62r, and (quoted here) a 
later one, undated, in Harley MS 4153, 14r-18r: “We must (as Plato sayth), separate our selues from all matters 
or corporeall substances, or the knowledge that result of them: Nay yet further; (allowing to St. Dionysius 
Areopagita) wee must exclude out of our minde all Intelligible Species whatsoeuer; euen of spirituall obiects: 
And then, the soul will liue by contemplation when it is dead to sense, and eleuated aboue ratiocinatiue 
discourse.” The less radical position of the Two Treatises accords with a more nuanced view of the soul’s 
relation to the senses espoused in this work: “the soules being in a body, is not an imprisonment of a thing that 
was existent before the soul and body mett together; but her being there, is the naturall course of beginning that 
which can no other way come into the listes of nature”; the soul’s “nature is to be a compartner to the body, and 
to acquire her perfection by the mediation and seruice of corporeall senses”; it is “naturally designed to be in a 
body: but her being in a body, is her being one thing with the body, she is said to be in: and so she is one part of 
a whole, which from its weaker part is determined to be a body” (Kkk1r). Apparently the possibility of Digby’s 
influence on Milton has not been seriously considered; Fallon omits him “because his work neither closely 
parallels Milton’s nor presents, like Hobbes’s, a particular threat to Milton’s beliefs” (Philosophers, 98-9, n. 23). 
In fact, although obviously problematic – what does it mean for the soul to be “immaterial” and yet, however 
temporarily, “one thing with the body”? how can the soul be “one thing with the body” at the same time as it is 
“one part of a whole”? – Digby’s position offers an interesting contemporary alternative to Milton’s, seeking to 
preserve the immortality of the soul while at the same time groping for a philosophical upgrade to simpler and 
increasingly untenable forms of dualism. Also of interest, in the light of Milton’s personification of Sin, is 
Digby’s comparison of the state of the “vicious” and “disordered” soul in the afterlife to “the fansie of the Poets, 
who fained a monster, which they termed Scylla, whose inferiour partes, were a company of dogges, euer 
snarling and quarrelling among themselues; and yet were vnseuerable from one an other, as being compartes of 
the same substance” (Two Treatises, Iii3v). 
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delights far beyond the aesthetic (or aesthetic in an immeasurably deeper sense), the loss of 
that beauty and those delights is proportionally devastating. Nor would Milton be restored to 
this beauty in the afterlife. Upon his death, his soul would not soar aloft, as that of the bishop 
of Ely he eulogized as a seventeen-year-old, or that of Digby, observing, “an infinite distance” 
below, the melancholy spectacle of time “wasting the existences of all corporeall things from 
nothing to nothing, in a perpetuall streame”.
37
 The whole of John Milton, living soul, would 
die, and when sight was restored to his reconstituted eyes at the second coming, they would 
behold a world very different from the one he had left, a world populated by supernatural 
beings and bent on a divinely ordained conflagration.
38
 There would be greater beauties, a 
new earth, and who knows, perhaps heaven and earth would really turn out to be “Each to 
other like, more then on earth is thought” (Paradise Lost, 5.576). Yet on this world, as it was 
when he last saw it – the world which, however fallen, was the stage on which the drama of 
human suffering and human hope had unfolded until its cataclysmic final act – he would 
never look upon again. 
 The most profound loss, however, is the one last mentioned, of the “human face 
divine”. Here again the poignancy of Milton’s verses can be fully appreciated only in the light 
of a related and highly technical piece of theological heterodoxy. For centuries, Christian 
theologians had accounted for the Bible’s anthropomorphic and anthropopathic 
representations of God, and biblical representations more generally, as concessions to the 
limits of human understanding, a doctrine known as divine accommodation or 
                                                          
37 Milton, “In obitum”; Digby, Two Treatises, Nnn2r. The editors have noted the obvious similarities 
between the ascent of the soul in “In obitum” and of the souls borne to the Paradise of Fools in Paradise Lost, 
but have failed to grasp its implications. Thus Lewalski and Haan note that the 1626 poem “affords insights into 
Milton’s early conception of the cosmic journey, which would come to feature much more prominently in 
Paradise Lost” (OW 3: cxxi). It would come to feature indeed, but precisely as a travesty of this conception, 
including that entertained in Milton’s own youthful poem. “I flew”, the comforting voice reassures the weeping 
speaker of “In obitum”, “past the globe of the gleaming sun and far beneath my feet I beheld the triform goddess 
as she restrained the dragons with reins of gold. I am carried through the ranks of wandering stars, through the 
expanses of the Milky Way; often I marvelled at my newly acquired speed until I reached the resplendent 
entrance of Olympus, the palace of crystal, the court paved with emeralds” (55-64). The change of tone in 
Paradise Lost is striking: “They pass the Planets seven, and pass the fixt,/ And that Crystalline Sphear whose 
ballance weighs/ And now Saint Peter at Heavn’s Wicket seems/ To wait them with his Keys” (3.479-85). 
38 On Milton’s eschatology, see De doctrina, 1.33, and Paradise Lost, 12.536-51. Various aspects of the 
subject are discussed in the papers collected in Milton and the Ends of Time, ed. J. Cummins (Oxford, 2003); see 
esp. Cummins’ chapter, “Milton and Apocalyptic Transformations in Paradise Lost”, on the monist basis of the 
last judgment in Paradise Lost. 
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condescension.
39
 As traditionally understood, accommodation entailed a hermeneutics often 
indistinguishable from allegoresis, whereby human qualities ascribed to God were understood 
to signify non-human qualities which God really possesses. God’s eyelids, for example, 
signify his “incomprehensible Judgement”, his mouth “His commandements given unto men”, 
and so forth.
40
 Alternatively, in line with a more negative theological outlook, the idea can 
also manifest itself as a one-sided, hermeneutically abortive position: it is a given that God’s 
                                                          
39 For a general study of the doctrine, permeating, under various terms, in various contexts, at various 
historical periods, Jewish and Christian theology from Philo onwards, see S. D. Benin, The Footprints of God 
(Albany, 1993). Few things would be more beneficial to Paradise Lost criticism than a judicious critique of the 
ways in which the notion of “accommodation” has been used in Milton studies, where it appears to have gained 
currency through R. M. Frye’s inexplicably influential God, Man, and Satan (1960; repr. Port Washington, 
1972), esp. 3-17. To Frye’s credit, he makes perfectly explicit the presentist orientation of his work: he is not 
attempting “a scholarly reconstruction of the seventeenth-century weltanschauungen [sic] of Milton and 
Bunyan” but is seeking to “establish [...] a vital interaction” between the work of these writers and contemporary 
theology, for the benefit of believing readers “who feel the need for an interpretation of such subjects as heaven 
and hell, angels and devils, in terms intelligible to the modern mind” (4-6). This should have served as a warning 
to critics who extended to Milton Frye’s account of accommodation as a “system of symbols” instructing 
believers to conceive of God “largely on the analogy of personality”: “God, though in essence beyond human 
comprehension, is to be dealt with as a person, rather than as an abstraction or absolute. The personal quality of 
God is conveyed through virtually every revealing accommodation of the Biblical symbols, [...] and is ultimately 
manifested in the historical person of the incarnate Son” (13). These are not “‘mere symbols’”, however, to be 
abandoned in pursuit of “an abstract conception of God”, yet neither are they “identical with what they 
symbolize, and are not to be clung to in their visible signs”, but rather “communicate in a definite way by the 
direction of their meaning” (12). This last phrase illustrates the strain placed on such reasoning, and in practice it 
soon becomes clear that Frye’s symbolic accommodation is indistinguishable from allegory. Satan, for example, 
is such an accommodated symbol: “Christianity summarizes the source of evil under the symbol of the 
demonic”, meaning that Satan is “not an independent evil being” but precisely the sort of abstraction that 
“accommodation” supposedly discourages – a “sphere”, an “anti-model”, a “force”, “an interpretation of a 
certain type of life”, “a commentary on life, on human frustration and fulfilment” (22-25). Nor can, on the other 
hand, “accommodation” be legitimately presented as an ancient alternative to allegory, a hermeneutic doctrine 
that somehow evades the separation between two or more levels of meaning. For a major recent statement, see 
Raymond, according to whom “accommodation” provides such a “third way”, by which “transcendental spiritual 
truths could be conveyed to finite human comprehension, without distortion or misrepresentation”, and thus, in 
its Protestant varieties, reinforces the “emphasis on the primacy of the ‘literal sense’”, unlike allegory, which 
“supposes a fierce separation between representation and the thing represented” (164-7, 224). Contrary to such 
claims, the idea that scriptural expressions are “accommodated” to human understanding does not, in itself, 
prescribe any particular type of hermeneutics, and has certainly been used as theological justification for 
allegorical readings of the most traditional type. The doctrine can lead to such positions as Raymond describes – 
and certainly Milton is bending it to a very unusual purpose – but it does not necessarily do so, and in fact views 
comparable to Milton’s seem exceedingly rare. Critics like Raymond take Milton’s highly unorthodox views as 
their starting point, and then project them, ignoring the emphatically polemical edge of his argument, onto an 
imaginary tradition to which they supposedly belong. 
40 The examples come from a 1642 handbook by R. Bernard (Figure 6), quoted in C. A. Patrides, “Paradise 
Lost and the Theory of Accommodation”, Texas Studies in Language and Literature 5 (1963): 58-63, p. 61. 
Bernard’s tables afford a good illustration of the degree of conventionalisation such an approach had attained by 
Milton’s day. 
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Figure 6. Tables explaining the meanings of God’s attributes in R. Bernard’s The Bibles 
Abstract and Epitomie (London, 1642), Aaa2v-3r. Several entries illustrate the difficulty of 
consistently avoiding anthropopathic and anthropomorphic language: God’s anger, for 
example, signifies “His Threatening of Punishment”, yet God’s nose signifies “His very Anger 
against sinners”. 
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eyelids are an accommodation, but precisely because the divine reality signified by this 
expression is unknowable, we cannot comprehend what they are an accommodation of. In 
practice, this is largely a matter of emphasis, for as we saw with Augustine, the generally 
accepted fact that God is unspeakable rarely stopped anyone from speaking about him. “With 
a wise silence we do honour to the inexpressible”, says Pseudo-Dionysius, one of the major 
exponents in this tradition, and then goes on to anatomize it in many pages of extravagantly  
expressive prose.
41
 Crucially, the hermeneutics of accommodation, as understood by the 
overwhelming majority of commentators up to Milton’s day, urges believers to move away 
from scriptural representations of the deity to a contemplation of the divine reality these 
representations signify. Views to the contrary, from Melito of Sardis in the second to the 
Socinians in the seventeenth century – whose Racovian Catechism burned on the streets of 
London in 1652 despite having been licensed for printing by none other than John Milton – 
never entered the mainstream of Christian tradition, and were invariably branded heretical 
wherever they acquired any level of acceptance.
42
 
 In one of the most daring passages in De doctrina, Milton espouses a view of 
accommodation which departs radically from this orthodoxy in extending a limited validity to 
the scriptural representations of the deity taken in their literal sense:  
Our safest way is to encompass God with our mind as he shows himself and describes 
himself in sacred literature. For although it be granted that God is always either 
described or outlined not as he really is but as we can grasp him, yet it will be no less 
our duty to imagine him in our mind exactly as he – in adapting [accommodans] 
himself to our grasp – wants to be imagined. For he has lowered himself to us [se ad  
nos demisit] for the very purpose of preventing us from loftily exceeding human grasp  
                                                          
41 The Complete Works (London, 1987), 50 (598B). 
42 On Milton and Socinianism, see M. Lieb, Theological Milton (Pittsburgh, 2006), 213-60, and M. 
Dzelzainis, “Milton and Antitrinitarianism”, in Milton and Toleration, ed. S. Achinstein and E. Sauer (Oxford, 
2007). More broadly on Milton’s anti-Trinitarianism, see M. Bauman, Milton’s Arianism (Frankfurt, 1987), and 
several of the essays in Milton and Heresy, ed. Dobranski and Rumrich, notably Rumrich’s “Milton’s Arianism”. 
The closest and most relevant parallels to Milton’s views on divine nature that I have come across are found in 
the writings of the Socinian J. Biddle, who also attempted to produce a complete statement of Christian doctrine 
based solely on scripture alone, and scripture taken solely in its literal sense. For Biddle’s view of divine nature 
as represented in the scripture, see the following note. Biddle’s views are discussed by Raymond, Angels, 173-5. 
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and written record, and from giving space to vague thoughts and sophistries. 
  Here, therefore, I think, Theologians have no need for anthropopathy (a term 
the Grammarians once thought up to justify poets’ nonsense about their god Jupiter); 
sacred scripture has indubitably taken good care neither to write anything unseemly or 
unworthy of God itself, nor to represent God as speaking thus of himself. [...] As to 
what is proper or improper for God, let us not demand a weightier authority than God 
himself. If Jehovah regretted having made humankind, Gen. 6: 6, and [regretted] their 
groaning, Judg. 2: 18, let us believe that he did feel regret; only let us not suppose that 
in God, as in mortals, the sorrow was born of inadvertency [...]. If God is said to have 
created man after his own image, after his own likeness, Gen. 1: 26 – and not just a 
spiritual one, either, but an outward physical one too, unless the same words do not 
mean the same as later, ch. 5: 3, where Adam begot a son after his own likeness, after 
his own image – and if God assigned himself a thoroughly human body and aspect, 
why should we be afraid to assign him what he assigned himself, so long as we believe 
that what is imperfect and feeble in us is most perfect and beautiful wherever assigned 
to God? (OW 8: 10-11)
43
 
                                                          
43 Cf. Biddle in the Preface to his Twofold Catechism (London, 1654), A6v-8r, discussing representations of 
God as a paradigmatic example of how traditional interpretations – “mystical or figurative”, “Figures & 
Allegories” – manipulate the plain sense of the scriptural text: “For instance, it is frequently asserted in the 
Scripture, that God hath a similitude or shape, hath his place in the heavens, hath also affections or passions, as 
love, hatred, mercy, anger, and the like, neither is any thing to the contrary delivered there, unless seemingly in 
certain places, which neither for number, nor clearness are comparable unto those of the other side. Why now 
should I depart from the letter of the Scripture in these particulars, and boldly affirm with the generality of 
Christians, (or rather, with the generality of such Christians only, as being conversant with the false Philosophy 
that reigneth in the Schools, have their understandings perverted with wrong notions) that God is without a 
shape, in no certain place, and uncapable of affections? Would not this be to use the Scripture like a nose of wax, 
and when of it self it looketh any way, to turn it aside at our pleasure? And would not God be so far from 
speaking to our capacity in his word, (which is the usual Refuge of the Adversaries [...]) as that he would by so 
doing render us altogether uncapable of finding out his meaning, whilst he spake one thing, and understood the 
clean contrary? Yea, would he not have taken the direct course to make men substitute an Idol in his stead, [...] if 
he described himself in the Scripture otherwise then indeed he is, without telling us so much in plain terms, that 
we might not conceive amiss of him? Thus we see, that when sleep, which plainly argueth weakness, and 
imperfection, had been ascribed to God, Psal.44.23. the contrary is said of him, Psal.121.4. Again, when 
weariness had been attributed to him, Isa.1.14. the same is expressly denied of him, Isa.40.28. And would not 
God (think ye) have done the like in those forementioned things, were the case the same in them, as in the 
others?” Cf. later discussion in the main text, B3v-7r. Biddle’s influence on De doctrina seems to have been 
underestimated and deserves a detailed reconsideration. There is every reason to suspect that he is among those 
whom Milton has in mind when he says, in the Epistle, that has come to agree with the opponents “of those who 
are known as the orthodox [...] whenever those opponents agreed with the scripture” (OW 8: 5). Cf. the YP note 
to this sentence, comparing a similar statement in the life of Biddle prefaced to the 1691 edition of his 
Apostolical And True Opinion concerning the Holy Trinity (London, 1653), A2v-3r. 
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The importance of this passage was recognized already by the treatise’s earliest nineteenth-
century readers, and it has been cited and discussed extensively ever since, yet this discussion 
has often meandered unprofitably as critics, beginning with Sumner, attempted to conflate 
Milton’s position with the very orthodoxy that he so emphatically attempts to subvert, or have 
recognized it as unorthodox, yet only at the expense of also deeming it inconsistent and 
paradoxical.
44
 Not until comparatively recently did scholarship fully catch up with both the 
originality and the coherence of Milton’s views, which emerge only in a careful consideration 
of the whole of his argument here, and its correlation with other relevant discussions in De 
doctrina, notably of the Son and his incarnation.
45
 
                                                          
44 See Sumner’s note to this passage: only “at first sight” does Milton appear to have “adopted one of the 
most ignorant errors of the dark ages of the Church”; Milton, Treatise, 18, n. 6. Not all early readers were 
convinced, however, and the above passage is among the most frequently extracted and criticized portions of the 
treatise. On the shock occasioned by the its publication, shattering, to the discontent of most, the previous 
consensus on Milton’s religious orthodoxy, see Lieb, Theological Milton, 256-60. One of the most extensive of 
the early responses is by J. P. Smith, “On Milton’s Treatise on Christian Doctrine”, published serially in The 
Evangelical Magazine and Missionary Chronicle, n. s., 4 (1826): 50-3, 92-5, 137-40, 371-5, 463-6, 555-8: “A 
striking example of the power of poetical feeling, overbalancing the dictates of a cool and rigorous judgment, 
appears in our great author’s opinion on the properties and affections of the Deity. [...] How did he come thus 
unhappily to stumble?” (92-4). Mid-twentieth-century critics worked hard at re-establishing Milton’s orthodoxy 
on this crucial point: besides Frye, see esp. C. A. Patrides – “Accommodation”; Milton and the Christian 
Tradition (Oxford, 1966), 7-25; “Paradise Lost and the Language of Theology”, in Language and Style in 
Milton, ed. R. D. Emma and J. T. Shawcross (New York, 1967) – and S. Fish, Surprised by Sin, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1998), 202-3. For conflations with Neoplatonism, see J. H. Hanford, “‘That Shepherd Who 
First Taught’”, UTQ 8 (1939): 403-19, p. 415-17, an argument widely disseminated in Hanford’s Milton 
Handbook, 4th ed. (New York, 1946), 226-8; more recently, M. Bryson, “Paradise Lost and the God beyond 
Names”, in Essays on the 1667 First Edition, ed. M. Lieb and J. T. Shawcross (Pittsburgh, 2007). For criticism 
which sees the passage as contradictory, see A. D. Nuttall, The Alternative Trinity (1998; repr. Oxford, 2007), 
151, and more recently, W. Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall (Cambridge, 2005), 192-3: “What [Milton] 
enables theoretically, he disables practically; what he accepts practically, he bans theoretically. The 
metaphysician and the fundamentalist talk at adds out of the same mouth”. 
45 A decisive step forward appeared with H. R. MacCallum’s “Milton and Figurative Interpretation of the 
Bible”, UTQ 31 (1962): 397-415, the first study to clearly acknowledge the “unusually daring and thoroughoing” 
nature of Milton’s view: “Scripture [...] frequently depicts God as if he were a man. Is it possible that he really 
exists in such a form? Milton will not say. [...] We see God through the glass of Scripture, and whether that glass 
is transparent and colourless, or whether it is merely translucent, or possibly even warped and tinted, we cannot 
say” (401-2). This evades the inference of contradiction, but it also fails to do justice to Milton’s comments on 
anthropopathy and Genesis 1:26; for MacCallum’s later revision of his views, see n. 52. Other important early 
contribution include L. Ryken, The Apocalyptic Vision in “Paradise Lost” (Ithaca, 1970), 15-43, and W. 
Shullenberger, “Linguistic and Poetic Theory”, ELN 19 (1982): 262-78. In “Reading God”, MS 25 (1989): 213-
43, revised in Theological Milton, 127-62, Lieb expands on Shullenberger’s emphasis on the incarnation, 
demonstrates Milton’s divergence from the orthodox view of accommodation and impassibility, gives a 
persuasive exposition of Milton’s “theopathic” alternative (see following note) and the “divinization of the 
passible” it entails, and notes the implications of this for the representation of the deity in Paradise Lost. Of 
interest is Lieb’s acknowledgement that he is writing against a wide-ranging consensus in Milton studies: 
“Although these assertions would appear to be self-evident, the state of Milton criticism at this time is such that 
Milton’s God is still viewed more nearly as abstract principle than as fully realized character. [...] When Milton 
took this view to task in De Doctrina Christiana, it is almost as if he were responding to the future critics of his 
own poem” (Theological Milton, 152). Finally, see N. D. Graves, “Milton and the Theory of Accommodation”, 
SP 98 (2001): 251-72, incorporating and refining all these insights, and the important paper by Killeen, which 
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 To see contradiction here is to fail to grasp the distinction, crucial to Milton’s thought, 
between anthropopathy and anthropomorphism and what should properly be called theopathy 
and theomorphism.
46
 “God created man, and not vice versa.”
47
 The difference might seem 
immaterial: either way, we want to say, God has a human form. Yet that is precisely what 
Milton’s counter-intuitive argument wants to banish from our thoughts. It is man who has a 
divine form. Anthropomorphism and anthropopathy, man’s ascription of human form and 
behaviour to God, are grounded in the vagaries of human reasoning. Theomorphism and 
theopathy, however, are justified not only by unambiguous passages of scripture, but still 
more importantly, by what even Milton accepts as a “great [...] mystery”, the incarnation of 
him whom “the Greeks in a single word most aptly call Theanthrōpos, ‘God-man’”, “in whose 
face invisible is beheld/ Visibly”, “Substantially express’d” (OW 8: 188, 192; Paradise Lost, 
3.140, 6.681-2). Consequently, as long as we do not stumble into anthropopathy, scriptural 
representations of God, in their plain, “literal” sense, afford us with “a true although 
incomplete representation of the transcendent deity”.
48
 
 This has obvious and profound implications for Milton’s much-debated representation 
of the deity in Paradise Lost, but it also illumines, to go back to the Skinner sonnet, that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
broadens the discussion into other directions, demonstrating the similarities between Milton’s idea of 
accommodation in Paradise Lost “accords with natural philosophers and theologians, from Boyle to Burnet, 
who, uniquely in this late-seventeenth-century era, saw the Scriptures as compatible with their science. 
Accommodation [...] became the exegetical tool that allowed emerging scientific and philosophical ideas to meld 
with Scripture”; K. Killeen, “Accommodation in Burnet’s Sacred Theory (1681) and Paradise Lost”, MS 46 
(2007): 106-22, p. 107; cf. P. Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge, 
1998), 129-38. 
46 Lieb coins the term theopatheia to express the inverted logic of Milton’s position: in anthropopathy, “God 
becomes an imago hominis, rather than man an imago Dei. Avoiding this trap, Milton advises against following 
the example of men, [...]; rather, he advocates following the example of God [...]. Having done away with 
anthropopatheia, he not only intensifies the idea of passibility but bestows upon it renewed significance. For 
lack of a better term, this new form of passibility might be called theopatheia” (Theological Milton, 146). The 
English equivalent, theopathy, is not recorded in the OED; the earliest example of theomorphism dates from 
1822. 
47 Graves, “Theory”, 270. 
48 Ibid., 259. This view is still by no means universally accepted. Recently, Sugimura and Raymond both fail 
to acknowledge the anthropopathy-theopathy problem and are thus driven into the fold of the “contradictionists”: 
Milton’s discussion is pervaded by a “rising anxiety” ending up in “fundamental contradiction” (Sugimura, 
Substance, 217); “Milton’s argument winds through a familiar logic, until he endorses, beyond all doubt, the 
anthropopathy he originally rejected” (Raymond, Angels, 186). Some further discussions include W. G. Madsen, 
From Shadowy Types to Truth (New Haven, 1968), 73-84; C. G. Shirley, Jr., “The Four Phases of the Creation”, 
South Atlantic Bulletin 45 (1980): 51-61; K. M. Swaim, “The Mimesis of Accommodation in Book 3 of 
Paradise Lost”, PQ 63 (1984): 461-75; Treip, Poetics, 231-38, 278-81; J. Guillory, Poetic Authority (New York, 
1983), 146-71; J. S. Shoulson, Milton and the Rabbis (New York, 2001), 93-134. 
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seemingly inconsequential postposited adjective in “human face divine”. The human face is 
not divine in some loose poetic sense, or the abstract sense in which all of God’s works are, 
by default, divine. Even in a monist ontology, in which all of creation is “one first matter [...],/ 
Indu’d with various forms”, the human form is unique. All forms are from God, but the 
human form is of God, a notion so important to Milton that he has Raphael stress it repeatedly 
in recounting to Adam the circumstances of his creation.
49
 Consequently, if being deprived of 
the human face is terrible enough for an orthodox, glass-half-empty accommodationist, how 
much more terrible is the deprivation of the unorthodox, glass-half-full accommodationist like 
Milton, who genuinely believes this face is – in a limited, carefully qualified, but nevertheless 
decisively real and “literal” sense – the face of God? The difference emerges very clearly if 
we compare the analogous list in the sonnet to Skinner, written in the winter of 1655-56: three 
years after he went blind, and predating or just coinciding with the development of Milton’s 
monist views. Its abstractness is striking: the “idle Orbs” have been deprived of the sight “Of 
Sun, or Moon, or Starre throughout the Year;/ Or Man, or Woman”.
50
 Perhaps Milton was 
simply not at his poetic best here, yet how much more felt and particularized is his later 
lament, not for the grandiose splendour of the heavens but such earthly, everyday blessings as 
a summer rose or a flock of grazing sheep, and not for a generic “Man, or Woman” but the 
transcendently theanthropomorphic “human face divine”. Indeed, it seems worth speculating 
whether we might have it backwards: whether it is really, as I have been suggesting, Milton’s 
                                                          
49 “Let us make now Man in our image, Man/ In our similitude, [...]/ This said, he formd thee, Adam, thee O 
Man,/ Dust of the ground, and in thy nostrils breath’d/ The breath of Life; in his own Image hee/ Created thee, in 
the Image of God/ Express, and thou becam’st a living Soul” (7.519-28). Elsewhere, Raphael also explicitly 
stresses that this extends to man’s outward form: Adam is, “Inward and outward both, [God’s] image faire” 
(8.221). Cf. H. MacCallum, Milton and the Sons of God (Toronto, 1986), 113-15: “All the works of God reflect 
his glory, [...] but traditionally those which are ‘images’ hold a pre-eminent position.” In the orthodox view, 
however – MacCallum cites Aquinas – the similarity resides in the faculty of reason, and the title is extended to 
“rational creatures, which imitate God through the possession not merely of being and of life, but of 
intelligence”. By contrast, Milton explicitly states the divine image “to shine ‘in [Adam and Eve’s] looks 
Divine,’ and the phrase suggests that it has a sensible and external manifestation. [...] Milton’s sense of the 
continuity of body and spirit allows him to handle the external aspects of the image more emphatically and with 
fewer reservations than most commentators; believing that ‘the whole man is soul, and the soul man’ [...], he 
does not share Calvin’s fear of the heresy of the anthropomorphites, who ‘were too gross in seeking this 
resemblance in the human body’”. 
50 According to Fallon, Philosophers, 96-9, Milton adopted his monist philosophy “by the late 1650s”. 
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monism that would have aggravated the trauma of his blindness, or whether it is the blindness 
that precipitated his monism?
51
 
 
WHAT HAPPENS IN PARADISE LOST? 
 
Be that as it may, this is only one example of how the recovery of Milton’s theological and 
philosophical views can transform our understanding even of the most unlikely aspects of his 
poetry. A more significant instance of the same shift in perspective is the problem of 
perceived allegory in Paradise Lost, especially in relation to the four particularly contentious 
domains of inquiry listed above. That an improved understanding of the intellectual 
background of this poem obviated the need for figurative readings was being realized already 
by the earliest readers of De doctrina, and certainly by 1855 Thomas Keightley found himself 
reading “a poem in which everything seems intended to be real”, including such touchstone 
episodes as Sin and Death’s passageway through chaos – for “who could say positively, after 
considering [...] Milton’s idea of the reality of his cosmology, that he may not have conceived 
a material junction between hell and the exterior orb of the world?”
52
 The excursus against 
anthropopathy made a particularly strong impression: Keightley cites it in its entirety, as 
affording “abundant proof of Milton’s belief of the doctrine of plenary inspiration”, which 
“his logical mind pursued [...] to its legitimate consequences”, and which provided a solid 
theological basis for his representation of the deity. The same representation is now also 
found to reflect the Arianism of the treatise “in so plain and unequivocal a manner, that [...] 
one might wonder that every reader did not discern it” previously. Still other elements in the 
poem correspond, point for point, to notions expounded in or deducible from De doctrina, 
                                                          
51 As Fallon shows, Milton converted to monist views by the late 1650s, and we know he was totally blind by 
early 1652. In other words, he came to hold such highly unusual philosophical and theological views as would 
have infinitely increased his appreciation for the visible world after having lost his sight, and its seems 
reasonable to speculate whether his heightened awareness of its beauties, recollected in the “ever-during dark” of 
his blindness, played a part in this. 
52 T. Keightley, An Account of the Life, Opinions, and Writings of John Milton (London, 1855), 411. 
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including Milton’s fallible and extravagantly material angels, whom “he makes in most 
respects like man”, or such episodes as the golden stairs of heaven, also “a reality”.
53
 
 Since Keightley, numerous scholars have been discovering, and more often than not 
rediscovering, the same insights, even though an articulately literalist “school” of Milton 
criticism has never emerged, and could perhaps be only retrospectively reconstructed. 
However, if the representational status of Milton’s God is still contested, efforts to de-
allegorize Milton’s angels have had much greater success, and even more importantly, 
seminal contributions to the understanding of Milton’s personifications have been made in the 
1970s and 1980s by Gallagher and Fallon, superseding virtually all previous scholarship on 
this subject, and posing a particularly formidable challenge to the allegorical view.
54
 
Gallagher showed that Milton ascribed to a form of Christian euhemerism which explained 
pagan myths as distorted retellings of sacred history, both that recorded in the Bible, but also, 
and much more importantly for Milton’s purposes, that deriving from extra- or pre-scriptural 
sources, notably the devils, who such “tradition [...] dispers’d/ Among the Heathen of thir 
purchase got” (10.578-9), but also human tradition extending, through the bottle-neck of 
Noah, to antediluvian times and ultimately Adam and Eve – or some amalgamation of these 
two options.
55
 Such a view of ancient myth inverts and indeed dispels the more standard 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 158, 164-6, 451, 467, 483. 
54 See Gallagher, “Ontology”, and S. M. Fallon, “Milton’s Sin and Death”, ELR 17 (1986): 329-50, slightly 
revised in Philosophers, 168-93. The debate on the poem’s personifications, often undifferentiated from other 
perceived “allegory in the work, begins with Addison’s Spectator papers, further discussed below. On 
eighteenth-century commentary, see S. Knapp, Personification and the Sublime (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 51-
65, and J. T. Shawcross, “Allegory, Typology, and Didacticism”, in Enlightening Allegory, ed. Cope. The 
literature is extensive: in addition to studies mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, see A. Stein, Answerable Style 
(Minneapolis, 1953), 157-8; J. H. Summers, The Muse’s Method (London, 1962), 32-70; I. G. MacCaffrey, 
“Paradise Lost” as “Myth” (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), esp. 179-206; A. Ferry, Milton’s Epic Voice (1963; repr. 
Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 116-46; V. Kahn, “Allegory and the Sublime in Paradise Lost”, in John Milton, ed. A. 
Patterson (Harlow, 1992); C. Gimelli Martin, “Approaches to Teaching Paradise Lost Allegorically”, in 
Approaches to Teaching “Paradise Lost”, ed. P. C. Herman, 2nd ed. (New York, 2012). The chapter on “God” 
in Leonard’s Labourers usefully surveys other aspects of the debate on Milton’s representation of the deity, but 
Leonard has little to say, here or elsewhere, on questions of representation. On angels, see below. 
55 As Gallagher notes, Milton’s euhemerist reconstructions are usually implicit, but several passages, such as 
the above comment on the myth of Ophion and Eurynome, give explicit voice to the doctrine. See also the 
narrator’s comment on Hephaestus’ fall from Olympus, said to be a distorted account of Satan’s fall from 
Heaven: “thus they relate,/ Erring; for he with this rebellious rout/ Fell long before” (1.745-7). For further 
discussion, see also Gallagher’s “Milton and Euhemerism”, MQ 12 (1978): 16-23, and “Paradise Lost and the 
Greek Theogony”, ELR 9 (1979): 121-48. For early anticipations of Gallagher’s argument, see Addison, quoted 
in n. 193 below; Keightley, Account, 178. A flaw in Gallagher’s work is his exclusive focus on the diabolic 
theory of the origin of the myths. Nowhere in Paradise Lost is any piece of classical tradition explicitly credited 
to extra-scriptural knowledge descended from Adam and Eve, but surely the reader is meant to come to this 
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procedure of Christian allegoresis of pagan myth, turning it into a source to be mined for 
insights into ancient history unrecorded, or recorded only partially or obscurely, in the Bible: 
“deeds”, as we read in Paradise Regain’d, “Above Heroic, though in secret done,/ And 
unrecorded left for many an Age” (1.14-16).  
 Bringing all this to bear on Sin and Death, Gallagher shows that Milton viewed the 
account of Athena’s birth from the head of Zeus in Hesiod’s Theogony as a distorted account 
of an event that really took place in ancient history, and poetically reconstructed this event as 
the birth of Sin from the head of Satan by correlating the Hesiodic myth, and its traditional 
allegorical interpretations, with the metaphors of James 1:15: “Then when lust hath 
conceiued, it bringeth forth sinne: and sinne, when it is finished, bringeth forth death.” The 
problem with Gallagher’s argument is the extension of this into the much bolder claim that 
“Sin and her son Death are consistently real (i.e., physical and historical) throughout Milton’s 
major epic, their allegorical onomastics notwithstanding”, and furthermore, that this “extends 
to virtually all of [the poem’s] personages, places and images”.
56
 Like Teskey, Gallagher fails 
to provide a persuasive explanation of how such beings as Sin and Death can exist on the 
same ontological plane as angels and, by proxy, humans. 
 Here we need to turn to Fallon’s equally important, and equally inconclusive, 
contribution to the debate, according to which Sin and Death are to be seen as allegorical 
representations of metaphysical evil, understood, in accordance with a tradition going back to 
Augustine and accepted in De doctrina, as the privation of the good, and consequently of 
being.
57
 So while the privation of being is obviously unrepresentable in mimetic terms, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
conclusion, especially given the extensive tutoring of Adam by Raphael in Books 5-8 and Michael in Books 11-
12. I omit a fourth theoretical possibility, that of pre-Adamite knowledge, an incendiary mid-seventeenth-century 
idea with which Milton was familiar, but which, whatever he may have otherwise thought of it, is entirely absent 
from his biblical epics; see Poole, Idea, 141-2. 
56 Gallagher, “Ontology”, 322. 
57 See Fallon, Philosophers, 168-93. In De doctrina Milton distinguishes between two “degrees or else parts 
or else modes” of sin, namely “evil concupiscence or lust for evildoing, and the evil deed itself”, and then goes 
on to note that the latter is “called Actual, not because sin is properly an action – since in reality it is a privation 
– but because it is usually involved in an action. For every action is in itself good: its irregularity or deviation 
from the rule of law is alone properly evil. Hence the action itself is not the material out of which sin [is made], 
but simply and solely the underlying thing and hypokeimenon in which [it exists]” (OW 8: 165-7). Fallon’s 
reading is partly anticipated by Summers: “Sin and Death remind us [...] that, despite all appearances, all the 
inhabitants of Hell approach nonentity: they represent a denial of proper being” and are thus “integral” to the 
poem (54-5, 70). For Summers, however, this includes, as he stresses here, Satan and the fallen angels, and by 
256 
 
singularly appropriate to dramatise it by inserting a non-mimetic, allegorical episode into an 
otherwise mimetic poem. What has been censured as a fault since Addison onwards thus turns 
into a virtue: “Taking advantage of the fit between allegory and nonentity in the seventeenth 
century, Milton in a virtuoso performance employs allegory to strengthen rather than violate 
the ontological coherence of the universe of Paradise Lost.”
58
 While presenting an essential 
advance over prior discussions, Fallon’s argument does not, however, evade the objections 
initiated by Addison. If Sin and Death are allegorical embodiments of evil as privation of 
being, how can they converse with Satan? How can that which does not exist interact with 
that which, as Fallon himself labours to prove elsewhere in his study, does exist? As 
understood by Fallon, Sin and Death might be the least obstructive way for Milton to violate 
the ontological decorum of his poem, but he violates it nevertheless. 
 Gallagher and Fallon thus set the parameters for further investigation into this most 
vexed of the four main clusters of supposed allegory in Paradise Lost. Both critics comment 
on the crucial lines in Book 10:  
 Mean while in Paradise the hellish pair 
 Too soon arriv’d, Sin there in power before, 
 Once actual, now in body, and to dwell 
 Habitual habitant (10.585-8) 
According to Gallagher, the lines show 
how Sin was figuratively in the Garden before she literally arrived there. She occupies 
the place in three distinct ways: “in power” (i.e., potentially, before the Fall, because 
of Adam’s and Eve’s fallability [sic]; “actual[ly]” (i.e., spiritually, upon the 
completion of the original sin, which in Adam’s case was also an actual sin); and “in 
body” (i.e. physically, when she and Death bodily arrive there).
59
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
implication the whole of the poem’s supernatural “machinery”; Satan is “a personified actor” in a “persistent 
symbolic structure whereby all the major actions and emotions of human life are reflected, imitated, or parodied” 
(67, 70). 
58 Philosophers, 169. 
59 “Ontology”, 324. 
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Fallon disagrees, arguing that “in body” refers not to Sin’s bodily existence on earth, but to its 
existence as an accident in the substance of fallen man:  
Sin is potential through human fallibility (“in power”), it is actually committed 
(“actual”), and it affects the sinner by depriving him or her of grace, righteousness, 
freedom, beauty, and other perfections (“in body”). Sin and Death are “in body” 
because they become accidents in man’s substance after the fall; they have no 
existence outside the fallen creature, only in his or her turning from God and the 
resulting spiritual deficiency and physical mortality.
60
 
Between them, Gallagher and Fallon thus identify or imply three conflated sets of theological 
and philosophical binaries behind this crucial passage.
61
 While it seems clear that Milton 
deliberately saturates these lines with such technical terminology, aiming at least partly and 
perhaps even mainly at satirical effect, I would propose that a coherent reading can still be 
established if we presume that Milton indeed did envision, in accordance with the orthodoxy 
to which he seems to subscribe in De doctrina, that sin and death can exist only as accidents 
in man’s substance in this world, but can in fact – yet another venture into philosophically and 
theologically uncharted territory prompted by his monism – assume substantial existence, as 
Sin and Death, in worlds ontologically alien to our own.  
 There is no room to mount a full argument here, but several details in the poem seem 
to support this hypothesis, notably the various descriptions of Sin, the only character in 
Paradise Lost who visits all the four major realms of the poem’s universe. Although 
                                                          
60 Philosophers, 189. 
61 Firstly, denoted by “Once actual”, the distinction between “actual” and “original” sin; secondly, denoted 
by “in body”, the distinction between “accident” and “substance” (thus Fallon, but see further discussion below); 
and thirdly, denoted by “in power”, another essential Aristotelian distinction, between “actuality” and 
“potentiality”. In addition, worth further consideration is the possibility of a fourth opposition at work here, 
triggered by the juxtaposition of the terms “actual” and “habitual”, which would add a topical and satirical 
dimension to the passage, namely that between “actual” and “habitual” grace, concepts which some Protestant 
commentators associated with Roman Catholicism and denounced as contrary to their views of justification by 
faith. See, for example, G. Downame, A Treatise of Ivstification (London, 1633), B4r: “hence we may conclude 
against the Papists; first that neither their first, nor second justification, is that justification, which is taught in the 
Scriptures. Not the second, for that is not God’s action, but their owne: who being justified before by habituall 
righteousnesse infused from God, doe themselves as they teach, by practising of good workes increase their 
righteousnesse, that is, justifie themselves by actuall righteousnesse, as the merit of their second justification.” 
This would fit with the other demonic inversions, which are a major structural principle throughout Milton’s 
biblical epics, and more specifically, with the travesty of orthodox Trinitarianism in the infernal trinity of Satan, 
Sin and Death; cf. Graves, “Trinity”. 
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commonly associated with hell, Sin is of course born in heaven, “at th’ Assembly, and in 
sight/ Of all the seraphim” (2.749-50), and her appearance there is strikingly divergent from 
her later appearance in hell. As born in heaven, Sin is not monstrous in shape, but rather, 
euhemerising Hesiod’s Athena, “a Goddess arm’d” (2.757). Furthermore, this radiant goddess 
is not a personification at all, but rather an ontologically unprecedented, prodigious being, 
born “in sight” of the unfallen angels and “call’d” by them: “back they recoild afraid/ At first, 
and call’d me Sin, and for a Sign/ Portentous held me” (2.759-61). Only subsequently, in hell, 
does Sin undergo a monstrous transformation analogous to that of the fallen angels. One way 
of looking at this is through the lens of the allegorist: sin is appealing at first, but is later 
revealed in its true colours. This is not, however, necessarily incongruous with a literal 
explanation of why Sin’s monstrous transformation takes place in hell, where, as Gallagher 
and Fallon both fail to mention, physical laws are not merely different from those of our 
world, but are inverse to those that govern divine creation.
62
 Thus hell is precisely the sort of 
place where such beings as Sin and even Death – the “shape [...] that shape had none” (2.667), 
the very opposite of what is normally understood as existence – can truly, and thus in some 
sense substantially, exist.
63
 
 As a subordinate creation – created out of Satan’s own created substance, in perverse 
imitation of God’s creation from uncreated substance – Sin can temporarily exist in heaven. 
As infernal and infernally perverted substances, Sin and Death can subsequently subsist in 
hell, as well as in chaos, although that realm’s native denizens are of a still different and also 
anomalous order of being, phasing in and out of existence in a way that does not, and 
                                                          
62 Hell, we are told, is “A Universe of death, which God by curse/ Created evil, for evil only good,/ Where all 
life dies, death lives, and Nature breeds,/ Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,/ Abominable, 
inutterable, and worse/ Than Fables yet have feign’d, or fear conceiv’d,/ Gorgons and Hydras, and Chimeras 
dire” (2.622-8).  
63 The possibility Sin and Death’s substantial existence in hell seems to have at least crossed Fallon’s mind, 
but is discarded as “to grant Sin and Death independent substantial existence would be to confer divine creativity 
on Satan” (Philosophers, 188). This seems incontestable in so far as independent existence and divine creativity 
are concerned, but what if, as further discussed below, Milton also envisioned the possibility of dependent and 
demonic creativity, emanating demonic substance, a perverted emulation of divine creation capable only of 
illusion, monstrosity and paradox? In a final ontological analysis, even this substance would be divine, and even 
in hell “Nature” is at work, only in perverted form, because “God [...] created” it such. 
259 
 
presumably could not, occur in any other region of the universe.
64
 However, in order to take 
possession of the earth, Sin and Death must undergo an alteration in their mode of being, even 
as their passage to earth alters the being of the cosmos – in reality, one and the same process, 
ordained by God, who employs both his angels and his “Hell-hounds” for executing different 
aspects of this transformation.
65
 Here we return to the key passage, describing how Sin and 
Death arrive in Paradise and have their brief exchange there, still possessed of their monstrous 
forms: 
 Mean while in Paradise the hellish pair 
 Too soon arriv’d, Sin there in power before, 
 Once actual, now in body, and to dwell 
 Habitual habitant; behind her Death 
 Close following pace for pace, not mounted yet 
 On his pale Horse (10.585-90) 
My reading vindicates Gallagher’s interpretation of “in body”: the words really do refer to 
Sin’s bodily existence in paradise, and are reinforced by the emphatically physical description 
of Death following in its footsteps, still possessed of a “Maw” and a “vast unhide-bound 
Corps” (10.601).
66
 This does not, however, invalidate Fallon’s view, denoted here not, as he 
supposes, by “in body”, but by “Habitual habitant”, the meaning of which is further specified 
                                                          
64 One of the most striking examples of just how methodically Milton conceptualized the ontological 
differences between his cosmic realms is the description of Chaos as of “faultring speech and visage 
incompos’d” (2.990). Here also a fuller investigation should be made into whether Milton is merely personifying 
an inanimate concept, or rather envisioning a form of existence suited to a cosmological domain memorably 
described as “without bound/ Without dimension, where length, breadth, & highth,/ And time and place are lost” 
(2.893-6). 
65 In their passage through the cosmos, Sin and Death deliberately choose the route that will cause most 
destruction in their path: “they with speed/ Thir course through thickest Constellations held/ Spreading their 
bane; the blasted Starrs lookt wan,/ And Planets, Planet-strook, real Eclips/ Then sufferd” (10.410-14). Modern 
commentators, uncomfortable with the materiality of what is described – Sin and Death hurling themselves into 
constellations, blasting stars and crashing planets into planets – seek to attribute the changes to astrological 
influence. Fowler, for example, glosses “blasted” as “breathed on balefully; influenced by a malign planet”, and 
“Planet-strook” as “stricken by an adverse planetary influence”, eliminating any material agency on the behalf of 
Sin and Death. The point, as Newton understood, is that such destruction as are usually attributed to adverse 
astrological influence is now being turned, by means of a superior force, on the very cosmic bodies which exert 
this influence: “We say of a thing when it is blasted and wither’d, that it is planet-struck; and this is now applied 
to the planets themselves. And what a sublime idea doth it give us of the devastations of Sin and Death!”; 
Paradise Lost, ed. T. Newton (London, 1748). Later on, God explains that it is by his bidding that “these Dogs 
of Hell advance/ To waste and havoc yonder World” (10.616-17), and dispatches angels to complete the process. 
66 Cf. W. B. Hunter, The Descent of Urania (Cranbury, 1989), 148, n. 50: Eve’s sin “brought the capacity for 
sin into form or actuality; now Sin arrives embodied”.  
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by Sin only a few lines below: “I in Man residing” (10.607; cf. 10.815-6, “Death and I/ [...] 
incorporate both”). Instead of two options, we thus have three, precisely denoted in lines 
10.587-8, specifying the past, present and future state of Sin on earth: she was “Once actual”, 
is “now in body”, and is “to dwell/ Habitual habitant”. Only now, in the brief interim of the 
fall – not before, not after, but precisely as it is taking place, as the very structure of the 
cosmos is being altered – can Sin and Death bodily exist in paradise. 
 Only now, and only in paradise. It is vital, I think, and apparently overlooked in 
previous criticism, that Sin and Death arrive and have their brief exchange in paradise rather 
than anywhere else on earth, because paradise is an ontologically anomalous region, governed 
by different physical laws from the rest of the planet.
67
 However debased morally, in 
ontological terms Sin and Death are beings of an infinitely higher order than man even in his 
unfallen state. Not only can they subsist in chaos, from which man and his cosmos need to be 
protected by its impervious shell, but can harness and mould it. When loosed into the cosmos, 
they wreak destruction in their path. On earth, then, such monstrous beings can substantially 
exist only in the ontologically elevated oasis of paradise, whereas elsewhere they must 
suitably modify their mode of existence from substance to accident, and, as Satan explains 
already in Book 2, “dwell [...] unseen” (2.841). Consequently, after their brief exchange in 
paradise, Sin and Death dissolve into sin and death, accidents in the substances of living 
things – “This said, they both betook them several ways” (10.610) – and are not heard of 
again. 
 Finally, the possibility should be entertained that Milton also envisioned Sin and 
Death as a genealogy, in accordance with Gallagher’s euhemerist model, of Platonic idealism. 
The monstrous beings dubbed “Sin” and “Death” would thus be the origin of a false 
philosophy later spread by Satan, in keeping with the view that Satan perverted Christian 
                                                          
67 We have this in no uncertain terms from God’s own mouth, explaining that fallen man cannot be allowed 
“longer in that Paradise to dwell,/ The Law I gave to Nature him forbids:/ Those pure immortal Elements that 
know/ No gross, no unharmoneous mixture foule,/ Eject him tainted now, and purge him off/ As a distemper” 
(11.48-57). 
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teaching by infusing it with Greek philosophy.
68
 More specifically, Milton’s euhemerizing 
account of Sin might be seen to focus on a particular variety of Platonic idealism, the 
“intradeical”, where ideas are claimed to reside in, or to be identical with, the thoughts of 
God.
69
 This is of great interest as intradeical idealism was traditionally aligned with 
Trinitarian theology, so that such a reading gives an additional layer to the elaborate satire of 
Trinitarian theology in the depiction of Satan, Sin, and Death, as compellingly reconstructed 
Graves’ recent study.
70
 Milton’s early Latin poem, “De Idea Platonica quemadmodum 
Aristoteles intellexit” (On the Platonic Ideal Form as Understood by Aristotle), also uses the 
myth of Athena’s cephalogony to ridicule Platonic idealism, and merits much more attention 
in this regard than it has hitherto received.
71
 
                                                          
68 Here again an interesting parallel is found in Biddle, according to whom all those “Personalities, Moods, 
Subsistences, and such like brainsick Notions” of the Trinitarians “were first hatched by the subtilty of Satan in 
the heads of Platonists, to pervert the worship of the true God” (Twelve Argvments, B1v). 
69 See H. A. Wolfson, “Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas”, JHI 22 (1961): 3-32; V. 
Boland, Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas (Leiden, 1996). 
70 See N. D. Graves, “The Trinity in Milton’s Hell”, MS 52 (2011): 111-36. Graves, however, is too quick to 
dismiss Gallagher’s euhemerism, which is perfectly compatible with his thesis; Milton satirizes Trinitarianism 
not through an allegory, but by giving a historical account of how intradeical idealism and its theological 
reverberations “actually” came into being. See also the note to lines 2.752-61 in Fowler’s edition, who similarly 
recognizes in the generation of Sin a “travesty” and “distort[ion]” of the allegorical interpretations of the 
Hesiodic cephalogony as signifying the “two-stage logos” theology of the Son – the very position ascribed to 
Milton by Hunter, conclusively rebutted by Bauman, Arianism. 
71 Traditionally the poem has been viewed as a parody, Coleridge setting the tone for most subsequent 
commentary by seeing in it “not, as has been supposed, a ridicule of Plato; but of the gross Aristotelian 
misinterpretation of the Platonic Idea, or Homo Archetypus”; quoted in A Variorum Commentary on the Poems 
of John Milton, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes et al. (New York, 1970–). Milton knew better, he was merely pretending 
not to. The OW editors perpetuate this view (OW 3: cxxiii), as does, in the final analysis, J. K. Hale, Milton’s 
Cambridge Latin (Tempe, 2005), 33-65. Although Hale rejects the parodical reading, he still believes that Milton 
is merely giving his best shot at an obviously exploded thesis, in accordance with the practice of arguing both 
sides of a case; thus “Milton may be obtuse; but his university studies trained people to be obtuse in exactly this 
way (and for a purpose)” (65). Hale’s explanation of Milton’s underlying motivation – in thus obtusely 
criticising Plato’s idealism, he is supposedly mounting an “ambush”, “a defence of poets, against their greatest 
and most influential calumniator” (cf. Variorum, ed. Hughes et al., on lines 37-9) – is forced and unpersuasive. 
In anticipation of a fuller examination in a separate study, I wish here only to draw attention to the striking 
resemblances between Sin and Death in Paradise Lost and “De idea”, lines 7-24, asking who the archetypal man 
is supposed to be: “He is not the young twin of the virgin Pallas, an unborn child locked inside Jove’s mind; but 
though his nature is universal, still he exists separately in the manner of an individual being and amazingly he is 
confined within a fixed spatial limit. Whether as the stars’ eternal companion he traverses the tenfold spheres of 
heaven or inhabits the moon’s globe, nearest the earth: [...] or whether perhaps in some distant region of the earth 
he advances as a huge giant, the original form of humankind, and rears his lofty head thereby frightening the 
gods, taller than star-bearing Atlas.” The birth of Sin is thus modelled on the very myth which Milton uses here 
to criticize (intradeical) Platonic idealism. As he moves on to other theories, the resemblances continue: after the 
fall, sin and death are “universal”, accidents in substances, but before the fall they are, “amazingly”, Sin and 
Death, existing “separately in the manner of [...] individual being[s]”, “huge giant[s]”, “monsters” (l. 36). We 
similarly see them “traverse” (“pererrat”; Hale has “roves”) the cosmos (although no longer a Ptolemaic one) in 
the illusion that their actions are “frightening the gods”. Commentators present no direct parallels for the 
monstrous physicality of the description, which is perhaps indicative of a curiously materialist streak in Milton’s 
imagination, long predating and anticipating his monism. Of potential interest here is Hale’s argument, not 
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 Similar reasoning would seem to underlie most of the minor episodes of supposed 
allegory in the poem, which are typically based on a conflation of classical and scriptural 
motifs, and whose apparent figurative dimension either resolve into unproblematic literal 
readings, or turn out to be restricted to the poem’s non-mimetic, rhetorical overlay. A good 
example of both these processes is found in the golden scales episode at the end of Book 4. 
The episode is obviously modelled on the motif in classical epic, which had been allegorically 
interpreted since ancient times.
72
 However, a careful reading of Milton’s passage leaves little 
doubt that the only scales which “happen” within the poem’s mimetic universe are the stars 
composing the constellation Libra. In order to prevent the battle between Satan and the 
guardian angels, God 
 Hung forth in Heav’n his golden Scales, yet seen 
 Betwixt Astrea and the Scorpion signe, 
 Wherein all things created first he weighd, 
 The pendulous round Earth with balanc’t Aire 
 In counterpoise, now ponders all events, 
 Battels and Realms: in these he put two weights 
 The sequel each of parting and of fight; 
 The latter quick up flew, and kickt the beam (4.997-1004) 
What happens, then – as opposed to what is merely said – is that God either creates or 
arranges previously existing stars into the image of an unbalanced scale, thus creating what 
has henceforth been known as the constellation Libra (or perhaps rearranges the stars of the 
already extant constellation from a balanced to an unbalanced position). Gabriel sees this, 
realizes what it portends, and tells Satan to “for proof look up,/ And read thy Lot in yon 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
adopted by the OW editors (OW 3: cxxii-cxxiii), that “De idea”, as we have it, does not quite fit with the relevant 
university genres and contexts, and is thus not to be equated with printed act verses mentioned in the 1628 letter 
to A. Gil (YP 1: 313-14), but rather that it and “Naturam non pati senium” (That Nature Does Not Suffer Decay) 
“began life as act verses, which they resemble at more points than they differ; but that they have developed past 
that set form, to something more personal and expressive” (36) – in other words, that the subject, although 
commissioned, struck a genuine intellectual and poetic chord in Milton, the same that would, years later, lead to 
his conception of Sin and Death in Paradise Lost. 
72 For an example, see Heraclitus, Homeric Problems, ed. D. A. Russell and D. Konstan (Atlanta, 2005), 13. 
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celestial Sign/ Where thou art weigh’d”, leading Satan to disengage from the conflict, having 
“lookt up and knew/ His mounted scale aloft” (4.1010-14). 
 This is not allegory. When Homer and Virgil have Zeus and Jupiter weigh the fates of 
their warriors in golden scales, they offer no comparable rationalization, cosmological or 
otherwise, and one must eventually be sought through allegoresis. With Milton, however, we 
are explicitly told that they are no scales at all: “yet seen” in its said position in the night sky, 
the constellation is a permanent “celestial Sign” of God’s judgement, and by synthesizing 
several strands of pagan and Christian tradition, Milton corrects pagan myth and astrology – 
the golden scales of classical epic are revealed to be a distorted, literalized account of the 
metaphoric depictions of God’s weighing in several places in the Old Testament
73
 – even as 
he gives a true account of the origins of a familiar cosmological phenomenon. 
 A similar rationale can be discerned behind another ostensibly “allegorical” episode, 
the “mysteriously [...] meant” golden stairs extending from the aperture at the top of the 
cosmos to the gate of heaven. Roaming across the outer shell of the cosmos, Satan 
  farr distant [...] descries 
 Ascending by degrees magnificent 
 Up to the wall of Heaven a Structure high, 
 At top whereof, but farr more rich appeerd 
 The work as of a Kingly Palace Gate 
 With Frontispiece of Diamond and Gold 
 Imbellisht, thick with sparkling orient Gemmes 
 The Portal shon, inimitable on Earth 
 By Model, or by shading Pencil drawn. (3.501-9) 
We are in fact never told, and the narrator does not pretend to know, what it is that Satan sees, 
except in the broadest, functional outlines. There is thus “a Structure”, leading up, in 
                                                          
73 See Job 28:25, “To make the weight for the windes, and he weigheth the waters by measure”; Job 37:16, 
“Doest thou know the ballancings of the clouds”; Isa. 40:12, “Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his 
hand: and meted out heauen with the spanne, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed 
the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance”; and Dan. 5:27, “thou are weighed in the balances, and art 
found wanting”. 
264 
 
increments, to a “Portal”, which is comparable (“as of”) to a magnificently ornamented palace 
gate, but is not fully comprehensible through such comparisons.
74
 
 Milton does not want us to imagine actual stairways and palace gates in deep space, 
but neither does he want us to take these images allegorically. Rather, he wants us to entertain 
the prospect that there really exist, outside of our cosmos, subject to different physical laws, 
and thus largely, but not wholly, beyond our understanding, material structures which are 
functionally comparable to stairways and gates. These limited insights are gleaned from a 
careful rationalization of key elements – notably the “ladder” and the “gate” – in Jacob’s 
dream.
75
 There is something out there in the universe functionally analogous to the these, but 
the reason is physical rather than symbolic. The cosmos is subject to same stable physical 
laws that we still daily experience, but outside it lies the volatile realm of chaos, which even 
Satan traverses with the greatest difficulty. There is thus a real need for a “structure” to 
facilitate movement between the cosmos and the empyreal heaven, just as for the analogous 
conduit through the “unvoyageable Gulf” (10.366) from earth to hell, variously referred to as 
                                                          
74 On Milton’s use of similes in such places, see esp. Murrin, Epic, 365-6, discussing the description of 
heaven at 3.344-415, specifically the mention of the angels’ “shout” being “sweet/ As from blest voices”: “A 
simile should clarify; these finally do not. [...] It could be read as tautology, for we know the angels are blessed 
and we are talking of their shout. More likely, however, the whatever of the angels resembled somehow many 
happy voices. Otherwise why say that the shout was only like to the noise made by voices, except to remind us 
that angels are not human and do not have voices in the normal sense of the term? The simile asserts difference 
perhaps as much as similarity. [...] The more similes Milton uses, the stranger the scene becomes.” See also 
Murrin’s discussion of the extensive use of similarly inconclusive similes in the opening chapter of Ezekiel (164-
6). Murrin takes the argument too far, however – in which he is followed by Sugimura – when he argues that 
Milton uses such devices to stage total epistemological abnegation. 
75 “And he dreamed, and beholde, a ladder set vp on the earth, and the top of it reached to heauen: and 
beholde the Angels of God ascending and descending on it./ And behold, the LORD stood aboue it [...]/ And 
[Jacob] was afraid, and said, how dreadful is this place: this is none other, but the house of God, and this is the 
gate of heauen” (Gen. 28:12-17). In keeping with the principles of scriptural exegesis outlined in De doctrina, 
and probably also consulting Protestant commentaries on the passage, Milton accepts this as divine revelation, 
and as it is a dream vision – and moreover, at 28:17, a report and interpretation of a dream vision, a further 
remove from the divine reality it represents – he feels warranted in exploring its figurative implications.Cf. The 
Dutch Annotations (London, 1657), according to which the “house” and “gate” of 28:17 refer to “a place where 
God dwelleth in a singular manner, to declare and reveal himself unto men, by speaking to them, and to be 
spoken unto by men, praying to and worshipping of him; whereby they may from hence, as by a gate, ascend up 
into heaven, to converse with him” (emphasis mine). How closely Milton scrutinized these motifs is best 
indicated by his dismissal of a particularly prominent aspect of the ladder, explicitly said to extend from “earth 
[...] to heauen”. This, Milton apparently deduces, is a concession to the figurative aspect of the vision, and 
therefore feels justified in extending his extrapolated “Structure” only to the aperture at the top of the cosmos. 
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a “beach”, “Mole”, “Bridge”, “passage”, “ridge”, “way”, “Pontifice”, “Rode”, “Causey” and 
“Highway” (10.299-415, and Argument to Book 10).
76
 
 Only now, only once all this has been established, does Milton make a reference to 
“Stairs”: 
 The Stairs were such as whereon Jacob saw 
 Angels ascending and descending, [...]  
 Dreaming by night under the open Skie 
 And waking cri’d, This is the Gate of Heav’n. (3.510-15) 
Again, however, the simile leads nowhere: we have no idea what the stairs of Jacob’s vision 
were like, and not only because the vision is figurative, but also, as Milton would have 
doubtless known, because the Hebrew word in question, sullām, is a hapax legomenon of 
                                                          
76 There is, however, no need for such conduits through the cosmos, and it is doubtful – consider again the 
effects which the intrusion of the ontologically alien beings of Sin and Death leaves in its wake – whether they 
could even exist within it.The juncture at which the “Structure” meets the “op’ning” is presumably to be 
identified with its “bounds”: “So wide the op’ning seemd, where bounds were set/ To darkness, such as bound 
the Ocean wave” (3.538-9). Arguing that Milton’s cosmology intentionally resists a fully rational explanation, 
Ittzés notes this as one of the places where “analysis breaks down and becomes meaningless”, for if we read the 
lines in purely rational terms, “chaos would violently pour” through the aperture, “flooding and drowning 
whatever is inside”; see G. Ittzés, “Structure of Milton’s Universe”, in Centuries, ed. Ittzés and Péti (Budapest, 
2012), 36. The problem with this reading, however, is not that it is excessively, but insufficiently rational. We 
know that, except at the “op’ning”, the cosmos is enveloped in a “firm opacous Glove” protecting it “From 
Chaos and th’ inroad of Darkness old” (3.418-19); we also know that, for this same reason, there is a “Structure” 
to facilitate movement between heaven and earth; the logical conclusion must be that the “bounds” at 3.538 refer 
to whatever means by which the “Structure” attaches to the “op’ning”, paralleling the “beach” by which Sin and 
Death “fasten” their passageway to hell (10.298-300). Their precise nature is again left unexplained: they are 
“such as bound the Ocean wave”, another pseudo-simile extending merely to their function. Incidentally, the 
“Glove” is probably “opacous” because it is “firm”. Milton’s is neither a magical universe, in which one might 
encounter an invisible barrier unaccountably resistant to the laws of nature, nor the universe of modern science 
fiction, where one might encounter an invisible but non-magical “force field”. To his reasoning, matter 
sufficiently strong to withstand chaos must be extraordinarily dense, and consequently opaque, at least to human 
and angelic sight. Even though “thir Power was great”, Sin and Death cannot simply conjure their conduit to 
hell, but must create it out of highly compacted chaotic matter: “what they met/ Solid or slimie” they “together 
crowded drove”, creating “aggregated Soyle”, which is further hardened by Death’s “Mace petrific, cold and 
dry” (10.284-93). A similar process formed the outer shell of the cosmos by compacting the “Ethereal 
quintessence of Heav’n” (3.716) – if the circular “walles [of] this Universe” at 3.721 are identical, as they seem 
to be, with the “firm opacous Glove” of 3.418. The Richardsons, Explanatory Notes and Remarks (London, 
1734), were the first to propose that Milton got the idea of a solid and opaque envelope from the passage in 
Lucretius describing how the firmament was formed when “the light and expansive ether, with coherent body, 
bent around on all sides [corpore concreto circumdatus undique flexit], and expanded widely on all sides in 
every direction, thus fenced in all the rest with greedy embrace”; see Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 5.467-70. “Concretus”, Leonard explains, “(from concresco, ‘grow together’) means 
‘hardened’. The idea is that fluid particles coalesce to form a solid structure: finer than modern industrial 
concrete, but a genuine ‘firmament’” (Labourers, 719). If this is so, then both the deity and its antipodes build 
chaos-resistant structures in basically the same way, only from appropriately opposing materials: God from 
ether, Sin and Death from slime. Consequently, for anyone but God, whose “eye/ Views all things at one view” 
(2.189-89), to enter or even see into the cosmos, there must be an “op’ning”, adjoining to the “Structure” 
ascending to the “Portal”. 
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unclear meaning, of which the Septuagint’s klimax and the Vulgate’s scala are merely 
traditionally accepted interpretations.
77
 Milton clearly thrived on such ambiguities, which 
bore scriptural authority even as they opened the prospect for daring speculation. From verse 
3.510 onwards, then, we pass from mimesis to diegesis, from a philologically grounded 
conjecture about aspects of deep-space cosmology to a vignette prompted by the traditional 
interpretations of Jacob’s vision.
78
 
. Room for discussion is limited, yet the above should suffice to prove that Milton did 
not, as Johnson would famously accuse, confuse spirit and matter. He did, however, walk a 
tightrope between the mimetic and the rhetorical, and if he occasionally wavered, failing to 
demarcate between the two as clearly as we might have wished him to, he did make it to the 
other side. This does not mean, to pre-empt an obvious objection, that there is no figurative 
significance to his golden stairs or his golden scales,
79
 but for the most part this meaning is 
successfully quarantined to the poem’s rhetoric rather than its mimetic action. It is allusion, 
properly speaking, rather than allegory. This does not mean that there are no figurative 
dimensions to Milton’s universe. Clearly Milton envisaged the creation as imbued, especially 
in its unfallen form, with symbolic significance, and early in his career he could even use the 
                                                          
77 See, for example, the discussion in V. P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 18-50 (Grand Rapids, 
1995): “The Hebrew word here is sullām, which occurs only here in the Hebrew Bible. Many commentators 
have connected sullām with the verb sālal, ‘heap up,’ and accordingly suggest for the noun something like 
‘ramp’ or ‘stairlike pavement.’ More likely is the suggestion that Heb. sullām is to be connected (through 
metathesis) with Akk. simmiltu, ‘stairway.’” An interesting detail in Hamilton’s discussion is his dismissal of the 
argument against the traditional translation “ladder” – one does not go up and down on a ladder at the same time 
–as based on “a modern, rationalistic concern than a linguistic observation. If we wish to be completely modern 
and rationalistic, then we need to isolate the issue in terms not of ‘ladder’ versus ‘stairway,’ but why angels 
would need either one!” I propose that this is precisely the question Milton asked himself. Cf. G. N. Conklin, 
Biblical Criticism and Heresy in Milton (New York, 1972), on the importance of the Hebrew terms nephesh, 
“soul”, and bara, “create”, to Milton’s doctrines of mortalism and creation ex Deo. 
78 That the stairs are “mysteriously [...] meant” is certainly a nod to the traditional commentary on the vision, 
and as further discussed below, it is possible that Milton would have condoned allegoresis of such overtly non-
mimetic passages of scripture. But these interpretations – and it seems indicative that we are never actually 
offered any – relate to the vision as recorded in Genesis, not to the cosmological extrapolation from aspects of 
that vision in Milton’s epic. For a survey of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century interpretations, see C. A. 
Patrides, “Renaissance Interpretations of Jacob’s Ladder”, Theologische Zeitschrift 18 (1962): 411-18. Patrides 
is wrong in saying, and thereby insinuating Milton’s supposed orthodoxy, that sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century theologians universally, “to a man”, allegorized the ladder as Christ. To take a notable example, this and 
any such allegorical interpretations are completely bracketed from the treatment of the vision in The Dutch 
Annotations. 
79 Or the other golden things in his poem: the golden hinges of the gate of heaven (5.253-6, 7.205-7), 
Michael’s golden sword (6.320-34) – not actually said to be golden in Paradise Lost, but a “sword of gold” in 
Milton’s source, 2 Macc. 15:15-16 – the golden compasses (7.224-231), and the golden altar (11.15-20). 
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term allegory in this context.
80
 If, however, we extend the notion of “allegory”, as Treip and 
Borris do, to the point where reality itself can be termed “allegorical”, then it must follow that 
any artistic representation, of any subject, by any person who subscribes to such a view of 
reality, is “allegorical” by default, which obviously creates more problems than it solves. 
Simply put, “if allegory is everywhere, it is nowhere”.
81
 Beliefs which may be particularly 
conducive to allegory – that the world is structured in terms of analogies or correspondences, 
or that all Christian believers enter a state of mystical union with Christ – cannot be equated 
with allegory itself. Allegory is not a belief or a worldview, and it is a simple fact of literary 
history that allegorical literature and art have been practiced independently of any such 
notions as Treip and Borris appeal to.  
 Such terminological problems point to deeper conceptual dilemmas. Critics argue for 
“allegorical” readings of Milton’s epic, yet do not employ the term in a way consistent with 
seventeenth-century Protestant usage, to which, as discussed below, Milton adhered in the 
final decades of his career. In fact, the term is used in ways which, in stressing the supposedly 
non-mechanical and non-hierarchical nature of allegory, directly contradict the understanding 
of this notion by the Milton who composed De doctrina and Paradise Lost. Recently, for 
example, Borris cites Rosemond Tuve’s view of allegory – we must not “suffocate” it “with 
the tightly drawn noose of inflexible equations, but allow meanings to flow into and inhabit 
the literal so that it is symbolic also” – adding that he has “always read allegory this way, 
rather than in ‘levels,’ and [...] assumed that this procedure can be taken for granted among 
early modern literary scholars, as common knowledge since the 1960s”.
82
 If, however, “the 
main bulk” of Paradise Lost is “allegorical, without being one whit less ‘real’ in its historical 
component”, with “metaphor and symbol passing more explicitly into allegory [...], but one 
that is enclosed with in an external framework of historical realism” – if Milton’s is a “meta-
                                                          
80 See below, pp. 272-5 
81 Anderson, Reading, 7. 
82 K. Borris, rev. of Structures of Appearing, by B. Machosky, The Spenser Review 43 (2014), unpaginated e-
text. For the quoted passage, see R. Tuve, Allegorical Imagery (Princeton, 1966), 353. As further discussed in 
the Afterword, statements like this expose the degree to which the late twentieth-century rehabilitation of 
“allegory” testifies to the continuing dominance of the very Romantic and modernist aesthetics which it 
nominally seeks to counter. 
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allegorical” and “subliminal ‘allegory’”, “dialectically transcending conventional allegory’s 
segregation of literal and figurative registers” – if we insist on the term’s “conceptual 
breadth” and its tendency to “complexity, multiplicity, openness, contradiction, and 
subversion”, to the point where discourse lacking such features “is simply not allegory” – if, 
in other words, the concept can be made useful only by emptying it of precisely those traits 
that had previously differentiated it from such neighbouring concepts as metaphor and symbol 
– then what is gained by holding on to it?
83
 This is one of the central questions underlying the 
ensuing sections of this chapter, which examine the emergence and development of 
allegorical readings of Milton’s poem, and which must begin with a re-examination of what 
exactly this term, allegory, meant and connoted to Milton and his contemporaries. 
 
THE SATANIC “OR” 
 
Towards the end of Paradise Regain’d, Satan claims that he has consulted the stars in order to 
foresee Christ’s future: “A Kingdom they portend thee”, he says, “but what Kingdom,/ Real 
or Allegoric I discern not” (4.389-90). The lines go without substantial commentary in most 
editions of the poem and the overall import of the passage is clear enough: Satan either 
genuinely fails to comprehend the true significance of the kingdom, or only pretends to do so 
in another futile effort to tempt Christ. The place is of interest, however, for being the only 
instance in the whole of Milton’s poetry where not only the concept of what might be called 
allegory is invoked, but where a form of the actual word, allegory, is employed. What, if 
anything, is to be made of this? Is it significant that the single time Milton uses the term 
allegory in all of his literary work, it is put into the mouth of Satan – and if so, what is the 
significance? 
 According to almost all previous commentary on the passage, the answer is no: 
Satan’s word-choice is relatively unimportant and “Allegoric” should here be taken in a broad 
sense indistinguishable from such neighbouring concepts as “figurative” or “typological”, or 
                                                          
83 Treip, Poetics, 251; Martin, Ruins, 42-3; Anderson, Reading, 7, 292. 
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perhaps simply as the opposite of “real”, i.e. “unreal”, “imaginary”.
84
 But if nothing more is 
intended, then why choose this technical, confessionally sensitive and otherwise methodically 
avoided term over various other, unproblematic possibilities? The same question is to be 
addressed at more recent readings by critics who approach Milton’s epics as fundamentally 
allegorical in character, and who therefore have a particular interest in defusing the potentially 
unpleasant implications of the passage. Thus according to Treip, in what remains the most 
extensive commentary on these verses,
 
Satan uses the term “allegoric” here partly in a general sense of “figurative” or 
metaphorical, partly (with unconscious or ironic allusion to the Old Testament 
tradition of messianic prophecy) in the older theological sense of “typical” 
(typological). [...] What is most intriguing about Satan’s statement is its either/or 
aspect. If the kingdom is “real” it cannot be figurative, and if it is figurative then it 
cannot be “real”; the two have to be mutually exclusive. Yet in traditional scriptural 
multi-layered reading and certainly in typological reading such was not the case. The 
historical or “literal” level of truth remained always perceived in the background, and 
in typology directly present. Type and antitype are both historically real, while they 
both also participate in a kind of mutual correspondence [...]. Both are “real” and 
simultaneously “allegoric”.
85
 
Satan is an allegorist, then, but he is a bad allegorist, and by “ironically expos[ing]” his 
“narrow literal-mindedness” Milton is instructing us how correctly to approach allegorical 
literature, including, supposedly, his own allegorical epics. 
 Anticipated by mid-twentieth-century studies that had presented Satan as ‘the arch-
literalist’ in the poem, Treip’s reading in turn anticipates more recent arguments along similar 
lines, for example by Anderson, who reads “Real or Allegoric” as “yet another of Satan’s 
pernicious, simplistic binaries, [...] equat[ing] allegory with abstraction, fable, and Idea alone, 
                                                          
84 The latter, for example, was the view of Frye – “for Satan the material is real and the spiritual is imaginary 
or, as he says, ‘allegoric’” – and is the gloss adopted in the Variorum: “Allegoric. Figurative [...] and hence 
unreal”. See N. Frye, “The Typology of Paradise Regained”, MP 53 (1956): 227-38, p. 213; Variorum, ed. 
Hughes et al. 
85 Treip, Poetics, 171-2. 
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ignoring its defining doubleness”.
86
 Such readings have an advantage over earlier ones in 
foregrounding the potential interest in the use of “Allegoric”, but they still fail convincingly to 
account for the unique and thus presumably deliberate usage of this theologically and 
politically sensitive term. However attractive to some modern critics, the idea of allegory as 
defined by a non-reductive “doubleness”, or of the term being used interchangeably with 
figure or type, would have been deeply problematic to many seventeenth-century Protestant 
readers, and all the evidence suggests that Milton is to be counted among them, at least as far 
as the final three decades of his career are concerned.  
 Against this prevailing opinion that the usage in Paradise Regain’d is either 
insignificant or reflects, through ironic contrast with Satan’s misuse of the term, Milton’s own 
predilection for allegory, I propose that exactly the opposite is the case – that the usage is 
significant and that it is significant precisely because it reflects Milton’s hostility towards 
allegory.
87
 In order to substantiate this reading, this section examines the usage of the term 
allegory in Milton’s early writings and its abandonment from 1645 onwards, his familiarity 
with the disputes regarding Galatians 4:24, a biblical verse of central importance in early 
modern disputes on the subject, and what might be called the satanic allegory topos – an 
overlooked tradition in Protestant commentary according to which allegorical reading was 
invented and introduced into Christian tradition by Satan, in order to obscure the true meaning 
of scripture. Having firmly aligned Milton with the anti-allegorical tendency in Protestant 
thought, the discussion returns to Paradise Regain’d to demonstrate how this anti-allegorism 
informs a number of passages in the poem, notably Satan’s often quoted but imperfectly 
understood “Real or Allegoric”. There is much more to this than previous criticism has 
                                                          
86 Madsen, Types, 193; Anderson, Reading, 273. Confusingly, Anderson back-tracks on this later in the same 
chapter: “Satan’s sin”, we now read, “overwrites Edenic monism with metaphorical tension, which, when 
continued, becomes openly allegorical. [...] We enter Eden with Satan and never see it without an awareness of 
his predatory, allegorical presence, which both narratively and conceptually frames the initial description of 
Adam and Eve. His very presence brings doubleness and perceived dualism with it” (293-4). 
87 For a partial exception to the dominant view, see Flannagan’s note: “Milton’s use of the word, juxtaposing 
it with ‘Real,’ suggests that he had indeed rejected allegory as a valid mode [...], at least at this point”; The 
Riverside Milton, ed. R. Flannagan (Boston, 1998). Flannagan further dilutes the claim by adding that “Milton’s 
customary use of the word relates it to biblical types [...] and hence is not pejorative”, citing his description of 
Revelation in the 1641 Animadversions: “the whole Booke soares to a Prophetick pitch in types, and Allegories” 
(YP 1: 714). As further discussed below, this is problematic not only because of Milton’s later avoidance of the 
term, but also because of the special status accorded to the Book of Revelation regardless of confessional 
divides. 
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acknowledged: what we are meant to be witnessing here is the very birth of Christian 
allegoresis, the precise moment at which this method of interpretation, which would go on to 
make such a profound impact on the ensuing history of Christianity and indeed the world at 
large, first emerges in history. 
 The principal context for such an understanding of the passage is the tendency within 
Protestant hermeneutics to dismiss, at least nominally, allegorical interpretation of the Bible 
in favour of an approach which may be exemplified by Milton’s own opinion on the subject in 
De doctrina Christiana: “The sense of each scriptural passage is single; in the Old Testament, 
though, it is often a compound of the historical and typological” (OW 8: 389).
88
 This is not to 
say that either the concept of allegorical reading, or even the term allegory itself, were simply 
anathema to every single Protestant commentator. In practice things were rarely as simple as 
definitions like Milton’s made them seem, and Protestant interpreters often resorted to 
readings which can be plausibly described as allegorical, even if they preferred not to call 
them so, especially with those books of the Bible that were generally considered to be 
particularly esoteric in their mode of expression.
89
 Alternatively, one could still employ the 
term, provided certain restrictions or qualifications were clearly acknowledged: for example, 
on the condition that the allegorical interpretation was proposed within the scriptural text 
itself, or that the allegorical sense was defined as a subset or aspect of the one literal sense 
rather than a separate sense in its own right, or that it was not understood as the actual sense 
or meaning of a scriptural text at all but merely its homiletic application – or any combination 
                                                          
88 As has long been acknowledged, the passage is taken over from J. Wolleb’s Compendium theologiæ 
Christianæ [1626] (Cambridge, 1642), A7v; translation in The Abridgment of Christian Divinitie (London, 
1650), B5v. Cf. Of Reformation: “the Scriptures [protest] their own plainness and perspicuity” (YP 1: 566); Of 
True Religion: “Scripture, which by a general Protestant Maxim is plain and perspicuous abundantly to explain 
its own meaning in the properest words” (YP 8: 425). 
89 A good example here is Wilson’s dictionary (in its early editions), which covers the whole of the Bible but 
is particularly concerned with, and includes “perticular” dictionaries for, the most “Mysticall” books, namely the 
Song of Songs (“a continuall Allegorie”), the Epistle to the Hebrews (containing “Tipes and Figures”), and 
Revelation (“which hath as many Mysteries, as words”); see T. Wilson, A Christian Dictionarie (London, 1612), 
A3r-v. In his entry for allegory, however, Wilson repeats the conventional Protestant warning: “it is a safe thing 
to tread in the steps of the holy ghost, not making Allegoricall sences, where the Spirit hath made none”. 
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of these and still other available loopholes, most of which had been around, in various 
permutations, since medieval or even early patristic times.
90
 
 In theory, however, the distinction was for the most part clear: to do “allegory” is to 
posit multiple senses, and to posit multiple senses, especially when this denies, or is perceived 
to deny, the historical reality of the persons and events signified by principal or literal sense, 
is to replace the true sense of scripture by man-made fabrications. By contrast, mainstream 
Protestantism taught that the scripture has only a single, literal or historical sense, although 
the characters and events thereby signified may, especially in the Old Testament, prefigure 
those of a later time. Indeed, the fact that in actual practice the difference between allegory 
and typology was often blurred probably only encouraged a “narcissism of small differences”, 
making such theoretical and terminological distinctions vital to the construction and 
preservation of confessional identities. As a result, allegory became – again, not universally 
and unequivocally, but to a considerable degree nevertheless – a branded word and a focus of 
extensive, complex and often acrimonious debate. 
 The contradictions and vacillations inherent in the Protestant position in this debate 
may be illustrated by the use of allegory and its derivatives in Milton’s own prose writings of 
the early 1640s. Even at this date the term is rarely used: only seven instances are found, of 
which two are irrelevant here, as he term is employed in a purely literary or rhetorical sense.
91
 
This is the case with one of the three instances found in passages added to the 1644 edition of 
The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (YP 2: 223) and the single instance in De doctrina, 
occurring in a disclaimer issued early in the chapter on predestination: “of assignment to life – 
if one must rely on metaphors and allegories in so contentious a matter – frequent mention is 
made, and of the book of life, but none anywhere of the book of death” (OW 8: 25-6). This 
has been cited as evidence of Milton’s acceptance of scriptural allegoresis, yet the term 
allegory is here clearly meant in the rhetorical rather than the hermeneutical sense, and the 
                                                          
90 For engaging overviews of this problematic, see Harrison, Bible, 129-38; B. Cummings, “Protestant 
Allegory”, in Allegory, ed. Copeland and Struck.  
91 Not counting the citation of the title of Philo’s Legum allegoria in the first Defence (CW 7: 78). 
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passages in question are all revealed to be extensions of the simple metaphor of the “book of 
life” (“this figure of writing”) into a series of related metaphors.
92
 
 There are thus, in addition to Paradise Regain’d, five relevant instances of the term 
allegory in the whole of Milton’s work: one in the 1641 Animadversions, already discussed 
above (n. 87), one in the 1642 Reason of Church-Government, two in the 1644 Doctrine and 
Discipline, and one in the 1645 Colasterion. Each of these displays a different facet of 
Milton’s engagement with the term and its various aspects and connotations. In Church-
Government we find him distinguishing between a valid and an invalid allegorical 
interpretation, as he sees them, ridiculing his opponents for attempting “to straine us a 
certaine figurative Prelat, by wringing the collective allegory of those seven Angels into seven 
single Rochets” (YP 1: 778, see note). In Doctrine and Discipline he similarly engages with a 
previous allegorical reading by Philo, but this time implying an understanding of allegory as a 
homiletic application of scripture rather than its actual meaning – apparently Philo’s 
interpretation is not so much wrong, as Milton’s is “haply more significant” (YP 2: 288).
93
 
The other instance in the same work is of interest for designating as “allegorick” not passages 
of scripture or any other text, but what he terms “precepts of beneficence fetcht out of the 
closet of nature” (YP 2: 273). 
 Of particular significance is the instance in the Colasterion, where Milton is 
responding to criticism and is therefore particularly explicit about his methodology and its 
underlying premises. The obviously opportunistic interpretation in question, turning two 
agricultural precepts at Deuteronomy 22:9-10 into precepts against joining incompatible 
personalities in marriage, was first proposed in Doctrine and Discipline, where it is not called 
allegorical (YP 2: 270). It was then challenged in some detail in the anonymous Answer to 
Milton’s treatise, and it is in responding to this rebuttal in the Colasterion that he refers to the 
                                                          
92 Indeed, the disclaimer is prompted by Milton’s own use of such a metaphor (following Isa. 4:3), for 
“assignment to life” is really “ascriptione [...] ad vitam” (emphasis mine).The metaphorical quality of two other 
scriptural passages referred to similarly turns on the root verb scribere and is thus partially lost in translation: Ps. 
69:28, “not enrolled with the righteous”, is “cum iustis ne conscribantur”; Jude 4, “marked down for this 
judgment”, is “praescripti ad hoc iudicium”. For this passage used as evidence of Milton’s allegorism, see Treip, 
Poetics, 182. 
93 Cf. the appreciative reference to Philo in the first Defence (CW 7: 78; cf. YP 4: 344-5, n. 16-17). 
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Deuteronomy verses as “allegorical” (YP 2: 751).
94
 On both occasions he goes to great 
lengths to maintain that he is following the best Protestant practice in discerning such a 
meaning: he is not acting on his own impulse, twisting an allegory out of an otherwise 
intelligible passage to suit his polemical interests, and he is not discerning this allegory by his 
own fallible intellect but is merely clarifying what is already suggested elsewhere in the 
scripture. 
 Be that as it may, it is to be strongly emphasized that the chief relevance of all this in 
approaching Satan’s ‘Real or Allegoric’ in Paradise Regain’d lies in its irrelevance. At most, 
these examples show that at an earlier stage in his career Milton occasionally used the term in 
his non-literary work, in senses which range from the purely rhetorical or literary to those 
display a keen awareness of the strictures placed on figurative interpretation in Protestant 
hermeneutics. None of this, however, to go back to Flannagan’s comment, can be taken as an 
example of Milton’s ‘customary’ use of the term. Rather, what is customary, especially in the 
last three decades of Milton’s career, is precisely the term’s disuse. Even though the writings 
from this period account for the majority of hermeneutical terminology found in Milton’s 
work, the word allegory virtually disappears from his vocabulary. 
 The five relevant instances of allegory are put into perspective by over a hundred 
instances of comparable terminology elsewhere in the prose, notably in De doctrina.
95
 In the 
poetry, the widest range of such terminology is found in Paradise Lost: we hear of “types”, 
“shadowes”, and “shadowie Types” (1.405, 12.232-3, 12.303), of things “mysteriously [...] 
meant” or presented “in mysterious terms” (3.516, 10.173), of events “foretold” and 
“Oracle[s] [...] verifi’d” (10.182, 191), of actions undertaken “in figure” (12.241) of those to 
                                                          
94 See An Answer to a Book, Intituled, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. (London, 1644), F4r-G1r. 
95 Most frequently Milton uses typus (OW 8: 45, 311, 350, 353, 389, 432, 434, 552, 571), but also adumbrare 
(67, 86), accommodare (10), dicere (109), exhibitio (338), figurare (348), illustrare (290), intelligere (99-100), 
manifestatio (306), obscuritas (81, 140, 312), parabola (151), repraesentatio (101), res certissima (356), sensus 
compositus (389), sensus duplex (49, 389), sensus metaphoricus (49-52), sensus theologicus (125), significatio, 
significare (99-100, 339, 356), signum (339, 435), symbolus (142, 307), tropus (81), umbra (307, 571), or such 
phrases as “sub nomine [...] intellige” (7), “more prophetico [...] significari” (67), “prophetici [...] libri stylus” 
(81), “sub [...] specie administrata” (101), “humano [...] more ait” (132), “obscuriùs [...] percipitur” (305), “ex 
charitati[s] sensu [...] interpretantur” (329), “per externa [...] signa repraesentatio” (330). The term is also 
avoided in the Prolusions (CW 12: 128, 130, 150, 248). Instances in the English prose include figure, foreshow, 
foresignify, mystery, pattern, shadow, type; see the entries in A Concordance to the English Prose of John 
Milton, ed. L. Sterne and H. H. Kollmeier (Binghamton, 1985). 
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come, of accounts related “By lik’ning spiritual to corporal forms” (5.573), of understandings 
passing “from Flesh to Spirit” (12.303), of texts “not but by the Spirit understood” (12.514) – 
but not of allegory. Except for Paradise Regain’d, Milton never used the term in its 
hermeneutical sense after 1645. Adapting a passage in Wolleb where allegoria is listed 
among the types of figurative language which cannot be charged with falsehood, he removes 
it from the list.
96
 The simplest explanation for this is that he came to view the term as 
controversial and joined many of his fellow Protestants in using it sparely or abandoning it 
altogether. 
 Just how controversial the term could be is vividly illustrated by an event from 
December 1655, when an Englishman was sent to prison for believing that the Bible was to be 
read allegorically. Admittedly, this particular Englishman, the itinerant nonconformist 
preacher Richard Coppin, harboured many other curious beliefs and had been preaching about 
them for several months in Kent, before he was finally examined, found guilty of breaching 
the 1650 Blasphemy Act, and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.
97
 Besides believing 
that the Bible was an allegory, Coppin also believed that there was no local heaven or hell, 
that baptism, good and bad deeds were equally irrelevant to salvation, that God will destroy 
the sin but not the sinner, and most importantly, “That all mankind, Jew or Gentile, and what 
ever they are, how ever they live, or dye, shall be saved”.
98
 But if these sound like far graver 
blasphemies than Coppin’s hermeneutics, they are often premised precisely on his allegorical 
readings of scripture, and it is no coincidence that of the twenty-five articles of his 
arraignment, it is the very first that reads: “That all the Scriptures is but an Allegory, that is 
all, said he, both Law and Gospel, and that it is nothing but an Allegory, said he, it is clear 
from Gal.4.24.”
99
 
 Coppin’s position was undoubtedly radical, yet it is still instructive in several ways: it 
shows that the question of scriptural allegoresis was not merely a theological but also a deeply 
                                                          
96 See Wolleb, Compendium, M11r: “Schemata, Metaphoras, Allegorias & similia, mendacia non esse”; cf. 
De doctrina: “parabolas, hyperbolas, apologos, ironias mendacia non esse” (OW 8: 655-6). 
97 See N. Smith, “Coppin, Richard”, ODNB. 
98 R. Coppin, A Blow at the Serpent (London, 1656), M7r. 
99 Ibid., M4r. 
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political and even, in such extreme circumstances, legal matter; it reminds us that scriptural 
allegoresis was not, in Protestant eyes, associated exclusively with Papist but also with 
nonconformist heresy; finally, it exemplifies the central importance of the scriptural passage 
to which Coppin appealed, Galatians 4:24. It is to this passage and the controversies which 
surrounded it that we can now turn for further insights into attitudes towards scriptural 
allegoresis held by Milton and his contemporaries. The reason why the passage was so 
important is simple: it contained the only use of a form of the word allegory in the whole of 
the Bible. At this place in the epistle, Paul not only gives an arguably allegorical interpretation 
of the account of Abraham’s sons in the Book of Genesis, but explicitly calls it “allegorical”:  
hatina estin allegoroumena, “all of which is spoken allegorically”, which had for centuries 
been rendered by the Vulgate as Quae sunt per allegoriam dicta, “Which things are said by an 
allegory”.
100
 As might be expected, Roman Catholics and nonconformists like Coppin cited 
this place in support of their allegorical interpretations, while their claims were wholly or 
partially disputed by their Protestant opponents.
101
 
 Graphic testimony to these disputes is found in the early English translations of the 
verse (Table 1). In spite of the fact that some form of the English word allegory was the 
obvious choice for rendering Paul’s allegoroumena, and that both the Vulgate and Erasmus  
rendered it by the Latin allegoria, Tyndale and Coverdale refuse to let this word into their 
renditions, translating, respectively, “Which thing[es] betoken mistery” and “These wordes 
betoken somwhat”.
102
 Tyndale’s version survived when his text of the New Testament was 
included in the 1537 Matthew Bible and the Tyndale-Erasmus diglot edition of 1538, the 
latter affording a particularly explicit instance of the conflict, with Tyndale’s English, 
                                                          
100 Novum Testamentum Graece, ed. B. and K. Aland et al., 28th rev. ed., rev. L. Herren et al. (Stuttgart, 
2012); The Vulgate Bible, ed. S. Edgar and A. M. Kinney (Cambridge, Mass., 2010-13). The precise meaning of 
allegoroumena, a New Testament hapax, remains disputed, with the arguments of modern commentators often 
reiterating those reaching back to Milton’s day and far beyond. The above translation is from H. Balz and G. 
Schneider, The Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, 1990), who add that the type of 
interpretation in question is “more accurately” to be identified as “typological allegorizing”. Other “allegory”-
based renderings in modern commentaries are similarly counterbalanced by the insistence that Paul’s “allegory” 
does not deny the reality of the historical events in question, raising the question of how this “allegory” is to be 
distinguished from what is more readily described as typology. For criticism on this ground, see A. T. Hanson, 
Studies in Paul’s Technique and Theology (London, 1974), 91-101. 
101 In addition to the examples below, see T. H. Luxon, Literal Figures (Chicago, 1995), esp. 77-101. 
102 Coverdale’s rendering shares “betoken” with Tyndale’s, while the rest is markedly similar to Luther’s, 
“Die wort bedeuten etwas”; Das Newe Testament Deůtzsch (Wittenberg, 1522). 
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“Whiche thynges betoken mistery”, directly facing Erasmus’s Latin, “que [sic] per allegoriam 
dicuntur”. A change occurs, however, in another diglot edition of the same year, printing a 
new translation by Coverdale parallel with the Vulgate, in which this verse is revised to 
include, for the first time in an English version, the word allegory: “[the] which thynges are 
spoken by an allegory”. This reading is then retained in Taverner’s Bible, the Great Bible and 
the Bishops’ Bible, and is repeated in substance in the King James Bible.
103
 
 The Great Bible continued to be printed in the reign of Edward VI, alongside further 
allegory-free renditions of the Galatians verse. The so-called Becke’s Bibles – revisions of the 
Matthew and Taverner versions produced between 1549 and 1551, apparently by the 
staunchly Protestant Edmund Becke – revert back to Tyndale’s version. Around 1552, 
Richard Jugge’s revision of Tyndale’s New Testament offers another vivid illustration of the 
conflict: the text is still Tyndale’s, “Which thynges betoken mystery”, but a marginal note 
adds that “Some read: whiche thinges are spoken in an allegorye”.
104
 In 1557, the translation 
of William Whittingham, a Marian exile in Geneva, gives “By the which thinges another 
thing is me[n]t”, a rendering adopted three years later in the Geneva Bible, as well as in 
Laurence Tomson’s 1576 English translation of Theodore Beza’s Latin version of 1565. 
 Predictably, the Rheims New Testament of 1582 responds to Geneva’s provocation 
not only by translating allegory but also appending a note adducing the passage as scriptural 
warrant for allegorical reading. Equally predictably, this note receives an extensive rebuttal by 
Fulke, who allows the story of Abraham’s sons a typological significance – it is “a figure or 
paterne of the Church to come” – but insists that the passage in no way presents a warrant “to  
                                                          
103 The influence of Erasmus’s translation, which reaffirmed the reading of the Vulgate, must have been 
considerable. It was first printed in England in the Tyndale/Erasmus diglot in 1538, and the fact that the 
Coverdale/Vulgate diglot, the first to use allegory at Gal. 4:24, appeared in the same year might indicate such 
influence. The expanding treatment of the verse in the editions of Erasmus’s Annotations reflects the ongoing 
debates: the original edition of 1516 contains only a brief note, giving a conventional definition of allegory as 
saying one thing and signifying another; the 1522 edition adds a reference to Augustine’s On the Trinity, where 
it is insisted that Paul’s “allegory” is not one of words but deeds, and is thus effectively equated with typology; 
the 1535 edition adds to this a reference to Chrysostom’s commentary: “Contrary to usage, he calls a type an 
allegory”; see Erasmus’ Annotations on the New Testament: Galatians to the Apocalypse, ed. A. Reeve (Leiden, 
1993); Augustine, On the Trinity, Books 8-15, ed. G. B. Matthews (Cambridge, 2002), 183; Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Galatians and Homilies on the Epistle to the Ephesians of S. John Chrysostom Archbishop of 
Constantinople, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1879). 
104 The newe Testament of our Sauiour Jesu Christe (London, [1552?]). For the inverse procedure, see the 
Bishops’ Bible, which gives “by an allegorie” in the text, but adds in the margin, “By an allegorie, that is another 
thyng is meant”. 
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Table 1. Some early English translations of Gal. 4:24, divided into those which avoid and those 
which employ the term allegory. The editions cited, in chronological order, are The New 
Testament: A Facsimile of the 1526 Edition, trans. W. Tyndale (London, 2008); Biblia. The 
Bible that is, the holy Scripture ([Antwerp], 1535); The Byble which is all the holy Scripture 
([Antwerp], 1537); The newe Testament in Englyshe & in Latin (London, 1538); The newe 
testament both Latine and Englyshe (Southwark, 1538); The Most Sacred Bible (London, 
1539); The Byble in Englyshe ([London], 1539); The Byble, that is to say all the holy Scripture 
(London, 1549); The seconde tome or volume of the Paraphrase of Erasmus vpon the newe 
testament, [trans. M. Coverdale and J. Olde] (London, 1549); The Nevve Testament of Ovr 
Lord Iesus Christ (Geneva, 1557); The Bible and Holy Scriptvres Conteyned in the Olde and 
Newe Testament (Geneva, 1560); The holie Bible (London, [1568]); The Nevv Testament of 
Ovr Lord Iesvs Christ Translated ovt of Greeke by Theod. Beza, trans. L. Tomson (London, 
1576); The Nevv Testament of Iesvs Christ (Rheims, 1582); The Holy Bible (London, 1611); 
Giovanni Diodati, Piovs Annotations (London, 1644); [M. Casaubon et al.], Annotations 
(London, 1645); Dutch Annotations. 
 
“Which thing[es] betoken mistery”  
Tyndale’s NT, 1526 
 
“These wordes betoken somwhat”  
Coverdale’s Bible, 1535 
 
“Which thynges betoken mystery” 
Matthew Bible, 1537 
 
“Whiche thynges betoken mistery” 
Tyndale/Erasmus NT, 1538 
 
“Which thinges betoken mysterye” 
Becke’s Bible, 1549 
 
“By the which thinges another thing is me[n]t” 
Whittingham’s NT, 1557 
 
“By the which things another thing is ment” 
Geneva Bible, 1560 
 
“By the which things another thing is me[n]t” 
Beza’s Latin NT, trans. Tomson, 1576 
  
“Which are things that have another signification” 
Dutch Annotations, 1657 
 
“[the] which thynges are spoken by an allegory”  
Coverdale/Vulgate NT, 1538 
 
“Which thinges are spoken by an allegorye” 
Taverner’s Bible, 1539 
 
“Which thynges are spoken by an allegorye” 
Great Bible, 1539 
 
“Whiche thinges are spoken by an alligorie” 
trans. of Erasmus’s Paraphrase, 1549 
 
“Whiche thynges are spoken by an allegorie” 
Bishops’ Bible, 1568 
 
“which things are said by an allegorie” 
Rheims NT, 1582 
 
“Which things are an Allegorie” 
King James Bible, 1611 
 
“Are an allegorie [...] have an allegoricall sense” 
Diodati’s Piovs Annotations, 1643 
 
“Which things are an allegory” 
Westminster Annotations, 1645 
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draw the Scriptures from the sense of the wordes which you call the literall sense, to any 
allegoricall interpretation, which is fayned and counterfected in mans brayne, and hath no 
ground of the spirit of God”.
105
 Fulke’s moderate position seems typical of many Church of 
England divines: he follows the reading of the Bishops’ Bible and takes no quarrel with the 
use of the term allegory as such, yet insists that “the Apostle in this place vsing the terme of 
allegory, meaneth no such descanting vpon the Scripture” as Catholic interpreters indulge in, 
that “prefigurations differ much from allegoricall interpretation”, and that even “if we should 
admit that the apostle, who was certeine of the sense of the Holy ghost, did make an 
allegorical interpretation, yet it is not lawfull for euery man”, who “hath no such assurance”, 
to do so. 
 There can be no doubt that Milton was aware of these variant readings and the 
disputes they reflected. Not only were they present in the two major vernacular versions, the 
Geneva and the King James Version,
106
 but also in Latin and polyglot editions, including the 
version of the New Testament that Hale and Cullington (OW 8: xlvii-li) identify as the one 
principally consulted by Milton in composing De doctrina, namely Beza’s, in the Geneva 
edition of 1598, printing the Greek, the Vulgate and Beza’s own Latin translation in parallel 
columns, with Erasmus’s translation sometimes supplied in the notes. Against all these, 
Beza’s translation of Galatians 4:24 still reads, as it did in the original edition of 1556, ‘Per 
quæ aliud figuratur’.
107
 The 1598 edition also contains features that would have lent further 
prominence to the passage, including additions to the already extensive commentary on the 
                                                          
105 W. Fulke, The Text of the New Testament of Iesvs Christ, translated ovt of the vulgar Latine by the Papists 
of the traiterous Seminarie at Rhemes... with A Confvtation (London, 1589). 
106 Even after the KJV reading became predominant it was still occasionally contested, for example in the 
1657 translation of the Dutch Statenvertaling Bible commissioned by the Westminster Assembly (The Dutch 
Annotations). Even before Haak’s translation appeared this particular note had already been borrowed in the 
Westminster Annotations of 1645 (Casaubon et al.), where, however, the KJV text is given: “Which things are 
an allegory”. 
107
 Iesv Christi Domini Nostri Nouum Testamentum, siue Nouum fœdus ([Geneva], 1598); cf. Novvm D. N. 
Iesv Christi testamentum ([Geneva], 1556). Beza explains his choice as striving for “perspicuity” – “allegorical 
discourse” is “completely fictional”, whereas Paul’s text is a “true history”, albeit one “adumbrating” a “hidden 
mystery” – but his statements elsewhere voice his deep aversion to allegory in less diplomatic terms. For the Old 
Testament and the Apocrypha, Milton is said to have relied primarily on the 1623-24 Hannover edition of the 
Junius-Tremellius-Beza Bible: D. N. Jesv Christi Testamentvm Novum (Hannover, 1623), Testamenti Veteris 
Biblia Sacra (Hannover, 1624). This included Tremellius’ translation from the Syriac, “Hæc autem sunt 
allegoriæ”, alongside Beza’s “Per quæ aliud figuratur”. 
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verse and even a schematic representation of Beza’s clarification of Paul’s “allegory” (Figure 
7). 
  
 
 
Figure 7. Beza’s schematic representation of Paul’s interpretation in the 1598 edition. Similar 
schemes are given for only two other passages, Rom. 7:1-6 and 2 Cor. 5:1-10; cf. J. Krans, 
Beyond What Is Written (Leiden, 2006), 279. 
  
 What did Milton make of all this? The banishment of the word allegory from his post- 
1645 vocabulary gives us one clue and further evidence is found between the lines of a 
quotation of Galatians 4:24 he gives in De doctrina. Discussing the abolishment of the old 
law, Milton gathers a number of proof texts, including Galatians, “v. 24, about Hagar and 
Sarah: these women are those two covenants: [...] Hagar [...] producing offspring for slavery; 
the other, v. 26, [...] is free; hence v. 30: cast out the slave-girl and her son, for in no way 
shall the slave-girl’s son be an heir with the freewoman’s son” (OW 8: 320).
108
 Obviously the 
quotation is highly elliptical, as are most of the thousands of biblical references and 
                                                          
108 This quotation agrees with Beza’s 1598 edition (“duæ illæ pactiones”). There is another reference to the 
passage in De doctrina (OW 8: 326) and another brief quote, “Gal. 4. 24. duo pacta” (OW 8: 312), which agrees 
with the 1623-24 JTB version (“duo illa pacta”), so we know that Milton looked up the passage in both versions. 
The banishment of Hagar is also mentioned in the 1644 Doctrine and Discipline (CPW 2: 263), but without any 
reference to its figurative dimension. 
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quotations which make up for half of the text of De doctrina. On closer view, however, it 
becomes clear that there is a particular logic behind the truncations which cannot be wholly 
ascribed to economy. Not only does Milton fail to cite the beginning of 4:24, containing the 
troublesome hapax, but he avoids using any hermeneutical terminology on his own part, 
limiting himself to the utterly indifferent about and hence and letting the whole weight of the 
interpretation to fall on Paul’s seemingly innocuous but in fact highly significant are.  
 The significance of this are becomes clearer in the light of Milton’s discussion of 
sacramental language in the following chapter of the treatise. The discussion is occasioned by 
the treatment of the Lord’s Supper, which inevitably revolves around the interpretation of the 
words attributed to Christ in the Synoptic Gospels and 1 Corinthians 11:24-5, notably the key 
phrase, “this is my body”. In keeping with Reformed orthodoxy, and drawing on Wolleb, 
Milton argues that these words and similar sacramental expressions elsewhere in the Bible are 
to be taken figuratively and vehemently dismisses the doctrines of transubstantiation and 
consubstantiation (OW 8: 354). However, he also steers clear of the other extreme – that 
sacramental expressions are merely figurative – arguing that they employ a special mode of 
figuration not encountered in other types of discourse.
109
 Specifically, sacramental figuration 
is the same in kind as that employed in other contexts, but not in degree: “in the case of the 
sacraments [...] the relation between signifier and the thing signified is very close [summa]’, 
and sometimes even closer, for ‘it seems the biblical writers used this manner of speaking to 
signify not only a very close [summam] correspondence between signifiers and the things 
signified, but also an absolutely sure sealing of spiritual things [certissimam rerum 
spiritualium obsignationem]” (OW 8: 354-6). 
 This and other finer points in Milton’s treatment of the sacraments are beyond the 
scope of the present study, but the remainder of this passage is of direct relevance to the 
truncated quotation from Galatians. “Hence”, he continues, “the same way of speaking has 
                                                          
109 Whereas Milton explicitly dismisses the literalist view, his avoidance of the opposite extreme can only be 
inferred, but see Wolleb again, arguing “against those who cry out that we have nothing in the Sacraments but 
empty signes”; Abridgment, K7r. If, as I propose, the same logic underlies Milton’s discussion at this point, then 
the editorial insertion of a “merely” in the following passage flattens the subtlety of his position: “sacraments by 
themselves confer neither salvation nor grace, but [merely] either seal or symbolize each of these benefits for 
believers only” (OW 8: 356). 
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also been transferred to the signifying of all other absolutely sure things [res certissimas]: 
Gen. 41: 27: the seven cows [...] are seven years...; Rev. 1: 20, and 17: 9: the seven heads are 
seven mountains; and v. 12: the ten horns [...] are ten kings”. While the preceding examples 
all relate to covenants and sacraments, these do not. Rather, they resemble sacramental 
expressions in being instances of esoteric figurative interpretations or analogies found within 
the biblical text itself and explicitly adduced through the use of the copulative verb – exactly 
what we find at Galatians 4:24.
110
 In other words, the introduction of this terminology, which 
is Milton’s own intervention into his principal source in Wolleb, presents yet another 
Protestant strategy to “rebrand” traditional modes of esoteric hermeneutics, including those 
which could be plausibly described as allegorical.
111
 
 Furthermore, there were various sources where Milton could have found the notions of 
sacramental language and the sacramental copula related directly to Galatians 4:24. The 
search for expressions comparable to hoc est corpus meum began in the early days of the 
eucharistic controversy, and at some point the Galatians verse began to be cited in this 
context.
112
 Eventually, through this association, the converse also began to apply: not only 
was Galatians 4:24 used in illustrating sacramental language, but the notion of sacramental 
                                                          
110 Apparently it is this use of the copula which makes them “absolutely sure” rather than just “very close”. 
Cf. Wolleb, Abridgment, sig. L1r: “it is not material whether the trope be in the attribute, or in the copula, or 
coupling of the words: for though the trope may be in the attribute, yet the cause or ground of the trope is in the 
copula”. Milton, it would seem, is not entirely convinced and prefers to have a category for those instances 
where the presence of the copula leaves nothing is left to the interpreter’s own inference. The examples bear out 
this interpretation: those preceding the above passage include both instances which do and those which do not 
contain the copula, whereas the four examples of “other absolutely sure things” all contain it.  
111 This becomes even clearer if we take a closer look at Milton’s sources here. The last quoted passage from 
De doctrina rewrites the following one in the Wolleb’s Compendium: “Yea, the very same is seen in other 
speeches besides sacramental; as Gen. 41. 37. The seven cows, are seven years; that is, types and figures [typi & 
figuræ] of seven years: Rev. 17. 9. The seven heads, are seven hills; and v. 12. The ten horns are ten Kings” 
(Wolleb, Abridgment, L1r; Compendium, F3v). Milton keeps the examples but removes the phrase “other 
speeches besides sacramental” and the reference to the contents of the pharaoh’s dream as “types and figures”, 
presumably because he finds such usage erroneous: types are historical figures and events and not elements in 
dreams or visions. But if these are neither sacraments, nor seals, nor types, nor figures, nor allegories – and note 
here that at an earlier period Milton was not averse, as he now seems to be, to employing the latter term with 
regard to Revelation – then what are they? They are res certissimas, and vague as that may be, it does the job of 
avoiding the controversial term allegory, while at the same time foregrounding the divine assurance for the 
interpretations adduced in such passages. 
112 For an example in English, see A Fvll Declaration of the Faith and Ceremonies Professed in the 
dominions of the most illustrious and noble Prince Fredericke (London, 1614), G2r-v: “this manner of 
reasoning, when one saith, This is this or that, hath often this meaning; as if one would say, this betokeneth this 
or that, or which is to one effect, [...] This is a token and sign of this or that. For example: [...] of Hagar and 
Sarah: These are the two Testaments. These speeches can no otherwise be vnderstood then as if hee had said: 
[...] Hagar and Sarah betokened the old and the new Testaments”. 
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language became a gloss for Galatians 4:24. Milton would have seen the verse glossed in 
similar terms by Beza, and possibly elsewhere as well.
113
 Although the verse is not mentioned 
among Milton’s examples of “absolutely true things” it clearly falls under this category, and if 
this is the thinking he brought to bear on it when quoting it in De doctrina, it makes perfect 
sense that he would skip the opening words and proceed directly to the part containing the 
‘sacramental’ or ‘absolutely sure’ copula, eliding the controversies that had accumulated 
around the passage. The quotation thus testifies, albeit in negative form, to Milton’s 
familiarity with these controversies, which would have been very prominently brought to his 
attention when he looked up this passage in the two principal Bible texts that he used and any 
other versions or commentaries he might have consulted. That he chose to pass over these 
disputes here is not surprising: a work aimed, in his view, at further consolidation of orthodox 
Protestant doctrine rather than polemic with “the Pontificians” was not the place for a 
judicious treatment of such a complex and controversial yet ultimately non-doctrinal matter 
(OW 8: 3-4).
114
 
                                                          
113 See the note in Beza’s 1598 NT, which does, however, instruct the reader to distinguish between 
“sacramental” and “typical” signification: “Sunt, εἰσιν. Id est, figurant & adumbrant, sicut dicitur Petra fuisse 
Christus, & Panis dicitur corpus Christi”, etc. Cf. The Dutch Annotations: “are [that is, signifie, betoken, 
represent. A sacramental phrase. See Gen. 41. 26. 27. Matt. 26. 26.]”; James Fergusson, A Brief Exposition of the 
Epistles of Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians (London, 1659): “So is it in the words of the institution of the 
Lord’s Supper, [...] and so it is here, [...] Those are the two Covenants”. 
114 Finally, it is important to keep in mind that Milton considered the text of the New Testament to be highly 
“corrupt” and that he might have, as he did in several other cases, questioned the authenticity of the unique use 
of allegoroumena at Galatians 4:24 (OW 8: 59-60, 73, 109-10, 396-8). If he also took the trouble of consulting 
the verse in B. Walton’s Biblia Sacra Polyglotta (London, 1657) he would have found additional motive for such 
suspicion. Walton’s polyglot gives nine texts here: the Greek, the Vulgate, the Syriac, the Arabic and the 
Ethiopic, with all the non-Latin texts accompanied by Latin translations. The Latin versions of the beginning 
words of Galatians 4:24 offer a predictably inconclusive array of readings: “Quæ sunt allegorizata” (from the 
Greek) and “Hæc autem sunt allegoriæ” (from the Syriac) vs. “Hæ autem duæ sensum habent cujus narratio 
ineffabilis est” (from the Arabic). Most interestingly, however, the translation from the Ethiopic gives nothing, 
jumping from its rendering of the final words of 4:23, “& quæ è libera secundùm promissionem”, directly to “Et 
hæc sunt duo testamenta”, and thus omitting any text corresponding to the disputed words in the Greek. One can 
only speculate, but Milton’s decision not to quote the part of 4:24 that is (to the best of his knowledge) lacking in 
at least one version of great antiquity and authority, is translated with significant variations here and in other 
renditions, and contains, in the ‘corrupt’ Greek, a very important hapax legomenon, seems entirely compatible, 
and may be indicative of, his doubts about its authenticity. Cf. Milton’s reference to the Ethiopic version in his 
dismissal of the Johannine Comma (OW 8: 59). Milton’s esteem for the Ethiopic text would have been 
influenced by the fact that Walton attributed great antiquity to it, believing it to have been translated “from 
ancient Greek exemplars close to the apostolic age”; Biblia Sacra Polyglotta, “Prolegomena”, Bb2v. His 
knowledge was almost certainly limited to the translation in Walton’s edition; see Fletcher, Use, 88. Milton’s 
familiarity with Walton’s polyglot was first demonstrated by H. F. Fletcher, The Use of the Bible in Milton’s 
Prose (Urbana, 1929), 86-8; cf. OW 8: lx, 237, n. lxi. 
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 There is, however, a further and compelling reason to believe that this is the context in 
which Satan’s “Allegoric” is to be taken, namely the term’s long-standing association with the 
devil in Protestant commentary. The tradition apparently begins with Luther, who condemns 
“the satanic madness and illusion” of allegorical reading, and refers specifically to Roman 
Catholic allegories as “thought out and devised, not by the Holy Spirit but by the devil”.
115
 
Possibly picking up on these statements, Calvin develops the sentiment into an actual theory 
of allegory’s satanic origins: “Without doubt, this was the inuention of satha[n] to abase the 
authoritie of the scriptures, & to take away the true vse fro[m] the reading thereof. which 
prophanation God hath reuenged with iust iudgeme[n]t, in that he hath suffred the puritie of 
vnderstanding to bee ouerwhelmed with the bastard & counterfeit gloses.”
116
 The same notion 
appears in Beza’s 1554 De haereticis a ciuili magistratu puniendis, and in the epistle to the 
1565 edition of his New Testament, Beza similarly recounts how in the age of the early 
church fathers “Satan layed [...] in the countrie of Grecia’ various ‘mischiefs’, of which ‘two 
[...] especially reigned in those dayes”.
117
 One was the tendency to fuse Christian teaching 
with pagan philosophy, yet “The other mischief was farre worse, for as an vnauoydable 
disease, it had almost possessed all mens mindes, and it was this, a maruelous desire that men 
had to misshape the whole Scripture, and turne it into allegories wherein euery man tooke so 
great pleasure without measure or compasse, that eche man thought he might do what he 
woulde”.
118
 The idea also appears in original seventeenth-century English texts, including a 
particularly elaborate account in Richard Gilpin’s 1677 Dæmonologia sacra, and is, finally, 
all but explicitly reiterated in a passage in Milton’s own Of Reformation.
119
 
                                                          
115 Luther’s Works, ed. J. Pelikan and H. T. Lehmann (Saint Louis, 1957-86), 2: 156, 5: 356.  
116 A Commentarie of M. J. Caluine vpon the Epistle to the Galathians (London. 1581), K1v. The idea is 
reiterated in Calvin’s sermons on Galatians and more explicitly in his commentary on Genesis: “the Allegories of 
Origen, and of such like are to be reiected: whiche Sathan by his most pestilent subtiltie went about to bring into 
the Churche, that the doctrine of the Scripture might be doubtfull, and voyde of certeintie”; Sermons... vpon... 
Galathians, Dd8v; Commentarie... vpon... Genesis, D6r. 
117 The New Testament, trans. Tomson, †9r-v. The passage from De haereticis is translated in T. Edwards’ 
The Casting Down of the last and strongest hold of Satan (London, 1647), Z1v: “For this was the speciall 
subtiltie of Sathan of old, which yet not one almost of the ancient Fathers observed, that when he could not cast 
the Scripture out of the Church wholly, yet by vaine Allegories, he made the whole Scripture unprofitable and 
fabulous, so as truely there was not one piece of Scripture left free of being contaminated with these Allegories”. 
118 See above, n. 68, for the same idea applied to Platonism in Biddle’s Twelve Argvments of 1647. 
119 T. Hearne, A Seasonable Word (London, 1650), chastizes the departures from the faith he perceives in his 
times, among other things, the “affectate desire we have (more consulting with Satan, then the Scripture) to turn 
285 
 
 If we now return to the portrayal of Satan in Paradise Regain’d, parallels should be 
quite obvious, even beyond the “Real or Allegoric” passage. Indeed, allegory is just one of the 
various forms of esoteric semiosis – “presages and signs,/ And answers, oracles, portents and 
dreams” (1.394-5) – which are Satan’s province both by his own account and by Christ’s 
disparaging response to his claims: 
  all Oracles 
 By thee are giv’n, and what confessed more true 
 Among the Nations? [...] 
 But what have been thy answers, what but dark 
 Ambiguous and with double sense deluding (1.430-5)
120
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
plain truths [...] into confused Allegories” – “have you not learned this yet, that tis Satans policy, chiefly this 
way, either to divert our hearts from, or darken our understandings in the eying any solid eminent truth, lest 
when the snare is discovered we escape” (A4r-v). According to another, similarly titled pamphlet – J. B., A 
Seasonable Word of Advice (London, 1655) – Satan encourages men “to put allegorical and mystical (as they 
call them) Interpretations upon prophetical, and Doctrinal Scriptures [...] so they will make of it what they 
please” (A3v, B3r). As late as 1969, C. Leslie’s anti-Quaker tract The Snake in the Grass (London, 1696) claims 
that it was “the Grand Design of him who first Inspired and Possessed them [i.e., the Quakers], to Destroy the 
only Saving Faith, in the Satisfaction made by Christ for our Sins, by turning all this to a meer Allegory” (n5v). 
An extensive account appears in R. Gilpin’s Dæmonologia sacra (London, 1677), Gg2r-3v. Satan, Gilpin 
explains, “befools men into a belief, that the Scriptures do under the Vail of their Words and Sentences, contain 
some hidden Notions, that are of purpose so disguised, that they may be locked up from the generality of Men”. 
There are various degrees of such satanic hermeneutics, depending on whether they depart wholly or only partly 
from the plain sense of the biblical text. The latter is the case with what Gilpin specifically terms “Allegorical 
reflections or allusions”, an approach which “supposeth the Letter of Scripture to be true, (but still as no better 
than the first Rudiments to train up Beginners withal)”. However, “the crafty Adversary at last enticeth” 
allegorical readers “to let go of the History, as if it were nothing but a Parable, not really acted, but only fitted to 
represent Notions to us. Allegories were a Trap which the Devil had for the Jews, and wherein they wonderfully 
pleased themselves. How much Origen abused himself and the Scriptures by this humour is known to many; and 
how the Devil hath prevailed generally by it upon giddy people in later times, I need not tell you.” 
Gilpin also takes note of Galatians 4:24 – “The pretence that Satan hath for this dealing is raised from some 
passages of the New Testament, wherein [...] some things are expressly called Allegories” – but denies that the 
passage justifies “any Mans boldne[ss] in presuming to do the like to any other passage of Scripture”. 
Responding, in Of Reformation, to the claim that the scripture is too difficult to understand without the guidance 
of the church fathers, Milton concedes that “there be some Books, and especially some places in those Books 
that remain clouded”, yet “Hence to inferre a generall obscurity over all the text, is a meer suggestion of the 
Devil to disswade men from reading it, and casts an aspersion of dishonour both upon the mercy, truth, and 
wisedome of God” (YP 1: 566). Allegory is not explicitly mentioned but in this context it can be taken for 
granted that this includes the “obscurity” presumed in such “wrung” allegorical readings as he criticizes in The 
Reason of Church-Government. At this point Milton still occasionally used the term in positive contexts so it is 
not surprising that he is not yet willing to attribute it unreservedly to the devil. Even so, the passage testifies to 
his early familiarity with the tradition that he would later exploit, with explicit reference to allegory, in Paradise 
Regain’d. Cf. Fulke’s Confvtation on 2 Pet. 3:16: “the hardness of the Scriptures, is not the cause of so many 
heresies, but the malice of Satan, that stirreth vp such proud and contentious instruments”. 
120 Editors have compared Cicero and several patristic sources, but the parallels in Milton’s own writings and 
contemporary English sources are perhaps even more relevant: see De doctrina, cited below, or Melton’s 
Astrologaster, K1r, denouncing the oracles as “meere witchcrafts and delusions of the Deuill, [...] deceiuing 
many that came to it, because his answer did still include a double sence”. Milton does use the term sensus 
duplex affirmatively in the already discussed passage from De doctrina: “The sense of each scriptural passage is 
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These are all qualities that could with equal propriety be ascribed to allegory, and in fact we 
find a remark in De doctrina which directly parallels these verses even as it makes an analogy 
between oracular and scriptural divination: “a principle article of faith [...] ought not to be dug 
out of ambiguities, or else obscurities – like the Delphic oracle’s answers [ex ambiguis aut 
obscuris quasi pythia responsa]” (OW 8: 75). 
 However, Satan’s hermeneutic prowess fails him when he attempts to divine the 
meaning of the events that transpired at Christ’s baptism. As he relates to his “gloomy 
Consistory” (1.42) – a glaring anti-Catholic allusion, paralleling the infernal “conclave” in 
Paradise Lost (1.795) – he saw “Heav’n above the Clouds/ Unfold her Crystal Dores”, and 
“thence on his head/ A perfect Dove descended, what e’re it meant” (1.81-83, emphasis 
mine). In other words, the one thing that Satan is unable to interpret is precisely that which is 
the ground of all valid interpretations – a point repeatedly emphasized by Protestant 
commentators and further underscored by Christ’s account of the same event later in the poem 
(1.282), to whom, as to all of the poem’s readers, the meaning of the dove is of course 
perfectly clear. 
 The second time Satan refers to the baptism, his language is even more symptomatic. 
Here he tells Christ that he had kept an eye on him ever since his infancy, but especially since 
he heard the voice from heaven proclaiming him the son of God: 
 Thenceforth I thought thee worth my nearer view 
 And narrower Scrutiny, that I might learn 
 In what degree or meaning thou art call’d 
 The Son of God, which bears no single sence (4.514-17, emphasis mine)
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single [sensus... unicus]; in the Old Testament, though, it is often a compound of the historical and typological 
[compositus ex historia et typo], for example in these words of Hosea, ch. 11:1, together with Matt. 2. 15: out of 
Egypt I called my son, where a double sense [sensus duplex] can be established, concerning both the people of 
Israel and Christ as a child” (OW 8: 389). Thus, within a single sentence, Milton manages to claim that certain 
passages in the Old Testament have a sensus unicus, a sensus compositus, and a sensus duplex, offering another 
example of the vacillations to which Protestant literalism inevitably inclined (in this he differs from his source in 
Wolleb, who speaks consistently of a sensus compositus). Given the context, however, sensus duplex must here 
mean the same thing as sensus compositus: one sense composed of two aspects, rather than two separate senses. 
121 The same detail is underscored by Herman, who does not discuss “Real or Allegoric”, but does note that 
“It is Satan who tries to glean complex resonances from language, [...] to tease out its various levels of 
meaning”; see P. C. Herman, Destabilizing Milton (Basingstoke, 2005), 157. See also N. Reisner, Milton and the 
Ineffable (Oxford, 2009), 236-48. 
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Again Satan is unable to comprehend a central tenet of the Christian faith, and again the 
terminology is technical and topical, with satirical and indeed comic effect, as the “single 
sence” of scripture is precisely the central premise of Protestant hermeneutics: “Not only sola 
scriptura, [...] but alongside it an equally significant principle, solus sensus litteralis.”
122
 
Satan had already failed in his attempt to lead Christ away from the principle of sola scriptura 
– “All knowledge is not couch’t in Moses law/ The Pentateuch or what the prophets wrote 
(4.225-6) – and now he is attempting to lead him away from that of solus sensus litteralis. It 
does not seem coincidental that these are precisely the two greatest “mischiefs” that Beza 
attributed to Satan’s influence on early Christian thought. 
 The conflict these passages imply is not, however, one between literal and figurative 
reading but between two incompatible approaches to the latter – the either/or of allegory, 
represented by Satan, and the both/and of typology, represented by Christ. Indeed, we hear of 
Christ’s invention of typological reading from his own mouth: having learned from his mother 
of the miraculous circumstances of his conception and the events and omens that transpired at 
his birth, 
  strait I again revolv’d 
 The Law and Prophets, searching what was writ 
 Concerning the Messiah, to our Scribes 
 Known partly, and soon found of whom they spake 
 I am (1.259-63)
123
 
Yet like most heavenly things, this too has its infernal counterpart. Christ is not the only 
creative reader of scripture in Paradise Regain’d. Indeed, in discussing the “Real or 
Allegoric” passage it is easy to overlook one simple fact, namely that prior to Satan saying 
these words Christian allegory is not yet in existence. Whatever Milton may have otherwise 
thought of it, the apostle’s use of allegoroumena in the Epistle to the Galatians is here 
irrelevant, for the Epistle to the Galatians has not yet been written. There are no apostles, no 
                                                          
122 Cummings, “Protestant Allegory”, 177. 
123 The ekphrasis of the temple reliefs in Vida’s Christiad seems a likely source here: Christ is the first to 
comprehend the typological significance of the “arcane notations and obscure signs, which to that day had never 
been deciphered by any man, not even by the priests”; G. Vida, Christiad (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), 1.551-725. 
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epistles, no canon of specifically Christian writings, no specifically Christian hermeneutics – 
all of that, except for Christ’s own insights, is yet to come. There is, however, and there had 
been for many centuries, allegory and allegorical reading, by means of which the pagans had 
attempted to make sense of their mythology. And now, the devil, with whom this false 
mythology itself originates, attempts this pagan method on a fundamental tenet of the 
emergent Christian faith, in another vain attempt to shake Christ’s conviction of the prophecy. 
This, I think, is what Milton, drawing on an old tradition in Protestant polemics, intends us to 
see in this passage: a condensed etiological myth, with strong satirical overtones, about the 
invention of Christian allegoresis. Satan is the first Christian allegorist. With him emerges, at 
this very moment, the pernicious method of interpretation that, many centuries later, 
Reformers like himself would set out to combat. 
 
LONG CHOOSING 
 
At this juncture, one is tempted to point to some glaringly obvious parallels, such as between 
Milton’s abandonment of the term allegory and his abandonment of early plans for a secular 
allegorical epic, or between the birth of allegorical interpretation from Satan’s mouth in 
Paradise Regain’d and the birth of allegorical representation from Satan’s head in Paradise 
Lost. However, as the primary aim of this chapter is to not to enter directly into these debates 
but rather to reconsider and hopefully reconfigure the grounds on which they have and 
continue to be waged, this and the ensuing sections will continue to focus on the evidence for 
and against allegorical readings of Milton’s late poetry, notably Paradise Lost. In reviewing 
this evidence, one thing, and one thing only, needs to be agreed upon by all the parties 
involved, namely that whether or not Paradise Lost is an allegorical poem, it is not obviously 
such a poem, as its allegorical readers have tended to claim. The most forceful statement 
comes from Treip, according to whom “The problem has always been not to demonstrate the 
presence of allegory but to account for its conspicuousness in Milton’s poem, and to arrive at 
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an adequate of its relationship to the poem at large”.
124
 Two general factors, however, in 
addition to various specific points of interpretation, militate against this claim: one, the lack of 
an explicit invitation to an allegorical reading within the poem itself, its editorial apparatus, its 
immediate literary-historical context, or the surviving evidence of its earliest reception; and 
two, the empirical record of numerous competent readers who have viewed the poem as either 
largely or even wholly non-allegorical. To be sure, there is no lack of the kind of material 
which an allegorist will see as constituting an implicit invitation to an allegorical reading. And 
yet, Treip herself inadvertently acknowledges the problem when she extends the title of “overt 
allegory” to only five episodes, comprising some 680 out of the poems 10,565 lines. 
 The problem is precisely that there is too little “overt allegory” unambiguously to 
establish it as the poem’s dominant representational mode. Thus some sort of evidence must 
be appealed to, even if the conclusions drawn from it be diametrically opposite – indeed, 
because the conclusions drawn from it have been diametrically opposite. “Once these 
associations suggest themselves”, wrote Stanley Fish of an interpretation he proposed in 
Surprised by Sin, “the way is open to read the vision allegorically”.
125
 But as Fish himself 
never gets tired of arguing, the associations never suggest themselves. It is the reader who 
perceives or fails to perceive them, it is the reader who then finds or does not find that they 
open the way to allegorical visions, and without an explicit authorial or editorial warrant to do 
so, it is the reader who takes responsibility for these choices.
126
 
 Thus, to take one of the central passages in the debate, it is up to the reader to 
extrapolate a broader significance for Raphael’s preamble to his account of the war in heaven 
in Books 5-6, and to adduce, as the poem’s allegorical readers have repeatedly done, the 
archangel’s stated method of accommodation – “lik’ning spiritual to corporal forms/ As may 
express them best” (5.573-4) – as evidence that the same method is employed by Milton 
                                                          
124 Treip, Poetics, 126. Similarly, the poem is “clearly” allegorical, “by any modest estimate”, to Martin 
(Ruins, 11), and Borris (Allegory, 183). 
125 Fish, Surprised by Sin, 299. 
126 Fish in fact goes on to add, in the same paragraph, that it is “the reader, if he has been attentive”, who 
“brings together within a single framework incidents he has not connected previously, thereby gaining an insight 
into the sameness of all spiritual experience”. 
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throughout his poem.
127
 However, drawing the opposite conclusion from Raphael’s words – 
that in specifying the accommodated nature of the ensuing metanarrative they establish 
precisely the unaccommodated nature of the primary narrative in which it is embedded – is 
not only possible, but in my view the only logical reading of this passage. If Raphael, as the 
embedded narrator, is accommodating his narrative to human understanding, then he himself 
is presumably unaccommodated. Otherwise, why would Milton feel the need to insert the 
preamble here, distinguishing the mode of what is about to be narrated by Raphael, from that 
which has been narrated, by the epic voice, up to this point? And if Milton’s angels are 
accommodated to human understanding “By lik’ning spiritual to corporal forms” (5.573), then 
what, if anything, do Adam and Eve see before them as Raphael is speaking these very 
words?
128
 
 In point of fact, however, Raphael never actually says this. It is not angels as such that 
require accommodation, but the extraordinary exigencies of angelic warfare.
129
 Furthermore, 
                                                          
127 To say nothing of the “though what if” which closes the preamble: “though what if Earth/ Be but the 
shaddow of Heav’n, and things therein/ Each to other like, more then on earth is thought?” (5.576-7). There is a 
venerable tradition in Paradise Lost criticism of suppressing the complexity of this crucial passage by quoting it 
in a form which omits these lines, traceable at least to “Philo-Spec.” in the 1730s (see p. 320-1). For more recent 
examples, see Patrides (“Accommodation”, 59), Fish (Surprised by Sin, 201-2), Treip (Poetics, 192-3), Borris 
(Allegory, 183), Sugimura (Substance, 197). 
128 At least since Johnson, with partial precedents as early as Dennis or perhaps even Dryden, the majority of 
critics have viewed Milton’s angels as allegorical representations of immaterial beings, although the term itself is 
seldom used; the literature reflecting this view is extensive, and its emergence is discussed below. A reappraisal 
of this orthodoxy begins after the discovery of De doctrina, but apparently it is only with Lewis’s Preface that it 
makes a broader impact: among other contributions, see P. L. Carver, “The Angels in Paradise Lost”, RES, o.s., 
16 (1940): 415-31; C. S. Lewis, A Preface to “Paradise Lost” (Oxford, 1942), 108-15; R. H. West, Milton and 
the Angels (Athens, Geo., 1955); Fallon, Philosophers, 137-67; F. G. Mohamed, In the Anteroom of Divinity 
(Toronto, 2008); Sugimura, Substance, 158-95; Raymond, Angels. Until recently there seemed to be a loose 
consensus on the materiality of Milton’s angels, but over the past decade or so a reaction appears to have set in: 
Sugimura argues that Milton attempts to fuse immaterial and material conceptions of angels, but “consistently 
falls short” (195) of this goal; Raymond finds that the “descriptions of angels meld the figurative and the literal, 
and Milton’s heaven is a place where these two collapse into each other firmly and inexplicably” (270). For a 
broader context, see the collections Angels in the Early Modern World, ed. P. Marshall and A. Walsham 
(Cambridge, 2006), and Conversations with Angels, ed. J. Raymond (Basingstoke, 2011).  
129 “[H]ow shall I relate”, Raphael asks, “To human sense th’ invisible exploits/ Of warring spirits” (5.564-6). 
It is this specific activity that requires the “lik’ning” of “spiritual to corporal forms”, these being various degrees, 
rather than kinds, of being. This was correctly glossed already by Lewis, Preface, 112: “I am not at all sure that 
corporal here means more than ‘grossly corporal’, ‘having bodies like ours’. The adaptation which Raphael 
promises may consist not in describing pure spirits as material, but in describing the material, though strictly 
unimaginable, bodies of angels as if they were fully human.” Other examples would include Raphael’s 
hypervelocity space travel (5.246-77), or Satan’s possession of the toad and the serpent (4.799-809, 9.412-13 
ff.): in order to perform such actions, angels can “colour, shape or size/ Assume, as likes them best” (6.352-3), 
including such as exceed human understanding. Milton goes far out of his way to establish his angels as material, 
both in theory, in the “one first matter” speech, and in practice, describing Raphael’s dinner with Adam: “So 
down they sat/ And to thir viands fell, nor seemingly/ The Angel, nor in mist, the common gloss/ Of theologians, 
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Raphael does not even say that the whole of his account of the war in heaven is 
accommodated, but only “what surmounts the reach/ Of human sense” (5.571-2). Thus at least 
some aspects of the war in heaven are in fact humanly intelligible. And then, finally, comes 
the “thought what if”, leaving it ultimately unresolved whether even this minimal form of 
accommodation will actually be taking place. Rereading the passage from the top, we can see 
how its claims in fact progressively diminish, and ultimately all but dissolve in this signal 
instance of Herman’s “Miltonic ‘or’”.
130
 If anything, it could be argued that this discourages 
an allegorical reading of the war in heaven, to say nothing of the rest of the poem.
 
At the very 
least, the matter is debatable, and the same goes for the rest of the poem: we can debate 
whether or not Paradise Lost is an allegorical work; what we cannot debate is whether or not 
it is so “conspicuous[ly]”, “clearly”, “by any modest estimate”. 
 With this single reservation in mind, let us now look at further evidence of Milton’s 
attitude towards allegory, especially in relation to Paradise Lost, including the use of allegory 
and personification in Milton’s early writings, his plans for composing an allegorical drama 
and an allegorical epic, the matter which accompanied Paradise Lost in some of its early 
editions, and the surviving responses of the poem’s early readers. Here again, it will be seen, 
the problem is often not in interpreting the finer points presented by the evidence but in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
but with keen dispatch/ Of real hunger, and concoctive heate/ To transubstantiate; what redounds, transpires/ 
Through Spirits with ease” (5.433-9). Furthermore, some of them have proper “theanthropomorphic” shapes. 
Satan, for example, “casts to change his proper shape” (3.634) in order to deceive Uriel, while Raphael, landing 
in Paradise, “to his proper shape returns/ A seraph wingd” (5.276-7). Further examples include the council of 
Pandemonium, where some devils “to smallest forms/ Reduc’d thir shapes immense”, while others remained “in 
thir own dimensions like themselves” (1.789-93), or Satan “start[ing] up in his own shape” (4.819) when touched 
by Ithuriel’s spear.  Angels possessing such proper shapes can retain them in conversing to unfallen humans, at 
least in the ontologically elevated domain of Paradise (see above, p. 260), although Raphael must use his wings 
“to shade/ His lineaments Divine” (5.277-8), because even before their fall Adam and Eve cannot withstand the 
sight of his fully unveiled form (just as even the “brightest Seraphim” must “with both wings veil thir eyes” 
[3.381-2] before the throne of God). After the fall, however, having descended on the monist ladder of being, 
and about to be banished from Paradise, Adam and Eve can no longer withstand to see angels in any measure in 
their proper forms, and Michael is explicitly said to meet them “Not in his shape celestial, but as Man/ Clad to 
meet Man” (11.239-40). Why would such subtle gradations and qualifications be required if Milton’s angels 
were simply allegorical or accommodated representations of immaterial beings? 
130 “High matter thou injoinst me, O prime of men,/ Sad task and hard, for how shall I relate/ To human sense 
th’ invisible exploits/ Of warring Spirits; how without remorse/ The ruin of so many glorious once/ And perfet 
while they stood; how last unfould/ The secrets of another world, perhaps/ Not lawful to reveal? yet for thy 
good/ This is dispenc’t, and what surmounts the reach/ Of human sense, I shall delineate so,/ By lik’ning 
spiritual to corporal forms,/ As may express them best, though what if Earth/ Be but the shaddow of Heav’n, and 
things therein/ Each to other like, more then on earth is thought?” (5.563-76). For the notion of the “Miltonic 
‘or’”, see Herman, Destabilizing Milton, 43-59. 
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properly assessing its relevance. Like any educated person of his day, Milton was familiar 
with allegorical poetics, and in his university exercises we even find a statement of the 
prevalent poetical doctrine of the day, namely that all good poetry is allegorical by 
definition.
131
 However, Milton seems to have discarded the theory already by the c.1638 Ad 
patrem, which contains a sprinkling of conventional humanist allegory – Jove for God, 
Olympus for Heaven – but notably avoids any appeal to allegorical poetics even though it 
does rehearse several other stock arguments from the period’s defences of poetry, as do 
Milton’s other statements of poetic theory.
132
  
 There are personifications and conventional mythological and pastoral allegory in 
some of Milton’s early poetry and the Mask Presented at Ludlow Castle (1634). Some topical 
reference may also be present: in the note prefaced to Lycidas in 1645, Milton says that the 
1637 poem “by occasion foretels the ruine of our corrupted Clergy then in their height”, and 
even though such explicit statements are lacking elsewhere, topical references may plausibly 
be suspected, as they may in other literature of the period.
133
 An appreciative reference to 
allegorical romance appears in Il Penseroso (1631) – “Forests, and inchantments drear,/ 
                                                          
131 In his Second Prolusion, dating from his Cambridge years of 1625-32, Milton writes that Pythagoras, in 
devising his notion of the music of the spheres, imitated “either the poets or, what is almost the same thing, the 
divine oracles, by whom no secret and hidden mystery is exhibited in public, unless clad in some covering or 
garment [involutum tegumento & vestitu]” (CW 12: 150-1). Cf. the above discussion of Dalechamp’s tactfully 
pro-allegorical Cambridge oration (ch. 1, pp. 96-7), which was printed in 1624, within months of Milton’s arrival 
to the University, and is perhaps illustrative of the view of the subject he would have encountered there. Milton’s 
Prolusions contain further examples of mythological interpretations which can be plausibly designated as 
allegorical, although the term itself is avoided. The ancient Greek poets “taught all learning [...], clad in the 
beautiful vestments of fiction [fabellarum involucres obvestitas]” (CW 12: 128-9). What the ancients have fabled 
of Night being born of Earth denotes a simple cosmological truth, namely that the darkness of night results from 
“the dense and impenetrable earth interposed between the light of the sun and our horizon” (CW 12: 130-1). 
Pythagoras’ notion of the music of the spheres “signif[ies], in his wise way [sapienter innuere voluit]” and 
“secretly introduces in poetic fashion [Poetico ritu subinduxit]” his cosmological learning, and the same is 
signified by Plato’s sirens and “suggested [adumbravit]” by Homer’s golden chain (CW 12: 150-1; the Yale 
translation is unreliable at this point, rendering sapienter innuere voluit as “suggesting allegorically”, Poetico 
ritu subinduxit as “poetically figures”, adumbravit as “used the [...] metaphor” [YP 1: 236]). 
132 In additions to publications mentioned elsewhere, on Milton’s poetics, see I. Langdon, Milton’s Theory of 
Poetry and Fine Art (New Haven, 1924); R. K. DasGupta, “Milton’s Theory of Poetry”, diss. University of 
Oxford, 1957; I. Samuel, “The Development of Milton’s Poetics”, PMLA 92 (1977): 231-40. All of these are of 
value in some respects, if inevitably dated in others, providing two caveats are borne in mind: one, emphasized 
by Samuel, is that Milton’s various references to the subject “cannot be taken as fragments from a fully 
articulated or even a single consistent theory” (“Development”, 231); the other is that Milton’s only treatments 
of the subject after 1660 are a few minor remarks in The Art of Logic and the brief discussion of tragedy 
prefacing Samson Agonistes, so that any attempt to relate a reconstruction of Milton’s theoretical views to his 
late works, and the biblical epics in particular, is additionally problematic. 
133 For an argument that the topical interpretation of Lycidas was not, or was not entirely, an afterthought, see 
N. Forsyth, “‘Lycidas’”, Critical Inquiry 35 (2009): 684-702. 
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Where more is meant then meets the ear” (l. 119-20) – and the earliest of Milton’s statements 
on the subject matter of his projected epic, in Mansus (1638) and Epitaphium Damonis 
(1639), propose an Arthurian framework, which, especially given the precedent of Spenser, 
was likely conceived as allegorical in mode, although this is never explicitly stated.
134
 
 By early 1642, however, Celtic legend has given way to Anglo-Saxon history, and 
Milton wonders “what K. or Knight before the conquest might be chosen in whom to lay the 
pattern of a Christian Heroe” (YP 1: 813-14).
135
 This agrees with the absence of Arthur and 
other legendary figures from the lists and drafts in the Trinity MS, dated to the early 1640s, 
the reference to the infatuation with secular epic and romance as a thing of the past in the 
mid-1642 Apology for Smectymnuus,
136
 and ultimately, the well-known excursus in Paradise 
Lost (9.25-44), where Milton states explicitly that after “long choosing” a fitting “Subject for 
Heroic Song”, he abandoned the “long and tedious havoc” of “fabl’d Knights/ In Battels 
feign’d” for the “higher Argument” of sacred history. While it seems probable that the earlier, 
Arthurian design was conceived allegorically, this was not necessarily the case with the 
                                                          
134 This argument goes back to remarks in Toland’s “Life of Milton”, prefaced to his 1698 edition of the 
prose works: Toland thought “it was from Manso’s Conversation and their Discourses about Tasso, that [Milton] 
first form’d his design of writing an Epic Poem, tho he was not so soon determin’d about the Subject”, and also 
notes his plans for an Arthurian epic in the Epitaphium Damonis; A Complete Collection of the Historical, 
Political, and Miscellaneous Works of John Milton, ed. J. Toland (Amsterdam [i.e., London?], 1698), 1: a1r-v. 
Here again Treip’s position is overconfident: “Toland’s identification of Paradise Lost with Tasso’s writings and 
principles concerning the allegorical epic, with the Manso-Milton critical discussions, and most notably, with 
Tasso’s prose allegory for the Gerusalemme, constitutes a formidable claim for the direct poetical and critical 
descent of Milton’s theories from Tasso” (Poetics, 114). Even if this was an adequate representation of Toland’s 
view, why should we accept it as valid, much less “formidable”? For the relevant passages in Milton’s early 
poems, see Mansus: “if ever I summon back into verse our native kings and Arthur waging wars even beneath 
the earth; or if I tell of great-souled heroes of a table rendered invincible by the bond of friendship and (if only 
the breath of inspiration be present) I shatter the Saxon phalanxes in a British war” (80-4); Epitaphium Damonis: 
“I will proclaim Dardanian ships over the Rutupian seas and the ancient realm of Inogen, daughter of Pandrasus, 
the leaders Brennus and Arvigarus and Belinus the old, and Armorican settlers at last under British law; next 
Igerne pregnant with Arthur through a fatal deception when the lying countenance and weapons of Gorlöis were 
assumed – Merlin’s trick. Oh then if life remains in me, you my pipe [...] will rasp out a British theme” (162-71). 
On the date of Il Penseroso, see OW 3: xxix. 
135 Treip (Poetics, 145), and Borris (Allegory, 185), have argued that “pattern” here means “allegory”, a 
possibility that cannot be wholly excluded and is strengthened by the ensuing mention of Tasso. More likely, 
however, “pattern” here simply means “example”, as in the Apology for Smectymnuus later in the same year: the 
poet “ought him selfe to bee a true Poem, that is, a composition, and patterne of the best and honourablest 
things” (YP 1: 890). 
136 “Next, [...] that I may tell ye whither my younger feet wander’d; I betook me among those lofty Fables 
and Romances”; this is contrasted to a later period, when “from the Lauerat fraternity of Poets, riper years, and 
the ceaseless round of study and reading led me to the shady spaces of philosophy” (YP 1: 890-1). 
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historical figures he was considering in the 1640s, and even less so with the poems Milton 
eventually ended up writing.
137
 
 Other related evidence is similarly inconclusive. In the 1644 Of Education, Milton 
praises “that sublime art which in Aristotles poetics, in Horace, and the Italian commentaries 
of Castelvetro, Tasso, Mazzoni, and others, teaches what the laws are of a true Epic poem, 
what of a Dramatic, what of a Lyric, what decorum is, which is the grand master peece to 
observe” (YP 2: 404-5). While it is true that two of the said theorists, Tasso and Mazzoni, are 
in favour of epic allegory, it is equally true that the perceived views of Horace and Aristotle 
on this matter varied, and that Castelvetro explicitly and categorically dismisses poetic 
allegory in any form.
138
 Milton’s allegorical readers have also pointed to his appreciative 
                                                          
137 A further problem presented by the attempts to bring Paradise Lost in line with the tradition of the secular 
allegorical epic is their failure to address the rival tradition of the divine epic poem, including such major works 
as Vida’s Christiad or Du Bartas’ Divine Weeks and Days, whose influence on Milton is amply attested, as well 
as a host of other, less familiar examples. Unlike the secular tradition, however, the tradition of the divine epic 
poem is not as essentially tied, and is sometimes openly hostile, to allegory, as for example in the following 
stanza from Du Bartas: “Nor thinke that Moses paints fantastike-wise/ A mistike tale of fained Paradice:/ (’Twas 
a true Garden, happy plenties horne,/ And seat of graces) least thou make (forlorne)/ An Ideall Adams food 
fantasticall,/ His sinne suppos’d, his paine Poeticall:/ Such allegories serue for shelter fit/ To curious Idiots of 
erronious wit,/ And chiefely then when reading Histories,/ Seeking the spirit, they doe the body leese”; Bartas: 
His Deuine Weekes and workes (London, 1605), T7r. As Madsen argued long ago, the recourse to the 
typological resonances of many biblical figures enabled Milton, as well as other writers working with biblical 
material, “to forgo the allegorical ‘veils’ and literal ‘shells’ that enclose spiritual ‘nutmeats’ of Renaissance 
theory without losing any of the deeper and higher resonances he desired” (Types, 17). 
138 Critics adducing this passage as evidence of Milton’s acceptance of the poetics of the allegorical epic also 
invariably fail to cite it in its entirety, omitting the preceding sentences, where Milton explains how to the 
teaching of logic and rhetoric “Poetry would be made subsequent, or indeed rather precedent, as being lesse 
suttle and fine, but more simple, sensuous and passionate. I mean not here the prosody of a verse, which they 
could not but have hit on before among the rudiments of grammar; but that sublime art”, etc. Whatever shades of 
meaning we ascribe to “simple, sensuous and passionate” – on which see B. Rajan, “‘Simple, Sensuous, and 
Passionate’”, RES, o.s., 21 (1945): 289-301 – these are emphatically not the working terms of allegorical poetics, 
and the fact that the mention of the Italian critics follows directly upon this statement is significant. A number of 
critics have posited or implied Milton’s extensive familiarity with the Italian critics: prior to Treip and Borris, 
see Langton (Theory, 148-50), who quotes E. Phillips’ passage on epic allegory (see below, p. 309) as evidence 
of his familiarity with the pseudo-Aristotelian defense of allegory under the aegis of the “impossible credible” 
such sources as Mazzoni’s Difesa of Dante, and who hesitates in ascribing Phillips’ views to Milton, but still 
claims that the passage “contains at least a reminiscence of the Italian commentaries read by Phillips under his 
uncle’s supervision, and in the pupil’s thought there may well be an emphasis originally derived from his 
teacher”. Langton’s source, but not her caution, is appropriated by J. T. Steadman, “Allegory and Verisimilitude 
in Paradise Lost”, PMLA 78 (1963): 36-9, who posits confidently that “Milton’s theory of the epic had been 
based, in large part, on the critical thought of the Italian Renaissance”, and then uses Mazzoni’s “impossible 
credible” to vindicate the propriety of Milton’s allegory of Sin and Death. See also Milton’s comment in 
Church-Government on “whether the rules of Aristotle herein are strictly to be kept, or nature to be follow’d, 
which in them that know art, and use judgment is no transgression, but an inriching of art” (YP 1: 813), and the 
YP note to this passage, according to which it “demonstrates Milton’s keen interest in Renaissance Italian 
criticism of the epic”. Such statements seem exaggerated. Clearly there was an interest, and it is reasonable to 
assume that it would have been intensified during and after Milton’s stay in Italy, but that it was a particularly 
keen interest, that Milton read these authors with the minute care evidenced by supposed “explicit and striking” 
(Treip, Poetics, 145) echoes in his writings, that their precepts “strongly influenced” his (late) work, and that he 
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reference to “our sage and serious Poet Spencer” in the 1644 Areopagitica (YP 2: 516), 
including the specific commendation of his “describing true temperance under the person of 
Guion”, and Dryden’s often cited report, that “Milton has acknowledg’d to me, that Spencer 
was his Original”.
139
 However, appreciative comments about the practice of an older 
allegorical poet do not automatically entail an acceptance of the same practice, and even if 
Milton’s original designs were Spenserian, there can be no doubt that even if Paradise Lost 
and Paradise Regain’d are in some way allegorical, it is a mode of allegory very different 
from that of the The Faerie Queene.
140
 
 The list of putative evidence of Milton’s allegorism goes on, even though it is often 
unclear what precisely it is supposed to prove.
141
 As we can debate the fine points of Milton’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
taught them to his pupils – for this I find no persuasive evidence in Milton’s rare and very general comments on 
the subject. Indeed, the incongruous combination, as far as the question of epic allegory is concerned, of Tasso 
and Mazzoni on the one hand, and Castelvetro on the other, makes one wonder how closely he read some of 
these authors, and whether this is much more than mere name-dropping. At any rate, the point is moot in the case 
of Milton’s late work, for his interest in the Italian critics is yet another thing we cease to hear of after 1645. 
139 Dryden, Works, 7: 25. 
140 It is unlikely that this is what Milton meant by referring to Spenser as his “Original”. It often goes unnoted 
that Dryden’s report of Milton’s statement occurs in a passage specifically discussing versification and tracing 
the “Lineal Descents and Clans, as well as other Families”, in the mastery of English verse. Also, as used in this 
place by Dryden, the term “Original” is clearly meant in the faux-Pythagorean sense relating to the topos of 
contemporary poets embodying the souls of their presumed “Originals”, and the sentence reporting Milton’s 
claim is preceded by one claiming that “Spencer more than once insinuates, that the Soul of Chaucer was 
transfus’d into his Body; and that he was begotten by him Two hundred years after his Decease”. Thus Milton’s 
comment – presuming, of course, that it is genuine, that Dryden reports it accurately, and that Aubrey accurately 
reports Dryden’s report – may well refer to matters of prosody or versification. Alternatively, the point of 
comparison might be Spenser’s shorter poems, with which Milton’s lyric poetry was compared within his 
lifetime, namely by H. Moseley in his prefatory note to the 1645 Poems, said to be “as true a Birth, as the Muses 
have brought forth since our famous Spencer wrote, whose Poems in these English ones are as rarely imitated, 
as sweetly excell’d” (OW 3: 1). 
141 Borris cites the Sixth Prolusion as evidence of Milton’s acceptance of Homeric allegoresis (Allegory, 13, 
32), but this is only one possible interpretation of Milton’s words: “First of all Homer appears, that rising sun 
and morning star of more refined literature, with whom all learning like a twin was born” (CW 12: 219). 
Perpetuating a misconception that apparently goes back to Bush, Treip and Borris both find evidence of Milton’s 
interest in allegory in the fact that he bought a copy of Heraclitus’ Homeric Problems – neither points out that he 
did so in 1637 – and “extensively annotated this text in Greek”; see D. Bush, “Notes on Milton’s Classical 
Mythology”, SP 28 (1931): 259-72, p. 259; Treip, Poetics, 318, n. 17; Borris, Allegory, 20. However, the mirage 
of the young poet delving deep into the mysteries of ancient Homeric allegoresis is quickly dispersed by the 
actual number and nature of these marginalia. They are hardly extensive: according to Fletcher’s account, there 
is a single, non-verbal mark in the whole of Gesner’s Latin translation, another in the translation of Dio 
Chrysostom’s discourse on Homer which follows it, then some annotation on 32 of the 82 pages of the Greek 
text, and none in the remainder of the book; see H. Fletcher, “Milton’s Copy of Gesner’s Heraclides, 1544”, 
JEGP 47 (1948): 182-7. All but two instances are non-verbal markings, mostly vertical lines entered against 
particular passages in the Greek text. The two verbal comments – each a single word, “Alcaeus” and 
“Archiloch[us]”, identifying the authors of the passages discussed in the text – are reproduced in facsimile in M. 
Kelley and S. D. Atkins, “Milton and the Harvard Pindar”, Studies in Bibliography 17 (1964): 77-82. A more 
detailed examination could perhaps discern some thematic rather than merely linguistic interest. From what can 
be gathered from existing discussions, however, the latter would seem to be the case: Fletcher describes them as 
“typical of the minor emendations and notes that Milton made in his Greek texts”, and more recently Poole notes 
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five relevant usages of the term allegory in prose works dating up to 1645, so we can debate 
the fine points of the above-quoted statements, which also cease at that exact same time. Yet 
whatever Milton wrote or contemplated writing in the 1630s and the 1640s, the fact is that he 
eventually composed a very different poem: a poem whose subject is derived neither from 
(secular) history nor legend, and which employed far fewer and far different personifications 
than those appearing in the Trinity MS drafts for “Paradise Lost” and “Adam Unparadiz’d” – 
and even there they were already being winnowed with each successive draft.
142
 In short, 
everything points to the conclusion already reached by Allen, Teskey, or Fallon, among 
others, namely that Milton eventually discarded his earlier plans in favour of an epic poem 
based on scriptural history, and that this choice also entailed a very different approach to the 
question of epic allegory.
143
 Ultimately, Vida’s trump prevailed over Tasso’s pipe, left 
hanging on that old pine tree in Epitaphium Damonis. Flatly to maintain in the face of all this 
that “There is no reason to think [...] that Milton ever abandoned either these earlier expressed 
views regarding epic form and purpose or his original interest in the Italian critics and poets” 
is to beg the question.
144
 
 
MISDOUBTING HIS INTENT 
 
If no unambiguous evidence is to be found in the poem itself, in Milton’s other works, or the 
general intellectual and literary context of the day, what about the responses of its earliest 
readers?
145
 The first thing to take note of here is the absence of an explicit statement of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that “most of [Milton’s] surviving marginalia” are “solely philological”; Fletcher, “Copy”, 186; W. Poole, “‘The 
Armes of Studious Retirement’?”, in Young Milton, ed. E. Jones (Oxford, 2013), 27. Borris also reiterates the 
discarded view that Milton read Homer in Jean de Sponde’s edition, which contained an allegorical commentary; 
see Borris, Allegory, 20; J. B. Dillon and G. Teskey, “Milton’s Homer”, PMLA 101 (1986): 857-8. The 
attribution to Milton of the marginalia found in a copy of Harington’s Ariosto has also been discarded; see  R. 
Flannagan, “Reflections on Milton and Ariosto”, Early Modern Literary Studies 2.3 (1996): 4.1-16, esp. notes 1-
5. 
142 Cf. Fallon, Philosophers, 181-2. 
143 See Allen, Mysteriously Meant, 289-301; Teskey, Delirious Milton, 129-47; Fallon, Philosophers, 180-3. 
144 Treip, Poetics, 139-40. 
145 In addition to the studies cited below, on the poem’s early reception see J. T. Shawcross, Milton: A 
Bibliography (Iter and the Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2006); Milton: The Critical 
Heritage, ed. J. T. Shawcross (London, 1970-72); “Paradise Lost”, 1668-1968: Three Centuries of 
Commentary, ed. E. Miner with W. Moeck and S. Jablonski (Lewisburg, 2004); Leonard, Labourers. The early 
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allegorical intention such as typically accompanied allegorical epics of the period. Some 
moderns, notably Tasso and Spenser, wrote such statements themselves, but more often these 
were editorial, and editions of epic poetry on secular subjects, including the classical works of 
Homer and Virgil, most often come equipped with more or less elaborate editorial 
appurtenances – epistles, prefaces, appendices, commentaries, annotations – which explicitly 
invited allegorical readings.
146
 In the light of this tradition, the absence of anything of the sort 
from both editions of Paradise Lost published in Milton’s lifetime is highly significant. 
Indeed, the first three “issues” of the 1667 first edition depart from the conventional 
presentation of allegorical epic poetry in the most drastic way possible, omitting additional 
matter of any kind, the first line of the poem following directly after its sparse and 
unassuming title page.
147
 
 Furthermore, even when accompanying matter was gradually introduced, it continued 
to defy the traditional presentation of the allegorical epic in both obvious and less obvious 
ways. The first additions appeared in the fourth “issue” of the first edition, dated 1668, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
manuscript comments of J. Hobart (1628-83), J. Beale (1608-83), and A. Hill were first published by, 
respectively, J. M. Rosenheim, “An Early Appreciation of Paradise Lost”, MP 75 (1978): 280-2; N. von 
Maltzahn, “Laureate, Republican, Calvinist”, MS 29 (1992): 181-98; Poole, “Readers”. The relevant excerpts 
from Beale’s letters are most handily consulted in, and are here cited from, Poole, “Readers”, 81-2. 
146 See Spenser’s “Letter of the Authors” and Tasso’s “Allegory of the Poem”, which was included in the 
translations of the Jerusalem Delivered by Carew (London, [1594[) and Fairfax (London, 1600). For some other 
English examples, see The xiii. Bukes of Eneados of the famose Poete Virgill (London, 1553): preface, B3v-4r, 
and prologues to some books, e.g. R4v-7r; The seuen first bookes of the Eneidos of Virgill (London, 1558): 
marginal annotations (e.g., A3v, P3v) and afterword, Z2v; Ten Books of Homers Iliades (London, 1581): epistle, 
A3r; Thee First Fovre Bookes of Virgil his Aeneis (Leiden, 1582): epistle, A2r-v; Ariosto, Orlando, trans. 
Harington (see ch. 2, pp. 93-4); Achilles Shield (London, 1598), the first epistle, A2r-v. Ironically, it is the 
translations of G. Chapman, a fervent advocate of Homeric and epic allegoresis, that contain no such invitations, 
but only because this was so important to Chapman that he envisaged a separate work wholly devoted to the 
subject, which he never finished: see Seaven Bookes of the Iliades of Homere (London, 1598), A6v, where he 
promises “a prettie com[m]entarie” promised for the projected complete edition, and Homer Prince of Poets... 
twelve Bookes of his Iliads (London, [1609?]), A4v, where the second prefatory poem again promises a separate 
“Poem of the mysteries/ Reuealde in Homer”. 
147 On the first edition of Paradise Lost, see esp. “Paradise Lost”, ed. J. T. Shawcross and M. Lieb 
(Pittsburgh, 2007), and the accompanying volume of Essays, ed. Lieb and Shawcross. Shawcross and Lieb 
identify six “issues” of the first edition – two dated 1667, two 1668, and two 1669 – or more precisely six 
different title page states, “since the texts do not evidence distinct issuing” and thus “the term ‘issue’ is incorrect 
for the text and applies only to the title page accompanying whatever text was assembled” (“Paradise Lost”, 
392-3). Alternatively, see S. B. Dobranski, “Simmons’s Shell Game”, in Essays, ed. Lieb and Shawcross, who 
treats the two title pages dated 1667 as variants, and thus posits five issues. On the variant forms of “The Printer 
to the Reader” and the existence of “anomalous copies” which these demonstrate, see “Paradise Lost”, ed. 
Shawcross and Lieb, 440-2. A possible explanation for the shorter version of Simmons’ note post-dating the 
longer one might be that on second thought Simmons saw it more prudent not to draw attention to the fact that 
the lack of rhyme “stumbled” many readers (as he puts it in the longer version), and thus draw attention to a 
feature that some potential buyers were bound to consider a flaw. 
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saw the introduction of a brief note from “The Printer to the Reader” (appearing in a reduced 
from in the fifth “issue” of 1669, and removed in the sixth), Milton’s prose “Argument”, his 
note on “The Verse”, and a list of “Errata”. Important alterations and additions followed in the 
revised second edition of 1674, which saw the redistribution of the text, with minor additions, 
into twelve books, the partitioning of the consecutive first-edition “Argument” to the 
beginnings of each of the twelve books, and most significantly, the addition of two prefatory 
poems, “In Paradisum Amissam Summi Poetæ Johannis Miltoni” by Samuel Barrow, and “On 
Paradise Lost” by Andrew Marvell.
148
 Of all these prefatory items, Marvell’s poem has 
attracted most attention, famously professing apprehension about the poem’s effect on its 
divine subject matter: 
When I beheld the Poet blind, yet bold, 
In slender Book his vast Design unfold, 
Messiah Crown’d, Gods Reconcil’d Decree, 
Rebelling Angels, the Forbbiden Tree, 
Heav’n, Hell, Earth, Chaos, All; the Argument 
Held me a while misdoubting his Intent, 
That he would ruine (for I saw him strong) 
The sacred Truths to Fable and old Song (1-8) 
Marvell continues in a similar vein for another dozen lines. Would Milton perplex “the things 
he would explain/ And what was easie he should render vain” (15-16)? And even if he 
himself was successful, would his achievement be imitated “some less skilful hand”, who 
“Might hence presume the whole Creations day/ To change in Scenes, and show it in a Play” 
(18-22)? 
                                                          
148 Toland’s identification of “S.B. M.D.” as the physician and lawyer S. Barrow (1625?-1683) is widely 
accepted; see Milton, Collection, ed. Toland, 1: d6v; N. von Maltzahn, “Samuel Barrow”, MQ 29 (1995): 25-8; 
and for a dissenting opinion, M. Lieb, “S.B.’s ‘In Paradisum Amissam’”, MQ 19 (1983): 71-8. Poole’s claim that 
Barrow’s poem “had already appeared in some of the remaining copies of the first edition” is apparently not 
documented elsewhere; see W. Poole, “The Early Reception of Paradise Lost”, Literature Compass 1 (2004): 1-
17, p. 3. Marvell’s authorship of “On Paradise Lost”, signed “A. M.”, has never been doubted and the poem was 
included in the posthumously collected Miscellaneous Poems (London, 1681). 
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 Taken out of context, this is a most curious encomium, and it is no wonder that 
various critics have doubted its sincerity, or at least its propriety and efficacy.
149
 Occasional 
verse of this sort might be expected to gloss over any misgivings and imperfections, and 
Marvell does eventually get to the obligatory praise, but not before spending the first half of 
his poem in raising charges of the most disturbing kind. To praise Paradise Lost by a poem in 
rhyme, on a page directly preceding Milton’s impassioned defence of blank verse – to end this 
poem by rhyming the word “Rhime” itself, and a biblical allusion with a possible sting in its 
tail – is perhaps nothing more than “humorous”.
150
 To use the occasion for thinly veiled stabs 
at Dryden – and implicitly Milton himself, if he really did authorize Dryden’s adaptation – is 
perhaps merely indecorous.
151
 Yet to intimate, especially given Milton’s tarnished reputation, 
that this poem poses a threat to sacred truths – to portray its author, for however transient a 
moment, as a vengeful Samson tearing down the very pillars of Christian belief – seems either 
incredibly thoughtless or else genuinely and intentionally hostile.
152
 But then this seems 
                                                          
149 See J. A. Wittreich, Jr., “Perplexing the Explanation”, in Approaches to Marvell, ed. C. A. Patrides 
(London: Routledge, 1978), and further references in this article. Wittreich argues the poem is a response to 
contemporary critics of Milton as well as Marvell himself, notably R. Leigh in his Transproser Rehears’d 
(London, 1673), but although he ends on a conciliatory note, he acknowledges that it is “anxious” and “uneasy”, 
and “it is a wonder [...] that Milton agreed to having this poem printed with his own” (286). More recently, 
Miner finds the poem, among other things, “very difficult and very odd”, “persistently grumpy, ill at ease, and 
critical”, “troubled”, “perplexing”, “disquiet[ing]”, “strange”, “very strange”, “passing strange”, “lumpy sauce” 
(Centuries, ed. Miner, 36-40). His speculation that Marvell’s chief concern is Milton’s antitrinitarianism, 
indicated by placing “Messiah Crown’d” at the head of the list of the poem’s contents, is unpersuasive. A radical 
argument is put forth by J. McWilliams, “Marvell and Milton’s Literary Friendship Reconsidered”, SEL 46 
(2006): 155-77: Marvell’s poems exacts a “quasi revenge” on a rival poet and former social superior, and thus 
reflects “not an easy, happy alliance, but rather a relationship that was variously fraught with envy, 
embarrassment, and the severest political pressure”, as well as “a profound difference between these writers and 
their sense of literary scale and ambition”. 
150 “Thy Verse created like thy Theme sublime,/ In Number, Weight, and Measure, needs not Rhime” (53-4). 
See Centuries, ed. Miner, 37; Parker, Milton, 636. 
151 Milton’s permission to Dryden to “tagge his Verses” is reported by Aubrey; see Lives, ed. Darbishire, 7. 
The anecdote, appearing independently in printed form in 1713, has generally been taken as authentic, although 
the estimates of Milton’s esteem for the project have varied. According to the later version, he was not 
enthusiastic: “Well, Mr Dryden, says Milton, it seems you have a mind to Tagg my Points, and you have my 
Leave to Tagg ’em, but some of ’em are so Awkward and Old Fashion’d that I think you had as good leave ’em 
as you found ’em”; Lives, ed. Darbishire, 335. On Marvell’s references to Dryden, see the commentary in The 
Poems of Andrew Marvell, ed. N. Smith, rev. ed. (Harlow, 2007). 
152 See “On Paradise Lost”, 9-10: “(So Sampson groap’d the Temples Posts in spight)/ The World 
o’rewhelming to revenge his sight.” Von Maltzahn has defended a generally positive view of the poem, but some 
of his key arguments are unconvincing: see N. von Maltzahn, “Ruining the Sacred Truths?”, Religion and 
Writing in England, ed. R. D. Sell and A. W. Johnson (Farnham, 2009). If Marvell’s “delight and horror” (“On 
Paradise Lost”, 35) is an allusion to Lucretius, and if Lucretius is also a source behind the descriptions of angelic 
sexuality – as first adduced by Hardie and Lewis, respectively – von Maltzahn’s extrapolation from this, that 
Marvell’s professed concern about the “sacred Truths” refers primarily to Milton’s representation of angelic and 
prelapsarian sexuality, seems implausible. What concerns Marvell is apparently not any particular point of 
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inexplicable: even if Marvell had his reasons for writing such a poem, why would Milton 
and/or his publisher agree to print it? What could they stand to profit from making sure that 
even a reader without any such misgivings about the poem was exposed to them before even 
reading a single line? Why would they want to reinforce them in readers already so inclined? 
 All these questions, however, take on a very different light once the testimony of pre-
1674 readers is taken into account, which strongly suggests that as Milton’s unorthodox 
encomiast, Marvell is not, or is not only, giving voice to his own doubts, but responding to 
those which had already been circulating for several years. It has still not been fully 
acknowledged how similar the specific points of Marvell’s “misdoubting” are to those 
reported in the two January 1668 letters of John Hobart, which present the earliest direct 
evidence of the poem’s reception. The extraordinary delight Hobart eventually found in “a 
deliberate & repeated reading” of Paradise Lost was increased, as he explains, by his initial 
apprehension about the poem: 
perhaps y
e
 horrour w
ch
 I conceiv’d at an essay in vers of quiet contrary nature, did 
much contribute to my better likein[g] of this: Could you think S
r
 our wickedness were 
swel’d to y
t
 monstrous bulke, y
t
 wee should make poison of y
e
 only salve and 
salvation [of] our soules? But ’tis too true, some persons of quality, but more 
infa[my?] have put y
e
 passion of our blessed Saviour in to Burlesque, & after y
e
 way 
of Hudebras, Inverted y
t 
sacred & soleme Tragedy into ridicule: This, though I might, I 
abhor’d to see, & tremble to think on
153
 
Apparently Hobart is referring to some sort of dramatic representation of the passion, which 
cannot have been genuinely burlesque in intention; rather, any insufficiently dignified 
representation of sacred history, however pious in intention, would have struck Hobart as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
theological doctrine, nor, for that matter, though this is closer to the point, Milton “offering argumentation where 
faith might be more appropriate”, as suggested by D. Norbrook, “Milton, Lucy Hutchinson, and the Lucretian 
Sublime”, Tate Papers 13 (2010), unpaginated e-text. What is at stake is the very fact of sacred history being 
represented in mimetic form (“fable and old song”) – “ruining by fictionalizing”, as Miner puts it; Centuries, ed. 
Miner, 38. 
153 In his transcript, Rosenheim notes that the remaining portion of the word beginning “infa” as illegible; 
“infamy” seems probable. 
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travesty of its subject.
154
 Hobart’s actual reaction anticipates that staged in Marvell’s poem of 
six years later with an almost uncanny precision: the reader fears that the poem would ruin the 
sacred truth to fable and old song, is particularly concerned about the prospect of dramatic 
representation, but eventually comes to understand the superior quality of Milton’s work and 
the initial doubt turns to enthusiastic praise. 
 Further complaints appear in the letters of another early reader of the first edition, 
John Beale. Beale criticizes not only the poem’s politics, objecting to the topical 
republicanism he perceives in the passage on Nimrod (12.24-82) but also its specifically 
literary qualities, namely “ye long blasphemies of Devils; For w
ch
 he hath no Authority, & 
they beget a bad, and afflict a good spirit”.
155
 “Blasphemies”, he writes elsewhere, in relation 
to Cowley’s Davideis, “should be [unutterable], too execrable to be adorn’d w
th
 y
e
 power of 
elegant verse”, and if Cowley erred in granting the devil a few good lines and leaving him to 
“horribly [speak] out in looks the rest”, how much worse did Milton, who, as Beale still 
maintained in 1681, “mistakes ye maine of Poesy to put such long & horrible Blasphemies in 
the Mouth of Satan, as no man y
t
 feares God can endure to Read it, or without a poysonous 
Impression”.
156
 Little further pre-1674 testimony has been found, but there must have been 
others who were similarly apprehensive or critical of Paradise Lost in the seven years 
between its first and second edition.
157
 When Dryden mentions, in 1677, Milton being “tax’d” 
                                                          
154 Von Maltzahn suggests that Hobart’s mention of “persons of quality” intimates a court performance of 
some kind, and ascribes the comments of the Presbyterian Hobart to “that revulsion at court excess which so 
coloured perception of royal government in 1666-7”; see N. von Maltzahn, “The First Reception of Paradise 
Lost”, RES, n.s., 47 (1996): 479-99, p. 490. 
155 In a letter of 18 December 1668, Beale notes that “Milton holds to his old Principle Lib 10 verse 918 & 
927, 954, 972 &c.” (the Nimrod passage), a criticism he reiterates in a letter of 24 December 1670, charging 
Milton with “great faults in his Paradyse lost in his plea for our Original right”. Beale’s topical reading of the 
Nimrod passage – later independently suggested in Newton’s note to the passage – compares interestingly to 
Tomkins’ suspicion of the monarch-perplexing eclipses at 1.594-9, as reported by Toland, “Life”, d5v-6r. 
156 For the passage in Cowley, see A. Cowley, Davideis, in Poems (London, 1656), 4A4r.  
157 Poole tentatively dates an entry on Paradise Lost in one of A. Hill’s commonplace books to “presumably 
[...] the same decades” (“Readers”, 76) as the Beale-Evelyn correspondence, so c.1659-82. Hill’s entry is of 
interest, especially its cryptically condensed ending – “Discours Pride the cause of heresy Milton a Socinian 
Logic. 132 Iohn 17. 3” – but it cannot date earlier than 1698, as the bulk of it is clearly derived from the Preface 
to C. Leslie’s History of Sin and Heresie Attempted (London, 1698), A2r-3r. Poole is further mistaken in his 
explanation of the words “Milton a Socinian/ Logic. 132 Iohn 17. 3”, partly due to erroneously transcribing the 
biblical reference as “12. 3”; the reference is to p. 132 (sig. G6v) of Milton’s Art of Logic in its original edition 
of 1672, containing an openly anti-Trinitarian, hence “Socinian”, comment relating to John 17:3, a verse of 
obvious relevance to the subject. Milton’s anti-Trinitarianism is also noted in a marginal comment on lines 
5.600-15 in a copy of the first edition of Paradise Lost now in Cambridge University Library, classmark 
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by “our false Critiques, [...] for his choice of a supernatural subject”, he is probably not 
referring only to the criticism of the divine epic in Boileau’s Art of Poetry, which he would go 
on to translate in 1683, but also to charges by English readers that had been around from 
before 1674.
158
 
 Is this the context which explains the peculiar nature of Marvell’s encomium? Is the 
poem meant as a methodical refutation of such criticism, reaffirming, first, the viability of the 
enterprise as such, second, the viability of the enterprise as executed by this particular poet, 
and third, the poet’s impunity from any inferior imitations of his work?
159
 In “The Printer to 
the Reader”, Simmons explicitly acknowledges that the additions to the bare text of the first 
three issues of the first edition – specifically, the prose “Argument” and “The Verse” – were 
made in response to readers’ inquiries and requests. This bears relevantly on another detail in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
SSS.32.40, according to which “this acco[...] of Xts birth [...?] seems to bo[...] on prophan[...]e[...] & destroy [...] 
coæternity”. This comment, first mentioned by Raymond (Angels, 201), derives from, and thus post-dates, the 
comment on the “Socinian” theology behind a different passages in the poem in J. Dennis’ Grounds of Criticism 
in Poetry (London, 1704), D2r-v. See further in my note on “Early Comments on Milton’s Anti-Trinitarianism”, 
MQ 49 (2015): 44-50. Another supposed pre-1674 allusion can also be removed from the corpus, namely the 
“appropriation” from Paradise Lost noted by Shawcross (Bibliography, 1672.2), as occurring on p. 8 (sig. A2r) 
of J. Phillips’ pamphlet Montelions predictions (London, 1672). This is probably a simple error: what Shawcross 
presumably had in mind is not an echo of Paradise Lost but Parker’s conjecture that Milton is the “Civil Grave 
old Gentleman” referred to in this place; see Parker, Milton, 1147, n. 59, and 1169, n. 95; J. T. Shawcross, The 
Arms of the Family (Lexington, 2004), 98. However, an attentive reading of the passage, especially in the light of 
its source, conclusively rules out the possibility. This source is apparently the second of T. Brown’s invectives 
against Dryden, which not only contains a sarcastic reference to the pope as “a Grave Old Gentleman”, but also, 
in immediate proximity, a mention of “Donna Olympia”; see [Thomas Brown], The Late Converts Exposed 
(London, 1690), A2r. Cf. Phillips’ reference to the pope’s “Delights in the Caresses of an Olympia” in the same 
passage which mentions the “Civil Grave old Gentleman”; “Donna Olympia” is the infamous, in Protestant 
sources, Olimpia Maidalchini (1591-1675); for a recent biography in English, see E. Herman, Mistress of the 
Vatican (New York, 2008). 
158 Dryden’s comment comes from the “Apology” prefaced to The State of Innocence: see The Works of John 
Dryden, gen. ed. E. N. Hooker et al. (Berkeley, 1956-2000), 12: 97. The edition was advertised in the London 
Gazette for 8-12 February, and the “Apology” was apparently written shortly before publication; see J. A. Winn, 
John Dryden and His World (New Haven, 1987), 587, n. 22; Dryden, Works, 12: 325. For Boileau’s criticism of 
divine subject matter in heroic poetry, see Dryden, Works, 143: “In vain have our mistaken Authors try’d/ These 
ancient Ornaments to lay aside,/ Thinking our God, and Prophets that he sent,/ Might Act like those the Poets did 
invent,/ To fright poor Readers in each Line with Hell,/ And talk of Satan, Astharoth, and Bel;/ The Mysteries 
which Christians must believe,/ Disdain such shifting Pageants to receive:/ The Gospel offers nothing to our 
thoughts/ But penitence, or punishment for faults;/ And mingling falshoods with those Mysteries,/ Would make 
our Sacred Truths appear like Lyes.” Whether Boileau knew Paradise Lost is unclear; see Shawcross, 
Bibliography, 1683.2, positing an allusion to Milton’s poem in the verses mentioning Hell, “Astaroth, Belzebuth 
[sic], Lucifer” (or “Satan, Astaroth, and Bel” in Dryden’s translation). What seems clear, however, is that 
Dryden’s “Sacred Truths” for Boileau’s “veritez” is an echo of Marvell’s “On Paradise Lost” – a poem he must 
have known very well indeed – and that Paradise Lost certainly crossed his mind when he was translating this 
passage; see N. Boileau, Œuvres diverses (Paris, 1674), Q3r-v. 
159 Cf. Miner’s observation that in the first half of the poem Marvell writes as if “he purports to recount, 
reaction by reaction, his first experience of the poem” and only then moves on to the “now of the 1674 edition” 
(Centuries, 38). 
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Marvell’s poem: “the Argument”, he writes, “Held me a while misdoubting his Intent”. 
Miltonists seem to have invariably supposed that “the Argument” here means the general 
subject matter of Milton’s poem – as in “this great Argument” (1.24) and “higher Argument” 
(9.42) – but on closer look it seems clear that Marvell also has in mind Milton’s prose 
“Argument”, singular, for all ten books consecutively, as it originally appeared in the late 
“issues” of the first edition (Figure 8).
160
 If read in this form, it is easy to see how the familiar 
“arguments” – as they have been indiscriminately referred to since their redistribution in the 
1674 edition, even in relation to the 1667 edition
161
 – might give rise to precisely the sort of 
scepticism that Marvell voices. How could this slender quarto volume – how could any  
  
  
 
Figure 8. Sig. A2r in the fourth (1668) and fifth (1669) “issue” of the first edition, featuring the 
long and short version of Simmons’ note and the beginning of the consecutive prose 
“Argument”. 
                                                          
160 As tentatively suggested in N. Smith’s note to this line in Marvell, Poems, ed. Smith. 
161 Including the edition of Shawcross and Lieb, which accurately prints the text of the added material as 
“The Argument” and “Argument” (421-1, 442, 444-6), but in the editorial commentary repeatedly refers to “The 
Arguments” (393), “the arguments” (419) or “the Arguments” (437, 442). 
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volume, by any mortal hand – hope to do justice to its subject if that subject is, in short, 
“All”? 
 Was Marvell’s poem meant to counteract such criticism? Was this also the reason, or 
one of the reasons, for the redistribution of “The Argument” in the second 
edition?
162
Furthermore, was this also the case with the seemingly straightforward panegyric 
by Samuel Barrow? Barrow’s poem divides into three segments: lines 1-16 praise the 
comprehensiveness of Milton’s project, lines 17-38 praise a specific episode, namely the war 
in heaven, and lines 39-42 conclude the poem by the conventionally hyperbolic assertion of 
Milton’s superiority over all other writers, ancient and modern. Besides the fact that the first 
segment directly parallels Marvell’s emphasis on the poem’s comprehensiveness – “You who 
read Paradise Lost, [...] what do you read but the story of all things. That book contains all 
things and the origin of all things, and their destinies and final ends” (1-4) – the most notable 
thing about Barrow’s encomium is its focus on the war in heaven, a fact significant for the 
present study as this was another element known to have displeased some early readers. 
Charles Leslie (1650-1722) was neither the first nor the last to criticise Milton specifically for 
having “Dress’d Angels in Armor, and put Swords and Guns into their Hands, to form 
Romantick Battles in the Plains of Heaven, a Scene of Licentious Fancy; but the Truth has 
been greatly Hurt thereby, and Degraded at last, even into a Play, which was Design’d to have 
been Acted upon the Stage: And tho’ once Happily Prevented, yet has Pass’d the Press, and 
become the Entertainment of Prophane Raillery”.
163
 
                                                          
162 This would not exclude other, literary reasons, such as suggested by M. Lieb, “Back to the Future”, in 
Essays, ed. Lieb and Shawcross, 6. Cf. also Masson’s conjecture that “Milton took the advantage of the Prose 
Argument to furnish explanations of the plan of the poem at one or two points where he had already heard that 
readers had been in difficulty”; C. Masson, The Life of John Milton (London, 1859-84), 6: 624, n. 1. 
163 See L. Hutchinson, Order and Disorder, ed. D. Norbrook (Oxford, 2001): Hutchinson never names 
Milton, but she clearly has Paradise Lost in mind when she explicitly refuses to give an account of the war in 
heaven – “But circumstances that we cannot know/ Of their [i.e., the angels’] rebellion and their overthrow/ We 
will not dare t’invent, nor will we take/ Guesses from the reports themselves did make/ To their old priests, to 
whom they did devise/ To inspire some truths, wrapped up in many lies;/ Such as their gross poetic fables are,/ 
Saturn’s extrusion, the bold Giants war,/ [...] But not to name these foolish impious tales,/ Which stifle truth in 
her pretended veils,/ Let us in its own blazing conduct go/ And look no further than that light doth show” (4.43-
60). The lines are also of interest in indicating Hutchinson’s understanding that Milton was trying to reconstruct 
the war in heaven and other aspects of unrecorded history from its supposed later distortions in pagan mythology 
and epic. Milton’s influence on Order and Disorder (while still attributed to Apsley) is noted by Shawcross, 
Bibliography, 1697.10; J. Wittreich, “Milton’s Transgressive Maneuvers”, in Milton and Heresy, ed. Dobranski 
and Rumrich, 250-3; Raymond, Angels, esp. 216-18 – Raymond highlights the same passage, noting that 
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 This final statement is intriguing. Leslie’s comments echo Marvell’s “On Paradise 
Lost” and the “Play” in question is obviously Dryden’s State of Innocence, of which there 
were several editions between 1677 and 1698.
164
 Did Leslie know that The State of Innocence 
was in fact censored – if this is, as it seems to be, the meaning of “Happily Prevented”? This 
would of course explain the central problem in the reception of Dryden’s adaptation, namely, 
that although licensed, presumably with Milton’s blessing, on 17 April 1674, The State of 
Innocence appears never to have been performed, and would not be printed until 1677, 
although it circulated widely in manuscript prior to this date. Various reasons have been 
adduced for this, most plausibly an intervention by Simmons, whose contract with Milton 
barred such an adaptation, but previous accounts have perhaps been too quick to judge 
Simmons’ motives as purely financial.
165
 The stipulations of the contract could have been 
easily used as a pretext for suppressing the work on religious and moral grounds.
166
 
Furthermore, such an intervention would also clarify a puzzling detail in Marvell’s poem, 
namely that, having first expressed his concerns about Milton’s “infinite” work being imitated 
by “some less skilful hand”, who “Might hence presume the whole Creations day/ To change 
in Scenes, and show it in a Play”, Marvell goes on to say that he is “now convinc’d [that] 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Hutchinson’s censures suggest a dialogue with Milton’s text”. Milton is also criticized by S. Morland, The Urim 
of Conscience (London, 1695), B3r-v, for attempting “to squeeze a plausible Description of LOST PARADISE, 
out of St. John’s Vision” by means of “Romantick Stories, which is Ludere cum Sacris, and much fitter for Poets 
and Painters” – to Moreland, significantly, Paradise Lost is a “Treatise” – “who when they are got to the top of 
their Pærnassus, frame to themselves Idea’s of what Chimera’s or Goblins they please”. Three year later, Toland 
defends Milton’s “choice of [...] subject [and] the particulars of his story” in Paradise Lost “against those people 
who brand ‘em with heresy and impiety” (“Life”, d4v).  
164 There are separate editions of the work with title pages dated 1677, 1678, 1684, 1690, 1692, and 1695, 
and it also appeared in the Dramatick Works of 1695. 
165 See, for example, Parker, Biography, 635: “One suspects that Dryden was not permitted to publish his 
opera until [the] second edition of Milton’s poem had been exhausted”. The contract, drawn on 27 April 1667, 
forbade Milton “or any other” to “print or cause to be printed or sell dispose or publish the said Booke or 
Manuscript or any other Booke or Manuscript of the same tenor or subiect wthout [Simmons’] consent” (Records, 
ed. French, 3: 430). Dearing speculates that Simmons and Dryden worked in agreement and that “Dryden was 
willing to wait until Simmons and Milton’s family would have their fair profit on the second edition. Dryden 
had, after all, known Milton since they marched together in the funeral procession of Oliver Cromwell” (Dryden, 
Works, 12: 322-5). Alternative explanations have included that it was never meant to be acted in the first place, 
that Adam and Eve’s nudity was the problem, or that the staging was too costly, but apparently the possibility of 
censorship has not been considered, although Winn does note “the possibility that someone would accuse 
Dryden of heretical language or take offense of at the very idea of a religious opera may have been among the 
reasons” (World, 269). 
166 Dryden perhaps even hints at this in his sarcastic reference to “my well-natur’d Censors” in the “Apology” 
(Works, 12: 95), although the specific objection here is of a strictly literary nature. 
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none will dare/ Within thy Labours to pretend a share” (17-26).
167
 If, as is generally accepted, 
these lines refer to Dryden and his State of Innocence, and if Marvell wrote this poem 
knowing that Dryden’s adaptation had been licensed, presumably with Milton’s blessing, on 
17 April, then why is he “now convinc’d” that the project has been aborted? If anything, we 
might expect to find him lamenting its imminent fruition – unless, that is, actions to ensure 
that this did not happen had already been undertaken.
168
 Further examination of the matter 
would be out of place here, but if it can be supported by additional evidence, the censorship, 
in 1674, of Dryden’s adaptation of Paradise Lost would greatly add to our understanding of 
the early reception of both works. 
 Going back to Barrow’s poem, it has been claimed that its emphasis on the war in 
heaven “demonstrates the extent to which Milton’s earliest readers were inclined to single 
out” this episode as “of paramount importance”.
169
 Certainly some early readers specifically 
praise this episode, but it seems just as clear that a part of this importance also lay in its 
infamy. It does not seem improbable that Barrow’s unreservedly literal praise, stressing 
precisely such details – angelic armour, weapons and battle vehicles, the throwing of 
mountains – as most displeased readers like Morland and Leslie, and apparently led to the 
                                                          
167 Along with most others, Lewalski’s edition retains the obviously suspect reading of line 25 found in both 
the 1674 edition of Paradise Lost and Marvell’s Miscellaneous Poems: “But I am now convinc’d, and none will 
dare”. I prefer the emendation, proposed already in the interleaved annotated copy of the Miscellaneous Poems 
which is now Bodleian Library MS Eng. poet. d. 49, where “, and” is struck out and replaced with “that”, giving 
the far superior reading, “But I am now convinc’d that none will dare”; the added and corrected pages from this 
copy are reproduced in the Appendix to “Miscellaneous Poems” 1681 (Menston, 1969). The emendation is 
accepted in Marvell’s Complete Poems, ed. E. S. Donno (Harmondsworth, 1972) – Donno notes that “This 
reading points up the allusion to Dryden’s having stopped publication of his opera” (301) – and Selected Poetry 
and Prose, ed. R. Wilcher (London, 1986). A comparison of the two texts shows nothing that would rule out the 
possibility that the version in the 1681 Miscellaneous Poems is not based on the one in the 1674 Paradise Lost. 
On the dubious provenance of the text of the 1681 volume, see A. Marvell, Pastoral and Lyric Poems 1681, ed. 
D. Ormerod and C. Wortham (Nedlands, 2000), xv-xx. Even without the emendation, it is still possible to read 
the line as referring to the prevention of Dryden’s adaptation, but as Donno points out, the emended lines makes 
even better sense in this respect. 
168 Note also the “now” in “now convinc’d”: this would make sense if the supposed measures against 
Dryden’s had only recently been undertaken, namely between 17 April and Marvell’s writing of “On Paradise 
Lost” later in the month or early May; see von Maltzahn, “Ruining”, 372, n. 19. Cf. Margoliouth’s commentary, 
according to which “Lines 25-6 suggest that Dryden, after obtaining his license in April, but before the 
appearance of Marvell’s poem, had decided against the publication or performance of his opera”; Marvell, 
Poems and Letters, ed. Margoliouth, 3rd ed., 1: 336. But why would he decide against it? Evidently Margoliouth 
believed that Marvell’s lines provided the answer – Dryden no longer “dare[d]” to do it – but obviously that only 
transfers the question to why he no longer dared to do it.“[N]one will dare” could just as well refer to measures 
taken against Dryden’s adaptation, possibly under the provisions of Milton’s contract with Simmons, rather than 
an independent decision on Dryden’s part. 
169 Lieb, “Commentary”, 75. 
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censoring of Dryden’s adaptation, was supposed to reaffirm the merit of Milton’s depiction 
against such objections.
170
 
 These questions merit further examination, yet what is certainly striking about the 
prefatory additions to the early editions is that they not only conspicuously fail to issue any 
invitation to an allegorical reading, but that they fail to do so in spite of the fact that they were 
at least partly prompted by precisely such criticisms as allegoresis was traditionally invoked 
to counter. The motive, the means, and the opportunity are all there, and it would have been 
so easy to silence the critics by instructing them not to take the poem’s representations of 
divine matters literally. It is therefore of exceptional significance that no such instructions are 
issued, and indeed, that there is no surviving evidence of any kind that Paradise Lost was 
understood as an allegorical poem within Milton’s lifetime. Whether they praise or criticize, 
the poem’s earliest readers invariably praise or criticize that which from the allegorical 
reader’s perspective is the literal sense of the poem. The only exceptions are the topical 
allusions or allegories suspected by Beale and, if Toland is to be believed, Tomkins, but these 
are clearly directed at isolated motifs and passages rather than the poem as a whole, and such 
topical interpretations are at any rate very different from those proposed by allegorical readers 
of later periods.
171
 
 If anything, we witness some of the earliest readers of Paradise Lost grasping for a 
vocabulary to express their non-allegorical understanding of the poem. Once his initial 
                                                          
170 See “In Paradisum Amissam”, 17-28: “How great Lucifer rises up in his celestial armor! [...] While they 
fling the uprooted mountains at each other as missiles and rain down inhuman fire from above, Olympus waits, 
doubtful as to which side it must yield”. Later on we meet with several appreciative comments on the war in 
heaven: Roscommon praises it in 1685, Addison in 1694, Hopkins imitates it in 1699; see W. Dillon, earl of 
Roscommon, An Essay on Translated Verse, 2nd ed. (London, 1685), D4v-5v; Addison, “Account”, Y1r-v; J. 
Hopkins, Milton’s Paradise Lost Imitated in Rhyme (London, 1699). The stage instruction which opens Dryden’s 
State of Innocence (London, 1677) calls for the final act of the war in heaven to be directly and spectacularly 
represented on the stage: “from the Heavens, (which are opened) fall the rebellious Angels wheeling in the Air, 
and seeming transfix’d with Thunderbolts: The bottom of the Stage being opened, receives the Angels, who fall 
out of sight”. Whatever some readers found objectionable in the literary representation of the war in heaven 
would have been found infinitely more objectionable in a dramatic representation of the same subject. 
171 Other early topical readings also seem to be sporadic, isolated incidents rather than reflecting a more 
broadly accepted view of the poem. See the anonymous Vindiciæ Carolinæ  (London, 1692), B2r, where Milton 
is of the devil’s party with knowing it: “Witness his Paradise lost; where he makes the Devil, – Who, though 
fallen, had not given heaven for lost [2.13-14], – speak at that rate himself would have done of the Son of this 
Royal Martyr (upon his Restauration) had he thought it convenient”. On W. Lloyd as the possible author, see von 
Maltzhan, “Laureate”, 197, n. 32. Later on, N. Salmon, The History of Hertfordshire (London, 1728), 185, finds 
a “Character of a Cavalier [...] under the Person of” Abdiel. For a survey of modern topical interpretations, see 
Paradise Lost, ed. Fowler, rev. 2nd ed., 41-5. 
308 
 
“horrour” was dispelled, Hobart was enamoured with Paradise Lost and bestows lavish praise 
on it in spite of his political animosity towards the “criminall & obsolete person” of its author. 
Moreover, Hobart specifically singles out the subject matter, which is said to be 
great, & it has this advantage, That ye Theme it treats off, is as much above 
Hyperbolyes, or Tropes, as other are usually below them: Some resemblance it has to 
Spencers way, but in ye opinion of ye impartiall learned, not only above all modern 
attempts in verse, but equall to any of ye Antie[nt] Poets, And his blind fate dose [sic] 
not barely resemble Homers fate b[ut] his raptures & fancy brings him upon a nearer 
paralele [...].
172
 
As Miner notes, Hobart’s report of the opinion of the “impartiall learned” is strikingly similar 
to what is reported of Denham and Dryden, which stressed Milton’s originality and triumph 
over both ancient and modern predecessors.
173
 This bears significantly on the claims of those 
who have argued for Milton’s adherence to the allegorical epic tradition: immediately upon its 
publication, it would seem, Paradise Lost was recognized by at least some competent and 
influential readers as a work which broke away from, rather than followed, this tradition.
174
 
 
 
                                                          
172 Rosenheim, “Appreciation”, 281.  
173 See Centuries, ed. Miner, 34. The responses of Denham and Dryden are reported by the Richardsons, 
Notes, g5r-v. On the chronological plausibility of the Denham anecdote, see von Maltzahn, “Reception”, 487-8. 
174 Hobart describes Milton’s subject as “above [...] Tropes”, which could even mean specifically that he did 
not see Paradise Lost as an allegorical poem. This interpretation is made further probable by Hobart’s 
comparison with Spenser and Homer: while exhibiting “Some resemblance” to the former – presumably in the 
episodic use of personifications (although see n. 140) – a “nearer paralele” is found in the latter, and not the 
allegorical and encyclopaedic Homer passed on from Theagenes of Rhegium to Milton’s own Sixth Prolusion 
and beyond, but the blind bard transported by his “raptures & fancy” in the tradition of Homer’s own 
Demodocus, “whom the Muse loved above all other men, and gave him both good and evil; of his sight she 
deprived him, but gave him the gift of sweet song”; Odyssey, rev. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 8.63-4. Cf. 
the 1694 defence of Paradise Lost by an unidentified “I. I.”: “the Composing such a compleat Poem on such, a 
no less Obscure than weighty Subject was a Task to be perform’d by Mr. Milton only, yet ’tis not out of doubt, 
whether himself had ever been able so to Sing of Unrevealed Heavenly Mysteries, had he not been altogether 
depriv’d of his Outward Sight, and thereby made capable of such continued Strenuous, Inward Speculations: as 
he who has the use of his Bodily Eyes, cannot possibly become possest with. This however must be Granted, as 
indubitably true: The bountiful Powers above, did more than make him amends for their taking away his Sight, 
by so Illumining his Mind, as to enable him most compleatly to sing of Matchless Beings, Matchless Things, 
before unknown to, and even untought of by the whole Race of Men; thus rewarding him for a Temporary Loss, 
with an Eternal Fame, of which Envy it self shall not be able ever to deprive this best of Poems, or its most 
Judicious Author”; “To Mr. T. S. in Vindication of Mr. Milton’s Paradise lost”, in C. Gildon et al., 
Miscellaneous Letters and Essays, ed. C. Gildon (London, 1694), D6r-v. 
309 
 
SPIRIT AND MATTER, DRYDEN TO JOHNSON 
 
There is, then, no evidence that Paradise Lost was understood as an allegorical poem within 
Milton’s lifetime. Two inconclusive statements are found in the later 1670s. The first of these 
appears in the “Apology” prefaced to the belated 1677 edition of Dryden’s State of Innocence, 
which is precisely the sort of statement of allegorical intention that is conspicuously lacking 
from both early editions of Milton’s epic. How, Dryden asks, “are Poetical Fictions, how are 
Hippocentaures and Chymæras, or how are Angels and immaterial Substances to be Imag’d; 
which some of them are things quite out of nature: others, such whereof we can have no 
notion?”
175
 The answer is “easie” with creatures of myth and legend, as poets have a “liberty, 
for describing things which really exist not, if they are founded on popular belief”. But what 
about such beings as angels, which are supernatural but which do, according to Christian 
belief, really exist? In representations of such 
Immaterial Substances we are authoriz’d by Scripture in their description: and herein 
the Text accommodates it self to vulgar apprehension, in giving Angels the likeness of 
beautiful young men. Thus, after the Pagan Divinity, has Homer drawn his Gods with 
humane Faces: and thus we have notions of things above us, by describing them like 
other beings more within our knowledge [...]. 
The contrast with Milton’s own view of these matters could not be greater. Yet while the 
statement presents further valuable evidence of how controversial the subject matter of 
Milton’s epic was to some of its early readers, we can never know whether this is how Dryden 
read Paradise Lost, or whether the “Apology” extends only to his own adaptation. 
 The same goes for the passage in Edward Phillips’s 1675 Theatrum poetarum, listing 
“proper Allegorie” as a requirement in an epic poem.
176
 Because of Phillips’s familiarity with 
                                                          
175 Dryden, Works, 12: 94. 
176 See Phillips, Theatrum, **5v-6r: “it is not a meer Historical relation, spic’t over with a little slight fiction, 
now and then a personated vertue or vice rising out of the ground, and uttering a speech, which makes a Heroic 
Poem but it must be rather a brief obscure or remote Tradition, but of some remarkable piece of story, in which 
the Poet hath an ample feild to inlarge by feigning of probable circumstances, in which and in proper Allegorie, 
Invention, the well management whereof is indeed no other then decorum, principally consisteth, and wherein 
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his uncle, and especially his services as one of the amanuenses for Paradise Lost, critics have 
been tempted to take this passage as indicative of Milton’s own view of his poem, yet the 
passage is in no overt way connected to Paradise Lost, and conversely, Phillips’ praise of 
Paradise Lost elsewhere in his works omits any mention of allegory.
177
 
 It is not until one full generation after the poem’s original edition that we meet with 
the earliest unambiguous instance of a reader who approaches Paradise Lost as an allegorical 
poem. The reader is John Toland, who, in his life of Milton prefaced to the 1698 edition of the 
prose works, defines an epic poem as “not a bare History delightfully related in harmonious 
Numbers, and artfully dispos’d; but it always contains, besides a general representation of 
Passions and Affections, Virtues and Vices, som peculiar Allegory or Moral”.
178
 To this he 
hastens to add that Milton was not “behind any body in the choice and dignity of his 
Instruction; for to display the different Effects of Liberty and Tyranny, is the chief design of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
there is a kind of truth, even in the midst of Fiction; for what ever is pertinently said by way of Allegorie is 
Morally though not Historically true”. 
177 See his Compendiosa Enumeratio Poetarum, in J. Buchler et al., Thesaurus, 17th ed. (London, 1669), 
R8r; Theatrum Poetarum, Ee9r-10r; and “The Life of Mr. John Milton” prefaced to Milton’s Letters of State 
(London, 1694), a8v-9v. The most forceful statement again comes from Treip: “Phillips’ remarks [...] are 
extremely important in that, published so soon after his uncle’s major poem and death, they must inevitably bear 
on Paradise Lost and probably embody something of Milton’s own conception of his epic” (Poetics, 112). But 
even if we assume that Phillips’ passage reflects his understanding of Milton’s work, this still does not prove that 
it reflects Milton’s own view of his poem. For one thing, an objective evaluation of Phillips’ remark must take 
into account the highly derivative nature of his Theatrum, on which see S. Golding, “The Sources of the 
Theatrum Poetarum”, PMLA 76 (1961): 48-53. Golding does not discuss the sources of Phillips’ “Prefatory 
Discourse”, where the passage on epic allegory appears, and some portions of which are clearly original, yet 
there is still a strong possibility that the theoretical remarks derive from a contemporary source, quite possibly 
one post-dating the composition of Paradise Lost. There are several parallels between Phillips’ remarks and Le 
Bossu’s Treatise, but as Treip points out, the licensing date for the Theatrum, 14 September 1674, seems to rule 
out the possibility of influence. A debt to some other late source seems likely, however, and Treip herself 
describes Phillips’ remarks as “Tasso filtered through some later authority”, with the “received epic-allegorical 
theory of the late sixteenth century [...] modulated by a neoclassical emphasis on decorum”. Certainly books 
could travel fast: T. Rymer, for example, not only read but translated and published Rapin’s 1674 commentary 
on Aristotle’s Poetics in the year of its original publication: see R. Rapin, Reflections on Aristotle’s Treatise on 
Poesie (London, 1674). The received view of Edward’s close involvement with Paradise Lost, and consequently 
the supposed authority of his comments, should also be re-examined. First of all, Phillips’ own report does not 
indicate a particularly close involvement: “for some years as I went from time to time to Visit him”, at which 
occasions he would assist Milton with “a Parcel of Ten, Twenty, or Thirty Verses at a Time, which being 
Written by whatever hand came next, might possibly want Correction as to the Orthography and Pointing” 
(“Life”, in Milton, Letters, a9v). Several qualifications are to be made here, however. First of all, the period 
during which Edward would have been most familiar with his uncle’s work, 1640-46, predates the composition 
of Paradise Lost, and belongs to the period in which Milton was still not averse to the notion of allegory. His 
contacts with Milton after leaving his household for Oxford, followed by a busy career as tutor, secretary and 
writer and translator of a number of publications, were by all accounts considerably lesser and the extent of his 
involvement with the composition of Paradise Lost is in fact unclear; see Shawcross, Arms, 73-94. His hand 
appears in the commonplace book, a letter of 1653, and the corrections made to the final manuscript of Paradise 
Lost; it does not appear in De doctrina, written in parallel with Paradise Lost up to c.1660. 
178 Toland, “Life”, e1v. 
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his Paradise Lost. This in the conclusion of his second Book of Reformation, publish’d in 41, 
he tells us was his Intention at that time; and he afterwards made this promise”.
179
 Two things 
need to be stressed here. Firstly, what is likely in Phillips’ case is certain in Toland’s: his view 
of epic as necessarily allegorical is based on neoclassical theory which postdates the 
composition of Paradise Lost and indeed Milton’s lifetime, most likely through Le Bossu’s 
Treatise and/or Blackmore’s Prince Arthur.
180
 Secondly, Toland has nothing to say on any of 
the elements in the poem that allegorical readers of later periods would focus on, and his 
identification of the work’s allegorical meaning seems determined not by a critical 
engagement with Milton’s text so much as his own struggle against various forms of religious 
and intellectual “tyranny”.
181
 Thus Toland appears to have been as typical in his neoclassical 
theory of the allegorical epic as he was atypical in its application to Paradise Lost, and his 
interpretation makes no impact on later commentary on the poem. 
 It is to the 1695 Annotations of Patrick Hume, the first comprehensive commentary on 
a vernacular work of English imaginative literature, that we need to turn for the first 
glimmers, but still no more than that, of a more representative allegorical view of the poem, 
based on a close and methodical engagement with the text.
182
 An extensive commentary like 
Hume’s was an ideal occasion for articulating a comprehensive allegorical reading of the 
poem, so that here too the fact that no such reading can be reconstructed from Hume’s notes is 
of special significance. In fact, already in his very first two notes Hume presents us with a 
                                                          
179 Toland goes on to quote the concluding passages of Of Reformation, overlooking, deliberately or not, that 
these still envisage a secular epic on a theme from national history, rather than the sacred subject of Paradise 
Lost: “Then amidst the Hymns, and Halleluiahs of Saints some one may perhaps bee heard offering at high 
strains in new and lofty Measures to sing and celebrate thy divine Mercies, and marvelous Judgements in this 
Land throughout all AGES; whereby this great and Warlike Nation instructed and inur’d to the fervent and 
continuall practice of Truth and Righteousnesse, and casting farre from her the rags of her old vices may presse 
on hard to that high and happy emulation to be found the soberest, wisest, and most Christian People at that day 
when thou the Eternall and shortly-expected King shalt open the Clouds to judge the severall Kingdoms of the 
World, and distributing Nationall Honours and Rewards to Religious and just Common-wealths, shalt put an end 
to all Earthly Tyrannies, proclaiming thy universal and milde Monarchy through Heaven and Earth”, etc. (YP 1: 
616-17). 
180 See Introduction, n. 32. See Toland, “Life”, a1v, for his praise of “the celebrated Pen of Sir Richard 
Blackmore”. His definition of the epic poem seems close to the above-quoted passage in Phillips’ Theatrum.  
181 In the background of Toland’s life of Milton are the controversies and persecutions occasioned by his 
Christianity Not Mysterious (London, 1696); for an account, see J. Champion, John Toland and the Crisis of 
Christian Culture (Manchester, 2003), 69-90. 
182 P. H[ume], Annotations on Milton’s Paradise Lost (London, 1695). On Hume, see A. Oras, Milton’s 
Editors and Commentators (Tartu, 1931); M. Walsh, “Literary Annotation and Biblical Commentary”, MQ 22 
(1988): 109-14. 
312 
 
textbook example of the Protestant position. In relation to the speculations on the species of 
the Tree of Knowledge he mentions the Song of Songs, which he describes as “wholly 
Allegorical, and not to be literally understood”. The positive use of the term is, however, 
restricted to such particularly esoteric texts. Thus Hume also insists that “Paradise was not 
Allegorical or Figurative, (according to Origen, St. Ambrose and others)”, and gives its 
precise historical location: Mesopotamia, “35 Degrees from the Equinoxial, and 55 from the 
Pole”, as “the Learned Sir Walt. Rawleigh plainly proves”.
183
 Still, this plainly proven 
Mesopotamian paradise does “Typifie” – but does not, of course, allegorize – “the high and 
happy State of Everlasting Life”, a reading for which Hume immediately adduces biblical 
support, namely Luke 23:43, “And Jesus said vnto him, Verily, I say vnto thee, to day shalt 
thou be with me in Paradise”. This corresponds exactly to the standard Protestant approach 
outlined above, and the remainder of his Annotations largely remains within the same 
parameters. 
 Of interest are also Hume’s annotations of Milton’s invocation of the Heavenly Muse, 
where he compares Tasso and finds him wanting: “though he calls to his Assistance the same 
Heavenly Spirit, yet we shall find him fall short of our Poet, both as to the Sublimity of his 
Thoughts and Argument, [...] and that he had but too just occasion to ask Pardon [...] for 
mixing and intangling Truth with vain Fiction”.
184
 By contrast, Milton successfully 
accomplishes a “much harder Task” of observing, “with all due Veneration, and Awful 
Respect, the great Decorum requisite in speaking of the True God; and to offend in nothing 
against the Revelations he has been pleased to make of himself; and yet to manage all this 
under the Heats and Heights of Towring Fancy”. The term itself is absent, but clearly it is 
Tasso’s allegorical mode of representation – mixing truth with fiction – that makes him 
inferior to the sublime imagination of Milton, which somehow transcends these limitations. 
                                                          
183 See W. Raleigh, The History of the World (London, 1614), D5r-G3r. 
184 The reference is to the second stanza of Tasso’s poem: “O heauenly muse, [...]/ Inspire life in my wit, my 
thoughts vpraise,/ My verse ennoble, and forgiue the thing,/ If fictions light I mixe with truth diuine,/ And fill 
these lines with others praise then thine”; Recouerie, trans. Fairfax, 1.2. 
313 
 
 Many of Hume’s annotations prove similarly revealing, providing literal expositions 
of episodes that some of Milton’s later critics read as allegorical.
185
 Nor is Hume troubled by 
the personifications.
186
 On the critical question of angels, however – critical because of all 
other potentially allegorical elements only the angels are continually present throughout the 
poem – we see Hume occasionally vacillating and thus anticipating the concerns of later 
critics. He clearly understood their seriousness, as witnessed by his remarks on the engraving 
of Satan prefaced to Book 1 in the illustrated edition.
187
 Glossing such key episodes as 
Raphael’s dinner with Adam, Hume is willing to follow Milton almost, but not quite to the 
utmost reaches of his imagination, with the materialism of which he was clearly not entirely 
comfortable.
188
 With the angels’emphatically physical wings, for example: most of the time 
Hume speaks of Milton’s winged angels as a matter of course, but occasionally he glosses the 
                                                          
185 See Hume, Annotations, notes to 3.495, 4.998-1004: Satan really enters the serpent, “actuating his 
Organs”, the location of the Paradise of Fools is “rationally assigned”, the “golden Scales” are the constellation 
Libra, etc. 
186 Annotating the Sin and Death episode, he explicates the allegorical meaning and provides scriptural and 
classical parallels, and his rare critical judgments are those of moderate praise: the allegory is “genuine and 
exact”, “a true Description” of its subject (notes to 1.34, 2.651, 2.781. 4.812). Even Sin and Death’s passage 
through chaos receives a scientific explanation: the “Asphaltic slime” (10.298) out of which it is fashioned is a 
naturally occurring “clammy Substance, a sort of natural Mortar extreamly viscous and binding”, which is 
“kneaded and wrought” by Death’s mace into “a Consistence, grown cold and dry”. The bridge also occasions 
one of Hume’s most original notes, recognizing the anti-Catholic reference in the phrase “by wondrous Art/ 
Pontifical” (10.312-13), and referring to Roman Catholic bishops as “Successors” of Sin and Death, who, “thô 
they found this Infernal Bridge built to their hand, have made bold to erect a Baiting-place of Purgatory by the 
way, more Poetical and Fictitious than it”. 
187 Cf. Oras, Editors, 45-6. Hume criticizes the artist for failing to respond to Satan’s description at 1.589-
606: he “should have taken the Noble Lineaments of his Obscured, and yet Glorious, Haughty Looks: He should 
have express’d his Furrow’d Face and Faded Cheek under those Lofty Brows of stedfast Courage and of wary 
Pride, vowing and waiting for Revenge: If he had hit these Lucky Stroaks, he might have spared his Horns and 
Asses Ears, so unsuitable to the Description of the Arch-Angel, that Milton has afforded him no hint of ’em”. 
Hume also criticizes the engraving prefacing Book 12, again insisting on the specificity of Milton’s description 
at 12.637-9: “The Angel led our Parents, loath to depart from their beloved Seat, in each hand, which the 
Designer of the Copper Plate has not well exprest, representing him, shoving them out, as we say, by Head and 
Shoulders.” For the criticized engravings, see Figure 9. 
188 Contrary to some passages of scripture (Tob. 12:19, Judg. 13:14), as well as some distinguished 
theologians (Theodoret, Aquinas), “Our Author believes the Angel did with keen and hungry dispatch eat, 
digest, and turn (what was convertible of it) into his proper substance, evacuating the rest by Perspiration; nor 
does there seem any absurdity in the Asseveration, since most Texts of Holy Writ, where the Appearances of 
Angels are Recorded, make ’em subject to Human Sight, Hearing and Feeling too, why not then to Eating, as 
literally affirm’d of ’em, as any of the other Actions falling under Sense? But these Enquiries are too subtle, and 
exceed the compass of our Capacities.” But if there is no absurdity in Milton’s depictions, then why this final 
disclaimer? Typically Hume resorts to such statements when he feels he is getting in over his head. See notes to 
1.46, 2.916, 3.342, 7.92, 7.501: “our Narrow Capacities are in no proportion to the Compass of the Creation”; 
“so obscure to our finite Understandings”; “as well as is possible for Human Understanding to do, in things so 
much exceeding the compass of our Capacities”; “Such Doubts are unresolvable, as not coming within the 
compass of Human comprehension”; “too high for Man’s capacity to reach”. 
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attribute as indicating a metaphorical or allegorical meaning.
189
 He also took exception to the 
limited knowledge attributed to Abdiel, who finds “Already known what he for news had 
thought/ To have reported” (6.20-1): “This is said”, Hume comments, “after the manner of 
Men, for it is unconceivable that an Angel [...] should be a stranger to the Omniscience of 
GOD Almighty.”
190
 On the whole, however, Hume’s understanding of the poem is still 
predominantly literal. 
 In sum, we fail to find in the first generation of the poem’s readers evidence either of a 
comprehensively allegorical reading of the poem, or of objections to its major allegorical  
episodes. The importance of Addison’s Spectator papers in the history of Paradise Lost 
criticism is well-acknowledged, but his view of the problem of allegory in the poem is usually 
oversimplified, most often by focusing only on his criticism of the most notable “allegorical” 
  
                                                          
189 Wings were of course a common angelic attribute. Unconventionally, however, Milton’s descriptions 
often insist on their physicality, most notably in the contrasting descriptions of Satan and Raphael. Thus Satan 
rises from the Lake of Fire and “with expanded wings [...] stears his flight/ Aloft, incumbent on the dusky Air/ 
That felt unusual weight” (1.225-7). We further see him “Fluttring his pennons” as he is tossed about in the more 
inhospitable domains of Chaos, whereas in the calmer regions “his Sail-broad Vannes/ He spreads for flight” and 
“Weighs his spread wings” (2.927-1045). This is paralleled by Raphael’s flight, who “Sailes [...] with steddie 
wing/ Now on the polar windes, then with quick Fann/ Winnows the buxom Air”, and meets Adam and Eve in 
the form of “A Seraph wingd”, with his three pairs of wings described in specific visual and even olfactory detail 
– a “Heav’nly fragrance” filled the air when he “shook his Plumes” (5.268-87). Hume accepts winged angels in 
notes to 2.77, 2.81, 2.132, 2.408, 2.634, etc. However, annotating the description of Gabriel as “winged 
Warriour” (4.576), he says that this is “according to the usual Description of Angels, adorn’d with Wings, to 
denote the Swiftness and Agility of Spiritual Beings”. Elsewhere, he glosses cherub as “a Human Shape with 
two Wings, placed over the Mercy-Seat of the Ark of the Covenant Exod. 25. 18 & 19. representing the Invisible 
Angels”, and in relation to the “winged Haralds” at 1.752 he notes that “Milton has given them Wings, not only 
as Angels, but to express their speed”. A brief statement in De doctrina has been interpreted as stating the same 
view: angels, it is said, “are of supreme swiftness, as if endowed with wings [quasi alis induti], Ezek. 1: 6” (OW 
8: 120). The passage is taken over from Ames: “And in greatest agility, that as if they had wings [quasi alati], 
they doe swiftly dispatch that which they have in commission. Ezech. 1. 6.”; Medvlla S. S. theologiæ, 3rd ed. 
(London, 1629), 1.8.38; The Marrow of Sacred Divinity (London, [1642]). Sumner translated “Endued with the 
greatest swiftness, which is figuratively denoted by the attribute of wings” (Christian Doctrine, 1: 247). 
Recently, see Raymond, Angels, 306: “De Doctrina suggests that the wings of angels indicate their great 
velocity.” The quasi does not, however, categorically exclude the possibility that angels actually have wings, and 
as we have seen above, Milton could resort to such careful phrasing, or re-use such as he found in his sources, 
when he wanted to avoid direct conflict with a more orthodox view than the one he espoused. In any case, in 
Paradise Lost the angels’ wings seem overwhelmingly real rather than figurative. Note esp. that Raphael 
apparently transforms himself into a bird-like shape when travelling to earth, and then, upon arrival, transforms 
back into a winged angel: once “within soare/ Of Towring Eagles, to all the Fowles he seems/ A Phœnix [...]/ At 
once on th’ Eastern cliff of Paradise/ He lights, and to his proper shape returns/ A Seraph wingd” (5.270-7). This 
makes no sense if the wings are merely symbolic. Finally, note that the proof text, Ezek. 1:6, fails to indicate any 
figurative meaning, reading simply “And euery one had foure faces, and euery one had foure wings”.  
190 Abdiel’s limited knowledge accords with Milton’s view in De doctrina: “The good angels do not see into 
all things in respect of God, as the Papists imagine, but [see] only, through revelation, those things which God 
has decided to [reveal], and other things through a certain outstanding process of reasoning; but many things 
they do not know” (OW 8: 140). 
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Figure 9. The two engravings Hume objects to in his Annotations, prefacing Books 1 and 12, 
respectively. These were first introduced in the fourth edition of 1688, and have been identified 
as the work of J. B. Medina (Books 3 and 5-11), H. Aldrich (Books 2, 12, and possibly 1), and 
B. Lens (Book 4), engraved by M. Burghers, with the exception of Book 4, by P. P. Bouche. It 
is interesting that Hume objects to two of the three illustrations by Aldrich, whose authorship 
was first identified by S. Boorsch, “The 1688 Paradise Lost and Dr. Aldrich”, Metropolitan 
Museum Journal 6 (1972): 133-50; see p. 148-9 on the tentative attribution to Aldrich of the 
illustration to Book 1. For a recent study, see T. Anderson, “Reading the Illustrations of the 
1688 Edition of Paradise Lost”, MQ 38 (2004): 163-87. 
 
episodes. What is of paramount importance to Addison is the probability of the action in its 
literal sense: everything else in his view of the epic poem follows from this central premise, 
including his view of epic allegory. Thus any use of personifications must be defensible by an 
appeal to commonly held beliefs, or their action must be curtailed to the point where they no 
longer inhabit the poem’s mimetic universe – they must be dissolved either into actual deities 
or mere metaphors.
191
 Secondly, any allegorical meanings proper (i.e. not personifications) 
                                                          
191 See J. Addison, Notes upon the Twelve Books of Paradise Lost (London, 1719), 128-9: “Homer indeed 
represents Sleep as a Person, and ascribes a short part to him in his Iliad; but we must consider that tho’ we now 
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must not come at the expense of the probability of the literal action by which they are 
signified.
192
 Hence Addison’s criticism of modern in favour of classical epic – where 
personifications are used sparsely, and where even the most fantastic episodes can be justified 
by the credulity of the author and his original audience – and his overall indifference to epic 
allegory, no longer the “soul” of the epic poem but an optional extra, which the reader may 
ignore or entertain at his pleasure. 
 This is the logic which governs Addison’s responses to the marvellous episodes in 
Paradise Lost, where he criticizes the improbable personification-allegories of Sin and Death 
and the pavilion of Chaos, as well as the Paradise of Fools – which “rather savour of the Spirit 
of Spenser and Ariosto than of Homer and Virgil” – but praises other episodes which he 
deems probable according to Christian belief, including those he considers allegorical, and for 
which he invariably adduces specific scriptural sources.
193
 It is of particular note that in his 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regard such a Person as entirely shadowy and unsubstantial, the Heathens made Statues of him, placed them in 
their Temples, and looked upon him a Real Deity”; where such belief is not found, personifications must not be 
“introduced as principal Actors, and engaged in a Series of Adventures”, but restricted to “such short Allegories 
as are not designed to be taken in the literal Sense, but only to convey particular Circumstances to the Reader 
after an unusual and entertaining Manner”. Addison’s papers first appeared in The Spectator between January 
and May 1712, with some subsequent revisions and additions. 
192 Ibid., 62-3: “I know that many Criticks look upon the Stories of Circe, Polypheme, the Sirens, nay the 
whole Odissey and Iliad to be Allegories; but allowing this to be true, they are Fables, which considering the 
Opinions of Mankind that prevailed in the Age of the Poets, might have been according to the Letter [...]. The 
story should be such as an ordinary Reader may acquiesce in, whatever natural, moral, or political Truth may be 
discovered in it by Men of greater Penetration.” Addison’s view is thus in sharp contrast to earlier allegorical 
poetics of the “impossible credible”, and in agreement with the opposite tendency, where limitations on allegory 
go hand in hand with limitations on the imagination. The only reason why Addison can excuse even the most 
fantastic episodes in ancient poetry – the transformation of ships in the Aeneid, for example, which he himself 
refers to as the poem’s “most violent machine” – is because he presumes that their authors and original 
audiences found them believable. 
193 For the criticism of the personifications and the Paradise of Fools, “Particulars which do not seem to have 
Probability enough for an Epic Poem”, see Addison, Notes, 11-12, 34, 55-7, 62-3 and esp. 127-30. The measure 
of probability for non-classical marvels is the perceived authority of scripture: see Addison’s positive 
commentary on the golden scales (4.990-1015), the golden hinges of the gate of heaven (5.253-6, 7.205-7), 
Michael’s sword (6.320-34), the golden compasses (7.224-231), and the golden altar (11.15-20), which he relates 
to Dan. 5:27, Ezek. 1, 2 Macc. 15:15-16, Isa. 40:12 and Job 26:7, and Rev. 8:3,  respectively (70-1, 78-80, 88-9, 
97, 131). Some of these are to be understood allegorically, and in several instances the term itself is used: the 
golden scales are a “noble Allegory”, Michael’s sword is an “Allegorical Weapon”, the golden compasses are an 
instance of “Poetry delight[ing] in cloathing abstracted Ideas in Allegories and sensible Images”. Elsewhere, 
Satan “starting up in his own form [4.810-19] is wonderfully fine, both in the literal description and in the moral 
which is concealed under it”; ibid., 68-9. At one point, Addison even anticipates Gallagher’s argument, 
approving of the throwing of mountains in the war in heaven not because it is based on Hesiod, but because it 
was “the Opinion of many Learned Men that the Fable of the Giants War, which makes so great a Noise in 
Antiquity, and gave Birth to the sublimest Description in Hesiod’s Works, was an Allegory founded upon this 
very Tradition of a Fight between the good and bad Angels” (87). This is to be distinguished from the claim, 
found already in Hume – see Oras, Editors, 30-1 – that classical myths are corruptions of biblical history; in 
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concluding remarks he refuses to adduce an overarching allegorical meaning for the poem. He 
does adduce a “Moral”, as “Those who have read Bossu, and many of the Criticks who have 
written since his Time, will not pardon me if I do not find out the particular Moral which is 
inculcated in Paradise Lost”.
194
 However, Addison specifically distances himself from Le 
Bossu’s allegorical concept of an epic poem’s “Moral”: he “can by no means think, with the 
last-mentioned French Author, that an Epic Writer first of all pitches upon a certain Moral, as 
the Ground-Work and Foundation of his Poem, and afterwards finds out a Story to it”.
195
 Thus 
Addison’s “Moral” means, precisely, a moral, in the modern sense of the word, rather than 
allegory: some general insight drawn by the reader from his or her engagement with a work of 
imaginative literature, and not necessarily one intended by the author, rather than an 
intentional structure of secondary meaning. How little relevance Addison ascribes to the 
poem’s moral, even in this limited sense, is most clearly seen in the actual moral he adduces 
for Paradise Lost, namely, “that Obedience to the Will of God makes Men happy, and that 
Disobedience makes them miserable”. Nothing could be more true, of course, nor could 
anything be more banal or superfluous, and one gets the feeling that he is, at least in part, 
ridiculing those who still adhered to Le Bossu’s view, in which the entire domain of the 
aesthetic is of almost no consequence and it “signifies little” whether the same “moral” is 
expressed through a story about figures of ancient myth or modern history, angels or dogs.
196
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
order to use ancient myth ancient poets to supplement and reconstruct sacred history, Milton must posit that it 
reflects oral tradition predating the Bible. 
194 Ibid., 146. 
195 See Le Bossu et al., Treatise, esp. B8r-C1r. Note also that Addison avoids speaking of allegory in 
discussing the poem’s moral, whereas Le Bossu uses the two terms interchangeably. The question of intention 
was debated by Richard Blackmore and John Dennis in 1716. Blackmore distinguishes between the epic poem’s 
“allegory” and its “moral”, and follows Addison in rejecting Le Bossu’s view of the latter: unlike with allegory, 
which is intentional, “If it be well observ’d it will evidently appear, that no Author can form the Narration of any 
great and memorable Action but some Moral will arise from it, whether the Writer intends it or not [...]. As from 
Pulpit Discourses on Divine Subjects, many useful Inferences may be deduc’d by the Preacher; so in these 
superior Poems various Doctrines may arise, which the Poet may himself mention if he pleases, or leave them to 
be drawn by the People for their Improvement” (Essays, 77-8). Dennis writes to Blackmore on 5 December 1716 
to express disagreement with this view, and his argument is interesting for its use of Shakespearean examples: “a 
Poet may form the Narration, of a Hundred great and memorable Actions, and not one Moral shall arise from 
them all, as the battle of Pharsalia, the Death of Brutus and Cassius, the Death of Cato, the Death of King Lear, 
the Death of Hamlet, the Death of Harry the Fourth: And I defie any Poet to form a general Action, and general 
Characters, but he must form them upon a Moral, and consequently that Moral must be first in his Head”; see J. 
Dennis, Original Letters (London, 1721), 1: B2v. Presumably Dennis means to say that there is a moral in the 
plays he mentions, but that it is there because of Shakespeare’s design rather than the subject matter itself. 
196 See Le Bossu et al., Treatise, C1r. 
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Addison’s position is exactly inverse: it matters little what the poem’s moral is, what matters 
is how it is expressed.  
 Nor does Addison object to Milton’s angels: the “machines” of the epic poem ought to 
be probable, and in addition, the “machines” of the divine epic poem ought also to be 
theologically probable, a difficult demand that Milton, however, successfully meets.
197
 The 
war in heaven is presented exactly as we might imagine it to have happened: the cause of the 
angels’ revolt is “founded on hints in Holy Writ, and on the opinion of some great writers”, 
and is thus “the most proper that the poet could have made use of”.
198
 Generally, a constant 
refrain in Addison’s criticism is his awe at how skilfully Milton has extrapolated epic 
narrative from even the minest hints in scripture. 
 Soon, however, a different critical position begins to emerge. In a letter from January 
1722, John Dennis raises “an Objection, which no one that I know has made against those 
very Machines of Milton, from the Force and Power of which those sublime Beauties were 
drawn”.
199
 The objection is that these machines have “the appearance of something 
inconsistent and contradictory, for in them the poet seems to confound Body and Mind, Spirit 
and Matter”. Why did Milton make his angels, “in themselves pure Spirits and uncompounded 
Essences”, bear “solid Arms and Armour, which can be employ’d by Body only?” “[A]ll the 
answer that can reasonably be made” – and one which anticipates the best contemporary 
modern scholarship on this subject – is that it was “Milton’s Notion of the thing” that angels 
“on occasion, either voluntarily assume Bodies, or by superiour Power and divine Command 
are oblig’d to assume them”. Dennis compares the representations of angels in Cowley and 
Tasso, but notes that they “avoided the giving their Readers the occasion of believing, that 
there is in their Descriptions of those fall’n Angels any real Contradiction”.
200
 Dennis’ 
                                                          
197 See Addison, Notes, 80: “Several of the French, Italian, and English poets have given a loose to their 
imaginations in the description of angels; but I do not remember to have met with any so finely drawn, and so 
conformable to the notions which are given of them in Scripture, as this [i.e. of Raphael] in Milton”. 
198 Ibid., 82. 
199 Proposals for Printing by Subscription... Miscellaneous Tracts, Written by Mr. John Dennis (London, 
1721), D1r-2v. 
200 In his “Allegory of the Poem”, Tasso himself states that his devils “are both a figure, and a thing figured, 
and doe here represent the verie same euils, which doe oppose themselues against our ciuill happiness, so that it 
may not be to vs a ladder of Christian blessednes”, while “The Angels doe signifie somtime Heauenly helpe, and 
somtime Inspiration” (Recouerie, A3r). In Canto 1, Gabriel appears “In forme of airie members faire imbared,/ 
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statements strike a new note in Paradise Lost criticism, at least as far as the surviving record 
is concerned, and he is conscious of their novelty. 
 Even a decade later, the educationalist John Clarke thought he discovered in Paradise 
Lost “some fundamental Flaws, [...] which [...] have not, I believe, been taken Notice of by 
others”, namely that Milton’s representation of angels, who are, “by common supposition, [...] 
immaterial Beings”, is “not only ridiculous, but profane”, and furthermore, that his depictions 
of the “unfathomable” deity, “whose Ways are past finding out”, are particularly offensive 
and blasphemous.
201
 The importance of the angels emerges even more clearly in the Notes of 
the Richardsons, for unlike other potentially allegorical episodes, “These Heavenly Beings are 
so often mentioned in this Poem that it will be proper also to fix the Idea of Them thus 
Early”.
202
 However, although they are similar to Dennis and Clarke in reporting an initial 
“Confusion in our thoughts” occasioned by Milton’s angels, the Richardsons, in one of their 
finest notes, negotiate this “Confusion” into the position later reached by Lewis and other 
modern critics.
203
  
 By the 1730s, then – roughly two generations now since the first edition of Paradise 
Lost – a number of critics had raised objections to Milton’s angels, while Addison, who found 
nothing objectionable in the angels, censored his personifications and the Paradise of Fools. In 
his 1727 Essay on Epick Poetry, Voltaire had already become the first critic to combine these 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
His spirits pure were subiect to our sight,/ Like to a man in shew and shape he fared,/ But full of heau’nly 
maiestie and might,/ A stripling seem’d he thrice fiue winters olde,/ And radiant beames adorn’d his locks of 
golde” (1.13). 
201 See J. Clarke, An Essay upon Study (London, 1731), 202-12. Clarke further dismisses the argument that 
angels are “vulgarly supposed capable of assuming Bodies, which is sufficient to justify the Poet. I humbly 
conceive it is not. For to take no Notice of the Absurdity of supposing them capable of receiving Pain by the 
Wounding of such Bodies, they are likewise supposed capable of laying them aside at Pleasure”. What Clarke 
means by “assuming Bodies” is taking control of material bodies as vehicles for their immaterial essence. This, 
as he correctly points out, would be a theological conception inadequate for Milton’s representation of the war in 
heaven, as instead of defending their material vehicles from the attacks of their opponents by means of swords 
and shields, they could protect themselves simply by “throwing away [their] Body at once”. 
202 Notes, n. to 1.45. 
203 “Milton calls them Spirits, but he also speaks of them in such a Manner, and as having such Properties as 
do not agree with the Notion we have of Spirits in the Strictest and most sublime Sense of that Term. [...] This 
necessarily occasions a Confusion in our Thoughts when we read, and consequently takes off from the Pleasure 
the Imagination might have with Reconcileable Ideas, that is, with understanding the Word Spirit in an Inferior, 
not in its Utmost Signification, as it has been observ’d the Term Creation must be understood. Suppose then we 
conceive of the Angels as Material Substances, Spirits in an Inferior Sense, Matter the nearest approaching to 
Spirit, but still Matter, Fire [...]. Thus conceiving of the Miltonick Angels gives us a most Delightful Idea, and 
such a One as the Mind can, as I may say, Deal withal; we can be Familiar with Such Angels, as Adam is 
described to have been, and with almost an Equal Pleasure” (ibid.). 
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two lines of criticism into a more comprehensive critique of the poem’s representational 
mode, but still does not attempt to appease these perceived faults through allegoresis.
204
 In 
1738-39, however, the representational mode of Paradise Lost becomes, apparently for the 
first time, the subject of public debate, waged largely in the pages of The Gentleman’s 
Magazine, and it is in this directly openly polemical context that we encounter what would 
seem to be the first comprehensive allegorical reading of the poem on record. The March 
1738 issue of the Magazine carried an open letter signed “Theophilus”, charging Paradise 
Lost with the specific religious heresies such as Arianism, and more broadly with a tendency 
“greatly to corrupt our Notions of the most sacred Things, and to sensualise our Ideas of God, 
of Heaven and another World”, especially in its “ridiculous” and “foolish” account of the war 
in heaven, with its “Cannon and Balls, and Powder and Matches, all described in such a 
Manner, and with such a Train of ludicrous Circumstances, as would make one believe he 
intended a joke by it”.
205
 These charges had been heard before. What is novel, however, are 
the counter-arguments of the respondent, who adopted the pseudonym “Philo-Spec.”. In his 
first letter, Philo-Spec. responds largely by citing from Addison’s Spectator papers, the 
acknowledged authority on the subject.
206
 More quotations from Addison follow in a further 
letter, answering specific points of Theophilus’ criticisms, yet in answering the most serious 
and farthest-reaching charge – that Milton’s depictions of the deity and the other worlds are 
almost as “sensual” as the pagans’ – Philo-Spec. resorts to a now familiar, but then, as far as 
Paradise Lost is concerned, original argument. “But let us hear Milton”, writes Philo-Spec., 
“who put these words into Raphael’s Mouth”: 
  What surmounts the Reach 
                                                          
204 To Voltaire, as to Addison, allegory should be “short, decent, and noble”, which is to say, it should not be 
allowed to pass from diegesis into mimesis (Essay, 114). Milton’s Sin and Death cross this invisible line, turning 
from figures to monsters, as do his angels, “For what avails it to draw at length the Picture of these Beings, so 
utterly Strangers to the Reader, that he cannot be affected any Way towards them” (118). The War in Heaven is 
“an imaginary Thing, which lies out of the Reach of our Nature”. 
205 GM 8 (1738): 124-5. 
206 GM 8 (1738): 201-2. Prior to the reply by Philo-Spec., a letter dated 1 August 1738,  signed “Urbanus 
Sylvan.”, appeared in the 7 August issue of The Daily Gazetteer, challenging Theophilus to define “what he 
means by the Arian Principle, and then produce some Passages from Paradise Lost, to prove that Milton has 
accepted that Principle into that Poem”, and thus clear himself of the suspicion of being “some concealed 
Popish Tool, who to deter well meaning People from reading a Poem wherein the Idolatry and Superstition of 
the Heathens and Papists are exposed with all possible Strength and Beauty, would brand it with the odious 
Mark of Heresy”. 
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 Of human Sense, I shall delineate so, 
 By lik’ning spiritual to corporeal Forms,  
 As may express them best.
207
 
I cite the passage in the form given by Philo-Spec., with the capitalized “W” at the beginning 
and a full stop at the end – a manoeuvre which, as already mentioned (n. 127), would find 
many later advocates. It is here, however, that the quotation is perhaps first given in this 
truncated form, and adduced as evidence of the representational mode of the entire poem, 
making Philo-Spec. the earliest known reader to understand Paradise Lost as a 
comprehensively allegorical poem.
208
 
 The exchange between these anonymous readers is a major milestone in a process 
which – fast-forwarding now through the mid-century – reaches a critical point with Samuel 
Johnson, whose well-known comments on the poem are all, point by point, anticipated by the 
earlier critics surveyed above, but now pursued without any of their hesitancy or restraint. He 
follows Addison and Voltaire in censuring the personifications: these should be “suffered 
only to do their natural office, and retire”, whereas “to give them any real employment, or 
ascribe to them any material agency, is to make them allegorical no longer, and to shock the 
mind by ascribing effects to non-entity”.
209
 He extends this criticism, however, to the 
“immaterial agents”, i.e. the angels. To Dennis, Milton’s angels only seemed to confound 
spirit and matter, but Johnson knows not seems: Milton has “unhappily perplexed his poetry 
with his philosophy”, producing a poem marred by a “confusion of spirit and matter”. In 
                                                          
207 GM 8 (1738): 288-290.  
208 In his response, which brought the exchange to an end, Theophilus specifically objects to the truncation of 
the “though what if”, which “Milton’s ingenious Advocate ought not to have suppress’d”, and by which Milton 
“immediately suggests, that there was greater Propriety” in Raphael’s narration “than his first Caution seem’d to 
imply; [...] And this (I say) is corrupting our Notions of spiritual Things, and sensualising our Ideas of Heaven to 
a Degree that may have ill Effects on Religion in general”; “Defence of Animadversions”, GM 9 (1739): 5-6. 
Nor does Theophilus accept Addison’s apology for the allegory of the golden compasses, and in fact turns 
Addison’s prescriptions against his own reading of this passage: “how wide the Difference is between these short 
Allegories [i.e., in scriptural passages adduced by Addison] and the Poet’s Compasses, every body must see; the 
Preciseness of the Description here, and the Manner of the Messiah’s Operation, one Foot he center’d, and the 
other turn’d, &c. [7.229] may indeed be in the Spirit of Homer, [...] but carries in it such a Narrowness of Idea 
as, when applied to the Almighty Architect, is utterly profane. Allegories from sensible Things, when applied to 
the supreme Understanding, ought to be short, and not spun out into Particulars and Circumstances, for since we 
are reduced to the Use of them, merely by the Imperfection of our Minds, we ought to recover our Thoughts 
from them as soon as possible; otherwise, we must become shocking and ridiculous”. 
209 S. Johnson, The Lives of the Most Eminent English Poets, ed. R. Lonsdale (Oxford, 2006) 1: 290-1. 
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Johnson’s reading of the poem there are only two material and thus mimetically representable 
sentient beings, Adam and Eve. As for the rest, Milton “saw that immateriality supplied no 
images, and that he could not show angels acting but by instruments of action; he therefore 
invested them with form and matter”. In other words, Milton wrote allegorically, and of this, 
given the inherent difficulty of the subject, Johnson approved, objecting only to Milton’s 
shortcomings as an allegorical poet. He should have – as, again, Dennis had only suggested in 
his comparison with Cowley and Tasso – “secured the consistency of his system, by keeping 
immateriality out of sight, and enticing the reader to drop it from his thoughts”. Thus with 
Johnson we reach a position exactly inverse to that of Addison: it is the mimetic elements that 
have now become an intrusion into an otherwise allegorical poem, and rather than a work 
flawed by allegory, Paradise Lost has become a work of flawed allegory, best read by 
skipping the inferior portions, especially the war in heaven, “the favourite of children, and 
gradually neglected as knowledge is increased”. 
 
READ CORRECTLY WHEN NOT READ AT ALL 
 
Clearly, what happened here is the same that happened two and a half millennia ago in ancient 
Greece, and has been happening in similar circumstances ever since: allegoresis came to the 
rescue of a privileged text which had outlived its ideological currency. What is peculiar about 
this case, however, is that this happens precisely over the period at which we are supposed to 
see allegory declining and eventually relinquishing its hold on Western culture. The sixteenth 
century has been said to have revolted against allegory, as has the seventeenth, as has the 
eighteenth, and certainly with the Romantics, if not earlier, we should have reached the shores 
of what turns out a surprisingly elusive, ever-receding modernity. When Paradise Lost was 
concerned, however, the Romantics took things even further than Johnson. Blake’s 
psychomachian allegoresis in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell will strike us as more 
idiosyncratic than it really is if we are not aware of how closely it is paralleled by the more 
prosaically expressed contemporary view of Henry Boyd, asking the reader to take the fallen 
323 
 
angels “merely as pictures of human nature, or at least of human passions, personified with 
aggravated features”.
210
 Another decade later, this has become an orthodoxy which Coleridge 
restates with an air of common knowledge: “The fallen angels are human passions, invested 
with a dramatic reality.”
211
 Thus the allegoresis makes an immense leap forward: to Johnson, 
Milton’s angels were an imperfectly executed allegorical representation of angels; now, 
Milton’s angels begin to represent abstract notions such as “Desire” or “human passions”. 
 From this point, an untraced and meandering, yet logically straight line leads to two 
classics of mid-twentieth-century Milton criticism with which this survey will close, and 
which manifest, in different but complementary ways, the terminal development of this 
critical tradition: Stanley Fish’s 1967 Surprised by Sin and Alastair Fowler’s 1968 edition of 
Paradise Lost. Fowler’s seminal edition is of particular interest as a bridge between the 
criticism of the early and mid-twentieth century, when allegorical readings of Milton’s poem 
proliferated, but the term allegory itself was largely banished from critical discourse, and the 
term’s postmodern rehabilitation, reflected in the work of Treip, Martin, Borris, and others. 
The use of allegory in Fowler’s first edition is thus relatively sparse, and largely restricted to 
various sources or analogues of Milton’s poem rather than the poem itself. There is, however, 
a premonition of what is to come a generation later: “What still remains to be investigated”, 
writes Fowler in the first-edition Introduction, “is the extent to which Paradise Lost 
allegorizes the inherited epic images, in the Neoplatonic manner of a Landino or a Spenser – 
that is, the extent to which the poem is tertiary rather than secondary epic.”
212
 By 1982, the 
problem has been solved: in Fowler’s influential Kinds of Literature, Paradise Lost is 
                                                          
210 “Observations on the Characters of the Fallen Angels of Milton”, in The Poetical Works of John Milton, 
ed. J. Todd, 2nd ed. (London, 1809), 2: 259-71. Cf. the famous passage in Blake’s work: “The history of this” – 
the process of Desire being restrained by Reason – “is written in Paradise Lost, & the Governor or Reason is 
call’d Messiah./ And the original Archangel, or possessor of the command of the heavenly host, is call’d the 
Devil or Satan, and his children are call’d Sin & Death./ But in the Book of Job, Milton’s Messiah is call’d 
Satan./ For this history has been adopted by both parties./ It indeed appear’d to Reason as if Desire was cast out, 
but the Devil’s account is, that the Messiah fell, & formed a heaven of what he stole from the Abyss. [...]/ But in 
Milton, the Father is Destiny, the Son, a Ratio of the five senses, & the Holy Ghost, Vacuum!”; W. Blake, The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell, ed. G. Keynes (Oxford, 1975), plates 5-6. 
211 “Unassigned Lecture Notes”, in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, gen. ed. K. Coburn 
(London, 1969-2002), 5: 2.426-7; Foakes tentatively suggests a dating range of 1808-18. Here Coleridge also 
notes that Milton solves the problem of representing the “supreme Being [...] by keeping the peculiar attributes 
of divinity less in sight, making them to a certain extent allegorical only”.  
212 Paradise Lost, ed. A. Fowler, 1st ed. (1968; repr. London, 1972), 11. 
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discussed in the same breath as The Faerie Queene – “tertiary” epics in which there is “little 
wholly exterior action”.
213
 Consequently, revising the above sentence in the second edition of 
1998, Fowler no longer asks whether, but “how far PL is tertiary rather than secondary epic – 
the extent, that is, to which it allegorizes the ancients, whether in the manner of Cristoforo 
Landino or of Edmund Spenser”, whose Faerie Queene is “the most important vernacular 
model” for the poem, “even if not apparently so”.
214
 
 Revising his classic edition thirty years after its original publication, Fowler can thus 
effortlessly translate the mid-twentieth-century jargon of metaphor, symbol, myth, and so on, 
into the newly fashionable jargon of allegory. “When Johnson said”, we read in the first 
edition, “that ‘the want of human interest is always felt’ in Paradise Lost, he betrayed his 
blindness to the metaphorical activity of the poem, whereby angels, devils, and even Sin and 
Death – not to say the divine persons – all convey insights in the psychology of man.”
215
 In 
the second edition, Johnson no longer overlooks the “metaphorical activity”, but “the allegory 
whereby angels, devils, Sin, Death – even the divine persons – convey human insights and 
experiences”.
216
 A new section, on “Politics and Allegory”, is added to the Introduction, 
positing “political”, “theological”, “moral”, and “psychological allegory” in the poem. The 
“angelic action probably all has allegorical content”, and a sufficiently “broad allegorization” 
can even help to integrate the problematic episode of Sin and Death.
217
 The representation of 
the divine persons risks “anthropomorphism in the interests of narrative and dramatic 
exposition”, but this is “Allegory, not novelistic realism”.
218
 Adam and Eve are a “recurrent 
allegory [...] represent[ing] complementary parts of human nature”.
 219
 Even physical settings, 
for instance the layers of the earth’s atmosphere, are “allegorical”: “Throughout, atmospheres 
allegorize degree – moral and natural station”.
220
 
                                                          
213 A. Fowler, Kinds of Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 163. 
214 Paradise Lost, ed. A. Fowler, 2nd ed. (Harlow, 1998), 11. 
215 Paradise Lost, ed. Fowler, 1st ed., 32. 
216 Paradise Lost, ed. Fowler, 2nd ed., 36. 
217 Ibid., 44. 
218 Ibid., n. to 3.80-343. 
219 Ibid., n. to 4.411. 
220 Ibid., n. to 12.76-8. The same is found throughout the second edition. In the first-edition Introduction we 
thus read that Milton’s God “is not a character, though he thinks and speaks” (35), that the description of hell is 
“not intended merely as physical description” (n. to 1.62-4), or that literal-minded critics miss Milton’s “moral 
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 Where in Fowler we thus find the extreme development of the via positiva, in Fish we 
find a complementary radicalization of the via negativa. The reception of Surprised by Sin has 
mostly revolved around the old “Satanist” controversy and the book’s proposal of a via media 
between “pro-” and “anti-Miltonist” readings.
221
 This, however, was only the first stage in 
Fish’s “program of education”, teaching his “fit reader” to see not only through Satanic 
grandeur and rhetoric, but also space, time, anthropomorphism, and eventually the poem 
altogether, enabling him or her to ascend to the utmost peak of human cognition and there 
“apprehend, negatively”, by a “negative intuition”, that which can never be apprehended in 
any other way. Fish described this as Milton’s “brilliant solution to the impossible demands” 
of his subject, “enabling him to avoid the falsification of anthropomorphism and the 
ineffectiveness of abstraction”.
222
 Surely, however, this brilliant solution must be all too 
familiar to students of allegory: anthropomorphism is falsification, yet outright statement of 
abstract doctrine is ineffective – the solution, from the ancient Homeric allegorists onwards, is 
to “invest” doctrine with myth, to write allegorically. 
 What is novel here, however, is Fish’s solution to the increasing demands of 
allegorizing Paradise Lost, especially in the light of the discourse of “accommodation”, 
which came to prominence exactly at the time Fish was at work on his book, and which, at 
least in MacCallum’s interpretation of 1962, was deeply problematic for his thesis, and is 
therefore silenced at all costs.
223
 Rather than in the investment of the immaterial with poetic 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
point” (n. to 1.728-9); in the second edition, Milton’s God “is not a character at all in the novelistic sense; he is 
rather an allegorical fictio” (39), “merely” has vanished, and the literalists miss “the point of M.’s discontinuous, 
allegorical picturing”. Romantic critics, Fowler notes in the added section on “Criticism”, “quite misconceived 
Milton’s allegory, in which the rigid authoritarianism is Satan’s and freedom lies in faithful obedience to God” 
(45). See also the revisions and additions in the annotations at 1.73-4, 1.84, 1.200-8, 2.99-101, 2.330, 2.630-2, 
2.745, 2.752, 2.859-903: “allegory need not be continuously visualized”; “The first of the metamorphoses, 
allegorizing moral decline”; “As an allegoria, posing further questions”; “Since angels are immortal, these 
doubts [...] are allegorically human”; “allegorically every sin is a new rebellion”; “In ‘figurative relation to 
exploratory intellectual flight’”, citing Borris, “Allegory”, 108; “Allegorically, he denies his own sin”; “Allegory 
tells the same events in another way”; “Chaos the ‘allegorical epitome of confusion, straying, error’”, citing 
Treip, Poetics, 137. The examples are from the Introduction and Books 1-2 only, and are all retained in the 
revised second edition (Harlow, 2007). 
221 A comprehensive survey is now available in the chapter on “Satan” in Leonard’s Labourers. 
222 Suprised by Sin, 38. 
223 In a sleight of hand similar to his treatment of Raphael’s preamble to the war in heaven, Fish gives a 
carefully doctored version of the key passage from De doctrina, quoted above on pp. 248-9. He quotes only the 
first paragraph, omitting “For although it be granted” (i.e., “For granting that”, in the YP text used by Fish) and 
the whole final caveat, and ending with a full stop after “as we can grasp him” (i.e., “comprehension”), which, 
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matter, or the dramatization of the abstract in the poetically concrete, the allegorical meaning 
of Paradise Lost is now claimed to reside in the unattainability of this meaning – in the 
reader’s negative apprehension of what can never be apprehended positively. Where it is the 
purpose of other allegorical poems to speak the unspeakable, Paradise Lost was designed to 
unspeak the speakable. The poem is a manual of the kind of apophatic theology espoused by 
Augustine in the passage cited at the beginning of this chapter, in which even to describe God 
as unspeakable is to say something of Him, and therefore to end up in verbal conflict – 
literally, a war of words, “pugna verborum”.
224
 When God speaks in Milton’s poem, we are 
wrong to read what he says. We should know better: we should know that, at most, our notion 
of speaking can serve as an allegory of what, in a reality beyond human comprehension, God 
really does – if, indeed, he does anything. Faced with God’s speeches, the “fit reader” will 
unread them, apprehending that they only “figure forth” the “still clarity and white light of 
divine reality”, just as Satan’s speeches “represent” the “colour and chaotic liveliness of 
earthly motions”.
225
 In short, Paradise Lost is “read correctly” only when it is “not read at 
all”.
226
 
 The proposition might seem absurd, but in fact the notion of a book best read when not 
read at all is a remarkably exact description of the fate of any book, sacred or secular, which 
attains canonical status. No wonder Fish likes to cite Augustine, the man to whom we owe the 
best advice for writing such a book: “Certainly, to make a bold declaration from my heart, if I 
myself were to be writing something at this supreme level of authority I would choose to 
write so that my words would sound out with whatever diverse truth in these matters each 
reader was able to grasp”.
227
 But what does it mean for supreme authority to be invested in 
words without meaning, an obedient textual mirror which merely reflects whatever truth we 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
although apparently mandated by the 1960s house style of the Harvard University Press, leaves a false 
impression of coherence and completeness. Furthermore, Fish explicitly refuses to apply the passage, even in 
this form, to Paradise Lost: “The safest way, however, may not be sufficient to the occasion”, and scripture 
offers only a “partial solution” – it is “the word of God; but it is the word of God accommodated to the powers of 
his creatures and therefore not literal or absolute, as inspiration and grace are absolute” (ibid.) 
224 Augustine, De doctrina, 16. 
225 Fish, Surprised by Sin, 88. 
226 Ibid., xlix. 
227 Augustine, Confessions (1991; repr. Oxford, 1998), 12.31. 
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choose to set before it? What does it mean to read books correctly by not reading them at all? 
It is easy to understand the positions of Dryden, Johnson, or Coleridge, for all of whom sacred 
truths were at stake, and any quarrel with Milton’s poem was an instalment of the ancient 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry, of which allegory is almost as ancient a means of 
settling. What is puzzling, however, is what continues to drive it long after its ideological fuel 
is supposed to have been exhausted. Why did the allegoresis of Paradise Lost not only persist 
but reach such radical heights in the supposedly secular literary academia of the late twentieth 
century? Why have, at the same time, aspects of Milton’s work most germane to a modern 
secular outlook remained so long overlooked? Why, finally to address one of the fundamental 
issues raised by this study, has allegory not only survived modernity but come back with a 
vengeance? A difficult question, no doubt, and usually evaded in silence, but perhaps finally 
ripe for quelling disputatiously. 
AFTERWORD 
(NEO)ALLEGORY AND (ANTI)MODERNITY 
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I 
 
“I cordially dislike allegory in all its manifestations, and always have done so since I grew old 
and wary enough to detect its presence”. The statement comes from the foreword to what is 
by all accounts the most popular work of fiction of our time, with a readership numbering in 
the hundreds of millions. Indeed, as mere numbers go, it is this statement, rather than that of 
any scholar or theorist of allegory mentioned in this study, that has to be, along with the rest 
of the passage in which it appears, the single most widely disseminated discussion of the 
subject to appear to date. To make things more interesting, its author was a devoted and 
distinguished medievalist, a conservative in political as well as most literary matters, and a 
deeply devout Roman Catholic to boot – the least likely person on earth, one would think, to 
harbour a cordial dislike of allegory to begin with, much less to get a chance to bring it to the 
attention of a wide international audience. And as if that were not enough, the book prefaced 
by this statement was so extraordinarily idiosyncratic as to be almost sui generis: a vast, 
three-volume, 1000-page fantastic romance, narrated in an archaic style punctuated by quotes 
in multiple invented languages and alphabets, buttressed with extensive prologues and 
appendices, embedded into an elaborate metafictional framework, accompanied by extensive 
chronologies and genealogies, and meticulously drawn maps. The book had in it dragons and 
wizards, yet it was clearly not a children’s book, for no child could make much sense of it, 
and if it was for adults, there had never been one like it. “Quite honestly”, said its sympathetic 
but sceptical publisher, “I don’t know who is expected to read it.” 
 The book in question is, of course, J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings.1 
Originally published in 1954-55, the book that nobody was expected to read soon became a 
bestseller, its author an international celebrity. Most readers simply enjoyed the story. Some, 
however, believed that there was more to it than met the eye, and as the book’s popularity 
soared to unprecedented heights, Tolkien increasingly found himself answering questions for 
                                                          
1 For the above quote, see The Lord of the Rings, 2nd ed. (1966; repr. London, 1995), xvii; for the comment 
by the publisher, S. Unwin, see The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, ed. H. Carpenter (1981; repr. New York, 2000), 
120. According to various media sources, The Lord of the Rings is estimated to have sold over 150 million 
copies, and to have been translated into almost forty languages. 
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which he had very little sympathy. As early as 1938, he had received a letter “asking for an 
authoritative exposition of the allegory” of his first book of fiction, The Hobbit, and with the 
expanded scope and decidedly adult tone of the sequel such queries proliferated. “It is not 
‘about’ anything but itself”, he writes in response to an early reader’s comments in April 
1955, and “Certainly [...] has no allegorical intentions, general, particular, or topical, moral, 
religious, or political.” “The Hobbits are no more an ‘allegory’”, as another letter suggested, 
“than are (say) the pygmies of the African forest.”  
 Nor is the book in any way about its author, and is “at no point an attempt to allegorize 
his experience of life”, an experience which extended over the two World Wars, in the first of 
which Tolkien saw combat at the Battle of the Somme, and which many presumed to be the 
topical horizon for the world-scale conflict depicted in the book. Tolkien would have none of 
it: “Of course my story is not an allegory of Atomic power”; “To ask if the Orcs ‘are’ 
Communists is to me as sensible as asking if Communists are Orcs”. By 1958, he is losing his 
patience: another “enquirer (among many)” into “what the L.R. was all about, and whether it 
was an ‘allegory’”, is answered in a rudely incomprehensible manner, and Tolkien notes that 
he lost no sleep over never hearing from him again. By 1961, he is furious: in the preface to 
the Swedish translation, the translator had taken the liberty of suggesting, among other things, 
that the story’s arch-villain, a demonic creature most often referred to as Sauron, represented 
Stalin – “He is welcome to the rubbish, but I do not see that he, as a translator, has any right 
to unload it here. [...] I utterly repudiate any such ‘reading’, which angers me. The situation 
was conceived long before the Russian revolution. Such allegory is entirely foreign to my 
thought.”2 
 By 1966, when the above-quoted Foreword was added to the second edition of The 
Lord of the Rings, the various allegorical readings were proliferating, and increasingly making 
their way into journalistic and academic criticism, so Tolkien took this opportunity to issue a 
public disclaimer of any such intentions on his behalf. “I should like”, he writes,  
                                                          
2 For the above quotes, see Tolkien, Letters, 41, 220, 233, 239, 246, 262, 264, 307. 
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to say something here with reference to the many opinions or guesses that I have 
received or have read concerning the motives and meaning of the tale. The prime 
motive was the desire of a tale-teller to try his hand at a really long story that would 
hold the attention of the readers, amuse them, delight them, and at times maybe excite 
them or deeply move them. As far as any inner meaning or “message”, it has in the 
intention of the author none. It is neither allegorical nor topical.3 
Besides delighting and moving, Tolkien is also willing to grant his story a degree of 
“applicability”, as he terms it, to contemporary events. He is careful, however, to distinguish 
this from allegory: “I much prefer history, true or feigned, with its varied applicability to the 
thought and experience of readers. I think many confuse ‘applicability’ with ‘allegory’; but 
the one resides in the freedom of the reader, and the other in the purposed domination of the 
author”.4 The distinction is clear, especially in those cases where the focus of the 
“application” post-dates the work. In 2003, for example, as the United States and its allies 
were embarking on their invasion of Iraq, a photomontage entitled “Frodo Failed” appeared 
on the Internet, showing US President George W. Bush with Sauron’s ring photoshopped onto 
his finger. It is clear how Tolkien’s story was hereby applied to a contemporary person and 
event, and how this can be extended indefinitely, to persons and events of which the author 
cannot have had the slightest conception, just as it is clear that The Lord of the Rings cannot 
be meaningfully called an allegory of any of these persons and events. 
 The phrase “history, true or feigned” should ring a bell: Bacon had defined poesy as 
“FAINED HISTORIE” in his Advancement of Learning, which also included an early critique 
of allegory. As already mentioned, Bacon’s definition of poetry was widely anthologized in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the possibility of actual influence should not 
be excluded. The terms delight and move also have a long tradition in poetics and rhetoric, yet 
here again, just as with Bacon, the classic triad is incomplete, and any notion of literature as 
teaching is conspicuously absent. More broadly, the aesthetic principles underlying Tolkien’s 
denunciation of allegory are clearly Romantic-modernist in affiliation, and in fact his literary 
                                                          
3 Lord, xvi. 
4 Ibid., xvii. 
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work is best described as the fusion of a belated and hypertrophied Romanticism and an 
instinctive, untheorized modernism. Its particular flavour of pseudomedievalism, deriving 
largely from the author’s extensive engagement with the literature of the old north, is clearly 
the offspring, and in terms of popular impact, the culmination of the fascination with the 
Middle Ages common to the Romantic impulse in all European literatures. On the other hand, 
in its compulsion to play Adam and invent languages, its metafictionist impulse, and – as 
strange as it may sound now, when entire shelves of imitations are to be found in any 
bookstore – the sheer scale and novelty of its experiment, which remains the most 
comprehensive and elaborate attempt at fictional world-making on record, Tolkien’s work is 
contemporary with the heyday of literary modernism in more than a merely chronological 
sense. 
 The point of all this is to put into perspective the idea of a return of allegory, supposed 
to have occurred, as already discussed in the Introduction, over the recent decades in response 
to the work of such thinkers as Benjamin, Gadamer, de Man, and others. It seems obvious this 
is almost exclusively a phenomenon of elite culture, and notably of specific domains in 
contemporary art and academia. Alongside it, in the popular sphere, the opposite appears to 
have taken place, and we seem to see a triumph of the anti-allegorical Romantic-modernist 
aesthetic at a mass level, with the thriving of such genres as either offer experiences out of the 
reach of everyday existence, or indeed any actual existence (fantasy, horror, science fiction), 
or are precisely focused on everyday experiences, albeit in a heightened mode 
(romance/erotica, crime/mystery). Easily recognizable behind this are the opposed but 
complementary poles of The Lyrical Ballads: Coleridge’s pull towards the supernatural, and 
Wordsworth’s towards the common experience and “real language of men in a state of vivid 
sensation”, both pursued for their own sake rather than any allegorical meaning such as epic 
and pastoral were traditionally obliged to convey.5 Combined, these genres make up for a 
huge percentage of the imaginative literature that Western adults buy of their own accord, 
actually read, and, most importantly in the present context, read without attempting to divine 
                                                          
5 Cf. ch. 1, n. 164. 
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some hidden sense concealed in such books. It thus seems that much the same thing happened 
here as when the London groundlings started paying for their plays in the 1570s, facilitated, 
no doubt, by various other developments falling under the category of modernity, such as the 
spread of verbal and eventually also mathematical and scientific literacy, which is itself 
related to still further social developments.6 
 If, then, any return of allegory occurred in the past several decades, it occurred in the 
sphere of elite rather than popular culture. Indeed it has always been so. Allegory does not 
come naturally. To begin with, the notion that a poem or a story contains an additional layer 
of meaning, significantly different or unrelated altogether to what it more obviously relates, is 
a phenomenon that emerges only with an advanced level of literacy. This is what one would 
expect theoretically, going by the scholarship on the orality-literacy dynamic, and what would 
also seem to be the case empirically.7 “Where and when the impulse to read poems 
allegorically emerged is”, Dirk Obbink writes recently, “impossible to say”.8 There is no need 
for such scepticism. Without any wish to underestimate the enormous problems involved in 
tackling these questions, there are, at the very least, highly promising avenues awaiting 
further exploration. For one thing, more important than the question of where or when is that 
of why allegory emerges, and here the answer seems only too clear: it emerges in order to 
adapt a canonical work to the ever-changing cultural circumstances in which it finds itself 
embedded. If this is so, then the questions of where and when are far from unanswerable. In 
fact, a large part of the answer is right there in the question itself, and as Obbink himself goes 
                                                          
6 Literacy, as J. H. Miller reminds us in On Literature (London, 2002), “is associated with the gradual 
appearance from the seventeenth century onward of Western-style democracies. This means regimes with 
expanded suffrage, government by legislatures, regulated judicial systems, and fundamental human rights or 
civil liberties. Such democracies slowly developed more or less universal education. They also allowed citizens 
more or less free access to printed materials and to the means of printing new ones” (3). 
7 For introductions into this scholarship, see W. J. Ong, Orality and Literacy (1982; repr. London, 1988), and 
E. Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write (New Haven, 1986). There seems to be no idea of allegorical 
interpretation in oral cultures. Two studies have used the term allegory in relation to products of what their 
authors designate as oral cultures – M. Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness (Bloomington, 1982), and R. 
Cancel, Allegorical Speculation in an Oral Society (Berkeley, 1989) – yet in both cases the term is used in vague 
senses virtually indistinguishable from metaphor, or even less tangible impressions of an imaginative resonance 
between two elements in a certain narrative. In both cases, too, we are dealing with products of something close 
to what Ong calls “secondary orality” (Orality, 11): narratives which, while oral, are told by people who are 
either literate or are at least familiar with literacy, and have been exposed to concepts and practices, and the 
effects of practices, associated with literacy. 
8 D. Obbink, “Early Greek Allegory”, in Companion, ed. Copeland and Struck, 15. 
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on to say, “among the Greeks evidence for reading allegorically [...] is as old as any evidence 
we have for reading poetry”.9 This gives us at least a notional lower limit for the emergence 
of allegoresis – namely, once there comes into existence such a thing as a poem one reads 
rather than listens to. 
 Before this happens, poems and stories, existing only in the fleeting act of their oral 
performance, can be brought up to date with any significant change in social circumstances 
simply by altering their contents. There is no permanent record of a “true” version of such a 
poem or story, and its contents are governed by what has been described as the “homeostatic” 
tendency of oral tradition: the tendency to “live very much in a present which keeps itself in 
equilibrium or homeostasis by sloughing off memories which no longer have present 
relevance”.10 This works on the level of lexis, on the level of non-narrative discourses such as 
genealogies, and also on the level of narrative agents and motifs in stories and myths; when 
they grow out of date, they are simply changed.11 A question orality-literacy theorists do not 
seem to have posed, and on which theorists of allegory have also had very little to say, is what 
happens once a poem or story is fixed in writing, from which point direct intervention into its 
contents becomes increasingly untenable, and yet social pressures continue to exert their 
influence.12 This is exactly what must have happened in ancient Greece between the seventh 
century BC, when the Homeric epics were first written down, and the sixth, when the first 
allegorical readings of these epics appear. At least as far as the Western tradition is concerned, 
                                                          
9 “Allegory”, 15. 
10 Ong, Orality, 66-7.  
11 There are thus well-documented cases where an oral people genuinely believe in the age-long identity of 
their myths, yet irrefutable evidence – a comparison of a transcript or recording produced by outsiders at a 
certain point in time to a recent performance of what is presented as the same poem or story – shows 
considerable changes occurring already in the space of several decades. The success of oral cultures at verbatim 
repetition of their poems and stories is “Most often [...] minimal by modern standards”, and even singers, as we 
have known since the ground-breaking work of M. Parry and A. Lord, typically perform not from memory, but 
by improvisation guided by metre and conventional formulae, a technique leaving abundant space for the 
revision of old and insertion of new elements; see A. B. Lord, The Singer of Tales [1960], 2nd ed., ed. S. 
Mitchell and G. Nagy (Cambridge, Mass., 2000). “In all cases”, Ong emphasizes, “verbatim or not, oral 
memorization is subject to variation from direct social pressures. Narrators narrate what audiences call for or will 
tolerate” (Orality, 66-7). 
12 For a notable exception here, see Teskey, Allegory: “it may certainly be doubted whether the notion of an 
‘undermeaning’ (hyponoia) concealed below the surface of a text could have developed out of anything in the 
epics themselves. Song has no surface. We may indeed deny that the Homeric Prayers constitute genuine 
allegory if we suppose that genuineness in this matter cannot be decided by means of a narrow, rhetorical 
definition. Rhetoric itself, understood as the minute, technical analysis of figures of speech, belongs to a much 
later age and is the expression of an instrumental relation to language” (41-2).  
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this is where, when, and why allegoresis emerges. The fixation of a canonical poem in writing 
transfers the mode of its ideological maintenance from composition to interpretation, and the 
increasing stability of the text, as a more in-depth inquiry would undoubtedly show, elicits 
ever more detailed and comprehensive efforts at its allegoresis.13 
 Even within an advanced literate culture, however, allegorical reading is learned 
behaviour. When asked what a certain story is about, a child who has yet to write his or her 
first book report, as well as an adult without a basic literary education, will typically respond 
with a plot summary. That there are such things as “themes” or “symbols” – the preferred 
contemporary terms for hermeneutic activity that is often undeniably allegorical in nature – is 
something most of us first hear from a teacher. Again, these are especially important in works 
less readily transmutable into the common currency of “human interest”, as is the case with 
the contemporary “fantasy” genre at the Coleridgian pole, but also with its Wordsworthian 
counterpart. In the same year The Lord of the Rings was published, Ernest Hemingway was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature “for his mastery of the art of narrative, most recently 
demonstrated in The Old Man and the Sea, and for the influence that he has exerted on 
contemporary style”. The Nobel Prize is awarded for an author’s entire oeuvre, but the 1954 
materials particularly stressed Hemingway’s then-recent bestseller – a novella about an old 
Cuban fisherman named Santiago, who struggles to catch a giant marlin only to have it eaten 
                                                          
13 Theoretically, it should be possible to see developments in the mode of allegoresis paralleling each stage in 
the progress of a text’s canonization: the first written versions; the point where disparate written versions are 
replaced by a broadly standard one (the moment which, with respect to the Homeric epics, would be equivalent 
to that of the “Pisistratean redaction”, although the traditional account is now dismissed); the more detailed 
stabilization of the standard text through the advent of textual criticism, etc. Corresponding to these, there should 
appear an increasing amount of detail in the proposed allegorical readings: in the earliest stages, we should 
expect to find simple equations between a major narrative agent and an abstract concept; later on, as the narrative 
becomes more standardized, we should find attention to the interaction of narrative agents and particular aspects 
of this interaction (i.e., not only Athena = Wisdom, but Athena-pulling-Achilles-by-the-hair = wisdom-
restraining-passion); later still, when not only the narrative, but the text itself becomes more minutely 
standardized, attention will be given not only to narrative but to individual words, including their etymology. 
Other developments also need to be considered in this respect, including the move from scroll to book, and 
eventually from manuscript to print, or the emergence of such paratextual elements as marginal notes, lists of 
contents, indices, and so forth. On the importance of the switch from scroll to codex in the Christian tradition, 
see, e.g., F. Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), 89: “The transfer of the Hebrew 
scriptures to Greek codices enacts the appropriation of those writings for Christian purposes. It made possible the 
use of the Jewish account for the peculiar purpose of establishing the validity of the Christian version not by, or 
not only by, reference to the Law and the Prophets, but also by reference to the testimonies, scattered apparently 
at random in the ancient text, and having occult senses that only now emerged. [...] So the codex, originally 
perhaps the memorandum-book of Hellenistic businessmen, became the vehicle for a new kind of a narrative, 
reflecting new views on the divine and human arrangement of time.” 
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by sharks while bringing it back to the shore – which has since acquired the status of a 
modern classic, and retains a very strong curricular presence. There could hardly be two 
books more different than The Lord of the Rings and The Old Man and the Sea, yet they 
perfectly exemplify the complementary impulses in modern aesthetics for epic and pastoral, 
shorn of their previous connection to allegory, which Hemingway dismissed with respect to 
his story as decisively, if not as politely, as Tolkien. “There isn’t any symbolysm” [sic], he 
writes to Bernard Berenson in September 1952: “The sea is the sea. The old man is an old 
man. The boy is a boy and the fish is a fish. The shark are all sharks no better and no worse. 
All the symbolism that people say is shit.”14 
 The difference between the cultural status of Tolkien and Hemingway speaks 
eloquently of the prudence of keeping such comments to one’s private correspondence, and 
perhaps an interview or two, rather than placing them on prominent and permanent public 
display.15 At any rate, The Old Man and the Sea owes its canonical status precisely to such 
“symbolic” or “thematic” interpretations, habitually imposed on the work ever since the 
Nobel Prize documents. The above-quoted summary praises Hemingway’s “mastery of the art 
of narrative” and “influence [...] on contemporary style”, yet the presentation speech by the 
Swedish author and critic Anders Österling tells a more complex story.16 Österling stresses 
the rise to prominence of American literature, Hemingway’s journalistic roots and his eventful 
biography, and the flourishing of his style in the form of “the laconic, drastically pruned short 
story”, which attains, in The Old Man and the Sea, the sustained power of a “masterpiece”. 
Yet the novella is not merely an “unforgettable story of an old Cuban’s fisherman’s duel with 
a huge swordfish in the Atlantic” – “Within the frame of a sporting tale, a moving perspective 
of man’s destiny is opened up; the story is a tribute to the fighting spirit, which does not give 
                                                          
14 E. Hemingway, Selected Letters, ed. C. Baker (1981; repr. New York, 2003), 780. 
15 Hemingway’s public statements elsewhere are more temperate. In an interview for Time magazine, 13 
December 1954, he says: “No good book has ever been written that has in it symbols arrived at beforehand and 
stuck in [...]. I tried to make a real old man, a real boy, a real sea and a real fish and real sharks. But if I made 
them good and true enough they would mean many things” (72). Cf. Tolkien, Letters, 121: “one finds, [...] that 
the better and more consistent an allegory is the more easily can it be read ‘just as a story’; and the better and 
more closely woven a story is the more easily can those so minded find allegory in it. But the two start out from 
opposite ends.” 
16 See “Summary” and “Presentation Speech” at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/ 
1954. 
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in even if the material gain is nil, a tribute to the moral victory in the midst of defeat.” 
“Courage”, we are told, “is Hemingway’s central theme – the bearing of one who is put to the 
test and who steels himself to meet the cold cruelty of existence, without, by so doing, 
repudiating the great and generous moments.” Apparently at this point the author felt he was 
close to crossing a line, for he takes a moment to specify that “Hemingway is not one of those 
authors who write to illustrate theses and principles of one kind or another”. This is followed 
by further praise of the ascetic yet evocative style, but Österling returns to his preferred 
hunting grounds, venturing a predictable comparison with Melville’s Moby-Dick – not, again, 
that either author “wanted to create an allegory; the salt ocean depths with all their monsters 
are sufficiently rewarding as a poetic element. But with different means, those of romanticism 
and realism, they both attain the same – a man’s capacity of endurance and, if need be, of at 
least daring the impossible”. 
 From Österling’s speech a direct line leads to the novella’s treatment in those most 
reliable indicators of the hermeneutic underpinnings of contemporary literary academia: 
CliffsNotes, SparkNotes, GradeSaver, and their like. What, according to these lowest 
hermeneutical denominators, is The Old Man and the Sea about? The two options we find in 
the SparkNotes digest of the novella, in the section entitled “Themes, Motifs, and Symbols”, 
are “The Honor in Struggle, Defeat & Death”, and “Pride as the Source of Greatness & 
Determination”.17 “Themes”, a general heading informs us, “are the fundamental and often 
universal ideas explored in a literary work.” They come in a variety of shapes and sizes. 
While SparkNotes favour specificity (and ampersands), GradeSaver’s themes, like Österling’s 
“courage”, are mostly undiluted Platonic ideas, arriving in single-word instalments: 
Hemingway’s story is about “Unity”, “Heroism”, “Manhood”, “Pride”, “Success”, and 
“Santiago as Christ”.18 The equivalent section in the earliest of such “study guides”, 
CliffsNotes, opens with the claim that it is “A commonplace among literary authorities [...] 
that a work of truly great literature invites reading on multiple levels”, adding further that this 
                                                          
17 From SparkNotes’ “literature study guide” to the work, anonymous; www.sparknotes.com/lit/oldman/ 
themes.html.   
18 “The Old Man and the Sea Themes”, from GradeSaver’s online “study guide” to the work, by S. Elizondo; 
www.gradesaver.com/the-old-man-and-the-sea/study-guide/themes. 
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particular work “also clearly fits into the category of allegory – a story with a surface 
meaning and one or more under-the-surface meanings; a narrative form so ancient and natural 
to the human mind as to be universal”.19 
 Nothing could be further from the truth, and ironically, there is no better proof of this 
than the very existence of CliffsNotes and similar publications and services. Surely the great 
majority of the hundreds of millions of pupils and students who resort to these have perfectly 
normal human minds. What they lack is the particular intellectual skill of transmuting the 
particulars of a literary work into more universal categories, of transforming Santiago, an old 
Cuban fisherman, into Man or Christ. This, perhaps obviously, is not the same as abstraction – 
as extrapolating, from any number of particular fishermen, the concept fisherman – but entails 
the attaching to a certain particular of a different universal. “The young can’t distinguish”, as 
Plato was well aware, “what is allegorical from what isn’t”,20 but that does not mean they are 
not capable of abstraction, or of “application” – of deriving an analogy from a story they have 
read, of applying it to their own circumstances. What their teachers require, however, is 
something very different, and the process that comes naturally, reading a story and then 
observing how it parallels or diverges from one’s own experience, is inverted. The view of 
“themes” as “universal ideas” that are “explored” in a literary work obviously presumes that 
these ideas predate this work, and are intentionally encoded in it. The secondary meaning, 
students are to understand, precedes the story, and they are to recover it. Whatever we may 
think of this, the fact is that those who, overwhelmed by this task, turn to such aides as 
CliffsNotes do so precisely because this activity does not come naturally to them, in spite of 
having, in the great majority of instances, perfectly normal cognitive capacities. Were they 
not made to look for “themes” and “symbols” by their teachers, they would never, under 
normal circumstances, arrive independently at such notions. The inability to summarize a plot, 
to contemplate an abstract concept, or to recognize a symbolic relation where one is either 
explicitly indicated, or may be inferred from the immediate context – these would all be 
                                                          
19 “Themes in The Old Man and the Sea”, from CliffsNotes’ “literature notes” on the work, by J. Salladé 
Criswell; www.cliffsnotes.com/literature/o/the-old-man-and-the-sea/critical-essays/themes-in-the-old-man-and-
the-sea 
20 Republic, 378d. 
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recognized as severe cognitive impairments. To be unable to allegorize is to lack a particular 
intellectual skill, of which we may think what we will, but which is certainly not ancient – not 
in any broad anthropological perspective – let alone universal. 
 
II 
 
Thus allegory is learned, which means that it is taught, which means that it becomes, at a 
certain level of professionalization, a commodity, which means that it acquires social and 
class dimensions. It was in fact a lucrative business long before CliffsNotes. While agnostic 
on the subject in his Republic, Plato wants to restrict the circulation of at least the more 
problematic myths to the wealthy elite: they “should be passed over in silence, not told to 
foolish young people. And if, for some reason” – such as their allegorical significance? – they 
have “to be told, only a very few people – pledged to secrecy and after sacrificing not just a 
pig but something great and scarce – should hear it, so that their number is kept as small as 
possible”.21 More explicitly, we read in Xenophon’s Symposium, a Socratic dialogue from 
about the same period, of Niceratus, a young Athenian who boasts of knowing the Homeric 
poems by heart, yet his interlocutors are not impressed: 
 “But have you failed to observe,” questioned Antisthenes, “that the rhapsodes, too, all 
  know these poems?” 
  “How could I,” he replied, “when I listen to their recitations nearly every day?”
  “Well, do you know of any tribe of men,” went on the other, “more stupid than 
 the rhapsodes?” 
  “No, indeed,” answered Niceratus; “not I, I am sure.” 
  “No,” said Socrates; “and the reason is clear: they do not know the inner 
 meaning [huponoias] of the poems. But you have paid a good deal of money to 
                                                          
21 Republic, 378a. 
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 Stesimbrotus, Anaximander, and many other Homeric critics, so that nothing of their 
 valuable teaching can have escaped your knowledge.22  
The masses are welcome to Homer’s “thoughts” (dianoiai), the merchandise of Plato’s Ion, 
but his “under-thoughts” (huponoiai) are reserved for the elite.23 
 The ethical and political implications of this are obviously not very pleasant. Indeed, 
already in what could be the very first recorded appearance of the word allegory – in the 
treatise On Style attributed to an unidentified and perhaps otherwise unknown Demetrius, and 
variously dated between the third century BC and the second century AD – the mode of 
discourse denoted by this term is exemplified by its use in war propaganda: 
 There is a kind of impressiveness also in allegorical language [allegoria]. This is 
 particularly true of such menaces as that of Dionysius: “their cicalas shall chirp from 
 the ground.” 
 If Dionysius had expressed his meaning directly, saying that he would ravage 
the Locrian land, he would have shown at once more irritation and less dignity. In the 
phrase actually used the speaker has shrouded his words, as it were, in allegory. Any 
darkly-hinting expression is more terror-striking, and its import is variously 
conjectured by different hearers. On the other hand, things that are clear and plain are 
apt to be despised, just like men when stripped of their garments. 
 Hence the Mysteries are revealed in an allegorical form in order to inspire such 
shuddering and awe as are associated with darkness and night. Allegory also is not 
unlike darkness and night.24 
Almost as if recoiling from the implications of what he had just written, Demetrius now 
repeats Aristotle’s strictures against “riddling” language in the Rhetoric and Poetics, but the 
                                                          
22 Xenophon, Symposium, 3.6, in Memorabilia (1923; repr. Cambridge, Mass., 1997). 
23 “In the classical period”, Ford comments, “allegorical readings of epic could be offered as an intellectual 
commodity under the term huponoia. If a rhapsode expounded the ‘fine thoughts’ (kalai dianoiai) of Homer, an 
education in poetry could still be incomplete without an acquaintance with the ‘under-meanings’ (huponoiai) 
available from a different class of experts”, which provided “those with pretensions to cultural leadership an elite 
purchase on a kind of poetry that was increasingly becoming the possession of all Greece”, and “did for those 
wishing to be distinguished in the city what the recherché interpretations of Orphic texts or Pythagorean secret 
sayings (sumbola) did for those desiring to form their own communities at the city’s margins, uniting them and 
their common beliefs by a shared interpretation of cherished texts” (Origins, 73). 
24 Demetrius on Style, ed. W. R. Roberts (Cambridge, 1902), par. 99-101. 
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damage has been done. While not entirely overthrown, the exoteric ideal of Aristotelian 
rhetoric and poetics has been eclipsed by shrouds, darkness, shuddering and awe. Where 
Aristotle believed “that language to be good must be clear, as is proved by the fact that speech 
which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do just what speech has to do”,25 Demetrius, 
along with the rest of the allegorical tradition, believes that there is room in the world for a 
type of language which is not clear, and is not to be universally intelligible to all, but 
separates its audience into two camps, those who are privy to its hidden sense, and those who 
are not. 
 Perhaps the finest exploration of this aspect of the subject remains that in Frank 
Kermode’s Genesis of Secrecy. Apparently nobody has commented on a subtle prank pulled 
by Kermode at the beginning of this book, where the first thing one encounters after turning 
the title page is a dedication reading: 
To Those Outside 
ἐκείνοις δὲ τοῖς ἔξω ἐν παραβολαῖς τὰ πάντα γίνεται 
The dedication is given in exactly this form, in full consciousness of the fact that the lack of a 
translation and any sort of reference will make it incomprehensible to the Greekless reader, 
because it is meant not merely to announce, but to perform, the book’s central thesis, namely, 
that “the history of interpretations may be thought of as a history of exclusions” – exclusions 
of those portions of the interpreted texts which contradict a proposed interpretation, which is 
Kermode’s principal point in the quoted passage, but also, as the larger tenor of his discussion 
entails, exclusions of hermeneutic outsiders; a separation between those to whom “has been 
given the secret of the kingdom of God”, and “those outside”, to whom “everything is in 
parables; so that [hina] they may indeed see but not perceive, and may indeed hear but not 
understand; lest [mēpote] they should turn again, and be forgiven.”26 
                                                          
25 Rhetoric, 1404b1. 
26 See Kermode, Genesis, 20; I quote the Revised Standard Version here, as this is what Kermode uses. 
Incidentally, we encounter something very similar on the title page of Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis, 
featuring the often quoted couplet from Ovid’s Amores – “Vilia miretur vulgus: mihi flauus Apollo/ Pocula 
Castalia plena ministret aqua” – which is not only about such a division of the readership into initiates and 
outsiders, but which, in its untranslated Latin, enacts this division. The couplet is quoted as it appears on the title 
page of W. Shakespeare, Venvs and Adonis (London, 1953). For a translation, see Ovid, Amores, 1.15.35-6, in 
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 At the heart of the book is an encounter with “the great crux” of the Parable of the 
Sower, its aftermath, including the above-quoted words of Christ to his apostles as they 
appear in the Gospel of Mark, 4:11-23, and the disturbing ethical implications of the 
hermeneutics they advocate.27 In what could be the oldest of the four gospels, Christ speaks to 
the people in parables in order for them not to understand him, and consequently not be saved. 
The sower sows some seeds along the path, some in rocky places, some among thorns, and 
some on good soil; all fail but the last, which “brought forth grain, growing up and increasing 
and yielding thirtyfold and sixtyfold and hundredfold” (4:8). “He who has ears to hear”, 
concludes the parable, “let him hear.” The apostles, however, fail to understand the meaning, 
and in response to their request for clarification, Christ utters the statement quoted above, 
according to which parables serve to prevent outsiders from reaching the truth, and are 
consciously used by him to doom them to damnation. This, as he further explains, is the 
meaning of the Parable of the Sower, or rather, the Parable of Parables: the seed is the word, 
and the word is wasted on those unprepared to receive it, whereas with those who are 
prepared it bears fruit hundredfold. This is a general hermeneutic principle, and the parable is 
really about itself, about the protocols of its own interpretation: “Do you not understand this 
parable? How then will you understand all the parables?” 
 Unsurprisingly, as Kermode notes, “the true sense of this theory of parable 
interpretation is much disputed”, and “cunning ways are found of making it mean other than it 
seems to say, involving accusations of treachery in redactors and scribes, and even in the 
Greek language as Mark used it”.28 Thus already in Matthew (presuming the priority of Mark) 
the key words in Mark’s account – hina, “so that”, and mēpote, “lest... again” – are excised, 
and the rest carefully manipulated into a statement supporting a very different and 
comfortingly exoteric theory of parable: “This is why I speak to them in parables, because 
seeing they do not see, and hearing they do not hear, nor do they understand./ With them 
indeed is fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah which says: ‘You shall indeed hear but never 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Heroides (Cambridge, Mass., 1914): “Let what is cheap excite the marvel of the crowd; for me may golden 
Apollo minister full cups from the Castalian fount”. 
27 Ibid., 34. 
28 Ibid., 3. 
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understand, and you shall indeed see but never perceive’”, etc.29 Lurking behind this, 
however, is the chilling account in Mark, presenting us with a rare unvarnished look at the 
ethical and ideological implications of hermeneutic esotericism in its crudest, exemplary 
form: 
Only the insiders can have access to the true sense of these stories. “For to him who 
has will more be given; and from him who has not, even what he has will be taken 
away.” To divine the true, the latent sense, you need to be of the elect, of the 
institution. Outsiders must content themselves with the manifest, and pay a supreme 
penalty for doing so. Only those who already know the mysteries – what the stories 
really mean – can discover what the stories really mean.30 
 
III 
 
“Allegories”, goes Benjamin’s much quoted analogy, “are, in the realm of thoughts, what 
ruins are in the realm of things.”31 Whatever precisely that might mean, they are also what 
apartheids are in the realm of politics, and what the bourgeoisie is in the realm of class 
struggle. Behind many of the statements of the modern hostility towards allegory, even when 
these are expressed entirely or predominantly in aesthetic and intellectual terms, unease with 
the ethical and political aspects of the phenomenon may also be detected. The prospect of a 
                                                          
29 See Matt.13:13-16. Kermode elaborates: “Now it happens that Mark’s first interpreter was Matthew (I 
assume throughout that Mark has priority and is Matthew’s principal source, though this long-established 
position is now under challenge). And Matthew also seems to have found Mark’s hina intolerable. For though he 
does not omit the general theory of parable from his big parable chapter (13), he substitutes for hina the word 
hoti, ‘because.’ This is a substantial change, involving a different grammar; Matthew replaces Mark’s 
subjunctive with an indicative. Later he had to deal with Mark’s mēpote, ‘lest they should turn,’ which obviously 
supports the uncompromising mood of hina; here he went to work in a different way. The whole passage about 
hearing and seeing comes from Isaiah (6: 9-10), though Mark, in paraphrasing it, does not say so. What Matthew 
does is to quote Isaiah directly and with acknowledgment, so that the lines retain a trace of their original tone of 
slightly disgusted irony at the failure of the people to perceive and understand. The sense is now something like: 
As Isaiah remarked, their stupidity is extremely tiresome; this seems the best way to get through to them. The 
mēpote clause is thus bracketed off from the rest; instead of Mark’s uncompromising exclusions – outsiders must 
stay outside and be damned – Matthew proposes something much milder: ‘I speak to them in parables because 
they see without perceiving...’ He was, it appears, unhappy with the gloomy ferocity of Mark’s Jesus, who is 
also, at this place, very hard on the Twelve: ‘if you don’t understand this you won’t understand anything.’ 
Matthew leaves this out, and substitutes a benediction: ‘Blessed are your eyes, for they see...’” (30-1). 
30 Ibid., 3. 
31 Origin, 178. 
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return of allegory is thus fraught with all kinds of questions and tensions, even beyond the 
principal spheres of aesthetics and literary criticism. What is to be made of this? If we are 
indeed witnessing a return of allegory, should we welcome it? What if, even more 
disconcertingly, allegory never really left, but has been with us all along, taking such 
temporary aliases as symbol, irony, or theme? From one perspective it might indeed appear as 
if we have not made it very far at all from the mystery cults. Granted, students of literature are 
no longer required to slaughter animals larger than a pig in order to be admitted to the inner 
cultural sanctum, but Xenophon’s Niceratus could certainly appreciate how steep their fees 
can get. And does not the classic threefold distinction of the audience found throughout the 
allegorical tradition survive quite intact in contemporary culture? – those without or with only 
an elementary literary education take stories literally; those with a secondary literary 
education have learned to scour them for “themes” and “symbols”; finally, those whose 
undertake university degrees in the subject are admitted to an elite interpretive caste, capable 
of unearthing “human interest” and “present significance” even out of the most unlikely and 
uncooperative of texts. 
 But most importantly, has a return of allegory really occurred? The word has certainly 
made a comeback, and retains a currency in contemporary culture that would have been 
unimaginable half a century ago. Now, however, that the initial wave of enthusiasm has 
subsided, it seems quite clear that the “allegory” of Benjamin, de Man, and others who 
followed in their train is not really the return of an old concept but the rechristening of a new 
concept by an old name, and furthermore, as already noted above, that the statements of this 
new concept of “allegory” are premised on the very aesthetics that they implicitly or explicitly 
set out to challenge.32 This emerges over and over again in Benjamin’s Origin: “It is not 
possible”, we read, “to conceive of a starker opposite [than allegory] to the artistic symbol, 
the plastic symbol, the image of organic totality”, yet in spite of this there is still a “synthesis 
reached in allegorical writing as a result of the conflict between theological and artistic 
intentions, a synthesis not so much in the sense of a peace as a treuga dei between the 
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conflicting opinions”.33 This is also why Benjamin so conspicuously avoids a formal 
definition of allegory: we get suggestive analogies and metaphors, and we hear a lot about 
what allegory supposedly does, but not about what it is, since a definition would inevitably 
expose the fact that, in the final analysis, Benjamin’s concept of allegory has little 
independent, positive content. It is, quite simply, a denial of the symbol, and completely 
incomprehensible except as this denial. “Where man is drawn towards the symbol, allegory 
emerges from the depths of being to intercept the intention, and to triumph over it.”34 An 
exact inversion of this claim would perhaps be the most adequate summary of Benjamin’s 
meandering argument in the Origin: he is drawn towards allegory, yet the symbol emerges 
from the depths of his modern aesthetic being to intercept his intention, and triumph over it. 
 The aesthetic fascination Benjamin finds in works of baroque allegory, and his vague 
expressions of an experience of an allegorical “synthesis” in these works, is inconceivable, 
indeed barely comprehensible, without being understood as the inverted form of the organic 
unity of the Romantic symbol. Until Benjamin, allegory is invariably, both by its advocates 
and its opponents, construed in terms of levels, and in terms of a hierarchy of levels: the literal 
is not merely separate from the allegorical, it is also less important than it, and often explicitly 
devalued by it. Neither Benjamin, however, nor any of the more recent critics who have 
championed a return to allegory, want to return to the traditional, schematic understanding of 
the mode, and in this they confirm their deep and irreversible contamination with modern, 
post-Romantic aesthetics. Admittedly, even in the crudest, most schematically allegorical 
work imaginable there is always going to be a degree of cognitive overlap between the 
mimetic and the allegorical, some of the more nuanced cognitive blending involved with what 
we call metaphor and symbol – and of course a wholly satisfactory distinction between 
metaphor, symbol, and allegory is one of the standing desiderata in allegory studies, and one 
far too extensive to be adequately addressed here. Yet to treat, as many critics now do, the 
metaphorical or symbolic blending as the desired effect rather than accidental side-effect of 
allegorical writing, to read allegory as if it were metaphor or symbol, is simply to abolish any 
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meaningful distinction between these terms. Thoroughly consonant with this conclusion is 
Benjamin’s conception of the history of allegory, which is plainly the old Burckhardtian 
framework in new garb. Just as Burckhardt’s, Benjamin’s allegory is thus the product of 
Christianity, and “it is not possible to overestimate the importance for the baroque of the 
knowledge of the Christian origin of the allegorical outlook”.35 More specifically, bad 
allegory is Christian, and is characteristic of the Middle Ages, while good allegory is 
classical: “Mediaeval allegory is Christian and didactic”, whereas “the mystic and natural-
historical aspect [of] the baroque is descended from antiquity: Egyptian antiquity, but 
subsequently Greek antiquity as well”.36 The allegory-symbol opposition is replaced with one 
“between the modern allegory which arose in the sixteenth century and that of the middle 
ages”, yet the fundamental historical framework and the values embedded in it remain 
unchanged.37 
 It further stands to reason that the most radical reinterpretations of “allegory” will 
occur in precisely those cases where it forms part – as it does with Benjamin and de Man, and 
less explicitly, for example, Foucault – of a critique of the post-Romantic notion of the 
symbol, and more broadly, a critique of modernity. This is so because these critics are 
attempting to pull themselves out of their modern condition by their own hair – because, as 
Habermas diagnosed with such admirable precision in his classic response, they 
essentially appropriate the fundamental experience of aesthetic modernity, namely the 
revelation of a decentred subjectivity liberated from all constraints of cognition and 
purposive action, from all the imperatives of labour and use value, and with this they 
break out of the modern world altogether. They establish an implacable opposition to 
modernism precisely through a modernist attitude. They locate the spontaneous forces 
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conflict between the guilt-laden physis, held up as an example by Christianity and a purer natura deorum [...], 
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of imagination and self-experience, of affective life in general, in what is most distant 
and archaic, and in Manichaean fashion oppose instrumental reason with a principle 
accessible solely to evocation, whether this is the will to power or sovereignty, Being 
itself or the Dionysian power for the poetic. In France this tradition leads from 
Georges Bataille through Foucault to Derrida. Over all these figures hovers, of course, 
the spirit of Nietzsche, newly resurrected in the 1970s.38 
Only from such a position can Foucault write that the poet’s is “the allegorical role”, and yet 
define this allegorical role in terms which clearly derive from the mute, transcendent 
resonance of the post-Romantic symbol: “beneath the language of signs and beneath the 
interplay of their precisely delineated distinctions, [the poet] strains to catch that ‘other 
language’, the language, without words or discourse, of resemblance”.39 Similarly to 
Benjamin’s, Foucault’s argument entails not only a conceptual but also a historical reversal. 
The difference is that Benjamin is in this respect a Burckhardtian, drawing the line at the close 
of the Middle Ages, whereas Foucault draws it at the close of the Renaissance, or rather, the 
dawning of the Enlightenment. Thus, in a textbook antimodernist manoeuvre, aesthetic 
modernity is evacuated from the historical period in which it came into being, projected onto 
that which preceded it, and rechristened to bear the name of the very doctrine it was devised 
to combat. 
 We find a similar case even with the most explicitly anti-symbolist of the modern 
revisions of “allegory”, that of Paul de Man. Following Benjamin and Gadamer, de Man 
argues that the notion of the symbol, in its post-Romantic usage, “had in fact been substituted 
for that of ‘allegory’ in an act of ontological bad faith”:  
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory 
designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the 
nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in a void of this 
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temporal difference. In so doing, it prevents the self from an illusory identification 
with the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self.40 
Yet again we find, however, the polemic against the aesthetic of the symbol undercut by the 
fact that “allegory” is redefined in terms which plainly derive from this very aesthetic. For 
example, even as he quotes from the famous passage in Coleridge’s Stateman’s Manual, de 
Man conspicuously fails to cite the portion most obviously relevant to his and any other 
discussion of the idea of “temporality” in figurative language, where Coleridge reaches for the 
notion of temporality precisely in his attempt to define the concept of symbol in opposition to 
allegory. “Allegory”, writes Coleridge, “is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-
language” – a formulation implying a non-narrative (“picture-language”) stasis – whereas 
a Symbol [...] is characterized by a translucence of the Special in the Individual or of 
the General in the Especial or of the Universal in the General. Above all by the 
translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the 
Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as 
a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative.41 
It is thus precisely the temporality of the symbol that differentiates it, “Above all”, from 
allegory; both entail a relationship between the universal and the particular, and both aim at a 
unity, yet it is in the symbol that this takes place “through and in the Temporal”. 
 Why does de Man choose to ignore this, and instead proclaim temporality as the 
defining feature of “allegory”? Predictably, this is where his language, as with Benjamin and 
Foucault above, gets particularly dense: the symbol, we are told, “will never be allowed to 
exist in serenity; since it is a veil thrown over a light one no longer wishes to perceive, it will 
never be able to gain an entirely good poetic conscience”.42 More comprehensibly, perhaps, 
we encounter a resistance to the notion of a unified self: “the asserted superiority of the 
symbol over allegory” is a form of “self-mystification”, “a defensive strategy that tries to hide 
from [a] negative self-knowledge”, knowledge of “the self in its authentically temporal 
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predicament”.43 Be that as it may – those who have waded through the biographical sewers 
have their own angle on this, but it is beside our purpose here – it is clear that the notion of 
“allegory” espoused in “Rhetoric of Temporality” is not in any sense a return to the traditional 
understanding of this notion. Much less so is the more deconstructive inflection of “allegory” 
of de Man’s Allegories of Reading, the book that spawned a flood of similar, “allegories-of-
X” titles, in spite of its highly specific usage of the term, denoting the self-deconstructive 
impulse inherent in literary works, the tendency of the “literary text [to] simultaneously assert 
and den[y] the authority of its own rhetorical mode”, enabling us to read it as “the allegorical 
narrative of its own deconstruction”.44 
 There are thus two ways of looking at the supposed return of allegory, and its bearing 
on the allegory-modernity problem. From one perspective, it seems clear that the return is 
really no return at all, that the various concepts of “allegory” emerging from this impulse are 
radically novel rather than traditional, and moreover, that they are anti- rather than post-
modern, in the Habermasian sense of reproducing, in their deep intellectual structures, certain 
fundamental tenets of the very aesthetic modernity that they notionally seek to challenge. On 
the other hand, the fact is that it is this term, allegory, rather than any other, that has emerged 
as the label under which these developments have unfolded, and this is clearly a phenomenon 
of first-rate significance for allegory studies. It is also a phenomenon that needs to be put in 
perspective by assessing its impact, or lack thereof, beyond the sphere of elite culture, and 
which awaits further detailed attention from scholars of the subject. 
 As does the allegory-modernity problem more broadly. If biblical allegoresis – one of 
Christianity’s many paradoxical inheritances, via intermediaries like Philo of Alexandria, 
from its pagan adversaries – played an essential role in the formation of the civilization of the 
so-called Middle Ages, the revolt against biblical allegoresis was no less crucial to the 
doctrines of the Protestant Reformation, and consequently to events which once again rewrote 
the cultural and political map of Europe. And yet, it has recently been argued that this same 
Protestant literalism also paved the way for the emergence of modern science, which in turn 
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expedited the process of secularization, leading to further and even more fundamental socio-
political transformations.45 Nor is this the final reversal, as contemporary resurgences of 
exegetical literalism tend to turn precisely on this modern world that their past dispensations 
had unwittingly ushered into being, whereas allegory, formerly an impediment to modernity, 
now emerges as one of its major bulwarks. One case in point is the literal reading of biblical 
cosmogony on which some strands of Abrahamic creationism base their denial of modern 
geological, astronomical, and evolutionary science, in contrast to the doctrines of mainstream 
Abrahamic denominations, which tend to view this cosmogony as allegorical, and are 
therefore capable of reconciling it with the findings of scientific inquiry, with far-reaching 
cultural and political ramifications. It is sufficient to contemplate the prospect of, say, the 
Roman Catholic Church, with its estimated 1.2 billion believers, revoking its current official 
doctrine on the hexameral creation – which, according to its catechism, is to be understood 
“symbolically”46 – to understand the magnitude of the implications of such seemingly 
abstruse and inconsequential matters. Competing attitudes towards the complex of phenomena 
denoted by the term allegory have in fact shaped history to a far greater extent than is usually 
acknowledged, and they continue to shape it, especially where interpretations of canonical 
texts still directly underscore cultural debate and political conflict. To take another obvious 
example, the turbulent and ongoing history of Middle-Eastern conflict is not fully 
comprehensible without at least some understanding of the bitterly contested hermeneutical 
apparatus that has accumulated around such key scriptural concepts as “jihad” or “the 
promised land”. In such contexts, the decision whether we are to read literally or allegorically 
remains a matter of utmost intellectual and political urgency, and indeed of life and death. The 
continuing relevance of these concepts and their transformations, and hence the continuing 
need for studying them, cannot be overemphasized. 
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IV 
 
In the Afterword to the 2012 reprint of his seminal study, Angus Fletcher recalls being asked 
by an early mentor, “Why are you writing about the kind of symbolism that you clearly do not 
like?”47 First of all, such a question simply cannot occur in most of the natural and social 
sciences, and even in many departments in the humanities. Surely entomologists dislike being 
bitten by mosquitoes no less than the rest of us. On the other hand, there perhaps exist, 
although one hopes they do not, such historians of the plague who like the plague, or, say, 
sociologists of violence against sexual minorities who like violence against sexual minorities. 
In fact, much of the most pressing research by our colleagues in various areas of the natural, 
social, and human sciences is on things we all deeply dislike: things like disease, climate 
change, or the very rich, which we desperately want to know more about because they 
threaten our health and well-being, or even the very survival of our race. This notion, then, of 
studying a subject one likes is not just some quaint mannerism that one has to suffer through 
in professional small talk (“So what do you work on?” – “Allegory” – “Allegory? How 
interesting! I have to say, though, I never really liked Spenser...”). Nor is it restricted to 
outbursts of an essentially political hostility, as when Harold Bloom – speaking, of course, not 
only for himself but for many of his less vocal peers – sought to brand literary scholars who 
openly expressed ideological disagreement with the texts they worked on, and indeed took to 
working on these texts precisely in order to express this disagreement, as a “school of 
resentment” (the problem being not in the fact that they treated their texts as little more than 
pretexts for political debate, but that they took a critical rather than affirmative position in this 
debate).48 
 The question of why one studies a subject one does not like – the possibility of this 
question, which seems to remain as strong in contemporary literary studies as when the 
question was posed to Fletcher over half a century ago – is a more serious affair. It is, 
moreover, especially serious when posed with respect to allegory, for allegory is itself one of 
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the primary means by which canonical texts have been made “likeable” to elite Western 
audiences since Theagenes of Rhegium. Lurking beneath the question of why one studies 
allegory if one does not like it is thus the more fundamental question of whether we can 
imagine a different kind of academic literary studies than this floundering assemblage of 
Arnoldian atavisms that we somehow seem to be unable to overcome. Once upon a time, such 
a thing was imaginable, and the most radical experiments in poetry went hand in hand with 
the most radical attempts to date at a genuine science of imaginative literature. Even as he 
befriended and admired the Russian avant-garde poets, with whom, along with their peers 
throughout the West, poetic experiment reaches its utmost frontiers, Shklovsky founded a 
Society for the Study of Poetic Language, designed to place literary studies on a firm 
scientific footing. Around the same time, Roman Jakobson founded a kindred society in 
Moscow, the Moscow Linguistic Circle, before emigrating to Czechoslovakia, and eventually 
the United States. “Until recently”, he wrote, soon after arriving to Prague in 1920,  
the history of art, particularly that of literature, has had more in common with causerie 
than with scholarship. It obeyed all the laws of causerie, skipping blithely from topic 
to topic, from lyrical effusions on the elegance of forms to anecdotes from the artist’s 
life, from psychological truisms to questions concerning philosophical significance 
and social environment. It is a gratifying and easy task to chat about life and times 
using literary work as a basis, just as it is more gratifying and easier to copy from a 
plaster cast than to draw a living body.49 
“Until recently” – how disheartening to read this from the present perspective, when it is 
abundantly clear that Jakobson’s youthful optimism has proven gravely unfounded, and when 
every single item on his list is far more likely to be taken for a virtue rather than a vice. 
Roughly contemporary with this, and equally melancholy, is the unbridled confidence of the 
American Shakespearean E. E. Stoll: 
Ours is the day of the historical method [...]. Other poets, as Homer and Dante, have 
yielded to it; the Bible, even the Koran is yielding to it now: fetichism [sic] is all that 
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stands in the way. That Shakespeare – fétiche monstrueux, as M. Sarcey calls him – is 
still bedecked with the rags and tinsel of the cult is due largely to the fact that scholars 
have kept to the life of the playwright and the language and external history of the 
plays, and have left criticism, the conclusion of the whole matter, to poets, essayists, 
gentlemen of taste and leisure, not to mention a horde of the tasteless and leisureless – 
propagandists and blatherskites.50 
This is where we stood c. 1915. Where we stand today, in 2015, with the hydra of 
“presentism” upon us, and with our returns to allegory, Burckhardt, humanism, character 
criticism, seems all too obvious. 
 To return to the question posed to Fletcher – “Why are you writing about the kind of 
symbolism that you clearly do not like?” – it should be easy to see how perfectly it epitomises 
the tradition at which “historicists” like Stoll and “formalists” like Jakobson charged so 
quixotically, and in which the allegorical conception of literature plays an essential part. It is 
only to be expected that this tradition will knit its hoary eyebrows over this rarest of wonders 
under the academic sun: a literary scholar who, if you can believe it, dislikes his object of 
study. “At the time”, Fletcher continues, “I had no ready answer, but eventually it became 
clear to me that beyond a vague personal interest my neutral stance regarding aesthetic value 
was akin to the scientist’s neutrality, a value-free interest in the forms and especially the 
rhythms of a certain natural order, whatever that turned out to be.”51 That is, of course, the 
obvious and indeed the only legitimate answer to be had – provided it is understood that there 
is, historically speaking, nothing neutral or value-free about such notions as “the scientist’s 
neutrality” or “value-free interest”. On the contrary, the impulse to study allegory, indeed the 
very ability to recognize it as a distinct object of historical and theoretical knowledge, is the 
product of the same historically specific developments to which we owe the emergence of 
modern anti-allegorical aesthetics. 
 Thus the question is to be turned on its head. It is only because of our dislike for 
allegory that we are able to study this subject in the first place. Only once an alternative 
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aesthetics becomes possible does allegory emerge into view as something to be studied rather 
than practiced, rather than something that simply is. This is why we have two millennia of 
extensive and extraordinarily variegated practice of allegory in the West, yet not a single 
study of the subject from this entire vast period. Much of this history remains uncharted, and 
many problems await further discussion. The loudly trumpeted return of allegory is one of the 
challenges here, but a far greater one is its silent, capillary survival at all stages and levels of 
literary culture, from the first book report to the doctoral dissertation, and from the peer-
reviewed article in a distinguished journal to the tangled underwood of CliffsNotes and 
GradeSaver. At every step, the fundamental prerequisite to recognizing that there is a subject 
to begin with, and to identifying and appraising its various manifestations, is the possibility of 
an alternative conception of poetry, poetic theory, and the modalities of their 
institutionalization, whether in the academia or elsewhere. Allegory remains a controversial 
subject in contemporary literary studies because the very idea of studying this subject is not, 
in the final analysis, entirely compatible with some of the fundamental elements in the current 
configuration of the discipline. Yet from Aristotle onwards, knowledge about imaginative 
literature – genuine, lastingly relevant knowledge in the spheres of poetics and literary 
history, informed by, but transcending, successive tides of literary and critical fashion – has 
come into being largely in those instances where, and in so far as, imaginative literature 
ceased to be understood as itself a form of knowledge. 
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